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[2026:RJ-JP:31173]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17474/2017
CNR: RJHC021120942017 | URN: CW / 30044U / 2017
Ganesh Prakash Saini Son Of Shri Om Prakash Saini, Caste - Mali
Obc And Resident Of 358/33, Pal Beesla, Church Road, Ajmer
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
State
Of
Rajasthan
Government,
Through
Department
Of
Its
Secretary
Secondary
To
The
Education,
Secretariat, Jaipur.
2.
The
Director,
Secondary
Education,
Directorate
-
Rajasthan, Bikaner
3.
The
Deputy
Director,
Secondary
Education,
Ajmer
Division, Ajmer
4.
The District Education Officer, Secondary- Ist, Ajmer
5.
The Principal Secretary, Department Of Personnel Ka-2,
Government Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s)
:
Ms. Priya Jain
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Devansh Sharma, Dy.G.C.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA
Order
30/07/2026
1.
This petition has been filed by the petitioner under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order dated
14.08.2017 passed by the respondent No. 2 - the Director,
Secondary Education, Directorate, Rajasthan, Bikaner, whereby
the petitioner's candidature for the post of Physical Training
Instructor ('PTI') Grade-III, was rejected.
(2 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:31173]
2.
[CW-17474/2017]
The brief facts of the case are that an advertisement
was issued on 18.09.2013 by the RPSC for recruitment to the post
of PTI Grade-II and III under the provisions of the Rajasthan
Educational Subordinate Service Rules, 1971 (for short, 'Rules of
1971'), wherein 2858 posts were shown for the post of PTI GradeIII. Thereafter, a category-wise bifurcation of the posts came to be
issued by the RPSC on 02.09.2014, wherein total posts for OBCGeneral were shown as 385 for PTI Grade-III. The petitioner
appeared in the exam for the said post, and subsequently, an
appointment order was issued to him by the respondent No. 4 The
District
Education
Officer,
Secondary-1st,
Ajmer
on
05.06.2016 in the Running Pay Band 9300-34800, Grade Pay
3600. An FIR came to be registered against the petitioner on
19.11.2014 at Police Station - Alwar Gate, Ajmer.
Subsequently, after issuance of the appointment order,
when the respondents sent the antecedents of the petitioner for
verification to the police, it was revealed that a challan has been
filed against the petitioner under Sections 143, 341, 323 and 336
IPC. Pursuant to this, directions were issued to respondent No. 4
by respondent No. 3 - the Deputy Director, Secondary Education,
Ajmer to not allow the petitioner to join the duties.
3.
Being aggrieved by the said directions, the petitioner
preferred a writ petition before the Court, wherein an interim
order was passed on 17.08.2016 directing the respondents to
keep one post vacant for the petitioner until final decision of the
petition. The said petition finally came to be decided by the Court
on 08.03.2017.
(3 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:31173]
4.
[CW-17474/2017]
In pursuance of the said judgement dated 08.03.2017,
a representation was filed by the petitioner before the respondent
No. 2 on 28.03.2017 which came to be decided by the
respondents on 14.08.2017, whereby the petitioner was held as
not entitled for appointment.
5.
The criminal case filed against the petitioner came to
be decided by the Court of learned Additional Civil Judge and
Judicial Magistrate First Class No. 6, Ajmer (for short, 'the learned
trial Court') vide its order dated 13.03.2018, whereby the
petitioner was held guilty of the offences punishable under
Sections 143, 341, 323 and 324 of IPC, but was also extended the
benefits of Sections 4 and 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act,
1958 (for short, 'the Act of 1958') subject to certain conditions.
6.
Against the said decision dated 13.03.2018, an appeal
was preferred by the petitioner before the Court of Additional
Sessions Judge No. 5, Ajmer (for short, 'the learned Appellate
Court'), which came to be dismissed on 25.01.2019.
7.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as on
the last date of submitting the application form for recruitment to
the post of PTI Grade-III i.e. 20.10.2013, no criminal case was
pending against the petitioner and an FIR came to be registered
only after 13 months of filling the application form. He submits
that the said offences are an outcome of a civil dispute pertaining
to construction between the neighbours, and as per Rule 12 of the
Rules
of
1971,
appointment.
the
petitioner
cannot
be
debarred
from
[2026:RJ-JP:31173]
(4 of 10)
[CW-17474/2017]
The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits
that the impugned decision dated 14.08.2017 was passed by the
respondents in accordance with the circular dated 15.07.2016,
however, the said decision stands contrary to the mandate given
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Avtar Singh v. Union
of India & Ors., (2016) 8 SCC 471.
8.
Learned counsel for the respondents in the reply to the
present petition submits that the respondents have not defied the
order dated 08.03.2017 since as per Rule 12 of the Rules of 1971,
at the time of appointment, the candidate should not have been
involved in any offence of moral turpitude.
9.
Considered the submissions made at Bar and also
perused the material available on record.
10.
The basic issue for consideration before this Court is
'Whether the 'benefit of probation' after conviction in a criminal
case is a disqualification for public employment?'
11.
The relevant provisions of the Act of 1958 are as
under:"4. Power of court to release certain offenders
on probation of good conduct — (1) When any
person is found guilty of having committed an
offence not punishable with death or imprisonment
for life and the court by which the person is found
guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the
circumstances of the case including the nature of the
offence and the character of the offender, it is
expedient to release him on probation of good
conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force, the court
may, instead of sentencing him at once to any
punishment direct that he be released on his entering
into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and
receive sentence when called upon during such
[2026:RJ-JP:31173]
(5 of 10)
[CW-17474/2017]
period, not exceeding three years, as the court may
direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and
be of good behaviour.
Provided that the court shall not direct such release
of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender
or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or
regular occupation in the place over which the court
exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely
to live during the period for which he enters into the
bond.
