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[2026:RJ-JP:1920-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17301/2013
Govind Agarwal aged about 44 years S/o Late Shri B.L. Agarwal
R/o of Suraj Pole, Gram Mandi Road outside Surajpole Gate,
Jaipur.
----Petitioner
Versus
High Court of Judicature, Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur at Jaipur
through Registrar General.
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr.R.B. Mathur, Sr. Adv. With
Ms.Nishita Gambhia,
Mr.Sourabh Thathera,
Mr.Falak Mathur,
Mr.Utsav Verma,
Mr.Yug Singh &
Mr.Manish Bhodiwal
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr.N.K. Maloo, Sr. Adv. assisted by
Mr.Pratyush Sharma,
Mr.Harsh Pratap Singh,
Mr.Ajay Singh Rajawat &
Mr.Aditya Goyal
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI CHIRANIA
Reportable
Order
1.
Date of conclusion of Arguments
07.01.2026
2.
Date on which the judgment was reserved
07.01.2026
3.
Whether the full judgment or only operative
part is pronounced
4.
Date of pronouncement
Full
29.01.2026
Per, Ravi Chirania, J:1.
The present writ petition has been filed by a Judicial Officer
who has challenged his punishment order dated 05.08.2013,
therefore, two observations as made by the Hon’ble Supreme
(2 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
Court with regard to judicial service, in two different judgments,
being relevant for the case, are quoted as under:“Judicial Service is not a service in the
sense of an employment. Judges are discharging
their functions while exercising the sovereign
judicial power of the State. Their honesty and
integrity is expected to be beyond doubt. It
should be reflected in their overall reputation”.
Another observation as made by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court is “a Judge holds the office of a
public
trust.
Impeccable
integrity,
unimpeachable independence with moral values
embodied to the core are absolute imperatives
which brooks no compromise. A judge is the
pillar of the entire justice system and the public
has a right to demand virtually irreproachable
conduct
from
anyone
performing
a
judicial
function. Judges must strive for the highest
standards of integrity in both their professional
and personal lives.”
1.1. Keeping the above two observations of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court as made in two different judgments, this Court proceeds to
decide the present writ petition in which challenge has been made
to the impugned order dated 05.08.2013, whereby the petitioner
was punished with the stoppage of three Annual Grade Increments
without cumulative effect by the Full Court of the High Court,
communicated to him by the order impugned in the writ petition.
(3 of 35)
2.
[CW-17301/2013]
Learned Senior counsel Mr.R.B. Mathur assisted by Advocate
Ms.Nishita Gambhia submitted that the complete case as set up
against the petitioner is baseless and without any foundation.
Learned senior counsel submitted that the petitioner has an
unblemished service record as a Judicial Officer. He further
submitted that the petitioner was appointed as a Civil Judge
(Junior Division) Judicial Magistrate in the year 1996 and since
then he is performing his services without any complaint, show
cause notice and no departmental enquiry was ever initiated
against him as a Judicial Officer. Surprisingly, he was served with
the charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter
referred to as 'CCA Rules, 1958, for short), dated 04.01.2010,
whereby
three
charges
were
communicated
to
him
by
Memorandum dated 04.01.2010. The charges as levelled against
him are reproduced as under:“1.
That,
two
No.32/1980
Nrisinghji
Civil
Suits
(190/1980)
Maharaj
Vs.
bearing
Mandir
Shri
Banwari
Lal
Agrawal & Ors. and No.31/1980 Mandir
Shri Nrisinghji Maharaj Vs. Prabhudayal
Meena, were pending in the Court of ADJ
(FT)
No.5,
Jaipur
City,
Jaipur.
Shri
Banwari Lal Agrawal, your father, was
defendant in the first case and was
counsel for the defendants in both the
cases.
2.
That,
since
your
father
was
defendant in the Civil Suit No.32/1980
(190/1980)
Mandir
Shri
Nrisinghji
Maharaj Vs. Banwari Lal Agrawal & Ors.
(4 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
and counsel for the defendant in the Civil
Suit No.31/1980Mandir Shri Nrisinghji
Maharaj Vs. Prabhudayal Meena, you
approached Shri Mahendra Sharma the
presiding Officer of the Court of ADJ (FT)
No.5, Jaipur City, Jaipur which is evident
from the order sheet dated 29.11.2008
drawn in the Civil Suit No.32/1980.
Thus,
you
interfered
in
the
administration of justice and judicial
proceedings.
3.
That, your above act is misconduct
and unbecoming of a judicial officer.
Thereby, you failed to maintain absolute
integrity and devotion to duty which
amounts to violation of provisions of
Rule 3 of the Rajasthan Civil Services
(Conduct Rules), 1971.”
3.
Learned senior counsel submitted that on receipt of the
above mentioned charge-sheet, the petitioner submitted his
explanation on time along-with three affidavits; one of his Father
Banwari Lal Agarwal, a practicing Advocate, another of Advocate
Dheeraj Gupta, a practicing of District Court and the third affidavit
of one PrabhuDayal S/o Gatti Lal.
4.
Learned senior counsel further submitted that, in the
explanation as submitted, it was specifically stated that the
concerned Judicial Officer (hereinafter referred to as ‘said Judge’)
who was working and posted as ADJ No.5, namely Shri Mahendra
Kumar Sharma was an Officer senior to him in the Judicial services
and he never tried to approach him directly or indirectly, and
therefore, the fact as recorded by the said Judge in a case pending
(5 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
before him in the order sheet dated 29.11.2008, is false and
baseless, as he has no knowledge about the same.
5.
Learned senior counsel further submitted that the petitioner,
upon receiving the charge sheet, inquired about the facts from his
father, namely Banwari Lal Agarwal, a practicing advocate of the
District Court (who is also an advocate as well as litigant in that
case), who then applied for the certified copy of the order and
informed him the facts, however, his father also denied knowing
anything about the order dated 29.11.2008, passed in a pending
case, in respect of which, he was issued the impugned chargesheet. Lastly, in the explanation, it was stated that he is innocent
and unaware of any allegation of approaching the said Judge in
the mentioned case, and therefore, prayed for dropping the
charge sheet by referring to the above-mentioned three affidavits.
6.
Learned senior counsel submitted that sufficient justification
was stated on oath in the three affidavits, in which it was clearly
stated that no attempt or effort was made to approach or
influence the said judge in the pending case, and therefore, the
allegations are false and baseless. Without properly considering
the
explanation,
three
affidavits,
and
other
relevant
record/documents, the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge recorded that
charge No.1 was factual in nature, however, found the charge
Nos.2 and 3 to be partially proved. Learned senior counsel
submitted that the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge, in his enquiry report
dated 17.04.2023, committed a serious mistake and failed to
consider the fact that on 29.11.2008, petitioner was not present in
Jaipur, rather was performing his duties as a Judicial Officer in
District Alwar, where he was posted, and therefore, there was no
(6 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
occasion for him to influence or to approach the said Judge on the
said date.
