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[2026:RJ-JP:39247-DB]
REPORTABLE
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
Judgment reserved on: 23/09/2026
Judgment delivered on: 03/10/2026
Judgment (Full) uploaded on: 03/10/2026
(1) D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 212/2017
CNR: RJHC020832612017 | URN: SAW / 356U / 2017
H. K. Meena Son Of Late Ram Pratap Meena, aged about 59
years, R/o 154, Nandpuri, Malviya Nagar, Jaipur Rajasthan
----Appellant
Versus
1.
State
Of
Rajasthan
Through
Its
Principal
Secretary
(Finance), Government Secretariat, C-Scheme, Jaipur
2.
The
Commissioner,
Commercial
Taxes,
Karbhawan-
Prithviraj Road, Jaipur - Rajasthan
----Respondents
Connected With
(2)D.B. Civil Special Appeal Writ No. 279/2017
CNR: RJHC020832772017 | URN: SAW / 496U / 2017
1.
The State Of Rajasthan Represented Through Principal
Secretary
(Finance),
Government
Of
Rajasthan,
Government Secretariat, Jaipur
2.
The
Commissioner,
Commercial
Taxes,
Kar
Bhawan,
Prathviraj Road, Jaipur.
----Appellants
Versus
H. K. Meena Son Of Late Ram Pratap Meena, aged about 60
years, R/o 154, Nandpuri, Malviya Nagar, Jaipur Rajasthan
----Respondent
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Ajatshatru Mina with
Mr. Himanshu Kala,
Mr. Movil Jeenwal, Mr. Nrip Raj Singh,
Mr. Rajat Choudhary &
(2 of 13)
[2026:RJ-JP:39247-DB]
[SAW-212/2017]
Mr. Rhytham Shrimal in DBSAW
No.212/2017
Mr. Vigyan Shah, AAG assisted by
Ms. Monisha Agarwal &
Mr. Pulkit Bhardwaj in DBSAW
No.279/2017
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Vigyan Shah, AAG assisted by
Ms. Monisha Agarwal &
Mr. Pulkit Bhardwaj in DBSAW
No.212/2017
Mr. Ajatshatru Mina with
Mr. Himanshu Kala,
Mr Movil Jeenwal, Mr. Nrip Raj Singh,
Mr. Rajat Choudhary &
Mr. Rhytham Shrimal in DBSAW
No.279/2017
DIVISION BENCH
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJAY K. AGRAWAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH
C.A.V. JUDGMENT
Sanjay K. Agrawal, CJ:
1.
Since, the above said two appeals arise out of a common
order dated 25.01.2017 and involve common & interconnected
questions concerning the validity of voluntary retirement and
directions for reinstatement and consequential benefits, they have
been clubbed together, heard together and are being disposed of
by this common order, as the writ petitioner and the State of
Rajasthan,
both
have
questioned
the
legality,
validity
and
correctness of the impugned order dated 25.01.2017.
2.
The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following
factual background:
(i)
The original writ petitioner H.K. Meena was initially
appointed on the post of Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer in the
Commercial Taxes Department, Government of Rajasthan. In the
(3 of 13)
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natural
course
of
service,
the
[SAW-212/2017]
writ
petitioner
would
have
superannuated on 31.07.2017, however on 17.10.2013, he
applied for voluntary retirement pursuant to Rule 50(1) of the
Rajasthan Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1996 (hereinafter called
as ‘the Rules of 1996’) on account of ill health, to be effective from
14.01.2014.
(ii)
The respondent forwarded the application of the writ
petitioner to the concerned department. The writ petitioner was
informed that no departmental enquiry is pending against him,
however his application seeking voluntary retirement was rejected
by the State Government on 13.01.2014 on the ground that it did
not complete the mandatory 90 days notice period.
(iii) Thereafter, on 09.04.2014 the writ petitioner again
submitted an application seeking voluntary retirement, to be
effective
from
31.07.2014,
to
which
the
respondent-State
Government informed the writ petitioner on 28.04.2014 that a
minor penalty in an enquiry under Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Civil
Services
(Classification,
Control
&
Appeal)
Rules,
(hereinafter called as ‘the Rules of 1958’) is pending against him.
(iv) On
23.07.2014,
the
writ
petitioner
submitted
an
application seeking extension of the date of his intended voluntary
retirement from 31.07.2014 to 31.10.2014. The said application
came to be accepted by the respondents extending the services of
the writ petitioner upto 31.10.2014.
