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2026:HHC:38602
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CrMMo No. 943 of 2026
Reserved on: 27.08.2026
Date of Decision: 10.09.2026
Gaurav Chauhan
...Petitioner
Versus
Gurmeet Singh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Sumit Sood, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Nemo
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present petition is directed against the order dated
29.05.2026, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Court No. 2, Paonta Sahib District, Sirmaur, H.P. (learned trial
Court), vide which an application under Section 311 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (CrPC) filed by the petitioner (accused before
learned trial Court) was dismissed. (The parties shall hereinafter be
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:38602
referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the
learned trial Court for convenience).
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned trial Court against the accused for the commission of an
offence
punishable
under
Section
of
the
Negotiable
Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the accused and his
brother, Vikram Chauhan, had offered to purchase two tractors
from the complainant in April, 2019. The complainant agreed and
paid money to the accused and his brother. Subsequently, a person
came to the complainant, who claimed ownership of the tractors
and stated that he had delivered the tractors to the accused and his
brother for a limited period. The complainant lodged a complaint
regarding this incident at the police station. The accused and his
brother admitted their fault and issued a cheque of ₹2,00,000/- to
return the amount taken by them from the complainant. The
complainant presented the cheque before the bank, but it was
dishonoured with an endorsement "signature differs". The
complainant served a legal notice upon the accused, and the
accused failed to return the amount. Hence, the complaint was
filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action as per the law.
2026:HHC:38602
3.
Learned Trial Court summoned the accused. When the
accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI
Act.
4.
The accused filed an application under Section 311 of
the CrPC asserting that the cheque was not signed by him. He
wanted to examine Rajnish Pradhan and prove the copy of the
judgment, which was decided in his favour. The cheque was
dishonoured with an endorsement "signature differs", and it is
necessary to call the record from the bank. Therefore, it was
prayed that the application be allowed and the official be
summoned from the bank and the copy of the judgment be taken
on record.
5.
No reply to the application was filed despite repeated
opportunities.
6.
Learned trial Court held that multiple opportunities
were granted to the accused to produce the evidence. However, he
failed to produce any evidence, and the evidence was closed by the
order of the Court. The application does not disclose any plausible
reason for summoning the additional evidence. The application
2026:HHC:38602
was filed at a belated stage to prolong the proceedings. Hence, the
application was dismissed.
7.
Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
Trial Court, the accused has filed the present petition asserting
that the learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the application on
the ground that sufficient opportunity had been granted to the
accused to produce the evidence. Learned trial Court failed to
record any finding as to whether the evidence sought to be
summoned was necessary for the just decision of the case or not.
The evidence is necessary to prove the defence taken by the
accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed
and the order passed by the learned trial Court be set aside.
8.
Mr
Sumit
Sood,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned trial Court erred in
dismissing the application. A similar complaint was filed by the
complainant earlier against the accused, which was dismissed by
the Court. The copy of the judgment is required to be proved on
record to show the falsity of the present complaint. The cheque
was dishonoured with an endorsement "signature differs", and it
is essential to prove the signatures of the accused. The evidence
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would help the Court in arriving at the truth. Hence, he prayed that
the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the
learned trial Court be set aside.
9.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
10.
It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.N. Patil
v. K. Niranjan Kumar, (2021) 3 SCC 661: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 172, that
the object underlying under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. is that there
should not be any failure of justice due to the mistake of either
party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving
ambiguity in the statements of witnesses examined from either
side. It was observed:
14. The object underlying Section 311 CrPC is that there may
not be a failure of justice on account of the mistake of either
party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving
ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined
from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is
essential to the just decision of the case. The significant
expression that occurs is “at any stage of any inquiry or
trial, or other proceeding under this Code”. It is, however,
to be borne in mind that the discretionary power conferred
under Section 311 CrPC has to be exercised judiciously, as it
is always said, “the wider the power, the greater is the
necessity of caution while the exercise of judicious
discretion”.