7.
Learned senior counsel submitted that the Hon’ble Enquiry
Judge also failed to
consider the fact that the petitioner
admittedly, was not known to the said Judge, which he (the said
Judge) had also accepted, and further no subordinate officer
would ever attempt to approach or influence his Senior Officer.
Learned senior counsel fairly admitted that the Hon’ble Enquiry
Judge, the then sitting Hon’ble Judge of the High Court, provided
sufficient opportunities of hearing to the petitioner, who appeared
in person. Learned senior counsel further submitted that perusal
of the order dated 29.11.2008 shows that the said judge did not
specifically named the petitioner in the order, and therefore, there
was no reason or basis for the respondents to issue him the
impugned charge sheet, however, this fact has also not been
considered by the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge in its report. He,
therefore, prayed that the punishment imposed upon him of
stoppage of three annual grade increments without cumulative
effect by the Full Court of the Hon’ble High Court, communicated
via the impugned order dated 05.08.2013, be quashed and set
aside.
8.
In support of his arguments, learned counsel relied upon the
judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at
Principle Seat, Jodhpur in the case of Rakesh Katara Vs. The
High
Court
of
Judicature
for
Rajasthan 1.
The
referred
relevant para Nos.20, 21 & 22 of the judgment are reproduced
hereunder:1
2016(4) WLN 499 (Raj.)
(7 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
“20. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar
v. Presiding Officer & Ors., reported in
(1985)3 SCC 378, held that an Enquiry Officer
must assign reason as to why the evidence
produced in defence did not appeal to him or was
considered not creditworthy. The Enquiry Officer
must permit a peep into his mind as to why
evidence produced by the management appeal to
him in preference to the evidence produced by
the delinquent. A report of enquiry must show
the reasons for conclusions and it cannot be an
ipse-dixit of Enquiry Officer. It has to be a
speaking one in the sense that the conclusion
must be supported by cogent reasons that
appealed to the Enquiry Officer. It should all the
more
necessary
attaches
a
where
stigma
quasi-judicial
to
the
enquiry
character
of
a
delinquent.
21. In the case in hand, the allegation against
the delinquent officer is very serious. If a judicial
officer exerts pressure upon any party before it
for his personal gains, then such officer is not a
person fit to hold the office. In the case in hand,
though the penalty imposed is not the severest
one, but the charge is quite grave and such
grave charge deserves to be proved only by
definite and cogent evidence. We failed to notice
any such cogent and definite evidence in the
instant matter to arrive at a conclusion about
involvement
of
the
delinquent
officer
in
commission of misconduct. Pertinent to notice
that no discussion is made in the enquiry report
about the evidence adduced by the witnesses
even produced by the prosecution other than to
Shri Bhopal Singh. No reason is given as to why
Shri Bhopal Singh is found more creditworthy visa-vis
other
witnesses
produced
by
the
prosecution itself. No discussion is made even of
(8 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
the evidence adduced by the delinquent officer in
defence.
22. An important aspect of the matter is that on
basis
of
the
complaints
made
by
the
Bar
Association, Dantaramgarh the delinquent officer
was charged for eight allegations of misconduct,
but out of those six were not found sustainable
even by Hon'ble the Enquiry Judge. Hon'ble the
Enquiry Judge held the delinquent guilty for
charges No.6 and 4 only. The Full Court did not
accept
the
findings
Enquiry Judge
arrived
relating
by
Hon'ble
the
to charge No.6 and
exonerated the delinquent officer from that. This
fact clearly indicates that most of the allegations
made in the complaints submitted by the Bar
Association, Dantaramgarh were ill-founded.”
9.
Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs.
Punjab National Bank and Ors.2, submitted that in the said
case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the impugned
punishment order as the order of the Disciplinary Authority and
the Appellate Authority were not supported by reasons. Learned
counsel submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said
judgment specifically held that the orders which have severe civil
consequences must contain appropriate and specific reasons and
in absence of the same, they cannot be said to be legal and in
accordance with law. The referred relevant para Nos.21, 22 &
23 of the judgment are reproduced below:“21. Yet again in M.V. Bijlani vs. Union
of India & ors. (2006) 5 SCC 88, this Court
held:
(2009) 2 SCC 570
(9 of 35)
"25.
....Although
departmental
[CW-17301/2013]
the
charges
proceedings
in
are
a
not
required to be proved like a criminal
trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts,
we cannot lose sight of the fact that the
Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial
function,
who
upon
analysing
the
documents must arrive at a conclusion
that there had been a preponderance of
probability to prove the charges on the
basis of materials on record. While doing
so, he cannot take into consideration
any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to
consider the relevant facts. He cannot
shift the burden of proof. He cannot
reject the relevant testimony of the
witnesses only on the basis of surmises
and conjectures. He cannot enquire into
the allegations with which the delinquent
officer had not been charged with."
22. Yet again in Jasbir Singh vs. Punjab &
Sind Bank & ors. [(2007) 1 SCC 566], this
court
followed
Narinder
United
India
Insurance
Mohan
Co.
Arya
Ltd.
&
vs.
ors.
(supra), stating:
"12. In a case of this nature, therefore, the
High Court should have applied its mind to
the fact of the matter with reference to the
materials brought on records. It failed so
to do."
23. Furthermore,
the
order
of
the
disciplinary authority as also the appellate
authority are not supported by any reason. As
the orders passed by them have severe civil
consequences,
appropriate
reasons
should
have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had
(10 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
relied upon the confession made by the
appellant, there was no reason as to why the
order of discharge passed by the Criminal
Court on the basis of self-same evidence
should
not
consideration.
have
been
The
materials
taken
into
brought
on
record pointing out the guilt are required to
be proved. A decision must be arrived at on
some evidence, which is legally admissible.
The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be
applicable in a departmental proceeding but
the principles of natural justice are. As the
report of the Enquiry Officer was based on
merely
ipse
dixit
as
also
surmises
and
conjectures, the same could not have been
sustained.
The
inferences
drawn
by
the
Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported
by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known,
however
high
may
be,
can
under
no
circumstances be held to be a substitute for
legal proof.”
10. Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of General Manager
(Operations)
State
Bank
of
India
and
Anr.
Vs.
R.
Periyasamy3. The referred relevant para Nos.9, 11 & 14 of the
judgment are reproduced below:“9.
In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vs.
Nemi Chand Nalwaya, this Court observed as
follows:"7.
