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CR-9926-2025 (O&M)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CR-9926-2025 (O&M)
Reserved on :-24.03.2026
Date of Pronouncement:-06.04.2026
Uploaded on:-07.04.2026
Gaurav Singla
… Petitioner
Versus
Gurmesh Vij and Another
... Respondents
****
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL
Argued by :Mr. Nakul Sharma, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Navdeep Chhabra, Advocate
for the respondents.
****
VIRINDER AGGARWAL, J.
1.
The instant revision petition has been instituted by the
petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, invoking the
supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, assailing the orders dated
19.09.2025 (Annexure P-1) passed by the learned District Judge,
Fatehgarh Sahib, and the order dated 06.02.2025 (Annexure P-2) passed
by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Amloh, whereby the
application filed by respondent No.1–plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules
1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) was
allowed, and the petitioner was restrained from alienating, transferring,
GAURAV SOROT
2026.04.07 14:14
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CR-9926-2025 (O&M)
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mortgaging, leasing, or creating any third-party interest in the suit property
during the pendency of the suit.
2.
The essential factual matrix, as emerging from the record, is
that a suit for specific performance of the agreement dated 27.07.2023 has
been
instituted
by
respondent
No.1–plaintiff
against
respondent
No.2/defendant No.1 as well as the petitioner/defendant No.2. It is pleaded
that after execution of the agreement to sell between respondents No.1 and
2, respondent No.2 subsequently alienated the suit land in favour of the
petitioner/defendant No.2 vide two alleged collusive sale deeds dated
19.10.2023, with an intention to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. Along
with the suit, an application for interim injunction was also filed.
2.1.
The suit was contested by the defendants. Defendant No.1
denied execution of the agreement to sell and contended that his signatures
were obtained on certain documents in connection with a business
transaction, and that he was not conversant with the Punjabi language;
hence, in good faith, he signed the documents without understanding their
contents. The petitioner/defendant No.2, on the other hand, contested the
suit by asserting that the agreement in question is the result of collusion
between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 with an ulterior motive of
extorting money from the petitioner. It was further pleaded that the
petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for consideration, that the respondentplaintiff has no right, title, or interest in the suit property, and that the
petitioner cannot be restrained from dealing with the property in any
manner.
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CR-9926-2025 (O&M)
2.2.
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The learned Civil Judge, Amloh, allowed the application for
interim injunction vide order dated 06.02.2025. The petitioner preferred an
appeal against the said order; however, the same was also dismissed.
Aggrieved thereby, the present revision petition has been filed. During the
pendency of the revision petition, the respondent-plaintiff appeared
through Mr. Navdeep Chhabra, Advocate.
3.
Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties at
length, and upon a careful, comprehensive, and judicious perusal of the
entire paper-book with the able assistance rendered the learned counsel for
the contesting parties, this Court proceeds to record its considered
findings.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that it is a settled
proposition of law that an agreement to sell does not create any right, title,
or interest in the suit property. It is further submitted that both the Courts
below failed to appreciate that an agreement to sell merely confers a right
in personam to seek specific performance and does not create any
enforceable proprietary right in favour of the plaintiff. It is thus argued that
no injunction could have been granted against a bona fide purchaser for
consideration. It is further submitted that the agreement in question being
unregistered, cannot be relied upon for any purpose in law.
5.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that
there is no illegality or infirmity in the concurrent findings recorded by
both the Courts below. It is submitted that both Courts have rightly
restrained the petitioner/defendant from creating any third-party interest in
the suit property, as the very object of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC is
to preserve the suit property during the pendency of the suit and to prevent
GAURAV SOROT
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CR-9926-2025 (O&M)
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multiplicity of litigation. Dismissal of the revision petition has, therefore,
been prayed for.
6.
The learned First Appellate Court has recorded its findings in
paragraph No.8 of the impugned order, which reads as under:8.