xxxxx
2026:HHC:38602
16. This principle has been further reiterated in Mannan
Shaikh v. State of W.B., (2014) 13 SCC 59 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri)
547 and thereafter in Ratanlal v. Prahlad Jat, (2017) 9 SCC 340
: (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 729 and Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI,
(2019) 14 SCC 328 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839. The relevant
paragraphs of Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC
328 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839 are as under: (Swapan Kumar
Chatterjee case [Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14
SCC 328 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839], SCC p. 331, paras 10-11)
“10. The first part of this section which is permissive
gives purely discretionary authority to the criminal
court and enables it at any stage of inquiry, trial or
other proceedings under the Code to act in one of the
three ways, namely, (i) to summon any person as a
witness; or (ii) to examine any person in attendance,
though not summoned as a witness; or (iii) to recall
and re-examine any person already examined. The
second part, which is mandatory, imposes an
obligation on the court (i) to summon and examine,
or (ii) to recall and re-examine any such person if his
evidence appears to be essential to the just decision
of the case.
11. It is well settled that the power conferred under
Section 311 should be invoked by the court only to
meet the ends of justice. The power is to be exercised
only for strong and valid reasons, and it should be
exercised with great caution and circumspection.
The court has the power under this section to even
recall witnesses for re-examination or further
examination, necessary in the interest of justice, but
the same has to be exercised after taking into
consideration the facts and circumstances of each
case. The power under this provision shall not be
exercised if the court is of the view that the
application has been filed as an abuse of the process
of law.”
2026:HHC:38602
17.
The aim of every court is to discover the truth. Section
311 CrPC is one of many such provisions which strengthen
the arms of a court in its effort to unearth the truth by
procedure sanctioned by law. At the same time, the
discretionary power vested under Section 311 CrPC has to be
exercised judiciously for strong and valid reasons and with
caution and circumspection to meet the ends of justice.”
11.
It was held in State v. N. Seenivasagan, (2021) 14 SCC 1:
2021 SCC OnLine SC 212, that the true test under Section 311 is
whether the evidence of the person who is sought to be examined
or recalled is essential to the just decision of the case or not. It was
observed:
“12. In our view, having due regard to the nature and ambit
of Section 311 of the CrPC, it was appropriate and proper
that the applications filed by the prosecution ought to have
been allowed. Section 311 provides that any court may, at
any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under
CrPC, summon any person as a witness, examine any
person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness,
or recall and re-examine any person already examined and
the Court shall summon and examine or recall and reexamine any such person “if his evidence appears to it to
be essential to the just decision of the case”. The true test,
therefore, is whether it appears to the Court that the
evidence of such a person who is sought to be recalled is
essential to the just decision of the case.
13. In Manju Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 6 SCC 203 :
(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 765, a two-Judge Bench of this Court
noted that an application under Section 311 could not be
rejected on the sole ground that the case had been pending
for an inordinate amount of time (ten years there). Rather,
it noted that: (SCC p. 209, para 13)
2026:HHC:38602
“13. … the length/duration of a case cannot displace
the basic requirement of ensuring a just decision after
taking all the necessary and material evidence on
record. In other words, the age of a case, by itself,
cannot be decisive of the matter when a prayer is made
for examination of a material witness.
Speaking for the Court, Dinesh Maheshwari J.
expounded on the principles underlying Section 311 in
the following terms: (Manju Devi case [Manju Devi v.
State of Rajasthan, (2019) 6 SCC 203: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri)
765], SCC pp. 207-08, para 10)
“10. It needs hardly any emphasis that the
discretionary powers like those under Section
311CrPC are essentially intended to ensure that
every necessary and appropriate measure is taken
by the Court to keep the record straight and to
clear any ambiguity insofar as the evidence is
concerned, as also to ensure that no prejudice is
caused to anyone. The principles underlying
Section 311CrPC and amplitude of the powers of
the court thereunder have been explained by this
Court in several decisions [Vide Mohanlal Shamji
Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271: 1991
SCC (Cri) 595; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of
Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158: 2004 SCC (Cri) 999; Mina
Lalita Baruwa v. State of Orissa, (2013) 16 SCC 173 :
(2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 218; Rajaram Prasad Yadav v.