(v)
On 29.10.2014, the writ petitioner again moved an
application with a request to extend the date of voluntary
retirement by six months on account of constant improvement in
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his health, however no action was taken by the respondents on
the said application and ultimately on 30.10.2014, the State
Government passed an order rejecting the application of the writ
petitioner dated 29.10.2014 seeking extension of the date of
voluntary retirement and retired the writ petitioner voluntarily
with effect from the afternoon of 31.10.2014.
(vi) On
application
31.10.2014,
seeking
the
writ
petitioner
filed
another
withdrawal
of
the
of
voluntary
order
retirement, however the State Government did not decide the said
application
leading
to
filing
of
S.B.
Civil
Writ
Petition
No.12546/2014 before this Court questioning the order dated
30.10.2014.
(vii) The
learned
Single
Judge
vide
its
order
dated
25.01.2017, quashed the impugned order dated 30.10.2014
voluntarily retiring the writ petitioner and directed for his
reinstatement within four weeks, however the salary, annual grade
increments and seniority benefits for the period from 30.10.2014
to 25.01.2017 were confined solely for the purpose of pension,
denying
notional
benefits,
continuity
in
service
and
other
consequential monetary benefits to the writ petitioner.
(viii) Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 25.01.2017
passed by the learned Single Judge, the writ petitioner and the
State Government both have filed separate appeals before this
Court.
3.
Mr. Ajatshatru Mina, learned counsel appearing for the writ
petitioner (now the appellant) would submit as under:
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(i)
[SAW-212/2017]
That the rules of 1996 permits extension of an
application for voluntary retirement after its submission. The
earlier
acceptance
dated
23.07.2014
created
a
legitimate
expectation in favour of the writ petitioner that his subsequent
request for extension would also be considered in accordance with
the same Rules and on the same principles and the respondents
could not have taken a contrary stand in respect of the
subsequent application without assigning any valid reason or
distinguishing the circumstance of the two applications.
(ii)
He further submitted that principle of consistency
required the respondents to consider the subsequent application
dated 29.10.2014 in light of their own earlier decision, by which
the request of the writ petitioner for extension had already been
accepted.
(iii) He would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court
in the matter of Union of India etc. Vs. Gopal Chandra Misra
and others, etc.1, to submit that after reinstatement the writ
petitioner is liable to be continued in service with all consequential
benefits including salary, annual grade increments and seniority.
(iv) A prayer has, therefore, been made to direct the
respondent-State to treat the period in question as continuous
service for all purposes including salary, annual grade increments,
seniority, promotion and all consequential service and monetary
benefits by treating the order dated 30.10.2014 as non-existent
for such purposes.
AIR 1978 SC 694
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4.
(6 of 13)
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On the other hand, Mr. Vigyan Shah, learned Additional
Advocate General appearing for the State, while opposing the
prayer made by the writ petitioner, would submit as under:
(i)
That in the writ petition, the only prayer has been made
for setting aside the order dated 30.10.2014 and the relief, not
claimed in the writ petition, cannot be granted in the appeal.
(ii)
He would rely upon the decisions of the Supreme Court
in the matters of Bharat Amaratlal Kothari & Anr. Vs.
Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi & Ors. 2, and Union Public
Service Commission and Anr. Vs. Naseer-Ud-Din Wani and
Ors.3, to contend that the relief, not sought in the writ petition,
cannot be granted in the appeal.
5.
We
have
heard
learned
counsel
for
the
parties
and
considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also
went through the record with utmost circumspection.
6.
It is not in dispute that the writ petitioner had earlier
submitted an application for voluntary retirement and the date of
voluntary retirement was fixed as 31.07.2014. However before the
said date, the writ petitioner submitted an application on
23.07.2014 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) seeking extension of
the date of voluntary retirement from 31.07.2014 to 31.10.2014.
The said application was duly considered and accepted by the
respondent-State and the writ petitioner was permitted to
continue in service till 31.10.2014.
(2010) 1 SCC 234
(2011) 14 SC 142
(7 of 13)
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7.
When
the
writ
petitioner
[SAW-212/2017]
subsequently
submitted
the
application dated 29.10.2014 seeking further extension of the
date of voluntary retirement, this time the State Government
rejected his application for extension of date of voluntary
retirement and retired the writ petitioner with effect from the
afternoon of 31.10.2014. The writ petitioner challenged the
rejection of his application by way of filing a writ petition and the
learned Single Judge vide its order dated 25.01.2017, set aside
the order dated 30.10.2014, which is sought to be challenged by
both the parties by way of present appeals.
