The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
15. Be that as it may, it is held that the nomination of Justice Challa Kodanda Ram (retired) as the Arbitrator for the applicant is legally valid and since the arbitration clause does envisage that this Court can appoint a Presiding Arbitrator in the event the Arbitrators do not reach a consensus on appointing a Presiding Arbitrator, this Court appoints Justice Ramesh D. Dhanuka, former Chief Justice, High Court of Bombay, as a Presiding 2000 (7) Supreme 145 ARBAPPL_39_2025 & another Arbitrator, who shall enter upon the reference forthwith. The learned Presiding Arbitrator shall be entitled to claim the fee in consultation with the parties. Accordingly, the arbitration application is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, in this application, shall stand closed. A copy of this order be communicated to the learned Arbitrator on the address mentioned herein below: Justice Ramesh D. Dhanuka, 13, Mittal Tower, C-Wing, Barrister Rajini Patel Marg, Nariman Point, Mumbai – 400 021. Ph:98211 34074.
Full Judgment Text
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Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
APHC010592712025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
Bench
[3441]
Arbitration Application No.39 of 2025
along with
Arbitration Application No.40 of 2025
Arbitration Application No.39 of 2025:...Applicant
M/s. Goodearth Maritime Private Limited
Vs.
M/s. Hindustan Shipyard Limited
...Respondent
**********
Advocate for Applicant
:
Mr. Anirudh Krishnan representing
Mr. Venkat Challa
Advocate for Respondent
:
Mr. J. Prabhakar, learned Senior
Counsel representing Mr. Sai Sanjay
Suraneni
CORAM: THE CHIEF JUSTICE DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR
DATE
: 6th March, 2026
P C:
The two arbitration applications have been filed by the applicant M/s.
Goodearth Maritime Private Limited under Section 11(6) r/w Section 15(2) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (for short, the Act of 1996).
With a view to understand the backdrop in the light of which the present
applications stand filed, it is necessary to give the material facts in brief as
under:
2.
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The parties entered into four shipbuilding contracts for construction of
bulk carriers. Four supplementary agreements in respect of the contracts
came to be also executed specifying in detail the agreed terms. Each of the
contracts is stated to be identifiable by an individual Identification Hull No. The
details of the Hull No., the contract date, date of the supplementary agreement
and the contractual date for delivery as also the actual date of delivery and the
delay in the delivery have been specified by the applicant, which is also
reproduced herein below:
Hull No.
11115
Contract
Date
21.05.2004
Supplementary
Agreement
01.09.2004
Contractual
Delivery
20.08.2006
Actual
Delivery
31.05.2007
Delay
(Days)
11116
21.05.2004
01.09.2004
20.02.2007
03.01.2008
11117
03.01.2005
15.02.2006
20.10.2007
07.05.2008
11118
03.01.2005
14.03.2006
20.10.2007
10.08.2009
On account of the alleged delay in the delivery of the vessels, it is
stated that four arbitration proceedings were initiated for Hull Nos.11115,
11116, 11117 and 11118. Arbitration proceedings involving Hull No. 11115,
11116 and 11117 were consolidated into a common arbitration. Thus,
Arbitration Application bearing No.39 of 2025 concerns Hull No. 11118 and
Arbitration Application bearing No.40 of 2025 concerns Hull No. 11115, 11116
and 11117.
3.
The present applications have been filed primarily seeking appointment
of the Presiding Arbitrator.
4.
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According to the agreed terms, in the event of a dispute between the
parties, it was agreed that the same would be resolved through the
mechanism of arbitration in terms of Article XIII of the agreement. The
disputes having arisen between the parties, the stated case of the applicant is
that a notice was issued invoking the arbitration clause in which the applicant
nominated Justice B. P. Jeevan Reddy (retired) as its nominee Arbitrator. The
respondent - M/s. Hindustan Shipyard Limited also responded and appointed
Justice T. Ch. Surya Rao (retired) as its nominee Arbitrator. Both the
Arbitrators then appointed Justice M. Jagannadha Rao (retired) as the
Presiding Arbitrator.
