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Page No.# 1/18
GAHC010270082019
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/8960/2019
GULENUR BEGUM
W/O- LATE MATIUR RAHMAAN, D/O- LATE ABDUL ZALIL, R/O- VILLNAKHOLA GRANT, P.S- JAGIROAD, DIST- MORIGAON, ASSAM
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA AND 4 ORS
REP. BY MIN OF HOME AFFAIRS, NEW DELHI- 01
2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM
HOME DEPTT
DISPUR
GUWAHATI
3:DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
MORIGAON
ASSAM
4:SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (B)
MORIGAON
ASSAM
5:THE STATE COORDINATOR
NRC
BHANGAGARH
GUWAHATI- 78100
Advocate for the Petitioner
: MR. D P CHALIHA, MS M ROY
Advocate for the Respondent : ASSTT.S.G.I., SC, ELECTION COMMISSION.,SC, F.T,SC, NRC
BEFORE
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Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE Pranjal Das
Advocate for the petitioner :
Shri DP Chaliha, Senior Advocate
Ms. M. Roy
Advocates for the respondents : Shri G. Sarma, SC- Home Deptt. & NRC;
Ms. RB Bora, GA, Assam;
Shri AI Ali, SC - ECI.
Shri S. Chanda, CGC.
Date on which judgment is reserved
: 10.08.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
: 19.08.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the
judgment?
: NA
Whether the full judgment has been pronounced?
: Yes
Judgment & Order
(S.K. Medhi, J.)
The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked
by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting
to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 04.01.2019
passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No.1, Morigaon in F.T.(D.) Case No.
303/2019. By the impugned judgment, the petitioner, who was the proceedee
before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post
25.03.1971.
2.
The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows:
(i)
A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Morigaon
District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T.(D.)
Case No. 303/2019.
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(ii)
As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that
the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written
statement on 26.09.2016 along with certain documents and adduced
evidence through herself.
(iii)
The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances
and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the
Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as
opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon her and
accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be
a foreign national post 25.03.1971.
3.
We have heard Shri DP Chaliha, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. M.
Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also heard Shri G. Sarma,
learned Standing Counsel, Home Department & NRC; Ms. R.B. Bora, learned GA,
Assam; Shri A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of India
and Shri S. Chanda, learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the records
which were requisitioned vide an order dated 12.05.2020.
4.
Shri Chaliha, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, at the outset, has
submitted that no notice was issued to the petitioner as there was no reference
against her. On the other hand, it appears that there was a reference against
one Musstt. Gulenera Begum whereas the petitioner is Musstt. Gulenur Begum.
He has also submitted that in the notice issued by the learned Tribunal, the
process server had made an endorsement that no person by the name of
Gulenera Begum was found and accordingly, the notice was returned to the
learned Tribunal. In view of that, it is submitted that the impugned order
against the petitioner is unsustainable.
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5.
On the merits of the case, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner
has submitted that in the written statement, all material disclosures were made.
He has contended that the petitioner could prove her case with cogent evidence
and in view of the fact that there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal
should have accepted the said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a
citizen of India. In this regard, he has referred to her evidence adduced as DW1
and also the following documentary evidence:
(i) Ext-A– School Transfer Certificate;
(ii) Ext-B – Voter List of 1965;
(iii) Ext-C – Voter List of 1970;
(iv) Ext-D– Gaonburah Certificate.
6.
The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that relevant
documents in the form of Voters Lists of the years 1965 and 1970 were proved.
The 1965 List contains the name of her father and in the 1970 List, along with
the name of her father, there was the name of her mother – Golbahar and stepmother Nurjahan Bibi. Further, one document has been relied upon wherein the
learned Member, FT has certified that the NRC has been checked. He has also
referred to a Certificate by the Headmaster that the petitioner was a student of
Class III on 20.08.1979. Reliance has also been placed on new document,
namely, a Transfer Certificate dated 03.04.2019 issued by the Jagiroad
Secondary School wherein the petitioner has been stated to be the daughter of
Md. Abdul Zalil and that she was reading in Class V in 1971 and her date of birth
was 01.07.1960. It is submitted that the said document can be accepted and in
this regard, Sections 62, 63 and 65 of the Indian Evidence Act have been
referred to.