8.
At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce Rule 50
under Chapter V of the Rules of 1996, which provides for
retirement on completion of 15 years qualifying service as under:
"50. Retirement on
qualifying Service
completion
of
years’
(1) At any time after a Government servant has
completed fifteen years qualifying service, he may, by
giving notice of not less than three months in writing to
the appointing authority, retire from service.”
(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub
rule (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing
authority:
Provided that where the appointing authority does not
refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the
expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the
retirement shall automatically become effective from
the date of expiry of the said period.
(3) (a) A Government servant referred to in sub rule
(1) may make a request in writing to the appointing
authority to accept notice of voluntary retirement of
less than three months giving reasons thereof;
(b) On receipt of a request under clause (a), the
appointing authority subject to the provisions of sub
rule (2), may consider such request for the curtailment
of the period of notice of three months on merits and if
it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of notice
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(8 of 13)
[SAW-212/2017]
will not cause any administrative inconvenience, the
appointing authority may relax the requirement of
notice of three months.
(4) A Government servant, who has elected to retire
under this rule and has given the necessary notice to
that effect to the appointing authority, shall be
precluded from withdrawing his notice except with the
specific approval of such authority:
Provided that the request for withdrawal shall be made
before the intended date of his retirement.”
9.
A careful perusal of the aforesaid Rules would show that a
government servant who has completed 15 years of qualifying
service, he may, by giving notice of not less than three months in
writing to the appointing authority, retire from service. The notice
of voluntary retirement given under sub-Rule (1) of Rule 15 shall
require acceptance by the appointing authority and sub-Rule (3)
(a) requires that a government servant referred to in sub Rule (1)
may make a request in writing to the appointing authority to
accept notice of voluntary retirement of less than three months
giving reasons thereof. Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 50 provides that a
government servant who has elected to retire under this Rule and
has given the necessary notice to that effect to the appointing
authority, shall be precluded from withdrawing his notice except
with the specific approval of such authority. The proviso to subRule (4) states that the request for withdrawal shall be made
before the intended date of his retirement.
10.
As such, voluntary retirement is an option given to a
government servant to retire from service on fulfilment of the
specified terms and conditions and accordingly, the voluntary
retirement is a condition of service which gives an option in
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(9 of 13)
[SAW-212/2017]
absolute terms to a public servant to voluntarily retire after giving
the requisite notice and after he has reached the qualifying age or
rendered the qualifying service, as the case may be. (See Dinesh
Chandra Sangma Vs. State of Assam & Ors.4)
11.
Since the Rule requires acceptance of voluntary retirement
by the competent authority, therefore, the government servant is
entitled to withdraw it before the date it is actually accepted by
the competent authority.
12.
In the matter of Tek Chand Vs. Dile Ram5, followed in the
matter of Ashok Kumar Sahu Vs. Union of India & Ors 6, a
three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court catalogued three
categories rules relating to voluntary retirement namely;
“(a) Where voluntary retirement automatically comes
into force on expiry of notice period;
(b) Where retirement comes into force unless an order
is
passed during the notice period withholding
permission to retire;
(c) Voluntary retirement does not come into force
unless
permission to this effect is granted by the
competent
authority.”
13.
The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter
of Gopal Chandra Misra, (supra) clearly held that if a person by
writing chooses to resign from a future date, the act of resigning
office is not complete because it does not terminate his tenure
before such date and the person can at any time before the arrival
of that prospective date on which it is intended to be effective,
(1977) 4 SCC 441
(2001) 3 SCC 290
(2006) 6 SCC 704
(10 of 13)
[2026:RJ-JP:39247-DB]
withdraw
it
because
the
[SAW-212/2017]
Constitution
does
not
bar
such
withdrawal. It has been held in paragraph 51 as under:
“51. It will bear repetition that the general principle is
that in the absence of a legal, contractual or
constitutional bar, a 'prospective' resignation can be
withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective, and
it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the
employment or the office- tenure of the resignor. This
general rule is equally appli- cable to Government
servants and constitutional functionaries. In the case of
a Government servant/or functionary who cannot,under the conditions of his service/or office, by his own
unilateral act of tendering resignation, give up his
service/or office, normally, the tender of resignation
becomes effective and his service/or office-tenure
terminated, when it is accepted by the competent
authority. In the case of a Judge of a High Court, who is
a constitutional functionary and under Proviso (a) to
Article 217(1) has a unilateral right, or privilege to
resign his office, his resignation becomes effective and
tenure terminated on the date from which he, of his
own volition, chooses to quit office. If in terms of the
writing under his hand addressed to the President, he
resigns in praesanti, the resignation terminates his
office- tenure forthwith, and cannot therefore, be
withdrawn or revoked thereafter. But, if he by such
Writing chooses to resign from a future date, the act
resigning office is not complete because it does not
terminate his tenure before such date and the Judge.