State of Bihar, (2013) 14 SCC 461 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri)
256 and Natasha Singh v. CBI, (2013) 5 SCC 741 :
(2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 828]. In Natasha Singh v. CBI
[Natasha Singh v. CBI, (2013) 5 SCC 741 : (2013) 4
SCC (Cri) 828], though the application for
examination of witnesses was filed by the accused
but, on the principles relating to the exercise of
powers under Section 311, this Court observed,
inter alia, as under : (Natasha Singh case [Natasha
2026:HHC:38602
Singh v. CBI, (2013) 5 SCC 741 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri)
828], SCC pp. 746 & 748-49, paras 8 & 15)
‘8. Section 311CrPC empowers the court to
summon a material witness, or to examine a
person present at “any stage” of “any
enquiry”, or
“trial”, or “any other
proceedings” under CrPC, or to summon any
person as a witness, or to recall and reexamine any person who has already been
examined if his evidence appears to it, to be
essential to the arrival of a just decision of the
case. Undoubtedly, CrPC has conferred a very
wide discretionary power upon the court in
this respect, but such a discretion is to be
exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. The
power of the court in this context is very wide,
and in the exercise of the same, it may
summon any person as a witness at any stage
of the trial or other proceedings. The court is
competent to exercise such power even suo
motu if no such application has been filed by
either of the parties. However, the court must
satisfy itself that it was in fact essential to
examine such a witness, or to recall him for
further examination, in order to arrive at a just
decision of the case.
***
15. The scope and object of the provision is to enable
the court to determine the truth and to render a just
decision after discovering all relevant facts and
obtaining proper proof of such facts, to arrive at a just
decision of the case. Power must be exercised
judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any
improper or capricious exercise of such power may
lead to undesirable results. An application under
Section 311CrPC must not be allowed only to fill up a
2026:HHC:38602
lacuna in the case of the prosecution, or of the
defence, or to the disadvantage of the accused, or to
cause serious prejudice to the defence of the accused,
or to give an unfair advantage to the opposite party.
Further, the additional evidence must not be received
as a disguise for retrial or to change the nature of the
case against either of the parties. Such a power must
be exercised, provided that the evidence that is likely
to be tendered by a witness is germane to the issue
involved. An opportunity of rebuttal, however, must
be given to the other party. The power conferred
under Section 311CrPC must therefore be invoked by
the court only in order to meet the ends of justice, for
strong and valid reasons, and the same must be
exercised with great caution and circumspection. The
very use of words such as “any court”, “at any
stage”, “or any enquiry, trial or other proceedings”,
“any person” and “any such person” clearly spells
out that the provisions of this section have been
expressed in the widest possible terms, and do not
limit the discretion of the court in any way. There is
thus no escape if the fresh evidence to be obtained is
essential to the just decision of the case. The
determinative factor should therefore be whether the
summoning/recalling of the said witness is, in fact,
essential to the just decision of the case.” (emphasis
in original)”
12.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Varsha Garg v. State of M.P., (2023) 19 SCC 646: 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 986 that the Court has the jurisdiction under Section 311
Cr.P.C. to summon any witness, recall or re-examine any
person for the just decision of the case. It was observed at page
659: -
2026:HHC:38602
31. Having clarified that the bar under Section 301 is
inapplicable and that the appellant is well placed to
pursue this appeal, we now examine Section 311 of
CrPC. Section 311 provides that the court “may”:
(i) Summon any person as a witness or to examine
any person in attendance, though not summoned as
a witness; and
(ii) Recall and re-examine any person who has
already been examined.
