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2024:MLHC:896-DB
Serial No. 04
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.A. No. 35 of 2024
Date of Decision: 01.10.2024
Shri. Geisinglung Meiringmei
Shri. Digonthu Meiringmei,
Resident of Mukti Khullen,
Nungba District,
Manipur
……Petitioner
-VersusNational Investigation Agency (NIA)
Represented by its Deputy Superintendent of Police (NIA)
…...Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
: Mr. S. Thapa, Adv.
Mr. D. Theimei, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. L.M.D. Marak, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
2024:MLHC:896-DB
ORDER (ORAL)
Per W. Diengdoh, (J):
1.
The petitioner (sic appellant) being aggrieved with the order
dated 22.05.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA), Shillong in
Bail Application No. 75(H) 2024 wherein his prayer for grant of bail was
rejected, has now approached this Court with this instant appeal under
Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008.
2.
Heard Mr. S. Thapa, learned counsel for the petitioner who has
submitted that the on an FIR dated 14.05.2018 lodged at Jowai Police
Station, Jaintia Hills District wherein it was alleged that the petitioner
herein and his associates as members of the banned NSCN (K) outfit had
demanded a sum of ₹ 25,00,000/- (rupees twenty five lakh) only from
Bharatya Infra Projects Limited (BIPL) Company on 12.05.2018 in lieu
of releasing an abducted employee of the said company. In course of
investigation the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)
had caused the National Investigation Agency to investigate into the case
and the same was re-registered as FIR No. RC-03/2018/NIA-GUW
under Sections 120A, 120B, 121, 121A, and 384 IPC read with Section
10 and 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.
3.
On investigation launched, the petitioner was arrested on
14.05.2018 and is still in custody till date. Of course, along with the
petitioner six other accused persons were arrested, three of them have
since been released on bail.
4.
In due course, the charge sheet was filed inter alia finding the
2024:MLHC:896-DB
petitioner to be involved in this alleged incident and therefore he is
charged with the offences aforementioned. The stage of the case being
now registered as Special (NIA) Case No. 1 of 2018 pending before the
learned Sessions Judge (NIA) case is for recording of the evidence of
prosecution witnesses.
5.
The learned counsel has further submitted that the main charge
against the petitioner herein is that he was the one who has directed for
the kidnapping and also for demanding of ransom money from the said
BIPL Company as an exchange for release of the abducted employee of
the Company, however, there is no credible evidence either in the charge
sheet or through the witnesses to implicate the petitioner herein as far as
the alleged offences are concerned.
6.
However, the learned counsel would submit that at this point of
time, the petitioner having been in custody for more than six years, there
is no likelihood of the trial to be concluded in the very near future
therefore, the learned trial court failing to consider this aspect of the
matter among other credible grounds, the impugned order cannot be
sustained.
7.
The learned counsel has however pressed only on one ground
that is, that because of the long incarceration of the petitioner his
personal liberty as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
has been deprived. Considering the well settled principle of bail
jurisprudence that bail is the rule and jail is the exception and that an
accused person is always assumed to be innocent until proven guilty
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which is to be done so in course of trial, keeping the petitioner in custody
for more than is necessary will only defeat this liberty.
8.
To support his contention that the petitioner is entitled to be
enlarged on bail on the ground of prolonged custody, the learned counsel
has referred to a number of authorities as follows:
i. Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, para 17,
18 and 19;
ii. Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.,
2024 SCC Online SC 1693, para 8, 9, 18, 19 20 and 21;
iii. Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State
of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC Online SC 1755, para 21, 22,
23.1, 27.1 and 28;
iv. Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., Special Leave to
Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 8523/2024, para 7, 8, 9 and 10.
9.
The learned counsel has reiterated that the issue of prolonged
custody and the right to be granted liberty vis-à-vis the proceedings in
the trial has also been noticed by this Court in a case between the parties
herein being Crl.A. No. 18/2021 wherein vide order dated 01.05.2023
this Court at para 7 has elicit a response from the respondent/NIA that
although the prosecution intended to examine about 150 witnesses, only
about 75 or so witnesses would be examined and the trial, at its present
pace, should be completed in course of this year, meaning 2023.
However, till date, only about 69 witnesses have been examined and
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considering the fact that most of the witnesses are from Manipur, under
the prevailing situation there is no likelihood of the trial being concluded
before the end of this year.
10.
For the reasons stated hereinabove, the learned counsel has
submitted that if enlarged on bail, the petitioner will ensure that he will
comply with any conditions to be imposed by this Court.
11.
Per contra, Dr. N. Mozika, learned DSGI has submitted that
apart from the offences being serious in nature, notwithstanding the fact
that the petitioner has been in custody for about six years or so, the trial
is proceeding with about 69 witnesses already examined and only
approximate 6 or more witnesses to be examined.
12.