It is now well settled that the courts
will not act as an appellate court and
reassess the evidence led in the domestic
enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that
(2015) 3 SCC 101
(11 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
another view is possible on the material on
record. If the enquiry has been fairly and
properly held and the findings are based on
evidence, the question of adequacy of the
evidence or the reliable nature of the
evidence will not be grounds for interfering
with the findings in departmental enquiries.
Therefore, courts will not interfere with
findings of fact recorded in departmental
enquiries, except where such findings are
based on no evidence or where they are
clearly perverse. The test to find out
perversity is to see whether a tribunal
acting reasonably could have arrived at
such conclusion or finding, on the material
on record. The courts will however interfere
with the findings in disciplinary matters, if
principles of natural justice or statutory
regulations have been violated or if the
order is found to be arbitrary, capricious,
mala
fide
or
based
on
extraneous
considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India: (1995) 6 SCC 749, Union of
India v. G. Ganayutham: (1997) 7 SCC
463,
Bank
of
India
v.
Degala
Suryanarayana: (1999) 5 SCC 76 and High
Court
of
Judicature
at
Bombay
v.
ShashiKant S Patil (2000) 1 SCC 416)."
It is not necessary to multiply authorities
on this point. Suffice it to say that the law is
well settled in this regard.
11. It is interesting to note that the learned
Single Judge went to the extent of observing
that
the
concept
of
preponderance
of
probabilities is alien to domestic enquiries. On
the contrary, it is well known that the standard
(12 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
of proof that must be employed in domestic
enquiries is in fact that of the preponderance of
probabilities. In Union of India Vs. Sardar Bahadur,
this Court held that a disciplinary proceeding is
not a criminal trial and thus, the standard of
proof required is that of preponderance of
probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable
doubt. This view was upheld by this Court in
State Bank of India & ors. Vs. Ramesh Dinkar
Punde. More recently, in State Bank of India Vs.
Narendra Kumar Pandey, this Court observed
that a disciplinary authority is expected to
prove the charges leveled against a bankofficer on the preponderance of probabilities
and not on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
14. In administrative law, it is a settled
principle that the onus of proof rests upon the
party alleging the invalidity of an order. In
other words, there is a presumption that the
decision or executive order is properly and
validly made, a presumption expressed in the
maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta
which means 'all things are presumed to be
done in due form”
11. On the basis of the arguments as advanced and the above
judgments as cited, learned senior counsel prayed that the
impugned punishment order be quashed and set aside and the
writ petition be allowed.
12. Per contra, learned senior counsel Mr. N.K. Maloo assisted by
Advocate Mr.Pratyush Sharma appearing for the respondent
strongly
opposed
the
submissions.
Learned
senior
counsel
submitted that the petitioner was rightly issued the impugned
charge-sheet, as he tried to influence the said Judge by
(13 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
approaching him in the mentioned case, who recorded the said
fact in the order dated 29.11.2008. The order dated 29.11.2008 is
reproduced below:“oknh&izkFkhZ
,oa
izfroknh
Jh
cuokjhyky@vizkFkhZ
izHkqn;ky ds vf/koDrk Jh cuokjhyky mifLFkr gSA
vkt bu nksuksa ekeyks ls lEcfU/kr fjO;w vkosnu tks mDr
izfroknh&vizkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr fd;s x;s gS] cgl gsrq fu;r
FksA
gekjs }kjk oknh&izkFkhZ dk vkosnu vUrxZr vkns’k 22
fu;e 3 lh-ih-lh bl U;k;ky; esa dk;ZHkkj lEHkkyus ls iwoZ ls
yfEcr pyk vk jgk Fkk] ftlesa fn- 05-07-2008 dks cgl lqudj
fnukad 02-08-2008 dks vkns’k lquk;k x;k FkkA
fjO;w vkosnu ds lEcU/k esa mDr izfroknh Jh cuokjh
yky@vizkFkhZ ds vf/koDrk Jh cuokjh yky us vius iq= U;kf;d
vf/kdkjh ds ek/;e ls gesa vizksp djus dk iz;kl fd;k gS] ftl
dkj.k ekStwnk ekeys esa vkxs ge dksbZ dk;Zokgh djuk mfpr ugha
leÖkrs gSaA vr% ekuuh; ftyk U;k;k/kh’k egksn; dks mijksDr
izdj.k o vU; lEc+) rhuksa izdj.k vU; U;k;ky; esa vUrfjr
djus gsrq fuosnu fd;k tkosA
i=koyh okLrs bUrtkj vkns’k fnukad 05-12-2008 dks is’k
gksA”
13. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the petitioner
was
issued
a
charge-sheet
for
the
above
misconduct
by
memorandum dated 04.01.2010 by which three charges were
communicated to him. The petitioner submitted his explanation to
the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge in which he, at the first instance by
his
clarification/response,
failed
to
counter
the
fact
as
recorded by the said Judge in the order dated 29.11.2008. The
explanation as submitted by the petitioner, being the relevant is
reproduced under:-
(14 of 35)
“1-
[CW-17301/2013]
;g fd eSa Jh egsUnz dqekj th 'kekZ vij ftyk U;k;k/kh’k
QkLVVªsd la[;k&5 t;iqj 'kgj dks O;fDr’k% ugha tkurk uk eSa
dHkh muls feyk gwaA Jh 'kekZ lkgc esjs ls nks Js.kh ofj"B
vf/kdkjh gSaA eSa rks cgqr NksVk deZpkjh gwaA eSaus dHkh Hkh Jh 'kekZ
lkgc ls dksbZ vizksp flQkfj’k izR;{k ;k vizR;{k :i ls ugha dhA
esjs fo:) bl izdkj ds vkjksi fcYdqy xyr yxk;s x;s gSaA
2- dfFkr U;k;ky; vknsf’kdk fnukad 29-11-08 dh ckcr eSaus vius
firkth Jh cuokjhyky vxzoky] ,MoksdsV ls ekyqe fd;k rks
mUgksaus izekf.kr izfrfyfi 18 tuojh 2010 dks udy izkIr dj
fn[kkbZ rks fuEu ckrsa izrhr gksrh gS%&
¼v½ & eq> xksfoUn vxzoky dk uke bl vknsf’kdk esa gS gh
ughaA
Jh cuokjh yky th vxzoky gekjs firk ds ge nks iq= gS] nksuksa gh
