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2026:HHC:25688
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.611 of 2025
Date of Decision: 30.06.2026
__________________________________________________________________________
Hari Chand
……...Petitioner
Versus
Jogindra Central Co-operative Bank Ltd.
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
_____________________________________________________________________________
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Rajinder Thakur and Ms. Kiran Verma,
Advocates.
For the Respondent:
Mr. Arvind Sharma and Ms. Kiran Sharma,
Advocates.
__________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays challenge to judgment
dated 25.07.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II,
Solan, Camp at Arki, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal
No.9-AK/10 of 2024, titled as Hari Chand Vs. JCC Bank, affirming judgment
of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.02.2024/28.02.2024, passed by
the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Arki, Solan, Himachal Pradesh,
in Cr. Complaint No.83/3 of 2020, whereby the learned trial Court while
holding the petitioner-accused (hereinafter, ‘accused’) guilty of having
committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (in short the ‘Act’), convicted and sentenced him to
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undergo simple imprisonment for a period of nine months and pay
compensation to the tune of ₹4,30,000/- to the respondent-complainant.
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that respondent-complainant (hereinafter, ‘complainant’) instituted a
complaint under Section 138 of the Act, in the competent Court of law,
alleging therein that accused approached it for availing a DEDS loan facility
of ₹4,50,000/-, which was sanctioned on 13.09.2017. Though aforesaid
amount was to be returned in monthly installments with interest, as per the
terms and conditions of the agreement entered inter se parties, however, fact
remains that on account of default in repayment, loan account of the
petitioner fell into NPA category on 15.05.2019. Accused, with a view to
discharge his lawful liability, issued Cheque No.076245, dated 16.11.2019,
for sum of ₹3,83,000/- of his bank account maintained in Jogindra Central
Co-operative Bank, Branch at Bhararighat. However, fact remains that
aforesaid Cheque on its presentation to the Bank concerned was
dishonoured vide memo dated 16.11.2019 and 01.01.2020 with remarks
‘insufficient funds’. Immediately, after receipt of aforesaid return memo,
complainant served accused with legal notice dated 14.01.2020, calling upon
him to make the payment good well within stipulated time. However, since
petitioner-accused failed to make the payment good within the time
stipulated in the legal notice, respondent/complainant was compelled to
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initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the Court of learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Arki, Solan, Himachal Pradesh.
3.
by
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
the
respective
parties,
vide
judgment/order
dated
02.02.2024/28.02.2024, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having
committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted
and sentenced him, as per the description given hereinabove.
4.
Though, at first instance, accused preferred an appeal in the
Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Solan, Camp at Arki, District
Solan, Himachal Pradesh,
however, same was dismissed vide judgment
dated 25.07.2025. In the aforesaid background, petitioner-accused has
approached this Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein his
acquittal after setting aside the judgments of conviction recorded by the
Courts below.
5.
Vide order dated 29.10.2025, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
stayed the substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below, subject
to petitioner/accused depositing 30% of the Cheque amount and furnishing
personal bond in the sum of ₹50,000/-. Though aforesaid order never came
to be complied with, but this Court was informed that after filing of the
petition, sum of ₹1,30,000/- was deposited with the respondent-Bank, which
fact is not denied by the learned counsel representing the respondent-Bank.
This Court also came to be apprised that sum of ₹2,16,000/- is lying
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deposited with the learned trial Court, meaning thereby that as of today, sum
of ₹3,46,000/- has been deposited. This Court, having taken note of
statement made by learned counsel representing the petitioner
that
remaining sum of ₹84,000/- shall be deposited on or before today’s date,
adjourned the matter for today’s date, but since needful has not been done,
as per undertaking given to this Court, this Court has no option but to decide
the petition on its own merits.
6.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material adduced on record, vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgments, this Court sees no reason to agree with learned counsel
representing the petitioner, that Courts below have fallen in grave error while
appreciating the evidence, rather this Court finds that both the Courts below
have meticulously dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and there
is no scope left for interference.
7.
Though in the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C.,
accused denied the case of the complainant, but despite opportunity, he
failed to lead any evidence. However, pattern of cross-examination conducted
upon complainant clearly reveals that there is no specific denial with regard
to issuance of Cheque as well as signatures thereupon. If it is so, no illegality
otherwise can be said to have been committed by the learned Courts below
while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which speak about
presumption in favour of the holder of the Cheque that Cheque was issued
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towards discharge of a lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is
rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption, accused either can refer to the
documents and evidence led on record by the complainant or presumption
can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any.
