The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
17. In the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Re: Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (Supra), it is held that the present case is a fit case to be referred for Arbitration. Thereby, the petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is allowed.
18. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court appoints Hon’ble Mr. Justice Iqbal Ahmed Ansari (Retired Judge) to be the Arbitrator, and the seat of the Arbitrator may be as per the convenience of the parties.
19. This Arbitration Petition accordingly stands disposed of.
20. Parties to bear their own costs Comparing Assistant
Full Judgment Text
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Page No.# 1/8
GAHC040005402026
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
(ITANAGAR BENCH)
Case No. : Arb.P./3/2026
Global Energy Private Limited
through its nominee, M/s Bhumikka Shah and Associates, registered office at Pride B904, HRC Professional /Hub, Vaibhav Khand, Indirapuram, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh
201014
VERSUS
The Department of Power
through its Secretary, Govt of Arunachal Pradesh, Vidyut Bhawan, Itanagar,
Arunachal Pradesh 791111
Advocate for the Petitioner
: Chetan Kumar Garg, Kinyak Loya
Advocate for the Respondent : Lissing Perme, SC(Power)
-BEFOREHON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUSMITA PHUKAN KHAUND
ORDER
17.06.2026
Heard Mr. K. Pal, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. C. Garg,
learned counsel for the petitioner-Global Energy Private Limited and Mr. L.
Perme, learned Standing Counsel, Power Department represented by its
Secretary to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh.
Page No.# 2/8
2.
The petitioner-Global Energy Private Limited has filed this application
under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for
short,’1996 Act’) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(CPC, for short) with prayer for appointment of an Arbitrator.
3.
The learned Senior Counsel Mr. Pal has drawn the attention of this
Court to the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA, for short) executed
between the petitioner and the respondent (at Page No.268 of the
additional affidavit dated 21.04.2026) which includes an agreement clause
as well as the Clause-11 relating to Resolution of disputes. It was agreed
that:- In the event of any difference or dispute arising out of the
application or interpretation of this agreement amongst the parties, the
parties shall attempt to settle such dispute by mutual discussion within
thirty (30) days after the date of written notice by disputing parting to
other no-disputing party. During such mutual discussions, the parties shall
faithfully
continue
to
perform
their
respective
obligations
and
responsibilities under this agreement. In the event of parties are unable to
resolve any dispute within (30) days, then the parties agree to settle the
same under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996”.
4.
The agreement was executed on 14.07.2011 and the respondent was
supposed to supply to the petitioner 25 MW power for a period of 4 (four)
years till 30.06.2025, which would be sold to the licensee. However, on
02.08.2011, the Chief Engineer (Power) Western Electrical Zone, Deo
unilaterally and arbitrarily terminated/cancelled the PPA on the strength of
a letter No. PWRS/W-1937/2009-4474-76 dated 28.07.2011 without there
being any continuing default on the part of the petitioner in terms of the
Page No.# 3/8
Clause-10 of the PPA (Annexure P-2).
5.
On being aggrieved by the alleged unilateral and arbitrary
termination, the petitioner issued letters dated 05.08.2011, 06.08.2011
and 15.09.2011 to the respondent for a solution. Subsequent thereto, the
petitioner was called for a meeting on 01.02.2019 but the petitioner was
unable to attend the meeting and he had informed and expressed his
inability to attend the meeting. The respondent-Department then
forwarded the reply to the petitioner dated 04.06.2019 directing the
petitioner to pay an amount of Rs.5,72,88,000/- (Rupees Five Crores
Seventy Two Lakhs and Eighty Eight Thousand) within 15 days from
04.06.2019. It is pertinent to mention that in the reply to the
aforementioned letters, it has also been mentioned at Pargraph-3 that a
payment of Rs.1Crore has been received by the respondent-department.
It is also submitted by the petitioner that petitioner had participated in
other Notice Inviting Quotations (for short, ‘NIQs’) floated by the
respondents. Now, as there is already an agreement executed and as
there is a dispute relating to the amount to be paid to the respondent, the
petitioner has prayed for appointment of an arbitrator for resolution of
their disputes as per Clause-11 of PPA.
6.
The learned Standing Counsel for the Power Department Mr. L. Perme
laid stress in his argument that this petition is not maintainable as the
same is barred by limitation, and the PPA which has been cancelled in the
year 2011, is not an existing and executable PPA.
7.
The Annexure-P-2 of the petition clearly depicts that the PPA drawn
up by the Department on 14.07.2011 was cancelled vide order dated
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28.07.2011 implying that the terms and conditions are not enforceable.
The reasons why the PPA was cancelled were recorded and Annexure-C
clearly reveals the reasons for cancellation of the PPA. It is submitted that
an unauthorized person had affixed his signature on the PPA on
14.07.2011 when the incumbent was on earned leave w.e.f. 12.07.2011
and the person in-charge of his post had affixed his signature on behalf of
the incumbent who was on leave. It is submitted that any PPA signed by
any officer during his earned leave is invalid and legally untenable. Apart
from other reasons, the pre-dominant reasons to cancel the PPA was
execution of PPA by an unauthorized person. On the basis of an illegal
PPA, the petitioner cannot pray for appointment of an arbitrator on the
strength of an arbitration clause included in the PPA. Moreover, as the
contract period is already over and the petitioner has approached this
Court after 14 years, the prayer to appoint an arbitrator is liable to be
rejected. It is averred by the learned counsel for the respondent that the
conduct of the petitioner appears to be shady as he had participated in
subsequent NIQs floated by the same Department. The cancelled PPA is
not live. The cause of action arose on 02.08.2011 and the limitation under
Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 ends on 02.08.2014.