7.
The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a Voters
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List of 1993 containing the name of the petitioner. Lastly, he has submitted that,
so far as the elder sister of the petitioner, namely, Afroza Begum is concerned,
the learned Foreigners Tribunal had removed the prefix “D” from her name vide
order dated 21.10.2016 which would prove that the petitioner is also a citizen of
India.
8.
In support of his submission, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner
has relied upon the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Sabitri Dey @ Swasthi Dey & Ors. Vs. UoI & Ors. reported in 2026 INSC
694 and also the case of Md. Rahim Ali @ Abdul Rahim Vs. UoI reported in
2024 INSC 511.
9.
The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner accordingly submits that in
view of the availability of the aforesaid materials, the impugned opinion could
not have been rendered against the petitioner and therefore, the same requires
interference.
10.
Per contra, Shri Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department has
categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. He submits that
a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals)
Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner
or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the
proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely
upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act,
1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However,
in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is
also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would
be given only if necessary. He further submits that the evidence of a proceedee
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has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only
thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in.
11.
The learning Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written
statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation
of the case of the proceeding and the written statement in the instant case
lacks details and is totally vague. There is no date or year of the birth of the
petitioner and there is no detail of the family members. The name of the mother
of the petitioner or any of her siblings has not been mentioned. In this
connection, he has relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal Vs. Union of India
reported in(2005) 5 SCC 665:
“17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon
the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country.
In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to
give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his
parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of
birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1)
(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the
personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of
the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State
authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if
necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a
person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but
almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points.
This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the
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knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”
12.
The learned Standing Counsel has also submitted that in the written
statement, more specifically in paragraph 4, the petitioner admits that her name
was wrongly put and had accordingly filed a petition to correct her name.
Therefore, the submission made before this Court on behalf of the petitioner
regarding incorrect name has no legs to stand.
13.
The learned Standing Counsel has submitted that new grounds have been
taken in the writ petition which are factual in nature and not permissible. The
ground regarding the projected sister was not even pleaded in the Tribunal and
in any case, would not have a material bearing. He has specifically submitted
that the order regarding the projected sister is dated 21.10.2016 but there was
no mention of any pending proceeding regarding her sister in the written
statement. Further, the petitioner had adduced evidence in December, 2016 and
yet there was no mention about the case of the sister. In this connection, he has
submitted that there cannot be any variance between pleadings and evidence
and in this regard, he has relied upon the case of Momin Ali Vs. UoI reported
in 2017 (2) GLT 1076.
14.
The learned Standing Counsel has also submitted that the projected father
of the petitioner had expired sometime in the year 1986 and yet there is not a
single Voter List containing the name of the father after 1970. He has also
pointed out that in the Voters List of 1970, there is a name Gol Bahar who is
projected to be the mother of the petitioner. However, from the crossexamination of the petitioner, it reveals that the name of her mother is Asia
Khatun.
15.
In support of his submission that a document has to be proved from
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contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the
judgment passed in the case of Romila Khatun Vs. Union of India reported
in 2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into
service.
“20. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the
basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and
prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and
proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to be
proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the
truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be
established from the record. A document or the contents of the document
cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge. …”
16.
He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum
Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347 wherein certain
observations regarding exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction have been made which
read as follows:
“9.
On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered
opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and
documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and
opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari
jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate
jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts
reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned
opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in
violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from
Page No.# 9/18
illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on
evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal
refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no
support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not
been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the
face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.”
17.
He has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rupajan Begum Vs. Union of India reported in (2018) 1 SCC 579,
wherein it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two
aspects, firstly, the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of
the contents.
18.
The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ
petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated.
19.
