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[2026:RJ-JP:1411]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11940/2013
Gopal Sharma S/o Shri Rampal Sharma, aged about 60 years,
R/o 356, Shopping Centre, Near Jain Temple, Kota.
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
State of Rajasthan through Secretary, the Public Works
Department, Jaipur.
2.
Chief Engineer, PWD, Station Road, Jaipur.
3.
Additional Chief Engineer, Division Kota.
4.
Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Division,
District Jhalawar.
5.
Pension Department, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur through Director.
----Respondents
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Suresh Kashyap Advocate.
For Respondents
:
Mr. Dheeraj Tripathi, Additional
Government Counsel.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
Date of conclusion of arguments
::
09.01.2026
Date on which judgment was reserved ::
Whether the full judgment or only
09.01.2026
the operative part is pronounced
::
Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement
::
15.01.2026
1.
The petitioner has approached this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of writ of
mandamus directing the respondents to grant him pension and
retiral benefits.
2.
Briefly stated the facts are that the petitioner was
appointed on the post of Lower Division Clerk (LDC) as a
substantive
employee
of
the
Government
of
Rajasthan
on
(2 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:1411]
[CW-11940/2013]
20.08.1973. He rendered continuous service from the year 1973
to 1987, till he was transferred vide order dated 14.07.1987. The
petitioner has not placed on record any document to show that he
reported back for duty thereafter or marked attendance anywhere,
or even raised any grievance before the departmental authorities
by making a representation. For more than two decades following
1987, the petitioner remained completely silent and took no steps
whatsoever to assert any alleged service right.
3.
As
per
the
petitioner,
his
normal
date
of
superannuation was 30.11.2010 and in the absence of any formal
order of termination or disciplinary action, his service must be
deemed to have continued till his date of superannuation. After
keeping silence for more than two decades and after attaining the
age of superannuation in the year 2010, the petitioner submitted
representations in the year 2012 seeking grant of pension and
other retiral benefits, followed by a legal notice dated 27.06.2013.
The said request was not entertained by the respondents on the
ground that the petitioner had abandoned service in the year 1987
and did not possess the minimum qualifying service required
under the applicable pension rules and his service record was
missing. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner instituted the present
writ petition in the year 2013.
4.
The respondents,
in their
reply, have
specifically
pleaded that the petitioner abandoned service in the year 1987
and never reported back thereafter, resulting in cessation of the
employer–employee relationship. It has further been contended
that the service records of the petitioner are not traceable owing
[2026:RJ-JP:1411]
(3 of 10)
[CW-11940/2013]
to passage of time and the petitioner’s own prolonged inaction and
making verification of his claim was impossible.
5.
Despite repeated and strict directions issued by this
Court requiring the respondents to explain the loss of records and
to produce whatever documents were available as also to explain
the loss of service records, the respondents failed to place original
records on record and confined themselves to filing affidavits
explaining non-availability as well as lodging FIR in this regard.
While this Court does not approve such administrative lapse and
deprecate
the irresponsible attitude of the officials of the
respondents, the core question remains whether such lapse can
create or resurrect a substantive legal right in favour of the
petitioner.
6.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assailed
the impugned inaction in not granting pensionary benefits as
arbitrary, illegal and violative of the Rajasthan Civil Services
(Pension) Rules, 1996 as well as Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India. It was submitted that the petitioner was a
substantive employee and at no point of time, his services were
ever terminated in accordance with law. According to learned
counsel, mere non-attendance, in the absence of a formal order of
termination, resignation or compulsory retirement, cannot result
in forfeiture of service or extinguishment of lien on a substantive
post.
7.
It was vehemently argued that under the Rajasthan
Service Rules, abandonment of service is not an automatic
consequence of absence and necessarily requires affirmative
departmental action after issuance of notice and grant of
(4 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:1411]
[CW-11940/2013]
opportunity to the employee concerned. In the present case, no
notice of recall, no charge-sheet, no order of termination and no
proceedings of any nature were ever initiated against the
petitioner. In the absence of such action, the presumption must
operate in favour of continuity of service and the respondentemployer cannot be permitted to treat the petitioner as having
abandoned service.
8.