“It is an admitted fact that respondent no.2 Tarunjeet Singh was
owner of the suit property. The plaintiff/respondent no.1 alleged
that Tarunjeet Singh being owner of the suit property entered into
an agreement to sell with him on 27.07.2023 for a consideration of
Rs.2,21,28,000/- and Tarunjeet Singh defendant no.1/respondent
no.2 has received Rs.50,00,000/- as earnest money. The sale deed
was to be executed on 26.12.2023. The defendant no.1 took the
plea that his signatures were taken on some blank papers in lieu of
security of auto parts which he has to sell to the plaintiff. The
defendant no.1 further took the plea that he sold the suit property
to defendant no.2 vide two sale deeds. The defendant no.2 alleges
himself to be bonafide purchaser and alleged that the present suit
has been filed by the plaintiff in connivance with defendant no.1 to
extort more money from him. The learned trial court has held in
the impugned order that it is to be proved whether defendant no.1
has executed the agreement to sell dated 27.07.2023 in favour of
the plaintiff and defendant no.2 is bona fide purchaser for
consideration. One plea has been taken by the appellant in the
grounds of appeal that mutation has not been sanctioned in his
favour. The learned counsel for the respondent no.1 has produced
copy of the order dated 13.03.2025 according to which mutation
has been sanctioned in favour of appellant. The fact whether the
defendant no.1 executed the agreement to sell in favour of plaintiff
or not or whether the said document was created only for the
purpose of the sale of auto parts is question of fact, which can be
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CR-9926-2025 (O&M)
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decided after appreciation of evidence. Whether defendant no.2 is
bona fide purchaser for consideration is also a fact which can only
be determined after appreciation of evidence. Therefore, this court
is of the considered opinion that the valuable rights of the parties
are involved in the present case. Any alienation made by the
appellant during the pendency of the suit will lead to multiplicity of
litigation. Therefore, this court is of the considered opinion that the
impugned order passed by the learned trial court is based on
correct appraisal of facts and documents. There is no perversity in
the impugned order. Therefore, the impugned order is hereby
affirmed.”
7.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the
judgment rendered by the Patna High Court in Lallan Prasad vs.
Parmeshwar Singh, 1998 SCC OnLine Patna 27, wherein it was held that
‘an agreement to sell confers merely a right in personam and does not
create any right, title, or interest in the property. It was further observed
that such an agreement only entitles the proposed purchaser to institute a
suit for specific performance, but no proprietary interest in the property
accrues till the decree for specific performance is passed’. Reliance has
also been placed upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Jiwan
Dass vs. Narain Dass, AIR 1981 Delhi 291, wherein it was held that ‘a
temporary injunction cannot be granted so as to restrain the transferee
under a registered sale deed from enjoying possession, particularly till
execution of the sale deed pursuant to a decree for specific performance’.
7.1.
A careful perusal of the aforesaid judgments indicates that the
principle laid down therein is in the context of situations where injunction
was sought to interfere with possession already delivered under a
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CR-9926-2025 (O&M)
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registered sale deed. However, the factual matrix of the present case is
clearly distinguishable. In the present matter, the injunction granted by the
learned Courts below does not operate to restrain the petitioner/defendant
No.2 from enjoying possession of the suit property on the strength of any
concluded conveyance. Rather, the learned Courts below have merely
restrained the petitioner from creating third-party interests in the suit
property, with a view to preserving the subject matter of the suit and
preventing multiplicity of litigation.
7.2.
It is a well-settled principle that the primary object of Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to preserve the
suit property during the pendency of proceedings and to maintain the
existing state of affairs, so as to ensure that any decree ultimately passed is
not rendered ineffective, infructuous, or incapable of execution. It is not in
dispute that the respondent–plaintiff possesses a legally enforceable right
to institute a suit for specific performance on the basis of the agreement to
sell executed in his favour. In the event that, during the pendency of the
suit, third-party rights are created by the petitioner–defendant, the same
would not only complicate the adjudicatory process but would also
inevitably result in multiplicity of proceedings and unnecessary litigation.
7.3.
In view of the above, it is evident that both the Courts below
have exercised jurisdiction in accordance with law and in furtherance of
the settled principles governing grant of temporary injunction. The
exercise of discretion cannot be termed as arbitrary, capricious, or perverse
so as to warrant interference in revisional jurisdiction. Accordingly,
finding no merit in the present revision petition, the same is hereby
dismissed.
GAURAV SOROT
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integrity of this document
CR-9926-2025 (O&M)
8.
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It is, however, clarified that the observations recorded here-in-
above are confined strictly to the adjudication of the present controversy
and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the
underlying dispute between the parties. Nothing contained herein shall
prejudice or influence the rights, claims, or contentions of any party in any
other proceedings, nor shall it be treated as a final determination of any
substantive question of fact or law in the main suit.
9.
Consequent upon the final adjudication of the principal matter,
all pending miscellaneous applications, if any, arising out of or connected
with the present proceedings, stand disposed of by necessary implication.
No further orders are required to be passed in that regard.
( VIRINDER AGGARWAL)
JUDGE
06.04.2026
Gaurav Sorot
Whether reasoned / speaking?
Yes / No
Whether reportable?
Yes / No
GAURAV SOROT
2026.04.07 14:14
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integrity of this document
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