This power can be exercised at any stage of any
inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the CrPC.
The latter part of Section 311 states that the court
“shall” summon and examine or recall and reexamine any such person “if his evidence appears to
the court to be essential to the just decision of the
case”. Section 311 contains a power upon the court in
broad terms. The statutory provision must be read
purposively to achieve the intent of the statute to aid
in the discovery of truth.
32. The first part of the statutory provision, which
uses the expression “may”, postulates that the
power can be exercised at any stage of an inquiry,
trial or other proceeding. The latter part of the
provision mandates the recall of a witness by the
court as it uses the expression “shall summon and
examine or recall and re-examine any such person if
his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just
decision of the case”. Essentially, the evidence of the
person who is to be examined, coupled with the need
for a just decision of the case, constitutes the
touchstone that must guide the decision of the court.
The first part of the statutory provision is
discretionary, while the latter part is obligatory.
33. A Two-Judge Bench of this Court in Mohanlal
Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271:
1991 SCC (Cri) 595, while dealing with pari materia
2026:HHC:38602
provisions of Section 540 of the Criminal Code of
Procedure, 1898, observed: (SCC p. 279, para 16)
“16. The second part of Section 540, as pointed
out, albeit imposes upon the court an obligation
of summoning or recalling and re-examining
any witness, and the only condition prescribed
is that the evidence sought to be obtained must
be essential to the just decision of the case.
When any party to the proceedings points out
the desirability of some evidence being taken,
then the court has to exercise its power under
this provision — either discretionary or
mandatory — depending on the facts and
circumstances of each case, having in view that
the most paramount principle underlying this
provision is to discover or to obtain proper
proof of relevant facts in order to meet the
requirements of justice.”
34. S. Ratnavel Pandian, J., speaking for the twoJudge Bench, noted that the power is couched in the
widest possible terms and calls for no limitation,
either with regard to the stage at which it can be
exercised or the manner of its exercise. It is only
circumscribed by the principle that the “evidence to
be obtained should appear to the court essential to a
just decision of the case by getting at the truth by all
lawful means. In that context, the Court observed:
(Mohanlal Shamji Soni case [Mohanlal Shamji Soni v.
Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri)
595], SCC p. 280, para 18)
“18. … Therefore, it should be borne in mind
that the aid of the section should be invoked
only with the object of discovering relevant
facts or obtaining proper proof of such facts for
a just decision of the case, and it must be used
judicially and not capriciously or arbitrarily
because any improper or capricious exercise of
the power may lead to undesirable results.
2026:HHC:38602
Further it is incumbent that due care should be
taken by the court while exercising the power
under this section and it should not be used for
filling up the lacuna left by the prosecution or
by the defence or to the disadvantage of the
accused or to cause serious prejudice to the
defence of the accused or to give an unfair
advantage to the rival side and further the
additional evidence should not be received as a
disguise for a retrial or to change the nature of
the case against either of the parties.”
35. Summing up the position as it obtained from
various decisions of this Court, namely, Rameshwar
Dayal v. State of U.P., (1978) 2 SCC 518: 1978 SCC (Cri)
311, State of W.B. v. Tulsidas Mundhra, 1962 SCC OnLine
SC 413: 1963 Supp (1) SCR 1, Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v.
State of Maharashtra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 19 : (1967) 3
SCR 415: AIR 1968 SC 178, Masalti v. State of U.P., 1964
SCC OnLine SC 30 : (1964) 8 SCR 133: AIR 1965 SC 202,
Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B., 1965 SCC
OnLine SC 122 : (1966) 1 SCR 178: AIR 1965 SC 1887 and
Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 1
SCC 523: 1971 SCC (Cri) 231], the Court held :
(Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1)
SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595], SCC p. 283, para 27)
“27. The principle of law that emerges from the
views expressed by this Court in the above
decisions is that the criminal court has ample
power to summon any person as a witness or
recall and re-examine any such person even if
the evidence on both sides is closed and the
jurisdiction of the court must obviously be
dictated by exigency of the situation, and fair
play and good sense appear to be the only safe
guides and that only the requirements of justice
command the examination of any person which
would depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case.”
