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Civil

Guruguntla Lakshmidevi.b vs Bandaru Jagannath Babu

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Court
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Date
16 June 2026
Case No.
CRP 3826/2025
Result
Dismissed
Bench
B S Bhanumathi
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27. The learned counsel for the D.Hr. submitted that when no reasonable cause is shown, the delay cannot be condoned even by imposing heavy costs and referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Lingeswaran & others Vs. Thirunagalingam9, wherein at paragraphs Nos. 4, 5 and 5.1, it was held as follows: — “4. Having gone through the order passed by the learned trial Court, even the learned trial Court also specifically observed that, in the absence of material evidence, it cannot be said that the delay has been explained. The trial Court has also observed that the Court feels that there are no merits in the application. Still the trial Court condoned the delay by observing that an opportunity of fair trial should be given to both the parties to put-forth their case on merits. The trial Court also observed that, on allowing the application for condonation of delay, no prejudice will be caused to the Plaintiff and, therefore, the delay can be condoned by compensating the Plaintiff by way of heavy costs. The said order has been set aside by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order.

5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane Vs. Land Acquisition Officer reported in [(2013) 10 SCC 765] is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular/party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.

Filed under

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963 Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 47, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Order IX Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Execution of decrees (Order XXI Rule 97, Section 47 CPC)

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Date of reserved for orders : 21.04.2026 Date of pronouncement : 17.06.2026 Date of uploading : 04.07.2026 APHC010628642025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI [3311] (Special Original Jurisdiction) Wednesday, the 17th day of June, two thousand and twenty six Present The Honourable Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi Civil Revision Petition Nos.3451 & 3826 of 2025 Between: Guruguntla Lakshmidevi.B, W/o. late B.Venkates B.Venkateswarlu, D. No. 27/763-1, 1, Plot No.183 No.183-A, Ambedkar Nagar, Ananthapuramu mu city (A.P.) ….Revision Petitioner / J.Dr. and Bandaru Jagannath Babu, S/o. B. Venkatesulu, D.No.27-763, 763, Plot No.183, Ambedkar Nagar, Ananthapuramu City (A.P.) ….Respondent / D.Hr. Counsel for the petitioner: 1. J. Narayana Swamy Counsel for the respondent: 1. P. Sravan Kumar Reddy The Court made the following: BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 COMMON ORDER: The respondent herein filed H.R.C.No.2 of 2018 before the Rent Controller -cum- Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division), Ananthapuramu against the petitioner under Section 10 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 seeking eviction of the revision petitioner from the petition schedule house alleging that the respondent herein is the absolute owner of it after the death of its original owner by name B. Venkateswarlu on 10.11.2014, who constructed the building on the land assigned under a patta and that on 01.02.2015, the respondent herein orally let out the property to the revision petitioner on monthly rent of Rs.2,000/- payable on or before 5th day of every English calendar month, but she failed to pay the rent since 01.02.2016. As the revision petitioner remained ex parte in H.R.C. No.2 of 2018 for not filing counter despite engaging a counsel, a decree was passed on 07.12.2018 against her. The D.Hr. filed E.P.No.363 of 2019 seeking execution of the decree. The revision petitioner / J.Dr., having engaged a counsel, failed to file counter. The execution Court set the JDr. ex parte on 16.02.2021. 2. The D.Hr. filed E.A.No.168 of 2022 seeking delivery of possession of the property. Though the D.Hr. had not filed a petition seeking police aid, the execution Court ordered police aid for the purpose of delivery of the property to D.Hr. and issued a warrant through police of I Town Police Station, Ananthapur for delivery of the property. When the D.Hr. and the police came to the property for execution of the warrant, the J.Dr. raised an objection on the ground that she had an order of injunction, dated 14.11.2019, against the D.Hr. granted in I.A.No.686 of 2019 in OS.No.1316 of 2019 on the file of the BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 Court of III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Ananthapuramu and that the suit was pending for cross examination of the plaintiff. 3. At that juncture, the J.Dr. filed a petition vide E.A.No.72 of 2024 in E.P.No.363 of 2019 under Section 47 C.P.C., on 07.03.2024, to declare the ex parte decree dated 07.11.2018 in H.R.C.No. 2 of 2018 as null and void and not binding on the J.Dr. and not executable against the J.Dr. The case pleaded is briefly stated as follows: She / J.Dr. is not a tenant of the petition schedule property as alleged by the D.Hr. On 23.04.1975, an extent of 4 ½ cents of land, shown as plot No.183, was assigned by the Tahsildar, Anantapuramu in favour of B.Venkateswarlu vide H.S.No.22/1984 and he was in possession and enjoyment of the same. She is the second wife of B. Venkateswarlu and has a son by name B. V. Durga Prasad through B. Venkateswarlu. There are four children to B. Venkateswarlu through his first wife. B. Venkateswarlu gave a site to an extent of 40x14 sq. feet out of 4 ½ cents in plot No.183 to her and submitted an application to the Tahsildar, Anantapuramu for sub-division of plot No.183 and accordingly the Tahsildar sub-divided the plot and allotted plot No.183-A to her by issuing a separate patta in her name. She constructed the petition schedule house in the site given to her in plot No.183-A and paid tax to the Municipal Corporation, Anantapuramu vide assessment No.1001061947 in the name of her son B.V. Durga Prasad. Suppressing the real facts, the respondent filed H.R.C. No. 2 of 2018 against her and obtained the ex parte decree. She had no knowledge of filing H.R.C. against her. She approached her counsel M. Guruswamy when she received notice in E.P. No. 363 of 2019. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic upto February, 2022, the Courts had not properly functioned and her counsel had not appeared in the execution BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 proceedings. She was set ex parte on 16.02.2021 in the execution petition. Then, the D.Hr. filed E.A. No. 168 of 2022 for delivery of possession of the E.P. schedule property. Though no petition was filed by the D.Hr. seeking police aid, the execution Court ordered police aid for delivery of the property. A warrant of delivery with police aid was issued. The D.Hr., along with the police, approached her for execution of the warrant. She narrated the above said facts to the police by showing the assignment patta for the plot No.183-A, the house tax receipts and the interim order of injunction dated 14.11.2019 in I.A. No. 686 of 2019 in O.S. No. 1316 of 2019 and further stated that the suit was coming up for cross-examination of P.W.1. The police authorities advised her to obtain clarification from Court regarding the discrepancy in the warrant schedule property. The execution petition shown schedule house property bearing D. No. 27-763 in plot No.183 (as shown in H.R.C.) is different from her house property bearing D. No. 27-763-1 in plot No.183-A. Since the ex parte decree was obtained suppressing the truth and misleading Court, the ex parte decree, so fraudulently obtained, is null and void and not binding on her and executable against her. 4. In the petition, the following list of documents were mentioned and filed along with the petition: i) D-Form patta issued by Tahsildar, Ananthapur vide H.S. No. 22/1984, plot No.183-A on 22.05.2010. ii) House Tax receipt dated 17.05.2023 for the house bearing D. No. 27-763-1. iii) Demand notice dated 03.04.2020 for the house bearing D. No. 27-763-1. . 5. BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 iv) Special notice of property tax assessment 14.09.2019 for the house bearing D. No.27-763-1. v) Photos along with C.D. dated On 26.08.2025, a counter was filed by the D.Hr. stating briefly as follows: All the facts stated by the petitioner / J.Dr. regarding assignment of plot, division of the plot, construction of house by her, the relationship pleaded by her and the inability to represent the case are denied. It is false that this respondent / D.Hr. suppressed the facts and obtained the decree. The petitioner is only a tenant under the respondent. Having full knowledge of pendency of the proceedings in H.R.C. No. 2 of 2018, she remained ex parte without filing counter after engaging Sri M. Guruswamy as her advocate by filing vakalat on 18.06.2018. She again engaged in E.P. No. 363 of 2019 the same counsel by filing vakalat on 30.10.2019 and failed to file counter. She was set ex parte on 17.02.2020. The execution Court, on 22.02.2021, ordered issuance of a warrant for delivery of possession of the property. When Amin went for execution of the warrant, the J.Dr. refused to deliver the property and as such a report to that affect was filed by the Amin. On such report, the execution Court passed an order for taking steps. Accordingly, on a petition in E.A.No.168 of 2022 filed on 25.04.2022 by this respondent, the execution Court granted police aid on 26.04.2022. Thus, the J.Dr. is misleading and blaming the Court stating that the police aid was granted by the Court without filing a petition. The allegation that the D.Hr. obtained a collusive and fraudulent ex parte decree is false. All the material documents filed by the D.Hr. were marked as Exs. A1 to A9 in H.R.C. No. 02 of 2018 in support of the ownership over the schedule BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 property. If the E.P. schedule property stands in the name of B.V. Durga Prasad, he has to approach the execution Court. The petitioner invented this contention only to get unlawful gain. He is no way connected to the E.P. schedule property. The J.Dr, is not at all the second wife of the father of the D.Hr. nor is B. V. Durga Prasad son of the father of the D.Hr. The father of the D.Hr. did not give any property to the petitioner. The documents mentioned in the list filed by the J.Dr. were fabricated and created for filing this petition and to avoid the proceedings in execution. The J.Dr. filed E.A. No. 39 of 2024 in E.P. No. 363 of 2019 under Order XXI, Rule 106 C.P.C. to set aside the ex parte order dated 22.02.2021. It was dismissed on merits. A fresh delivery warrant was issued. At this juncture, the J.Dr. cannot seek the present relief. The execution Court cannot go behind the decree. The petition was filed only to drag on the proceedings. This respondent prayed to dismiss the petition. 