Another contention raised by the learned DSGI is that the
petitioner is a residence of the State of Manipur and if enlarged on bail,
there is every possibility that he will abscond, therefore, being a flight
risk, bail may not be granted at this point of time.
13.
On the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner as
regard prolonged trial and the reliance of the petitioner in the case of
K.A. Najeeb (supra), the learned DSGI has referred to the case of
Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2024) 5 SCC 403, wherein
at para 45 and 46 of the same the case of K.A. Najeeb was distinguished
by the Apex Court to hold that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave
offences cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. It is therefore prayed
that this appeal be dismissed.
2024:MLHC:896-DB
14.
In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that
the Gurwinder Singh case (supra) was also referred to in the case of
Sheikh Javed Iqbal (supra) wherein at para 31 of the same the Apex
Court has observed that in the K.A. Najeeb case the accused therein was
already in custody for more than five years and that the NIA had filed a
long list of witnesses to be examined, the unlikelihood of trial being
completed in the near future has influenced the court to grant him bail,
whereas in the Gurwinder Singh case trial is already on the way and 22
witnesses including the protected witnesses have been examined and
therefore, it was observed that mere delay in trial pertain to grave
offences cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. However, it is
reiterated that there is no likelihood of the remaining witnesses to be
examined within a short span of time from here on and as such, on this
ground alone, the petitioner may be allowed to be enlarged on bail.
15.
This Court has considered the arguments advanced by the
learned counsels for the rival parties and is made to understand that,
irrespective of the severity of the offence alleged, the prolonged
incarceration of the petitioner in custody has been cited as a ground for
grant of bail, the relevant authorities in this regard being cited by the
learned counsel for the petitioner to lay stress on this aspect of the
matter.
16.
The observation of the Apex Court in the case of K.A. Najeeb
(supra) at para 17, 18 and 19 do resemble the factual position of the case
of the petitioner herein. It would be but profitable for the same to be
reproduce herein as follow:
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“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory
restrictions like Section 43D (5) of UAPA per se does not oust
the ability of constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of
violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the
restrictions under a Statue as well as the powers exercisable
under Constitutional Jurisdiction can be well harmonised.
Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts are
expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail
but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is
no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time
and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded
a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach
would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like
Section 43D(5) of the UAPA being used as the sole metric for
denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to
speedy trial.
18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact
that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a
serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the
threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the
respondent’s prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the
period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial
being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have
been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt
has been made to strike a balance between the appellant’s right
to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond
any doubt and simultaneously the respondent’s rights
guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well
protected.
19. Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge the
respondent on bail is that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is
comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Unlike the NDPS Act where the competent court needs to be
satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is
unlikely to commit another offence while on bail; there is no
such precondition under UAPA. Instead, Section 43D (5) of the
UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the
competent court to refuse bail, in addition to the wellsettled
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considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of
tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of
the accused evading the trial by absconsion, etc.”
17.
Even if reliance is placed in the case of Gurwinder Singh
(supra), particularly at para 45 of the same, the factual situation of the
case of the petitioner is that the trial has taken a considerable period of
time, to the extent that during the intervening period, the petitioner has
been in custody for more than six years or so. It is a matter of course that
since the charge sheet has been filed and recording of the evidence of the
witnesses is in progress, there is no possibility for the petitioner/accused
person to tamper with the evidence or witnesses at this point of time.
18.
As to the commitment given by the prosecution that the trial
will be expedited with only a few more witnesses to be examined, this
Court would recall the said observations made at para 7 in the order
dated 01.05.2023 in Crl.A. No. 18/2021 to say that in spite of the
assurance given by the prosecution that the trial will be completed by the
end of 2023, we are now almost at the fag end of 2024 and still more
witnesses are yet to be examined. On this ground alone this petition
deserves to be allowed.
19.
On an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of
the case of the petitioner, this Court hereby set aside and quash the
impugned order dated 22.05.2024 (supra) and directs that the petitioner
be released on bail on the following conditions:i.
That he shall not abscond or intimidate the witnesses;
ii.
That he shall appear before the trial court as and when
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required;
iii.
That he shall not leave the jurisdiction of the North
Eastern States without prior permission of the trial court;
iv.
That he shall surrender his passport (if he has one) to the
trial court and can use the same only if allowed by the
trial court; and
v.
That he shall bind himself on a personal bond of ₹
1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh) only with two solvent
sureties of like amount to the satisfaction of the trial
court.
20.
Needless to say, if the petitioner violates any of the above
stipulated conditions, the prosecution is at liberty to pray for cancellation
of bail before the trial court.
21.
In view of the above, this appeal is hereby disposed of. No
costs.
(B. Bhattacharjee)
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
Judge
TIPRILYNTI KHARKONGOR
Date: 2024.10.01 19:39:29
PDT
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