2026:HHC:38602
36. The power of the court is not constrained by the
closure of evidence. Therefore, it is amply clear from
the above discussion that the broad powers under
Section 311 are to be governed by the requirement of
justice. The power must be exercised wherever the
court finds that any evidence is essential for the just
decision of the case. The statutory provision goes to
emphasise that the court is not a hapless bystander
in the derailment of justice. Quite the contrary, the
court has a vital role to discharge in ensuring that
the cause of discovering truth as an aid in the
realisation of justice is manifest.
13.
It was further held that filling up the loopholes is
a subsidiary factor, and the Court should be concerned with
the essentiality of the evidence. It was observed at page 662:
43. In the decision in Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v.
State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 8,
which was more recently reiterated in Godrej Pacific
Tech. Ltd. v. Computer Joint India Ltd., (2008) 11 SCC
108 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 455], the Court specifically
dealt with this objection and observed that the
resultant filling of loopholes on account of allowing
an application under Section 311 is merely a
subsidiary factor and the court's determination of the
application should only be based on the test of the
essentiality of the evidence. It noted that: [Zahira
Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC
374: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 8], SCC p. 393, para 28]
28. … The court is not empowered under the
provisions of the Code to compel either the
prosecution or the defence to examine any particular
witness or witnesses on their side. This must be left to
the parties. But in weighing the evidence, the court
2026:HHC:38602
can take note of the fact that the best available
evidence has not been given, and can draw an adverse
inference. The court will often have to depend on
intercepted allegations made by the parties, or on an
inconclusive inference from facts elicited in the
evidence. In such cases, the court has to act under the
second part of the section. Sometimes, the examination
of witnesses as directed by the court may result in what is
thought to be “filling of loopholes”. That is purely a
subsidiary factor and cannot be taken into account.
Whether the new evidence is essential or not must, of
course, depend on the facts of each case, and has to be
determined by the Presiding Judge.” (emphasis
supplied)
44. The right of the accused to a fair trial is
constitutionally protected under Article 21. However,
in Mina Lalita Baruwa v. State of Orissa, (2013) 16 SCC
173 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 218, while reiterating Rajendra
Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6 SCC 110: 1999 SCC (Cri)
1062, the Court observed that it is the duty of the
criminal court to allow the prosecution to correct an
error in interest of justice. In Rajendra Prasad v.
Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6 SCC 110: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1062, the
Court held that: (Rajendra Prasad case [Rajendra
Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6 SCC 110: 1999 SCC (Cri)
1062], SCC p. 113, para 8)
“8. Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as
the inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix
of the prosecution case. The advantage of it should
normally go to the accused in the trial of the case, but
an oversight in the management of the prosecution
cannot be treated as an irreparable lacuna. No party in
a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors. If proper
evidence was not adduced or relevant material was not
brought on record due to any inadvertence, the court
should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to
be rectified. After all, the function of the criminal court
is administration of criminal justice and not to count
2026:HHC:38602
errors committed by the parties or to find out and
declare who among the parties performed better.”
(emphasis supplied)
45. In the present case, the importance of the
decoding registers was raised in the examination of
PW 41. Accordingly, the decoding registers merely
being additional documents required to be able to
appreciate the existing evidence in the form of the
call details, which are already on record but use codes
to signify the location of the accused, a crucial detail,
which can be decoded only through the decoding
registers, the right of the accused to a fair trial is not
prejudiced. The production of the decoding registers
fits into the requirement of being relevant material
which was not brought on record due to inadvertence.