5.
It appears that the arbitration proceedings continued until Justice T. Ch.
Surya Rao (retired), the Arbitrator nominated by the respondents, passed
away on 01.02.2016 and the respondent thereafter nominated its substitute
Arbitrator Justice N.R.L. Nageswara Rao on 12.03.2016. The reconstituted
Tribunal is stated to have continued the proceedings for a period of 8.5 years
till 25.11.2024 when the Presiding Arbitrator Justice M. Jagannadha Rao
passed away.
On 26.12.2024, the applicant’s Arbitrator Justice B. P. Jeevan Reddy
(retired) recused himself from the proceedings. The applicant then nominated
Justice Challa Kodanda Ram (retired) as a substitute Arbitrator on 03.06.2025
who conveyed his consent on 06.06.2025. The appointment of the substitute
Arbitrator was also stated to have been brought to the notice of the nominee
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Arbitrator of the respondent and the counsel acting on behalf of the said
respondent.
6.
It appears from the record that a communication dated 26.10.2025, was
addressed by the nominee Arbitrator of the applicant, Justice Challa Kodanda
Ram (retired), informing the respondent about his entering the reference in the
pending arbitration relating to the contracts concerning Hull Nos.11115 to
11117 and 11118 and for taking necessary action at their end.
It also appears from the record that a communication, dated 17.10.2025,
was addressed by the General Manager of the respondent Company to the
learned counsel for the applicant informing that in terms of clauses 1.1 and 1.2
of Article XIII of the Ship Building Contract, the applicant had to appoint the
substitute Arbitrator in place of Justice B. P. Jeevan Reddy (retired) within 30
days of the communication of his resignation as Arbitrator and since the
applicant had failed to make the appointment within the stipulated time,
Justice N.R.L. Nageswara Rao (retired) had become the sole Arbitrator to
adjudicate upon the claims as per the agreed terms.
7.
It was, in those circumstances, stated that the appointment of Justice
Challa Kodanda Ram (retired) as substitute Arbitrator was not valid. At this
stage, it would be apt to reproduce the arbitration clause, which reads thus:
“1.1. In the event of any dispute between the parties hereto as
to any matter arising out of or relating to this Contract or any
stipulation herein or with respect thereto which cannot be settled by
the parties themselves, such dispute shall be resolved by arbitration
in Visakhapatnam, India, in accordance with the rules of the Indian
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Either party may demand
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arbitration of any such disputes by giving written notice to the other
party. Any demand for arbitration by either party hereto shall state the
name of the arbitrator appointed by such party and shall also state
specifically the question or questions as to which such party is
demanding arbitration. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of notice of
such demand for arbitration, the other party shall in turn appoint a
second arbitrator. The two arbitrators thus appointed shall thereupon
select a third arbitrator and the three arbitrators so named shall
constitute the board of arbitration (hereinafter called the "Arbitration
Board") for the settlement of such dispute.
1.2. In the event however, that said other party should fail to
appoint a second arbitrator as aforesaid within thirty (30) days
following receipt of notice of demand of arbitration, it is agreed that
such party shall thereby be deemed to have accepted and appointed
as its own arbitrator the one already appointed by the party
demanding arbitration, and the arbitration shall proceed forthwith
before this sole arbitrator, who alone, in such event, shall constitute
the Arbitration Board. And in the further event that the two arbitrators
appointed respectively by the parties hereto as aforesaid should be
unable to reach agreement on the appointment of the third arbitrator
within thirty (30) days from the date on which the second arbitrator is
appointed, either party of the said two arbitrators may apply to any
court in India or other official organization in India having jurisdiction
in such matter to appoint the third arbitrator. The award of the
arbitration, made by the sole arbitrator or by the majority of the three
arbitrators as the case may be, unless appealed by either parties,
shall be final, conclusive and binding upon the parties hereto.”