U;kf;d vf/kdkjh gSaA ,slk yxrk gS fd Jh egsUnz dqekj th 'kekZ
dks fnukad 29-11-08 dh vknsf’kdk fy[krs le; rd uke ekyqe gh
ugha FkkA
¼c½& bl vknsf’kdk ls ;g Hkh ekyqe ugha iMrk gS fd dc]
dgka fdl izdkj ls Jh 'kekZ lkgc U;k;k/kh’k egksn; dks vizksp
djus dk iz;kl fd;k rFkk eq>s fn;s x;s vkjksi i= o eseksjsaMe esa
Hkh bl izdkj dk mYys[k ugha gSA
¼l½& bl izdkj Li"V rF;ksa ds fcuk Li"V mRrj Hkh
fuosnu djuk laHko ugha gSA
3- ;g gS fd vkjksi i= o eseksjsaMe esa flQZa vknsf’kdk 29-11-08
dks vk/kkjk cuk;k x;k gS vU; fdlh tkap] fjiksVZ c;ku ;k
f’kdk;r dk ftØ ugha gSA eq> xksfoUn vxzoky dk uke ckn esa
dc] fdl vk/kkj ls bl izdj.k esa fjdkWMZ ij vk;k ;g Hkh
mYysf[kr ugha gSA
4- eSaus bl laca/k esa fnukad 16-01-10 dks tfj;s ,d jftLVªh
fyQkQk esa Jheku~ jftLVªkj lrdZrk t;iqj ds irs ij ekuuh;
Jheku~ U;k;kf/kifr egksn;] Jheku vklksik lkgc dks lacksf/kr
djrs gq, i= Hkstdj esjs fo:) f’kdk;r] vkWMZj 'khV 29-11-08
c;ku ;k tkap ;k vU; fjiksVZ dh izfrfyfi gsrq uez fuosnu fd;k
Fkk] fodYi esa i=koyh fujh{k.k gsrq Hkh fuosnu fd;k Fkk] ijUrq eq>s
bl ckcr dksbZ funsZ’k vHkh rd izkIr ugha gqvk gSA bl dkj.k
Li"Vhdj.k Jheku~ th dh lsok esa iw.kZ rF;ksa dh tkudkjh ds vHkko
esa fn;k tkuk laHko ugha gSA
(15 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
5- eSa bl ekeysa esa fcYdqy funksZ"k o vufHkK gwaA ;fn bl ckcr esa
vizksp djus dk gh iz;kl fd;k tkrk rks Jheku~ egsUnz dqekj th
o mlds iwoZ ds U;k;k/kh’k egksn; ls Hkh fd;k tk ldrk FkkA
6- ;g fd Jh egsUnz dqekj th 'kekZ lkgc] us vknsf’kdk 29-11-08
esa ,slk vkjksi yxkus dk vk/kkj esjs firkth Jh cuokjh yky
vxzoky }kjk fn;s x;s layXu 'kiFk i=ksa o vU; 'kiFki=ksa ls
Jheku~ dks Li"V gks tk;sxkA
7- bl lEcU/k esa ;g Hkh fuosnu gS fd Jheku~ eq> izkFkhZ dks
O;fDrxr :i ls Hkh mifLFkr gksdj lquokbZ dk volj iznku djus
dh Ñik djsaA
vr% fuosnu gS fd esjs fo:) tkap fu;e 17 lh-lh-,- ds
rgr lekIr djus dh Ñik djsaA”
14. According to learned senior counsel Mr. N.K. Maloo, the
above explanation failed to counter the specific fact as recorded
by the said Judge in the order, however, in support the petitioner
also submitted three affidavits; one of his father Banwari Lal
Agrawal, Advocate, another of Advocate Dheeraj Gupta, and one
of Prabhu Dayal S/o Gatti Lal. As the said judge recorded in the
order dated 29.11.2008 that father of the petitioner (through him)
tried to approach him in the matter and therefore, the affidavit as
submitted by father of the petitioner i.e. Advocate Banwari Lal
Agarwal also relevant and therefore the same is also reproduced
as under:-
“
'kiFk i=
eSa cuokjh yky vxzoky ,MoksdsV iq= Lo- Jh lk/kwjke
vxzoky tkfr egktu mez 74 lky fuoklh lwjtiksy] vukt e.Mh
jksM] t;iqj l’kiFk dFku djrk gwa fd%&
1- esjs o esjs Hkkb;ksa ds fo:) efUnj u`flax th cuke cuokjh yky
oxSjg ds uke ls okn U;k;ky; vij ftyk U;k;k/kh’k QkLVVªsd
la[;k&5 t;iqj 'kgj esa py jgk FkkA
2- ;g fd Jh izHkwn;ky iq= eV~Vhyky eh.kk us ,d fjV fiVh’ku
1978 esa ekuuh; jkt- mPp U;k;ky; esa efUnj ds VªLVh ds fo:)
(16 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
izLrqr dh Fkh fd orZeku dfFkr egUr ukjk;.knkl ds firk nkeksnj
nkl efUnj dh lEifRr dks nsoLFkku foHkkx ls fudkydj csp jgs
gSaA tks lEifRr csp nh mls fujLr fd;k tk,A eSa cuokjh yky
vxzoky ml fjV ;kfpdk esa vf/koDrk FkkA ml ;kfpdk dh
tokcnsgh ds fy, Jh izHkwn;ky eh.kk ds fo:) o esjs fo:) nokc
o Mj mRiUu djus ds fy, ,d >wBk nkok lu~ 1980 esa bl vkjksi
ds lkFk izLrqr dj fn;k fd izHkwn;ky us o cuokjh yky us lu~
1969 esa okn ds 11&12 o"kZ iwoZ tehu ij dCtk dj edku cuk
fy;kA bl nkok dks 30 o"kZ ls tc dHkh efUnj ds egUr ds
f[kykQ dk;kZokgh djrs gSa rks vius cpko esa dke esa ysrs jgrs gSaA
3- ;g fd egUr nkeksnj nkl dfFkr ofdZax VªLVh ds nsgkUr ds ckn
ukjk;.knkl us mlds LFkku ij ofdZax VªLVh cukus dk ckn esa
vkns’k 22 fu;e 3 ds rgr izkFkZuk i= is’k fd;kA bldk fu.kZ;
fnukad 02-08-08 dks ikfjr Jheku~ egsUnz dqekj 'kekZ }kjk ikfjr
fd;k x;kA
4- bl vkns’k ds laca/k esa nksuksa nkok esa fjV ;kfpdk is’k dh xbZ
fjO;w fiVh’ku dks ntZ djrs le; Jheku~ egsUnz dqekj th 'kekZ
ukjkt gq,A mlds i’pkr~ gj is’kh ij okfil ysus gsrq nokc Mkyrs
jgsA
5- ;g fd Jheku 'kekZ lkgc ds ys[k dks ns[kdj fnukad 22-09-08
dks fyf[kr cgl is’k djuh iMhA tks fuEu ifjf’k"V&1 gS bldk
isjk la[;k&2 egRoiw.kZ gSA
6- ;g fd dbZ rkjh[k cnyus ds ckn fnukad 29-11-08 dks fjO;w
fiVh’ku ij eksf[kd cgl dh tk jgh FkhA U;k;k/kh’k egksn; ds
cgl ds fcUnw ewy i=koyh ds ljcjd dh iq’r ij uksV fd;s FksA
cgl ds nkSjku dqN ,sls fof/kd fcUnw fuosnu fd;s tk jgs Fks
ftlls fd muds }kjk ikfjr eq[; vkns’k 02-08-08 ds lEcU/k esa FksA
blesa Jh 'kekZ lkgc O;fFkr gks x;s vkSj ;kfpdk dks okfil ysus gsrq
nokc MkykA ftl ij ;kfpdkdrkZ U;k;ky; dh efgek o 'kkafr ds
dkj.k pqi gks x;s o ckgj vk x;sA
7- ;g fd Jh 'kekZ lkgc egsUnz dqekj th vius gh vkns’k ds
fo:) fjO;w fiVh’ku ls Hkh O;fFkr FksA
8- ;g fd blh ds dkj.k ls fn- 29-11-08 dh vknsf’kdk xyr :i
ls fy[k nhA eSaus vius nksuksa U;kf;d vf/kdkfj;ksa iq=ksa esa ls fdlh
iq= ds ek/;e ls Jheku~ egsUnz 'kekZ U;k;k/kh’k egksn; ls vizksp
djus dk iz;kl ugha fd;kA”
(17 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
15. Learned senior counsel submitted that by the affidavit father
of the petitioner also fails to satisfactorily counter the specific
allegation as recorded by the said Judge in the order dated
29.11.2008. The other two affidavits though have been submitted,
however, are not relevant. Learned senior counsel submitted that
the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge provided sufficient opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner-Judicial Officer, thereafter submitted the
report dated 17.04.2013 to the High Court. The said report was
placed before the Full Court of the High Court, which after
considering the matter resolved to impose the punishment of
stoppage of three Annual Grade Increments without cumulative
effect.
16. Learned senior counsel specifically argued that the Full Court