6. After hearing both the parties, on 15.10.2025, the petition was dismissed holding that the execution Court cannot travel behind the decree, nor can it sit in appeal or pass an order jeopardizing the rights of the parties thereunder and that, as per Section 47 of C.P.C., questions arising between the parties or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree can be determined by an execution Court, but not any adjudication beyond the same. It was further observed that the grounds raised by the petitioner / J.Dr. do not render the decree in-executable. It is also the observation of the Court that the petitioner contended that E.P. schedule property and the property of the petitioner are not one and the same, and that even if the E.P. schedule property and the property of the petitioner are one and the same, no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner, if the delivery BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 warrant is executed. It was further observed that the allegation of fraud to secure ex parte decree is visibly self serving, speculative and unauthentic and does not render the decree invalid and that though the execution petition was filed in the year 2019, the D.Hr. is not able to get the fruits of the decree. 7. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.10.2025, the petitioner / J.Dr. in E.A. No. 72 of 2024 filed a revision petition in C.R.P. No. 3451 of 2025 on 20.11.2025. 8. On 01.07.2024, the J.Dr. filed a separate petition vide I.A. No. 437 of 2024 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone delay of 2000 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree dated 07.12.2018 in H.R.C. No. 2 of 2018 reiterating the same facts as stated in E.A. No. 72 of 2024 and further stating that she has a good case in defence, but due to her old age and health problems, she was unable to prosecute the proceedings in H.R.C. and that the delay is neither intentional nor wanton. 9. The petition was resisted by the respondent by filing a counter on 26.09.2024 with the averments as in the counter filed in E.A. No. 72 of 2024 and further stating briefly, as follows: Meanwhile, she (J.Dr.) filed a suit in O.S. No. 1316 of 2019 against this respondent (D.Hr.) through the same counsel Sri M.Guruswamy on the file of the Court of III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Anantapuramu. The suit is pending. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner / J.Dr. has complete knowledge of the proceedings, both in H.R.C. and E.P. since the beginning. Therefore, as there is no sufficient cause for delay, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 10. BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 After hearing both the parties, the trial Court dismissed the petition on 16.06.2025 on the ground that the petitioner (J.Dr.) failed to make out sufficient cause, holding that she had intentionally waited till the time of issue of warrant for delivery of possession of the property and the petition did not contain correct and true facts. 11. Aggrieved by the order dated 16.06.2025, initially she filed revision petition in C.R.P. No. 3204 of 2025, but the same was withdrawn, with permission of the Court, due to errors in the order impugned in the revision petition. Subsequently, C.R.P. No. 3826 of 2025 was filed on 22.12.2025 along with a petition to condone delay of 89 days in filing the revision petition vide I.A. No. 1 of 2025 because the delay was due to filing of the previous revision petition. The respondent reported no counter to the petition and thus, I.A. No. 1 of 2025 was allowed for the said reasons. 12. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner / J.Dr. submitted that fraud was played on Court by the D.Hr. in obtaining the ex parte decree by suppressing the true material facts, stated by the J.Dr. supported by the documents, though they are within the knowledge of the D.Hr., as they are opposite to the case pleaded by him and fatal to the relief sought by him in the main case (H.R.C.) and thereby the decree so obtained is null and void and unexecutable being vitiated by fraud and can be challenged under Section 47 C.P.C., but the execution Court erroneously dismissed the petition. 13. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the D.Hr. submitted that the grounds raised by the J.Dr. do not fall within the scope of Section 47 and the execution Court had rightly dismissed the petition. 14. BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 He referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in in Dhurandhar Prasad Singh Vs. Jai Prakash University and others1 wherein at paragraphs Nos. 23 & 24, it was held as follows: "23. Under Section 47 of the Code, all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree have got to be determined by the court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. The powers of Court under Section 47 are quite different and much narrower than its powers of appeal, revision or review….” 24. The exercise of powers under Section 47 of the Code is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole. Thus it is plain that executing Court can allow objection under section 47 of the Code to the executability of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab initio and nullity, apart from the ground that decree is not capable of execution under law either because the same was passed in ignorance of such a provision of law or the law was promulgated making a decree inexecutable after its passing….” 