46. Finally, we also briefly deal with the objection of
the respondents regarding the stage at which the
application under Section 311 was filed. The
respondents have placed reliance on Swapan Kumar
Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC 328 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri)
839, a two-Judge Bench decision of this Court, to
argue that the application should not be allowed as it
has been made at a belated stage. The Court in
Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC 328;
(2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839 observed: (SCC p. 331, paras 1112)
“11. It is well settled that the power conferred under
Section 311 should be invoked by the court only to
meet the ends of justice. The power is to be exercised
only for strong and valid reasons, and it should be
exercised with great caution and circumspection. The
court has wide power under this Section to even recall
witnesses for re-examination or further examination,
necessary in the interest of justice, but the same has
to be exercised after taking into consideration the
facts and circumstances of each case. The power
under this provision shall not be exercised if the court
2026:HHC:38602
is of the view that the application has been filed as an
abuse of the process of law.
12. Where the prosecution evidence has been closed
long back, and the reasons for non-examination of
the witness earlier are not satisfactory, the
summoning of the witness at a belated stage would
cause great prejudice to the accused and should not be
allowed. Similarly, the court should not encourage the
filing of successive applications for recall of a witness
under this provision.”
47. In the present appeal, the argument that the
application was filed after the closure of the evidence
of the prosecution is manifestly erroneous. As already
noted above, the closure of the evidence of the
prosecution took place after the application for the
production of the decoding register and for the
summoning of the witness under Section 311 was
dismissed. Though the dismissal of the application
and the closure of the prosecution evidence both took
place on 13-11-2021, the application by the
prosecution had been filed on 15-3-2021, nearly eight
months earlier. As a matter of fact, another witness
for the prosecution, Rajesh Kumar Singh, was also
released after examination and cross-examination on
the same day as recorded in the order dated 13-112021 of the trial court.
48. The court is vested with a broad and wholesome
power, in terms of Section 311CrPC, to summon and
examine or recall and re-examine any material
witness at any stage, and the closing of prosecution
evidence is not an absolute bar. This Court in Zahira
Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC
158: 2004 SCC (Cri) 999 while dealing with the prayers
for adducing additional evidence under Section
391CrPC at the appellate stage, along with a prayer for
examination of witnesses under Section 311CrPC
explained the role of the court, in the following terms
: (SCC pp. 188-89, para 43)
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“43. The courts have to take a participatory role
in a trial. They are not expected to be tape
recorders to record whatever is being stated by
the witnesses. Section 311 of the Code and
Section 165 of the Evidence Act confer vast and
wide powers on presiding officers of the court
to elicit all necessary materials by playing an
active role in the evidence-collecting process.
They have to monitor the proceedings in aid of
justice in a manner that something which is not
relevant is not unnecessarily brought into the
record. Even if the prosecutor is remiss in some
ways, it can control the proceedings effectively so
that the ultimate objective, i.e. truth, is arrived at.
This becomes more necessary where the court has
reasons to believe that the prosecuting agency or
the prosecutor is not acting in the requisite
manner. The court cannot afford to be wishful or
pretend to be blissfully ignorant or oblivious to
such serious pitfalls or dereliction of duty on the
part of the prosecuting agency. The prosecutor
who does not act fairly and acts more like a
counsel for the defence is a liability to the fair
judicial system, and courts cannot also play
into the hands of such a prosecuting agency,
showing indifference or adopting an attitude of
total aloofness.” (emphasis supplied)
49. Further, in Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of
Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 8, the
Court reiterated the extent of powers under Section
311 and held that: (SCC p. 392, para 27)
“27. The object underlying Section 311 of the
Code is that there may not be failure of justice
on account of mistake of either party in
bringing the valuable evidence on record or
leaving ambiguity in the statements of the
witnesses examined from either side. The
determinative factor is whether it is essential to
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the just decision of the case. The section is not
limited only to the benefit of the accused, and it
will not be an improper exercise of the powers
of the court to summon a witness under the
section merely because the evidence supports
the case of the prosecution and not that of the
accused. The section is a general section which