in its resolution specifically recorded that the report of the Hon’ble
Enquiry Judge was considered in depth and after deliberation, the
report was accepted and the above mentioned punishment was
passed.
17.
Learned Senior counsel further submitted that the present
case is of a Judicial Officer who is required to perform his duties
with great care & caution, impeccable integrity, devotion and
honesty, however, the conduct of the petitioner, as recorded by the
said Judge in the order dated 29.11.2008 and also found to be
proved by the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge in the report dated
17.04.2013 was undignified & serious misconduct, and therefore,
the punishment was rightly passed by order dated 05.08.2013.
18. Learned senior counsel further submitted that in the entire
arguments as raised by learned senior counsel for the petitioner,
there is no allegation regarding not providing the required
(18 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
documents, denial of sufficient opportunity of hearing, or violation
of
prescribed
procedure
in
conducting
the
departmental
proceedings and in passing the impugned punishment order. In
the absence of any such allegations, and in terms of the law as
settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court has a limited
scope of judicial review in the matters relating to departmental
proceedings.
19. In support of his arguments, learned senior counsel firstly
relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Pyare Mohan Lal Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.4. The
referred relevant paras 8, 9, 10 & 14 of the judgment are as
under:“8. In Baikuntha Nath Das & Anr. Vs.
Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada &
Anr., AIR 1992 SC 1020, this Court has laid
down certain criteria for the Courts, on which it
can interfere with an order of compulsory
retirement and they include mala fides, if the
order is based on no evidence, or if the order is
arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person
would form the requisite opinion on the given
material, i.e. if it is found to be a perverse
order. The Court held as under:–
“(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a
punishment. It implies no stigma nor any
suggestion of misbehaviour.
(ii)
The
order
has
to
be
passed
by
the
Government on forming the opinion that it is in
the public interest to retire a Government
servant compulsorily. The order is passed on
the subjective satisfaction of the Government.
(2010) 10 SCC 693
(19 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
(iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in
the
context
of
an
order
of
compulsory
retirement. This does not mean that judicial
scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High
Court or the Court would not examine the
matter
as
an
appellate
Court,
they
may
interfere if they are satisfied that the order is
passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on
no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary- in the
sense that no reasonable person would form the
requisite opinion on the given material : in
short, if it is found to be a perverse order.
(iv) The Government (or the Review Committee,
as the case may be) shall have to consider the
entire record of service before taking a decision
in
the
matter-
of
course
attaching
more
importance to record of and performance during
the later years. The record to be so considered
would naturally
confidential
favourable
servant
include
the entries
records/character
and
is
adverse.
promoted
notwithstanding
the
If
to
rolls,
a
a
adverse
in the
both
Government
higher
post
remarks,
such
remarks lose their sting, more so, if the
promotion is based upon merit (selection) and
not upon seniority.
(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not
liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the
showing that while passing it uncommunicated
adverse
remarks
consideration.
That
were
also
taken
circumstance
by
into
itself
cannot be a basis for interference.” (Emphasis
added).
9. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court
in Posts and Telegraphs Board & Ors. Vs. C.S.N.
Murthy, AIR 1992 SC
1368; Sukhdeo
Vs.
(20 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
Commissioner Amravati Division, Amravati &
Anr., 6 (1996) 5 SCC 103; I.K. Mishra Vs. Union
of India & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 3740; M.S. Bindra
Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 3058;
and Rajat Baran Roy & Ors. Vs. State of West
Bengal & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 1661. This Court
observed that there was a very limited scope of
judicial
review
in
a
case
of
compulsory
retirement and it was permissible only on the
grounds of non-application of mind; mala fides;
or want of material particulars. Power to retire
compulsorily a Government servant in terms of
Service Rules is absolute, provided the authority
concerned forms a bona fide opinion that
compulsory retirement is in public interest.
10. In State of Gujarat & Anr. Vs. Suryakant
Chunilal Shah, (1999) 1 SCC 529, this Court
held that while considering the case of an
employee for compulsory retirement, public
interest
is
of
paramount
importance.
The
dishonest, corrupt and dead-wood deserve to be
dispensed with. How efficient and honest an
employee is, is to be assessed on the basis of
the material on record, which may also be
ascertained from confidential reports. However,
there must be some tangible material against
the
employee
warranting
his
compulsory
retirement.
14. In Nawal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR
SC
4303,
a
similar
view
has
been
reiterated. The Court observed as under: “At
the outset, it is to be reiterated that the judicial
service is not a service in the sense of an
employment.