8.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is
able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise
probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the
complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the Cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor is able to contest existence of
a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:“23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the
matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section
139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been
included in furtherance of the legislative objective of
improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While
Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to
prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court
however, further observed that it must be remembered
that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be
better described as a regulatory offence since the
bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil
wrong whose money is usually confined to the private
parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a
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scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the
construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses
and the defendant accused cannot be expected to
discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court
further observed that it is a settled position that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139,
the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of
probabilities.
24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a
probable defence which creates doubt about the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution
can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted
by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and
it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however,
the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises
a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory
presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding
commission of the offence comes into play if the same is
not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the
complainant.
25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in
order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the
NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is
called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to
arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque
and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such
a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay
the amount, that the said default would be considered a
dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But
even in such cases, the question whether or not there was
lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof
the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial
court will have to examine having regard to the evidence
adduced before it keeping in view the statutory
presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is
presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration.
In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while
issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where
there has been instruction to stop payment despite
sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a
sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be
extremely heavy.”
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9.
Complainant with a view to prove its case, examined Manager of
the complainant-Bank, who while deposing as CW-1, tendered evidence by
way of affidavit Ex.CW1/A, reiterating therein contents of the complaint.
Besides above, he also placed on record copy of Cheque dated 16.11.2019,
Ex.CW1/B, dishonour memos Ex.CW1/C and Ex.CW1/D, legal notice
Ex.CW1/E and postal receipt Ex.CW1/F. Cross-examination conducted
upon afore witness nowhere suggests that accused was able to extract
anything contrary, to what this witness stated in examination-in-chief. In his
cross-examination, afore witness explained that loan had been disbursed in
two installments of ₹2,25,000/- each. While admitting that amount being
shown in the account statement, Ex.CW1/W, is different than the amount
being claimed through Cheque, he explained that it keeps on changing as
some amount is deposited. No suggestion worth the name ever came to be
put to the witness with regard to existence of lawful liability as well as Cheque
issued towards discharge of such liability.
10.
To the contrary, complainant successfully proved on record that
accused had availed loan to the tune of ₹4,50,000/- and the Cheques issued
by accused towards discharge of lawful liability were dishonoured on account
of insufficient funds in the bank account maintained by him. It also
successfully proved on record that before initiating proceedings under
Section 138 of the Act, complainant-Bank had served accused with legal
notice, calling upon him to make the payment good within stipulated time,
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but accused neither replied to the notice nor made the payment. As has been
observed hereinabove, though accused in his statement recorded under
Section 138 of the Act denied the case of the complainant in toto, but despite
sufficient opportunities, he failed to lead any evidence and as such, no
illegality can be said to have been committed by both the Courts below while
holding accused guilty of his having committed offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Act.
11.
If the evidence led on record by the respective parties is read in
conjunction, this Court sees no reason to differ with the findings returned by
the Courts below that complainant successfully proved on record that
accused had issued Cheque towards discharge of his lawful liability. Since
factum of issuance of Cheque by the accused as well as his signatures
thereupon was never disputed, presumption as available under Section 118
and 139 of the Act rightly came to be invoked in the case of the petitioner
that Cheque in question was issued in discharge of lawful liability. Since no
evidence worth credence ever came to be led on record to rebut the
presumption, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the Courts
below while holding petitioner/accused guilty for the commission of offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Act.
12.
Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the
respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients of Section
138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Since Cheque issued by accused
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towards discharge of his lawful liability was returned on account of
insufficient funds in the bank account of accused and he despite having
received legal notice failed to make the payment good within the stipulated
time, complainant had no option but to institute proceedings under Section
138 of the Act, which subsequently rightly came to be decided by both the
Courts below on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record
by the respective parties.
13.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C to re-appreciate the evidence, especially in view of
the concurrent findings of fact and law relied upon by the Courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction
is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional
power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court
nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High
Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in
appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of
the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross
miscarriage of justice.”
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14.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present
case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any,
committed by the Courts below, while passing impugned judgments, there is
no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
15.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another
Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has
held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of
judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is
salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the process or
miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by
inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order,
but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any
material irregularity committed by the Courts below while appreciating the
evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the wellreasoned judgments passed by the Courts below.
16.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove as
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgments recorded by the Courts
below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of
evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
17.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
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before the learned trial Court within a period of thirty days to serve the
sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Bail
bonds of the petitioner, if any, are cancelled. Interim order dated 29.10.2025
stands vacated. Amount, if any, deposited by the petitioner-accused with the
learned trial Court as well as Registry of this Court is ordered to be released
in favour of complainant by remitting the same in its bank account, detail
whereof, shall be furnished by its counsel within a period of one week.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
t
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
June 30, 2026
(Rajeev Raturi)
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