15. He cited another decision of the High Court of Madras in K. Duraisamy Vs. E. Kuppusamy2, wherein at paragraph No.16 it was observed as follows: — (2001) 6 SCC 534 2017 Supreme (Mad) 3918 BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 “16. ... It is well settled that the executing court cannot go behind the decree unless it is shown that it is passed by a court having inherent lack of jurisdiction, which would make it a nullity. In the case of Ittyavira Mathai Vs. Varkey Varkey [AIR 1964 SC 907], a Bench of four learned Judges of this Court speaking through Mudholkar, J. observed that when the question of limitation was not raised for the first time before this Court even in the hierarchy of proceedings arising from the suit when such question of limitation raised before the Court was not a pure question of law but was a mixed question of law and fact. In the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman [(1970) 1 SCC 670)], J.C. Shah, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court made the following pertinent observation in connection with the jurisdiction of the executing court, when called upon to execute the decree and on the question as to under what circumstances the executing court can go behind the decree sought to be executed. The observation at SCR p. 68 of the Report deserves to be extracted in extenso: (SCC pp 672-73, paras 6-7) "6. A court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree; between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 7. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record; where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. In Jnanendra Mohan Bhaduri Vs. Rabindra Nath Chakravarti (AIR 1933 PC 61) the Judicial Committee held that where a decree was passed upon an award made under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, an objection in the course of the execution proceeding that the decree was made without jurisdiction, since under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1809, there is no provision for making a decree upon an award, was competent. That was a case in which the decree was on the face of the record without jurisdiction." 10. The aforesaid decision of this Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case. This is not a BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 case in which the award decree on the face of it was shown to be without jurisdiction. Even if the decree was passed beyond the period of limitation, it would be an error of law or at the highest, a wrong decision which can be corrected in appellate proceedings and not by the executing court which was bound by such decree. It is not the case of the respondent that the Court which passed the decree was lacking inherent jurisdiction to pass such a decree. This becomes all the more so when the respondent did not think it fit to file objection against the award which was sought to be made the rule of the court." 16. He cited a decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad in V. Basavaiah Vs. Ch. Lakshmi and another3 wherein the scope of authority of an execution Court was observed at paragraph No.8 as follows: — “8. The prayer in the application filed by the petitioner was not the one, pertaining to adjustment, or satisfaction. He wanted the executing Court to declare the decree as well as the other proceedings in the E.P. as null and void. It is well settled principle of law that an executing Court cannot go beyond the scope of the decree. If the decree is null and void or illegal, the judgment-debtor has to get such a declaration by filing an appeal before an appellate Court. Even the validity of execution proceedings cannot be assailed before the Court, which executed the decree. 2013 (1) ALD 385 BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 Here again, the remedy of appeal, or revision has to be availed.” 17. A petition can be filed under Section 47 C.P.C. regarding (i) execution; (ii) discharge; & (iii) satisfaction. So, insofar as execution is concerned, inexecutability of a decree is inherent. Inexecutability can be due to nullity, barred by law, vague etc. When a decree is a nullity it is completely void ab initio. When fraud is played, the consequence is nullity being vitiated by fraud, if it goes to the root of the matter. The facts stated by the J.Dr., along with documents filed along with the petition, are such that, if proved, would definitely establish that the Court would not have passed the decree, but for the suppression of the truth with complete knowledge. An ex parte decree is as good as a decree passed on contest. But, merely because the other side has not contested, the party seeking a relief is not allowed to obtain it by pleading false statements and suppressing vital facts / truth which is quite adverse to the pleaded case. 18. The execution Court erred in holding to the contrary. Moreover, the execution court did not consider any document filed by the J.Dr. Section 47 C.P.C mandates all the questions arising between the parties to the suit relating to execution etc., must be determined by the execution Court and not by a separate suit. Therefore, the execution Court ought to have thoroughly examined the contentions of both the parties in the light of an elaborate case pleaded by the J.Dr. and the documents filed in support thereof. It would have been clear whether the property claimed to be in favour of the son of J.Dr. is part of the schedule property or a separate property and whether against the same, this decree can be executed. Moreover, in a collateral suit, there BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 is an interim order in favour of the J.Dr. vide order dated 14.11.2019 in I.A. No. 686 of 2019 in O.S. No. 1316 of 2019. Therefore, there is an issue of executability of the decree in this case against the property in respect of which it was granted restraining the D.Hr. from proceeding with the decree, if that property is part of the property under execution. 19. Therefore, the order impugned in C.R.P. No. 3451 of 2025 is liable to be set aside with a direction to re-hear the petition and pass an order afresh by considering the evidence. 20. Insofar as the order impugned in C.R.P. No. 3826 of 2025 is concerned, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that in view of the above case of the petitioner and the reasons stated for the delay, irrespective of the length of the period, the execution Court ought to have condoned the delay. 21. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the D.Hr., submitted that C.R.P. under Section 115 C.P.C. doesn't lie when an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed along with a petition under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C. is filed and placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Koushik Mutually Aided Co op. Housing Society Vs. Ameena Begum and another4. The relevant portion of the decision at paragraphs Nos. 5, 7 to 10, 15 and 16 reads as follows: “5. By order dated 07.06.2018, the V-Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad dismissed I.A. No. 30/2016 filed for seeking condonation of delay of 5767 days in filing the application seeking setting aside of the ex-parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure, 2024 (1) ALD 174 (SC) BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 1908 ('CPC' for the sake of convenience). The said application was considered by the Trial Court and by order dated 07.06.2018, the application seeking condonation of delay was dismissed. Consequently, the petition filed Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure seeking setting aside of the ex-parte decree also stood dismissed. 7. By the impugned order dated 08.01.2021, the High Court has set aside Order dated 07.06.2018 passed in I.A. No. 30/2016 in O.S. No. 1144/1988, which also implies that the petition filed Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure which had also stood dismissed has been allowed. In the Civil Revision Petition, the High Court condoned the delay of 5767 days in filing the petition filed Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure seeking setting aside the ex-parte decree dated 15.02.1999 by directing the Trial Court to dispose of the petition filed Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure and to complete the trial of the suit expeditiously, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 8. Being aggrieved by the said order passed in Civil Revision Petition by the High Court, the Plaintiff/Appellant has preferred this appeal. As noted above, we have heard learned Senior Counsel for the respective parties and perused the material on record. 9. At the outset, this Court queried as to how a Civil Revision Petition was maintainable against an order BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 passed by the Trial Court dismissing the application filed seeking condonation of delay in filing the petition Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure and consequently rejecting or dismissing the said petition also. 10. During the course of submissions, it was noted that, in fact, the rejection of a petition filed Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure is an appealable order and, therefore Under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal ought to have been filed before the High Court rather than a Civil Revision Petition Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 15. Against the order passed Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure rejecting an application for seeking setting aside the decree passed ex- parte, an appeal is provided. When an application is filed seeking condonation of delay for seeking setting aside an exparte decree and the same is dismissed and consequently, the petition is also dismissed, the appeal Under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable. Thus, an appeal only against the refusal to set aside the ex-parte decree is maintainable whereas if an order allowing such an application is passed, the same is not appealable. 16. Thus, when an application or petition filed Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure is dismissed, the Defendant can avail a remedy by preferring an appeal in terms of Order XLIII Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, Civil Revision Petition Under Section BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not arise when an application / petition Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure is dismissed. Thus, when an alternative and effective appellate remedy is available to a Defendant, against an ex-parte decree, it would not be appropriate for the Defendant to resort to filing of revision Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the order refusing to set aside the order of setting the Defendant ex-parte. In view of the appellate remedy Under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) Code of Civil Procedure being available, revision Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed in the instant case was not maintainable.” This decision in Koushik Mutually Aided Co-operative Society (4 supra) cannot be applied to the present case as the petition filed under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C. was not said to be dismissed along with the petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the case before the Supreme Court, there is reference of dismissal of the petition under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C in paragraphs Nos. 5 & 15. 22. The learned counsel for the J.Dr. relied on another decision of the Supreme Court in C. Prabhakar Rao and another Vs. Sama Mahipal Reddy and another5 wherein at paragraph No. 11, it was held as follows: — “11. To start with, facts and events relating to passing of an ex-parte decree are distinct from the facts and events relating to the delayed filing of the application for setting (2025) 9 SCC 716 BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 aside of the ex-parte decree. Secondly, the procedure for setting aside the ex-parte decree will again be distinct from the procedure for condoning the delayed filing of the application to set aside the ex-parte decree. Thirdly, the adjudication and determination of a court with respect to setting aside the ex-parte decree are independent of the adjudication with respect to condoning the delay. Finally, the remedies against these orders are independent and one remedy would not subsume the other. They must be adopted and pursued independently. This much of clarity is sufficiently borne by our practice and procedure of law. The order passed by the High Court setting aside the exparte decree when no revision is filed against the said order of the Trial Court in I.A. No. 1163 of 2021 cannot be sustained.” 