Learned counsel further contended that the burden of
proving abandonment squarely lies upon the respondent-employer
and not upon the petitioner-employee. Since the respondents
failed to produce service records, attendance registers, leave
records or any legitimate evidence to establish abandonment on
the part of the petitioner, an adverse inference ought to be drawn
against them. It was argued that loss of records, which are
statutorily required to be preserved by the department, cannot be
used to defeat the legitimate claim of an employee, particularly
when the lapse is solely attributable to the respondents.
9.
On the issue of eligibility to get pension, learned
counsel submitted that pension is not a bounty, but a statutory
and
constitutional
right
which
crystallises
on
the
date
of
superannuation. It was urged that the petitioner’s date of
retirement being in the year 2010, the pension rules as applicable
on that date must govern his case. Under the amended Rajasthan
Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1996, a minimum of ten years’
qualifying service is sufficient for grant of pension and such
requirement stands satisfied by the petitioner’s admitted service
of fourteen years from the year 1973 to 1987. Reliance was
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
[2026:RJ-JP:1411]
(5 of 10)
[CW-11940/2013]
D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305,
to contend that pension is not a bounty and the Rules must
receive a liberal interpretation in favour of employees and
technicalities should not defeat substantive rights.
10.
It was further argued that the plea of delay and laches
is misconceived, as the petitioner could not have claimed pension
prior to superannuation. According to learned counsel, the cause
of action arose only when pension was denied in 2011 and the writ
petition filed by him in 2013 cannot be termed belated. It was
contended that pension being a recurring and continuing right, the
doctrine of laches has limited application and denial thereof results
in continuing wrong.
11.
Further, learned counsel urged that the respondents’
action suffers from arbitrariness, non-application of mind and
violation of principles of natural justice and the petitioner is
entitled to pensionary benefits with all consequential reliefs.
12.
Per contra, learned Additional Government Counsel
appearing for the respondents vehemently opposed the claim of
the petitioner and contended that the writ petition is wholly
misconceived and deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. It
was submitted that the petitioner admittedly stopped attending
duties after the year 1987 and never reported back thereafter.
Such prolonged and unexplained absence, spanning more than
two decades, clearly amounts to voluntary abandonment of
service on the part of the petitioner.
13.
Learned counsel for the respondents argued that
abandonment of service does not require issuance of any formal
termination order or prior notice, particularly where the employee
[2026:RJ-JP:1411]
(6 of 10)
[CW-11940/2013]
has wilfully disengaged himself from duties. Learned counsel
emphasised that in cases of desertion, the relationship of
employer and employee comes to an end by operation of law and
the employer is not obliged to pass any formal order in this
regard.
14.
It was further contended that lien on a substantive post
is not an absolute or indefeasible right and ceases when the
employee
abandons
service
and
due
to
abandonment,
no
subsequent claim of continuity or pension can be entertained.
15.
On the question of pension eligibility, learned Additional
Government Counsel argued that eligibility for pension crystallises
on the basis of qualifying service rendered till the date of
abandonment of service and not on a notional or assumed date of
superannuation. In the instant case, no order of retirement under
the relevant Rules has been passed in favour of the petitioner.
Since the petitioner abandoned service in 1987, the pension rules
prevailing at that time would govern his case. Under the rules
prevailing at the relevant time, a minimum of twenty years’
qualifying service was mandatory, which the petitioner admittedly
did not fulfill.
16.
Addressing the contention regarding loss of service
records, learned Additional Government Counsel submitted that
the petitioner’s own prolonged inaction materially contributed to
the present situation. With passage of time, records might have
been weeded out/ misplaced or even lost, however, the petitioner
cannot take advantage of his own indolence. It was argued that
statutory benefits cannot be granted in the absence of fulfillment
of qualifying service, irrespective of non-availability of records,
[2026:RJ-JP:1411]
(7 of 10)
[CW-11940/2013]
without there being any proof by the petitioner for verifying his
actual service.
17.
Finally, on the issue of delay and laches, learned
Additional Government Counsel submitted that the writ petition
suffers from gross delay of nearly twenty-six years from the date
of cessation of service whereas service-related claims must be
agitated within a reasonable time and that stale claims ought not
to be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Learned Additional Government Counsel, thus, urged that the writ
petition is barred by delay and laches, devoid of merit and liable
to be dismissed with costs.