applies to all proceedings, enquiries and trials
under the Code and empowers the Magistrate to
issue a summons to any witness at any stage of
such proceedings, trial or enquiry. In Section 311,
the significant expression that occurs is at any
stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding
under this Code. It is, however, to be borne in
mind that whereas the section confers a very
wide power on the court on summoning
witnesses, the discretion conferred is to be
exercised judiciously, as the wider the power,
the greater is the necessity for application of
judicial mind.” (emphasis supplied)
50. The Court while reiterating the principle
enunciated in Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India,
1991 Supp (1) SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595 stressed upon
the wide ambit of Section 311 which allows the power
to be exercised at any stage and held that : (Zahira
Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC
158: 2004 SCC (Cri) 999], SCC p. 189, para 44)
“44. The power of the court under Section 165 of the
Evidence Act is, in a way, complementary to its power
under Section 311 of the Code. The section consists of
two parts, i.e., (i) giving a discretion to the court to
examine the witness at any stage, and (ii) the
mandatory portion which compels the court to
examine a witness if his evidence appears to be
essential to the just decision of the court. Though the
discretion given to the court is very wide, the very
width requires a corresponding caution. In Mohanlal
Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271:
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1991 SCC (Cri) 595 this Court has observed, while
considering the scope and ambit of Section 311, that
the very usage of the words such as, “any court”, “at
any stage”, or “any enquiry or trial or other
proceedings”, “any person” and “any such person”
clearly spells out that the section has expressed in the
widest-possible terms and do not limit the discretion
of the court in any way. However, as noted above, the
very width requires a corresponding caution that the
discretionary powers should be invoked as the
exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially
with circumspection and consistently with the
provisions of the Code. The second part of the section
does not allow any discretion but obligates and binds the
court to take necessary steps if the fresh evidence to be
obtained is essential to the just decision of the case,
“essential” to an active and alert mind and not to one
which is bent to abandon or abdicate. The object of the
section is to enable the court to arrive at the truth
irrespective of the fact that the prosecution or the defence
has failed to produce some evidence which is necessary
for a just and proper disposal of the case. The power is
exercised, and the evidence is examined, neither to
help the prosecution nor the defence, if the court feels
that there is a necessity to act in terms of Section 311,
but only to subserve the cause of justice and public
interest. It is done with an object of getting the
evidence in aid of a just decision and to uphold the
truth.” (emphasis supplied)
51. While reiterating the decisions of this Court in
Karnel Singh v. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 518: 1995 SCC
(Cri) 977, Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1999) 2 SCC
126: 1999 SCC (Cri) 104, Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of
Bihar, (1998) 4 SCC 517: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1085 and Amar
Singh v. Balwinder Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 518: 2003 SCC
(Cri) 641 this Court held that the court may interfere
even at the stage of appeal : (Zahira Habibulla H.
2026:HHC:38602
Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 999], SCC p. 196, para 64)
“64. It is no doubt true that the accused persons have
been acquitted by the trial court and the acquittal has
been upheld, but if the acquittal is unmerited and
based on tainted evidence, tailored investigation,
unprincipled prosecutor and perfunctory trial and
evidence of threatened/terrorised witnesses, it is no
acquittal in the eye of the law and no sanctity or
credibility can be attached and given to the so-called
findings. It seems to be nothing but a travesty of
truth, fraud on the legal process and the resultant
decisions of courts — coram non judis and non est.
There is, therefore, every justification to call for
interference in these appeals.”
14.
A similar view was taken in K.P. Tamilmaran Vs.
State and others 2025 INSC 576 wherein it was observed: 47. Before moving further, we consider it necessary to
deal with the law relating to section 311 CrPC under
which PW-49 was summoned as a witness. Section 311
CrPC reads as follows:
“311. Power to summon a material witness or
examine a person present.— Any Court may, at any
stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under
this Code, summon any person as a witness, or
examine any person in attendance, though not
summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine
any person already examined; and the Court shall
summon and examine or recall and re-examine any
such person if his evidence appears to it to be
essential to the just decision of the case.”