8.
The petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act coupled with a
non-existent and a dead agreement is not tenable for reference to
arbitration.
9.
It is averred that a first Arbitration notice was issued way back in the
year, 2015 beyond the period of limitation, but the same was not pursued
by the petitioner. A present arbitration notice marked as Annexure-P-36
Page No.# 5/8
was issued on 08.12.2025, after 14 years, and much beyond the period of
limitation. It is further averred that when the petitioner did not challenge
the cancellation order and participated in subsequent NIQs, he has
impliedly not agitated against the cancellation of the PPA dated
02.08.2011. This has however been denied by the petitioner stating that
the petitioner participated under protest
10. I have considered the submissions at the Bar with circumspection.
11. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that, in reply to the letters
of the petitioner, the meeting was held and the petitioner could not
participate in the meeting but a letter dated 04.06.2019 was forwarded to
the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action does not end in the year, 2011
because correspondences to the same contract and agreement were
continuing till 04.06.2019. It is true that the letter No. CEP/WEZ/COM27/GEL/2018-19/803-05
dated
04.06.2019
also
reveals
that
the
respondent-Department had received payment of Rs.1crore from the
petitioner. The agreement executed between both the parties were indeed
cancelled on 02.08.2011 justifying the reasons vide Annexure-C, dated
28.07.2011. Whether, this case cannot be referred for Arbitration on the
basis of the cancelled PPA coupled with bar under the Limitation Act.
12. I find force in the submissions on behalf of the petitioner that as per
Section 11 (6A) of the Act of 1996, any High Court, while considering any
application under Sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6),
shall notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, confine
to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.
Page No.# 6/8
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Re: Interplay between Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 & the Indian
Stamp Act, 1899; reported in 2024 (6) SCC 1, wherein, it has been held
that:“155.The burden of proving the existence of arbitration agreement generally lies
on the party seeking to rely on such agreement. In jurisdictions such as India,
which accept the doctrine of competence-competence, only prima facie
proof of the existence of an arbitration agreement must be adduced before
the referral court. The referral court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a
minitrial by allowing the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to the
existence or validity of an arbitration agreement. The determination of the
existence and validity of an arbitration agreement on the basis of evidence
ought to be left to the arbitral tribunal. This position of law can also be gauged
from the plain language of the statute.
“156. Section 11(6A) uses the expression "examination of the existence of an
arbitration agreement." The purport of using the word "examination" connotes
that the legislature intends that the referral court has to inspect or scrutinize the
dealings between the parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement.
Moreover, the expression "examination" does not connote or imply a laborious or
contested inquiry. On the other hand, Section 16 provides that the arbitral
tribunal can "rule” on its jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement. A "ruling" connotes adjudication of disputes after
admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore, it is evident that the referral
court is only required to examine the existence of arbitration agreements,
whereas the arbitral tribunal ought to rule on its jurisdiction, including the issues
pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A similar
view was adopted by this Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd.-vs-Aksh Optifibre
Ltd.”.
14.
It is submitted by the learned counsel for both the parties that
concept of arbitration is to reduce the burden of the Court in matters
Page No.# 7/8
which can be settled through Mediation and Arbitration and not to
procrastinate and delay matters in the Court. Thus, there is no ambiguity
that the matter of limitation and the validity of existence of a subject
tender can be decided while taking up the Arbitration and the Referral
Court is not required to deal with the limitation or validity of existence of
an Arbitration clause.
15. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied on a decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal and
Others-vs-M/S B. B. M. Enterprises; reported in 2026 Supreme (SC)
387, wherein, it has been held that:“6. Arbitration though is an alternate dispute resolution system, which has to be
encouraged, it cannot deviate from the fundamental principle that law favours
the diligent and not the indolent. Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 applies the Limitation Act, 1963 to arbitrations as it is applied to
proceedings in Court. Hence, for recovery of amounts, as in this case, the
limitation is three years as provided in Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The
commencement of arbitration proceedings as per sub-section (2) of Section 43
being the date referred in Section 21, which is the date on which a request for
initiation of arbitration is received by the respondent, the claim itself was
hopelessly time barred, the notice having been issued after 21 years”.
16. Reverting back to the case, it is held that the learned counsel for the
respondent has stated that the period of limitation runs from 02.08.2011
which has been denied by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In this
case, it cannot be considered that the claim itself was hopelessly time
barred or a dead claim as the notice was issued after a lapse of 21 years.
The ratio laid down in the case of M/S B. B. M. Enterprises (Supra) is
not applicable to the present case.
Page No.# 8/8
17. In the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Re: Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 1996 (Supra), it is held that the present case is a fit case
to be referred for Arbitration. Thereby, the petition under Section 11 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 is allowed.
18. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court appoints Hon’ble Mr.
Justice Iqbal Ahmed Ansari (Retired Judge) to be the Arbitrator, and the
seat of the Arbitrator may be as per the convenience of the parties.
19. This Arbitration Petition accordingly stands disposed of.
20. Parties to bear their own costs
JUDGE
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