can at any time before the arrival of that prospective
date on which it was intended to be effective, withdraw
it, because the Constitution does not bar such
withdrawal.”
14.
As such, in the absence of any legal, contractual or
constitutional bar, where an employee intends his resignation to
take effect from a future date, such resignation does not
terminate his service before the said prospective date and can be
withdrawn before the date on which it is intended to become
effective.
15. In the instant case, the writ petitioner submitted the
application
for
withdrawal
of
the
voluntary
retirement
on
29.10.2014 before the date fixed for his voluntary retirement, i.e.,
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[SAW-212/2017]
31.10.2014. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly held
that the State Government could not have passed the order
retiring the writ petitioner w.e.f. 31.10.2014.
16.
It is appropriate to mention here that the Rules of 1996
admittedly does not provide for a procedure for extension, but
merely because there is no provision permitting specific extension,
it doesn’t mean that such a request is prohibited, particularly
when the voluntary retirement has not taken effect and the writ
petitioner
had
submitted
subsequent
request
before
the
prospective date of his retirement. Furthermore, merely because
the writ petitioner has not used the specific term “withdrawal”, the
communication made by him seeking extension of his date of
voluntary retirement could not have been ignored when he clearly
conveyed that he does not want his earlier retirement to take
effect on the previously fixed date.
17.
In the instant case, the writ petitioner has clearly sought
extension of the date of voluntary retirement before the extended
date itself and thus, the intention of the writ petitioner to continue
in service was clearly communicated to the respondents before the
voluntary retirement could take effect.
18.
As such, the learned Single Judge has rightly set aside the
order dated 30.10.2014, retiring the petitioner without considering
his application dated 29.10.2014, proposing to withdraw his
prospective date of voluntary retirement w.e.f. 31.10.2014.
(12 of 13)
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19.
[SAW-212/2017]
Now the writ petitioner has claimed that the intervening
period is liable to be treated as continuous service for all
consequential service benefits and the State Government has
questioned that reinstatement could not have been granted, if
such relief has not been prayed for.
20.
Admittedly and undisputedly, the writ petitioner has only
claimed that the order dated 30.10.2014 be set aside and the
respondent-State be directed to allow the application submitted by
the
writ
petitioner
and
he
did
not
claim
any
relief
of
reinstatement.
21.
In this regard, the decision rendered by the Supreme Court
in the matter of Bharat Amaratlal Kothari
(supra) may be
noticed herein, in which the Supreme Court has held that relief not
prayed for, cannot be granted, observing in para 29 as under:
“29. The approach of the High Court in granting relief
not prayed for cannot be approved by this Court. Every
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution must
contain a relief clause. Whenever the petitioner is
entitled to or is claiming more than one relief, he must
pray for all the reliefs. Under the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908, if the plaintiff omits, except
with the leave of the court, to sue for any particular
relief which he is entitled to get, he will not afterwards
be allowed to sue in respect of the portion so omitted
or relinquished.”
22.
Similarly in the matter of Naseer-Ud-Din Wani (supra), the
Supreme Court has held that the Constitutional Court should not
go beyond the prayer and grant relief, which has not been prayed
for and as such, the order of reinstatement could not have been
passed by the learned Single Judge, which has specifically not
been prayed for by the writ petitioner. It is set aside to that extent
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(13 of 13)
[SAW-212/2017]
however, the writ petitioner would be entitled for the benefits
except reinstatement flowing from setting aside the order dated
30.10.2014.
23.
Consequently, the impugned order dated 25.01.2017, passed
by learned Single Judge is modified to the extent, as indicated
hereinabove, leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).
24.
With the above observations, both the appeals stand
disposed of. Pending application, if any, also stand disposed of.
25.
A copy of this judgment be placed in the connected file.
(INDERJEET SINGH),J
KAMLESH KUMAR/RESERVED
(SANJAY K. AGRAWAL),CJ
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