Judges
are
discharging
their
functions while exercising the sovereign judicial
power of the State. Their honesty and integrity
(21 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
is expected to be beyond doubt. It should be
reflected in their overall reputation. Further, the
nature of judicial service is such that it cannot
afford
to
suffer
continuance
in
service
of
persons of doubtful integrity or who have lost
their utility. If such evaluation is done by the
Committee of the High Court Judges and is
affirmed in the writ petition, except in very
exceptional circumstances, this Court would not
interfere with the same, particularly because
the order of compulsory retirement is based on
the subjective satisfaction of the authority. ……
Further, it is impossible to prove by positive
evidence the basis for doubting the integrity of
the judicial officer. In the present-day system,
reliance is required to be placed on the opinion
of the higher officer who had the opportunity to
watch the performance of the officer concerned
from close quarters and formation of his opinion
with regard to the overall reputation enjoyed by
the officer concerned would be the basis. …..the
lower judiciary is the foundation of the judicial
system. We hope that the High Courts would
take appropriate steps regularly for weeding out
the dead wood or the persons polluting the
justice delivery system”.
20. Learned senior counsel further relied upon the judgment
passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Registrar
General, High Court of Patna Vs. Pandey Gajendra Prasad
and Ors.5 The referred relevant para Nos.13 to 16 of the
judgment are quoted hereunder:“13. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution, in State of
(2012) 6 SCC 357
(22 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
Andhra Pradesh Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, this
Court made the following observations:
“The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding
under
Article
of
the
Constitution a court of appeal over the
decision
of
the
departmental
authorities
holding
a
enquiry against a public
servant: it is concerned to determine
whether
the
enquiry
is
held
by
an
authority competent in that behalf, and
according to the procedure prescribed in
that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. Where
there
is
some
evidence,
which
the
authority entrusted with the duty to hold
the
enquiry
evidence
has
may
accepted
reasonably
and
which
support
the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function
of the High Court in a petition for a writ
under Article 226 to review the evidence
and to arrive at an independent finding on
the evidence.”
14. Elaborating on the scope of judicial review of an
assessment of the conduct of a judicial officer by a
Committee, approved by the Full Court, in Syed T.A.
Naqshbandi & Ors. Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir &
Ors. this Court noted as follows:
“As has often been reiterated by this
Court, judicial review is permissible only to
the extent of finding whether the process
in reaching the decision has been observed
correctly and not the decision itself, as
such. Critical or independent analysis or
appraisal of the materials by the courts
exercising powers of judicial review unlike
(23 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
the case of an appellate court, would
neither be permissible nor conducive to the
interests of either the officers concerned or
the
system
and
institutions
of
administration of justice with which we are
concerned in this case, by going into the
correctness
as
such
of
ACRs
or
the
assessment made by the Committee and
approval accorded by the Full Court of the
High Court.”
15.
In
Through
Rajendra
Singh
Verma
LRs.
Ors.
Vs.
&
(Dead)
Lieutenant
Governor (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., reiterating
the principle laid down in Shashikant S. Patil &
Anr. (supra), this Court observed as follows:
“In case where the Full Court of the High
Court recommends compulsory retirement
of an officer, the High Court on the judicial
side has to exercise great caution and
circumspection in setting aside that order
because it is a complement of all the Judges
of the High Court who go into the question
and it is possible that in all cases evidence
would not be forthcoming about integrity
doubtful of a judicial officer.”
It was further observed that:
“If that authority bona fide forms an opinion
that the integrity of a particular officer is
doubtful, the correctness of that opinion
cannot be challenged before courts. When
such a constitutional function is exercised
on the administrative side of the High
Court, any judicial review thereon should be
made
only
with
great
care
and
circumspection and it must be confined
strictly to the parameters set by this Court
(24 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
in several reported decisions. When the
appropriate
authority
forms
bona
fide
opinion that compulsory retirement of a
judicial officer is in public interest, the writ
court under Article 226 or this Court under
Article 32 would not interfere with the
order.”
16. In the present case, the recommendation
of the Standing Committee to dismiss the first
respondent from service was based on the
findings in the enquiry report submitted by
the
enquiry
officer
pursuant
to
the
departmental enquiry; his reply to the show
cause notice; his ACR and other materials
placed before it. The recommendation of the
Standing
Committee
was
approved
and
ratified by the Full Court. There is nothing on
record to even remotely suggest that the
evaluation made, firstly by the Standing
Committee and then by the Full Court, was so
arbitrary, capricious or so irrational so as to
shock the conscience of the Division Bench to
justify its interference with the unanimous
opinion of the Full Court. As regards the
observation of the Division Bench on the
reputation of the first respondent based on
his ACRs, it would suffice to note that apart
from
the
fact
that
an
ACR
does
not
necessarily project the overall profile of a
judicial officer, the entire personal file of the
respondent was before the Full Court when a
conscious unanimous decision was taken to
award the punishment of his dismissal from
service. It is also well settled that in cases of
such assessment, evaluation and formulation
of opinion, a vast range of multiple factors
(25 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
play a vital and important role and no single
factor should be allowed to be blown out of
proportion either to decry or deify issues to
be resolved or claims sought to be considered
or asserted. In the very nature of such things,
it would be difficult, rather almost impossible
to subject such an exercise undertaken by the
Full Court, to judicial review, save and except
in an extra-ordinary case when the court is
convinced that some exceptional thing which
ought not to have taken place has really
happened and not merely because there could
be another possible view or there is some
grievance with the exercise undertaken by the
Committee/Full
Court.
[(See:
Syed
T.A.
Naqshbandi (supra)].”
21. Learned senior counsel also relied upon the judgment passed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Murti Yadav
Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. 6. The relevant paras 10,
11, 13 & 14 of the judgment are reproduced hereunder:“10. This Court in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi &
Ors. vs State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors.,
(2003) 9 SCC 592, considering the scope of
judicial review of an assessment of the conduct
of a judicial officer approved by a Full Court,
observed as follows:
“7. … As has often been reiterated by this Court,
judicial review is permissible only to the extent
of finding whether the process in reaching the
decision has been observed correctly and not
the
decision
independent
itself,
as
such.
Critical
analysis
or
appraisal
of
or
the
materials by the courts exercising powers of
(2020) 1 SCC 801
(26 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
judicial review unlike the case of an appellate
court,
would
neither
be
permissible
nor
conducive to the interests of either the officers
concerned or the system and institutions of
administration of justice with which we are
concerned in this case, by going into the
correctness as such of ACRs or the assessment
made by the Committee and approval accorded
by the Full Court of the High Court.”
11. The question was again considered in
Rajendra Singh Verma (D) thr. Lrs. vs. Lt.
Governor (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 10 SCC 1,
reiterating the principle laid down in High
Court
of
Judicature
at
Bombay
vs.