The learned counsel for the rest of the respondents have supported the
submissions advanced on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court in exercise of
its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the
decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. It is
submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision
making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed.
They have further submitted that the procedure adopted for adjudication of a
reference by a Foreigners Tribunal is summary in nature and there is also a time
frame for completion. It is also submitted that there is a question of national
security by the unabated influx of foreign nationals and before any action is
taken, the proceedee is given an opportunity whereby he or she is required to
Page No.# 10/18
prove the citizenship through cogent, credible and acceptable evidence.
20.
The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials
placed before this Court, including the records of the learned Tribunal have been
carefully perused.
21.
With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of
the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a
proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts.
In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the
Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is
extracted hereinbelow“9.
Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any
question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction
given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not
a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that
such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class
or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such
person.”
22.
In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [AIR 1963 SC 1035] which
followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of
Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [AIR 1961 SC 1526] in the context
of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which are extracted hereinbelow“22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or
Page No.# 11/18
with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or
description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his
entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their
arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is
Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a
foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as
the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order
made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises
whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner
or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a
person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi
served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as
he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High
Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima
facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an
order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the
Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that
onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.”
23.
Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the
submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would
confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the
present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings
based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be
interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction.
24.
Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after
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discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ
of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in
Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No.
3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows:
“49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something
important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law
governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari.
50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more
particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in
granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of
Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which
the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It
demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or
palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the
inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is
apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high
prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking.
51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some
action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and
invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction
thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice
between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an
extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded
Page No.# 13/18
on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this
flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity
projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the
realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to
be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after
setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the
High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable
consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal
court of appeal which it is not.”
25.
In the instant case, the written statement is absolutely vague and
apparently, has not met the requirements, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to
disclose the following:
(i) his date of birth;
(ii) place of birth;
(iii) name of his parents;
(iv) their place of birth and citizenship.
Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the
grandparents. It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within
the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of
the State.
26.
As regards the first submission that there was no proceeding against the
petitioner, we have carefully looked into the records of the learned Tribunal. It
reveals that the reference was against one Musstt. Gulenera Begum and the
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submissions made regarding the endorsement made by the process server also
appear to be correct. However, the said submission cannot be countenanced in
view of the fact that the petitioner had subsequently contested the proceeding
by filing written statement and adducing evidence and therefore, the contention
is rejected. In this connection, the observations made by the learned Tribunal in
paragraph 2 of the opinion is to be taken into consideration which read as
follows:
“2.
Initiating the proceeding a show cause notice assigning the main
ground was dispatched to serve upon the OP on 08-12-2014, but the
notice could not be served upon the proceedee due to her unavailability.
Thereafter, the notice was hanged in a conspicuous place in presence of
witness. But the OP did not turn up for appearance and WS, even after
providing reasonable opportunity by the court to discharge her burden of
proof. Eventually, seeing no other alternative, the Ld. Predecessor filed the
case and directed the SP(B), Morigaon to make periodical enquiry to trace
out the OP. Subsequently, the OP appeared before the Tribunal and
prayed to restore the case record of the instant F.T. (D) Case through a
petition 1360/16 and accordingly upon hearing this Tribunal fixed 26-092016 for WS.”
27.
This Court also finds force in the contention advanced by the learned
Standing Counsel, who has referred to the pleadings made in paragraph 4 of the
written statement wherein the petitioner had admitted that there was a mistake
in her name. For ready reference, the said pleadings are extracted hereinbelow-
4) That, in the notice issued by the Foreigners Tribunal No.1, Morigaon
the name of the opp. Party is wrongly mentioned as Mustt. Gulenara
Begum instead of Mustt. Gulenur Begum and the opp. Party filed a
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petition to correct her name before the Hon’ble Tribunal.”
28.
Though reference has been made to an NRC, the said NRC however, does
not contain the name of the petitioner and the other names do not find mention
in any other documents. As regards the Certificate dated 20.08.1979, the same
is not in the Letter Pad of the School. Further, neither the Headmaster nor any
School Authorities had proved the same and therefore, the same would have
little evidentiary value.