18.
Having considered the rival submissions and perused
the record, this Court finds the petitioner admittedly ceased to
attend duties in 1987 and remained completely silent for more
than two decades. The contention that the cause of action arose
only upon superannuation in 2010 is misconceived. The cause of
action, if any, arose when the petitioner stopped discharging
duties and allegedly perceived deprivation of his service rights. A
vigilant employee would have immediately sought redressal
through departmental or judicial remedies. The jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India being discretionary and
equitable, relief can be declined on the ground of unreasonable
delay alone. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that
stale service claims ought not be entertained. Entertaining a claim
after twenty-six years would unsettle settled administrative
positions and defeat the principle of finality. On this ground alone,
the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
(8 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:1411]
19.
[CW-11940/2013]
Even otherwise, on merits, the petitioner has failed to
establish continuity of service beyond 1987. His prolonged and
unexplained
absence
squarely
attracts
the
doctrine
of
abandonment of service. Long unauthorised absence in the
present case can also be treated as voluntary abandonment of
service. The contention of the petitioner that absence of a formal
termination order presumes continuity is, thus, legally untenable.
20.
The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that
loss of service records should operate in favour of the petitioner
also cannot be accepted. Maintenance of service records is
undoubtedly a statutory obligation and this Court deprecates the
respondents’ lapse in this regard. However, loss of records does
not ipso facto confer substantive rights in favour of the petitioner.
Entitlement to pension must flow from statutory compliance and
proved qualifying service.
21.
benefit
It is settled preposition of law that pension is a deferred
earned
for
service
actually
rendered
and
eligibility
crystallises on the basis of qualifying service till cessation of
service. The petitioner’s service effectively came to an end in 1987
upon abandonment. The rules prevailing at that time required a
minimum of twenty years’ qualifying service, which the petitioner
admittedly did not fulfill. Subsequent amendments/ new Rules
reducing the qualifying service to ten years cannot be applied
retrospectively to revive a concluded service relationship due to
abandonment. Inaction of the respondents in passing any final
order for terminating relationship does not dispense with the
statutory requirement of minimum qualifying service.
(9 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:1411]
22.
The
reliance
placed
by
[CW-11940/2013]
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of D.S. Nakara & Others (supra) is totally misplaced in the
facts and circumstances of the instant case. The said judgment
deals with uniformity among eligible pensioners and does not
dispense with the statutory requirement of minimum qualifying
service and directions for grant of pension cannot be granted in
the absence of fulfillment of criteria of qualifying service.
23.
Granting relief in the present case would set an
unhealthy precedent by encouraging resurrection of long-buried
service disputes, thereby undermining administrative certainty
and public interest. The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be converted
into a forum for revival of stale claims founded on prolonged
indolence and neglect.
24.
For the reasons aforesaid, this Court does not find any
merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.
25.
Before parting, this Court finds it necessary to record
its strong disapproval of the plea taken by the respondents
regarding loss of the service records of the petitioner. Service
records constitute the foundational basis for determining the
rights and entitlements of an employee and are required to be
maintained and preserved with due care in accordance with the
statutory rules and administrative instructions. The respondents
are trustees of public records and cannot be permitted to take
shelter behind a bald assertion of loss of record, particularly when
such plea is raised in the course of judicial proceedings. Despite
repeated and specific directions issued by this Court to trace,
(10 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:1411]
reconstruct
or
produce
the
[CW-11940/2013]
relevant
service
records,
the
respondents have failed to do so and have confined themselves to
filing
routine
affidavits,
reflecting
a
casual
and
indifferent
approach. Such conduct not only demonstrates administrative
reluctance but also erodes public confidence in governance and
accountability. The loss or misplacement of service records is not
a mere procedural lapse, but a serious dereliction of duty for
which responsibility must be fixed. Accordingly, this Court directs
the Principal Secretary of Public Works Department, Government
of Rajasthan to conduct an appropriate enquiry for ascertaining
the responsibility for loss of petitioner’s service records and to
initiate suitable legal and disciplinary action against the erring
officials in accordance with law. A detailed compliance report
indicating the steps taken, the officials found responsible and the
action initiated their against shall be placed on record before this
Court within a period of four months from today.
26.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI /
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