Shashikant S. Patil & Anr., (2000) 1 SCC
416, this Court observed as follows:
“191. … in case where the Full Court of the High
Court recommends compulsory retirement of an
officer, the High Court on the judicial side has to
exercise great caution and circumspection in
setting
aside
that
order
because
it
is
a
complement of all the Judges of the High Court
who go into the question and it is possible that
in all cases evidence would not be forthcoming
about integrity doubtful of a judicial officer….”
It was further observed that:
“192. … If that authority bona fide forms an
opinion that the integrity of a particular officer
is doubtful, the correctness of that opinion
cannot be challenged before courts. When such
a constitutional function is exercised on the
administrative side of the High Court, any
judicial review thereon should be made only
with great care and circumspection and it must
be confined strictly to the parameters set by
this Court in several reported decisions. When
(27 of 35)
the
appropriate
[CW-17301/2013]
authority
forms
bona
fide
opinion that compulsory retirement of a judicial
officer is in public interest, the writ court under
Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would
not interfere with the order.
13. A person entering the judicial service no
doubt
has
career
aspirations
including
promotions. An order of compulsory retirement
undoubtedly
affects
the
career
aspirations.
Having said so, we must also sound a caution
that judicial service is not like any other service.
A person discharging judicial duties acts on
behalf of the State in discharge of its sovereign
functions. Dispensation of justice is not only an
onerous duty but has been considered as akin
to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, is a
very serious matter. The standards of probity,
conduct, integrity that may be relevant for
discharge of duties by a careerist in another job
cannot be the same for a judicial officer. A
judge
holds
the
Impeccable
office
of
a
integrity,
public
trust.
unimpeachable
independence with moral values embodied to
the core are absolute imperatives which brooks
no compromise. A judge is the pillar of the
entire justice system and the public has a right
to demand virtually irreproachable conduct from
anyone performing a judicial function. Judges
must
strive
for
the
highest
standards
of
integrity in both their professional and personal
lives.
14. It has to be kept in mind that a person
seeking justice, has the first exposure to the
justice
delivery
system
at
the
level
of
subordinate judiciary, and thus a sense of
(28 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
injustice can have serious repercussions not
only on that individual but can have its fall out
in the society as well. It is therefore absolutely
necessary that the ordinary litigant must have
complete faith at this level and no impression
can be afforded to be given to a litigant which
may even create a perception to the contrary as
the consequences can be very damaging. The
standard or yardstick for judging the conduct of
the judicial officer therefore has necessarily to
be strict. Having said so, we must also observe
that it is not every inadvertent flaw or error that
will make a judicial officer culpable. The State
Judicial Academies undoubtedly has a stellar
role to perform in this regard. A bona fide error
may need correction and counselling. But a
conduct which creates a perception beyond the
ordinary cannot be countenanced. For a trained
legal mind, a judicial order speaks for itself.”
22. Learned senior counsel also relied upon the judgment passed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Airports Authority
of India Vs. Pradip Kumar Banerjee7. The referred relevant
para Nos. 35 to 38 of the judgment are reproduced hereunder:“35.
It
is
proceedings,
trite
law
it
not
is
that
in
disciplinary
necessary
for
the
Disciplinary Authority to deal with each and
every ground raised by the delinquent officer in
the representation against the proposed penalty
and detailed reasons are not required to be
recorded in the order imposing punishment if he
accepts the findings recorded by the Enquiry
Officer. Our view stands fortified by the decision
(2025) 4 SCC 111
(29 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
of this Court in Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi
Gaolia Bank, wherein it was held:
11. . . . Further, it is well settled that if the
disciplinary authority accepts the findings
recorded by the enquiry officer and passes
an order, no detailed reasons are required
to be recorded in the order imposing
punishment. The punishment is imposed
based on the findings recorded in the
enquiry
report,
as
such,
no
further
elaborate reasons are required to be given
by the disciplinary authority.
36. All that is required on the part of the
Disciplinary Authority is that it should examine
the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings and
arrive at a reasoned conclusion that the material
placed on record during the course of enquiry
establishes the guilt of the delinquent employee
on
the
principle
of
preponderance
of
probabilities. This is precisely what was done by
the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
Authority while dealing with the case of the
Respondent.
37. In our considered view, the Division Bench
fell into grave error in substituting the standard
of proof required in a criminal trial vis-a-vis the
disciplinary enquiry conducted by the employer.
It is a settled principle of law that the burden
laid upon the prosecution in a criminal trial is to
prove
the
case
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
However, in a disciplinary enquiry, the burden
upon the department is limited and it is required
to
prove
its
case
on
the
principle
of
preponderance of probabilities.
38. In this regard, we are benefitted by the
judgment of this Court in the Union of India v.
(30 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
Sardar Bahadur, wherein this Court held as
follows:
15. . . . A disciplinary proceeding is not a
criminal trial. The standard proof required
is that of preponderance of probability and
not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
inference that Nand Kumar was a person
likely to have official dealings with the
Respondent was one which a reasonable
person would draw from the proved facts of
the case, the High Court cannot sit as a
court of appeal over a decision based on it.
Where there are some relevant materials
which the authority has accepted and which
materials
may
reasonably
support
the
conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not
the function of the High Court exercising its
jurisdiction Under Article 226 to review the
materials and to arrive at an independent
finding on the materials. If the enquiry has
been
properly
held
the
question
of
adequacy or reliability of the evidence
cannot
be
canvassed
before
the
High
Court…….”
23. On the basis of the arguments and the judgments as cited,
learned senior counsel Mr. N.K. Maloo supported the impugned
order dated 05.08.2013 and prayed for dismissal of the writ
petition.
24. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
25. This Court is cognizant of the fact that in the matter of
disciplinary proceedings, power of judicial review is very limited.
In the matter of departmental proceedings, the constitutional
(31 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
courts while exercising the power of judicial review cannot act as
an
appellate
authority
while
examining
the
orders
of
the
disciplinary authority, however, the difference can be made where
the court notes that the prescribed procedure under the law was
not followed, the enquiry report was contrary to the documents &
facts, the Enquiry Officer was biased and the complete exercise,
which culminated into passing the impugned punishment order is
palpably arbitrary, unreasonable, unjustified, principles of natural
justice were not followed or the enquiry was conducted by an
incompetent authority.
26. The facts of the present case, as noted from the pleadings
and arguments as advanced, shows that the petitioner, a judicial
officer, was issued a charge-sheet under 17 of the CCA Rules,
1958 under which three charges were levelled against him as the
senior judge of the District Court, in respect of a case pending
before him recorded in the order dated 29.11.2008 that father of
the petitioner, through the petitioner tried to influence, as he
approached
the
said
Judge
in
the
case.