8.
Notwithstanding the fact that learned counsel for the respondent has
laid a lot of emphasis on the arbitration clause reproduced hereinabove to
bring home the point that failure on the part of the applicant to appoint the
Arbitrator within 30 days would preclude the applicant from nominating a
substitute Arbitrator and further that the Arbitrator already appointed by the
respondent would have to be accepted as its own Arbitrator, in our opinion,
the said argument is legally unsustainable.
On a perusal of the arbitration clause, it can be said that clause 1.2
would kick in only at the initial stage when one of the parties invokes the
Arbitration agreement by nominating its Arbitrator and calls upon either to
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accept the Arbitrator nominated by him as a sole Arbitrator, if the Agreement
warrants the dispute to be resolved by a sole Arbitrator, or fails to respond to
nominate its Arbitrator in a three member Arbitral Tribunal.
9.
It is only in those cases where a party fails to nominate its Arbitrator
within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of notice of demand for
Arbitration that clause 1.2 would be invoked. In the instant case, however, that
stage has since been crossed as not only did the applicant initially invoke the
arbitration clause by nominating its Arbitrator but also called upon the
respondent to nominate theirs, and the respondent nominated Justice T.Ch.
Surya Rao (retired) as their Arbitrator. The two Arbitrators so nominated then
appointed Justice M. Jagannadha Rao (retired) as the Presiding Arbitrator.
10.
The present case has to be seen in the context of Section 15(2) of the
Act of 1996, which inter alia envisages that when the Arbitrator withdraws from
office for any reason, a substitute Arbitrator shall be appointed according to
the rules that were applicable to the “appointment of the Arbitrator being
replaced”. In Yashwith Constructions (P) Ltd v. Simplex Concrete Piles
India Ltd1, it was held:
“The term "rules" in Section 15(2) obviously referred to the
provision for appointment, contained in the arbitration agreement or
any Rules of any Institution under which the disputes were referred to
arbitration. .. .When Section 15(2) says that a substitute arbitrator can
be appointed according to the rules that were applicable for the
appointment of the arbitrator originally, it is not confined to an
appointment under any statutory rule or rule framed under the Act or
under the Scheme. It only means that the appointment of the
substitute arbitrator must be done according to the original agreement
(2006) 6 SCC 204
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or provision applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator at the initial
stage.”
If the applicant had been remiss in appointing a substitute Arbitrator, it
was incumbent upon the respondent to call upon the applicant by serving
upon it a 30 day notice for nominating the substitute Arbitrator, failing which
the mechanism as prescribed in clause 1.1 had to be followed. In the instant
case, the said procedure has certainly not been followed by the respondent as
no notice in terms of clause 1.2 was served.
11.
Having held so, we are not in the least approving the mechanism
prescribed under clause 1.2, which enables Arbitrator nominated by one of the
parties to act as a sole Arbitrator, as even that would go against the settled
legal principle in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC vs. HSCC (India)
Limited2, which was followed in Central Organisation for Railway
Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Co3.
12.
What was held by the Apex Court in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC
vs. HSCC (India) Limited was thus:
“21. But, in our view that has to be the logical deduction from
TRF Ltd. Para 50 of the decision shows that this Court was
concerned with the issue, “whether the Managing Director, after
becoming ineligible by operation of law, is he still eligible to nominate
an arbitrator” The ineligibility referred to therein, was as a result of
operation of law, in that a person having an interest in the dispute or
in the outcome or decision thereof, must not only be ineligible to act
as an arbitrator but must also not be eligible to appoint anyone else
as an arbitrator and that such person cannot and should not have any
role in charting out any course to the dispute resolution by having the
power to appoint an arbitrator. The next sentences in the paragraph,
(2020) 20 SCC 760
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3219
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further show that cases where both the parties could nominate
respective arbitrators of their choice were found to be completely a
different situation. The reason is clear that whatever advantage a
party may derive by nominating an arbitrator of its choice would get
counter-balanced by equal power with the other party. But, in a case
where only one party has a right to appoint a sole arbitrator, its choice
will always have an element of exclusivity in determining or charting
the course for dispute resolution. Naturally, the person who has an
interest in the outcome or decision of the dispute must not have the
power to appoint a sole arbitrator. That has to be taken as the
essence of the amendments brought in by the Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (3 of 2016) and recognised by
the decision of this Court in TRF Ltd.”