This Section 311 of the CrPC provides wide powers to a
Criminal Court to do the following:
I. Summon any person as a witness, or
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ii. Examine any person present in court, though not
summoned as a witness, or
iii. Recall and re-examine any person already examined.
The above powers can be exercised ‘at any stage of any
inquiry, trial or other proceeding’ under the CrPC. The
provision can be divided into two parts. The word ‘may’
is used in the first part of the section, which grants the
Court the discretion to summon a witness. In contrast,
the second part of the Section uses the word ‘shall’,
which casts a duty on the Court to summon and
examine or recall or re-examine any such person as a
witness when it appears to the Court that it is essential
to do so for a just decision in the case. In other words,
the second part is mandatory, and Courts are obligated
to exercise their powers under Section 311 CrPC when
the evidence of any person is essential for a just decision
of the case. (See: Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of
Maharashtra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 19)
48. As is clear from the language of the provision itself,
there is wide discretion with the Courts under Section
311 CrPC. These powers can be exercised suo motu or on
an application moved by either side. After all, the object
is that the Court must not be deprived of the benefit of
any valuable evidence. It is absolutely necessary that the
Court must be apprised of the best evidence available.
Thus, Courts have been given wide powers to decide on
their own if a witness is required to be called or recalled
for examination or re-examination. This power under
Section 311 CrPC can be invoked at any stage of the trial,
even after the closing of the evidence. Section 311 CrPC
can also be read along with Section 165 of the Evidence
Act, as the powers of the Court under Section 165 of the
Evidence Act are complementary to Section 311 of CrPC.
As discussed above, powers under Section 311 CrPC can
either be exercised on an application moved by either
side to the case or suo motu by the Court. In case a
person is not listed as a witness in the charge-sheet but
later the prosecution desires to bring that person as an
additional prosecution witness, then the prosecution
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can move an application to bring this person as a
prosecution witness. It is then for the Court to decide
whether such a person is required as a witness or not. If
the Court finds that such a person should have been
examined as a prosecution witness and he/she was
omitted from the list of witnesses due to some
oversight, mistake or for any other reason, the Court
may allow the application and such a person can be
examined as a prosecution witness. Thereafter, the
normal course of examination-in-chief, crossexamination, etc., would follow as per the procedure. On
the other hand, when the Court calls a person as a Court
witness, there are some restrictions regarding the crossexamination of such a witness.
15.
The complainant specifically asserted in the
complaint that the cheque was dishonoured with an
endorsement "signature differs". He relied upon the memo
of dishonour issued by the bank. The accused denied his
signature on the cheque. Therefore, it was a common case of
the parties that the signatures on the cheque were different
from the signatures of the accused. It is not explained what
purpose would be served by summoning the record from the
bank. Further, the accused never sought the comparison of
the signatures to determine whether the endorsement made
by the bank regarding the difference in signatures was
correct or not. Therefore, even if the specimen signatures
are summoned from the bank, it would not help in
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determining the controversy pending before the learned
trial Court.
16.
The judgment acquitting the accused of the
commission of an offence punishable under section 138 of
the NI Act is irrelevant. Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act
provides that the judgments, orders or decrees other than
those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant
unless they are a fact in issue. Section 40 deals with the
previous judgment, which bars the second suit or trial.
Section 41 deals with the judgments in the exercise of
probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction.
Section 42 deals with the judgments, which relate to matters
of public nature relevant to the enquiry. The judgment
delivered by a criminal court between two persons does not
fall within the purview of Sections 40, 41 and 42 and it would
be inadmissible under Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Therefore,
the
judgment
in
the
previous
case
inadmissible and could not have been taken on record.
17.
No other point was urged.
was
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18.
In view of the above, the present petition fails,
and it is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand
disposed of.
10 September, 2026.
th
(Ravinder)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge.
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