The
justification/explanation given by the petitioner on receiving the
charge-sheet
under
Rule
of
the
CCA
Rules,
1989,
as
reproduced in the previous paras has also been examined by this
Court, is insufficient and unsatisfactory and goes on to show that
the petitioner, through his explanation along-with three affidavits
as submitted, tried to question the said judge who pass the order
dated 29.11.2008. This Court also noted that the petitioner
through his explanation failed to answer in clear and justified
words that allegations as levelled against him are baseless and
there was no basis to connect him.
(32 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
27. This Court further noted that the explanation as submitted
by the said Judge, who passed the order dated 29.11.2008, noted
that
the
said
explanation/reply
Judge
specifically
stated
in
his
dated
22.05.2009
that
prior
to
29.11.2008 the petitioner herein met him, which amounts
to approaching in the pending judicial case in which his
father, Advocate Banwari Lal Agarwal, is a litigant as well
as lawyer. Relevant part is quoted below:“fnukad 29-11-2008 dh rkjh[k is’kh ij cgl ds
nkSjku mDr vf/koDrk Jh cuokjhyky vxzoky us [kqys
U;k;ky; esa v|ksgLrk{kjdrkZ dks ;g dgk Fkk fd
os ;g tkurs gSa fd muds fo#) lEcfU/kr vkns’k D;ksa
ikfjr fd;k x;k gS] tcfd gdhdr esa fnukad 29-112008 dh is’kh ls iwoZ Jh cuokjhyky vxzoky vf/koDrk
ds iq= Jh xksfoUn vxzoky] tks vyoj esa vij eq[;
U;kf;d eftLVªsV ds in ij
dk;Zjr gSa]
v|ksgLrk{kjdrkZ ls feys Fks] ftl dkj.k
v|ksgLrkk{kjdrkZ us mijksDr frfFk dh vknsf’kdk esa ;g
rF; vafdr fd;k gS fd vf/koDrk Jh cuokjhyky us
vius iq= U;kf;d vf/kdkjh ds ek/;e ls
v|ksgLrk{kjdrkZ dks ,izksp djus dk iz;kl fd;k gS]
ftl dkj.k os ekStwnk ekeys esa dksbZ dk;Zokgh djuk
mfpr ugha le>rs gSa vkSj nksuksa i=kofy;ka e; fjO;w
vkosnuksa ds vU; U;k;ky;ksa esa vUrfjr djus gsrq
ekuuh; ftyk U;k;k/kh’k egksn; dks fuosnu fd;k x;k]
tks fuosnu Lohdkj dj ekuuh; ftyk ,oa lS’ku
U;k;k/kh’k egksn; us lEcfU/kr i=kofy;ka fo}ku vij
ftyk U;k;k/kh’k QkLV Vªsd Øe&6] t;iqj uxj] t;iqj
ds U;k;ky; esa vUrfjr dh gSa vkSj vc lEcfU/kr
izdj.k mDr U;k;ky; esa yfEcr gSaA”
28. This Court also considered the fact as admitted by the
petitioner as well as the respondent both, that the said Judge was
not known to either the petitioner or his father, a practicing
(33 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
advocate of the district court, and therefore, there was no basis
for the said Judge to make any false or baseless allegation as
mentioned in the order dated 29.11.2008 and who also specifically
stated the said fact in his explanation dated 22.05.2009. This
Court has also considered the enquiry report dated 17.04.2013 as
submitted by Hon’ble Enquiry Judge of the High Court and finds
that no procedural irregularity or illegality was committed while
conducting the enquiry. This Court also noted from the record of
the case that the petitioner was allowed to inspect the relevant
record, and therefore, the complete procedure was duly followed
by the respondents.
29. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner during the entire
arguments also failed to point out that there was any noncompliance or violation of any procedure in conducting the
departmental proceedings and passing of the punishment order,
however, all the arguments were confined to the factual aspect,
which cannot be looked into by this Court under its power of
Judicial Review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
where the Court has to judicially review the orders/judgments etc.
strictly in terms of law as cited above.
30. The recent judgment as cited before this Court by learned
Senior counsel for respondent passed in the case of Ram Murti
Yadav (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the
previous law with regard to conduct of the said Judge & the scope
of judicial review, clearly sound a caution that judicial service is
not like other services. The person performing judicial services
stands on a different pedestal as it acts on behalf of the state in
discharge of its sovereign function.
(34 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
31. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that dispensation of
justice is not only an onerous duty but has been considered as
akin to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, the standards of
probity, conduct, integrity that are relevant for discharge of duties
by a careerist in another job cannot be the same for a Judicial
Officer. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that a judge holds the
office of a public trust and must acts with impeccable integrity,
unimpeachable independence with moral values embodied to the
core with no space for any compromise in performing the judicial
duties.
32. The
Hon’ble
Apex
Court
while
considering
its
earlier
judgments on the scope of judicial review, in the matters of
Judicial Officer in the case of disciplinary proceedings, held that
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is
not a Court of appeal over the departmental authorities. Judicial
review is permissible only where the Court finds that the
prescribed process in reaching to the decision was not duly
followed. Critical or independent analysis or appraisal of the
materials by the constitutional courts exercising powers of judicial
review unlike the case of an appellate court, is neither permissible
nor conducive to the interests of either the officer concerned or
the system and institutions of the administration of justice.
33. The serious observations as made by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Ram Murti Yadav (supra) and the other
relevant judgment as cited before this Court has settled the law
that performing the duties as Judicial Officer are not comparable
with any other services and the standard of integrity, devotion,
standards of ethics integrity are very high which does not permit
(35 of 35)
[CW-17301/2013]
any kind of compromise. In a democratic country like India people
have great faith in judicial system, of which the district Judiciary is
the strong backbone. If any conduct, which lower downs the
image of the Judiciary in the mind of the common litigant, erodes
the faith, then the same should not go unnoticed and deserves no
leniency. The observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as quoted
by this Court in the beginning of this judgment and the conduct of
the petitioner which is before this Court, minutely examined by
the Hon’ble Enquiry Judge and imposition of punishment by the
Full Court after deliberation proved the conduct of the petitioner
as a Judicial Officer. Unimpeachable integrity, honesty, found to be
seriously lacking and missing in the case of the petitioner as the
said Judge noted his conduct in its order which he failed to
counter as also examined by this Court in the above discussion.
34. This Court after considering the law as settled with regard to
interference of the decisions of the Full Court in the matter of
Judicial Officer is not inclined to exercise its power of judicial
review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the present
case.
35. Consequently, the present writ petition is dismissed.
36. No order as to costs.
(RAVI CHIRANIA),J
Monika
(INDERJEET SINGH),J
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