23. Nextly, the learned counsel for the J.Dr. referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by L.Rs. and others Vs. Special Deputy Collector (L.A.)6 wherein at paragraph No.28, the general principles for harmonious consideration of the provisions of law of limitation are summarized as follows: — “28. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (2024) 12 SCC 336 BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 24. BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 The learned counsel for the J.Dr. further cited a decision of the High Court of Telangana in Ameena Begum Vs. M/s. Koushik Co-op Housing Society and another7 wherein an ex parte decree was said to be passed without service of summons and playing fraud on Court and the delay in filing the petition to set aside the decree was 5767 days. But, the order in this case is the subject before the Supreme Court referred in Koushik Mutually Aided Co-operative Society (4 supra). 25. The learned counsel for the J.Dr. cited another decision of the Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for extension of limitation8, wherein during the period of Covid pandemic limitation period between the dates 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 was saved. Paragraph No. 5 of the order reads as follows: “5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by learned Counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus on public health and adversities faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the M.A. No. 21 of 2022 with the following directions: I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under 2021 (3) ALT 82 (TS) 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 31, dated 10.01.2022 BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 01.03.2022. III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. IV. It is further clarified that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed Under Sections 23(4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.” 26. In the present case, the decree was passed on 07.12.2018 and E.P. No. 363 of 2019 was filed in the year 2019 and she got filed vakalat of her counsel on 30.10.2019. The petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, I.A. No. 437 of 2024 was filed on 01.07.2024 to condone delay of 2000 days. The decision of the Supreme Court may help the petitioner to count the number of days delay, but even thereafter, the BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 delay is not short and moreover the delay must be justified by reasonable cause. 27. The learned counsel for the D.Hr. submitted that when no reasonable cause is shown, the delay cannot be condoned even by imposing heavy costs and referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Lingeswaran & others Vs. Thirunagalingam9, wherein at paragraphs Nos. 4, 5 and 5.1, it was held as follows: — “4. Having gone through the order passed by the learned trial Court, even the learned trial Court also specifically observed that, in the absence of material evidence, it cannot be said that the delay has been explained. The trial Court has also observed that the Court feels that there are no merits in the application. Still the trial Court condoned the delay by observing that an opportunity of fair trial should be given to both the parties to put-forth their case on merits. The trial Court also observed that, on allowing the application for condonation of delay, no prejudice will be caused to the Plaintiff and, therefore, the delay can be condoned by compensating the Plaintiff by way of heavy costs. The said order has been set aside by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order. 5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2233 BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane Vs. Land Acquisition Officer reported in [(2013) 10 SCC 765] is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular/party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. 5.1. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157], in paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under: The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025 legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.” 28. Coming to the reasonableness of the cause shown for the delay is concerned, irrespective of the length of the period of delay, except the case of fraud, there is no other justification. Here is a case where the J.Dr. / respondent in H.R.C. engaged a counsel, both before the trial Court and the execution Court, yet, failed to plead and prosecute. When there is no reasonable cause for the delay, it cannot be condoned. The order impugned doesn't require interference in the revision. 29. In the result, C.R.P. No. 3451 of 2025 is allowed and the order, dated 15.10.2025, in E.A. No. 72 of 2024 in E.P. No. 363 of 2019 in H.R.C. No. 2 of 2018 on the file of the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Anantapuram, is set aside with a direction to rehear the petition and pass order afresh by considering the evidence. 30. In the result, C.R.P. No. 3826 of 2025 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. Dt.17.06.2026 Speaking Yes/No / Recorded Yes/No Reportable Yes/No / Non-Reportable Yes/No RAR / PNV ___________________ B. S. BHANUMATHI, J

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