29.
So far as the Transfer Certificate is concerned, the same is admittedly
obtained after the impugned opinion and therefore, would be of no significance
as it was not proved at all. Further, the same appears to have been obtained
after inordinate delay of about 40 years apart from the fact that there would be
a gross discrepancy with the School Certificate regarding the age. The
contention that the said document can be accepted by this Court while
exercising certiorari jurisdiction would be contrary to the settled position of law.
As regards the reference to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it has already been
observed that the burden of proof under Section 9 the Foreigners Act, 1946 has
an overriding effect over the Evidence Act.
30.
So far as the Voters List of 1993 is concerned, though it apparently
contains the name of the petitioner, the same was not produced before the
learned Tribunal. Even for the interest of justice, if the same is considered, it
has no connection or link with the projected father and only the name of the
husband of the petitioner figures which will not come to the aid of the petitioner
to prove her citizenship. Further, there would be discrepancy in the age of the
petitioner even if this document is taken into consideration.
31.
As regards the submission that “D” has been removed from the name of
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the projected sister, this Court finds force in the argument advanced by the
learned Standing Counsel that there was no pleadings at all in the written
statement regarding such case. We have also noticed that there was no mention
of any siblings in the written statement or in the deposition of the petitioner.
Lastly, this Court is of the opinion that a reference has to be contested by a
proceedee on his or her own merits. This Court, in a number of judicial
pronouncements has laid down that mere declaration of a member of a family
as foreigner may not be the sole factor for declaring the other members as
foreigner in absence of a specific reference. Therefore, the corollary would also
apply that declaration of one member of a projected family as citizen would
itself not be conclusive to declare the other members as citizen in case there is
a reference.
32.
This Court finds force in the contention advanced by the learned Standing
Counsel who has relied upon the case of Momin Ali (supra) wherein this Court
had made the following observations:
“12. This written statement of the petitioner was wholly inadequate and
did not disclose any material facts. As noticed above, it was the allegation
of the State that petitioner was a foreigner. Therefore, as per mandate of
Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, it was the bounden duty of the
petitioner to have disclosed all material facts which were specifically
within his knowledge in the written statement but he did not do so.
Petitioner neither mentioned his date of birth nor his age. He was silent
regarding the name of his mother and identity of his grandparents - both
paternal and maternal. He did not mention anything about his brothers
and sisters or about his marital status. On the basis of such a written
statement, it cannot be said that petitioner had stated anything
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substantial to show that he was not a foreigner but a citizen of India.
13. It is a settled proposition of law that where a party fails to set up a
case in his pleadings, he would be debarred from adducing evidence in his
support at the stage of trial. As a matter of principle, variance between
pleading and proof is not permissible.”
33.
This Court finds sufficient force in the contention of the learned Standing
Counsel that the petitioner is also not able to state the name of her mother. The
records of the learned Tribunal has been examined from which it reveals that in
the cross-examination, the petitioner had disclosed the name of her mother as
Asia Khatun whereas in the Voters List of 1970, the name of Gol Bahar appears
with her projected father who was claimed to be her mother.
34.
Reliance upon the case of Sabitri Dey (supra) will not come to the aid of
the petitioner as that judgment is mainly on ex-parte opinions of the Foreigners
Tribunal. So far as the case of Md. Rahim Ali (supra) is concerned, it clearly
appears that the relevant observations of a Larger Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra) was not brought
to the notice of the Hon’ble Court as the observations made would amount to
reviving the IM(D)T Act which has been declared to be ultra vires by the Larger
Bench.
35.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion
that the impugned order dated 04.01.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners
Tribunal No.1, Morigaon in F.T.(D.) Case No. 303/2019 does not call for any
interference.
36.
The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed
earlier stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by
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the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law.
37.
The records be returned to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal forthwith,
along with a copy of this order.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
JUDGE
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