Subsequently, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Central
Organisation for Railway Electrification (supra), the Apex Court reiterated
that a clause that allowed one party to unilaterally appoint a sole Arbitrator
would give rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of
the Arbitrator and further that such a unilateral clause would hinder equal
participation of the other party in the appointment of Arbitrators.
13.
After arguing for some time, learned counsel for the respondent would
submit that they would have no objection if the Court nominated an Arbitrator
on behalf of the applicant in place of the Arbitrator nominated by the applicant,
who then along with the Arbitrator nominated by the non-applicant would
proceed to appoint a Presiding Arbitrator.
14.
I, however, see no good basis or justification so made by learned
counsel for the respondent, as the Arbitrator nominated by the applicant is
highly respected and distinguished former Judge of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh with impeccable integrity and competence.
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Besides this, the applicant was within its right to nominate a substitute
Arbitrator, as that right is protected, as the nomination was made, though with
some delay, but before the right could be lost in terms of the ratio of the
judgment laid down in Datar Switchgears Ltd. v. Tata Finance Ltd4, wherein
it was held:
“So far as cases falling under Section 11(6) are concerned -such as the one before us -- no time limit has been prescribed under
the Act, whereas a period of 30 days has been prescribed under
Section 11(4) and Section 11(5) of the Act. In our view, therefore, so
far as Section 11(6) is concerned, if one party demands the opposite
party to appoint an arbitrator and the opposite party does not make
an appointment within 30 days of the demand, the right to
appointment does not get automatically forfeited after expiry of 30
days. If the opposite party makes an appointment even after 30 days
of the demand, but before the first party has moved the Court under
Section 11, that would be sufficient. In other words, in cases arising
under Section 11(6), if the opposite party has not made an
appointment within 30 days of demand, the right to make appointment
is not forfeited but continues, but an appointment has to be made
before the former files application under Section 11 seeking
appointment of an arbitrator. Only then the right of the opposite party
ceases. We do not, therefore, agree with the observation in the above
judgments that if the appointment is not made within 30 days of
demand, the right to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) is
forfeited.”
15.
Be that as it may, it is held that the nomination of Justice Challa
Kodanda Ram (retired) as the Arbitrator for the applicant is legally valid and
since the arbitration clause does envisage that this Court can appoint a
Presiding Arbitrator in the event the Arbitrators do not reach a consensus on
appointing a Presiding Arbitrator, this Court appoints Justice Ramesh D.
Dhanuka, former Chief Justice, High Court of Bombay, as a Presiding
2000 (7) Supreme 145
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Arbitrator, who shall enter upon the reference forthwith. The learned Presiding
Arbitrator shall be entitled to claim the fee in consultation with the parties.
Accordingly, the arbitration application is disposed of. No costs.
Consequently, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, in this
application, shall stand closed.
A copy of this order be communicated to the learned Arbitrator on the
address mentioned herein below:
Justice Ramesh D. Dhanuka,
13, Mittal Tower, C-Wing,
Barrister Rajini Patel Marg,
Nariman Point, Mumbai – 400 021.
Ph:98211 34074.
DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, CJ.
AKN
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HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, CHIEF JUSTICE
Arb. Application Nos.39 & 40 of 2025
Dt:06.03.2026
akn
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