(2) Before making any order under sub-section (1),
the court shall take into consideration the report, if
any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to
the case.
(3) When an order under sub-section (1) is made,
the court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests
of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to
do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that
the offender shall remain under the supervision of a
probation officer named in the order during such
period, not being less than one year, as may be
specified therein, and may in such supervision order
impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the
due supervision of the offender.
(4) The court making a supervision order under subsection (3) shall require the offender, before he is
released, to enter into a bond, with or without
sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such
order and such additional conditions with respect to
residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other
matter as the court may, having regard to the
particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for
preventing a repetition of the same offence or a
commission of other offences by the offender.
(5) The court making a supervision order under subsection (3) shall explain to the offender the terms
and conditions of the order and shall forthwith
furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of
the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation
officer concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
[2026:RJ-JP:31173]
(6 of 10)
[CW-17474/2017]
...
12. Removal of disqualification attaching to
conviction — Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law, a person found guilty of an offence
and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or
section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any,
attaching to a conviction of an offence under such
law:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a
person who, after his release under section 4, is
subsequently sentenced for the original offence."
12.
It is trite law that the Act of 1958 embodies the theory
of reformation, which shifts focus from retributive incarceration to
rehabilitation of the first-time offenders. The Hon'ble Apex Court,
while emphasizing the purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act,
in the case of Lakhvir Singh v. State of Punjab, 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 25 observed as under:
“…to give the benefit of release of offenders on
probation of good conduct instead of sentencing
them to imprisonment. Thus, increasing emphasis on
the reformation and rehabilitation of offenders as
useful and self-reliant members of society without
subjecting them to the deleterious effects of jail life
is what is sought to be subserved…”
13.
Further, the Delhi High Court in the case of Rajesh v.
Union of India and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 7320
observed as under:"13. In the context of this legal question, notice may
first be taken of the Division Bench decision of this
Court in Shaitan Singh Meena. The petitioner therein
was a candidate for the post of “Limb Maker
Carpenter” in the Artificial Limb Centre of the
Government. He was convicted of offences under
Sections 323, 341, 447 and 324/34 IPC, in a case
arising out of a land dispute between members of the
(7 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:31173]
[CW-17474/2017]
family, but was released on probation under the Act.
Upon consideration of prior authorities, the Division
Bench drew a distinction between cases of
disqualification from appointment, which Section 12
of the Act covers, and cases avoiding dismissal from
a post, which is not covered by Section 12 of the Act.
The Division Bench also recorded the following
conclusions:
“24. The above three decisions of the DB explain
the legal position as regards grant of the benefit
of probation and consequently Section 12 POA
even while convicting a person. The object of
Section 12 POA is to remove the disqualification
attaching to the conviction. Another factor to be
noted is that in each of the above three
decisions, there was an additional issue
regarding non-disclosure by the Petitioners of
their involvement in the criminal case. Yet, that
did not come in the way of their being held not
disqualified for appointment to the respective
posts in government service.
25. The present case stands on an even better
footing since it is not the case of the
Respondents that there is any suppression of
facts by the Petitioner while applying for the
post. It so happened that the conviction for the
aforementioned offences came about on 1st
December 2016, after the Petitioner had already
successfully cleared the requisite tests in
November 2016. The fact of his conviction
emerged during the police verification that took
place in January 2017. Further, the conviction
was not for offences involving moral turpitude. It
was for relatively minor offences arising out of a
dispute over land between families.
xxx xxx xxx
31. As already noticed hereinbefore the
Respondent is seeking to use the conviction of
the Petitioner for evidently non-serious offences
to disqualify him for appointment in government
service by ignoring the fact that he has been
released on probation thereby defeating the very
object of the Section 12 POA. The Court is,
(8 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:31173]
[CW-17474/2017]
therefore, not able to accept the submission of
the Respondents that the conviction of the
Petitioner in the aforementioned case would
come in the way of his being appointed to the
post of Limb Maker Carpenter in the ALC
notwithstanding Section 12 POA.”
While arriving at this conclusion, the Court ultimately
directed appointment of the petitioner to the said
post.
...
19. In summary, I am of the view that the petitioner
is entitled to the protection from disqualification
enshrined in Section 12 of the Act, following the
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in
Shaitan Singh Meena. Although the petitioner was
convicted of offences under Sections 498A and 406
IPC, he was released on probation by the Appellate
Court after the proceedings between him and the
complainant [his wife] had been settled. This order
was passed without any objection of the complainant.
The marriage of the petitioner and the complainant
had also been dissolved by mutual consent. The post
for which the petitioner was offered appointment was
not such as to require such a lasting effect of his
conviction, so as to disentitle the benefit of the
statutory provisions.
E. Conclusion:
20. Consequently, the petition is allowed, and the
impugned order of AAI dated 09.12.2024 is set
aside."
14.
Considering the judgements cited above, it can be
deduced that release of an offender on probation under Section 12
of the Act of 1958 removes the disqualification attached to a
conviction under any law for the purpose of public employment,
although it does not completely wipe out the conviction.
15.
In the present case, FIR came to be registered after 13
months from the last date for filling the application form for the
(9 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:31173]
[CW-17474/2017]
post of PTI Grade-III, which implies that the petitioner had not
lied or suppressed any information at the time of filling the
declaration in the said application form. Further, the respondents
themselves
have
admitted
in
their
communication
dated
14.08.2017 that the offences alleged against the petitioner, do not
constitute moral turpitude.
While it is an undeniable fact that a teacher must
possess unimpeachable integrity, however, denying appointment
to a candidate solely based on a first-time conviction, for which
the candidate has already been extended the statutory benefit of
probation by the learned trial Court, does not appear to be the
right approach.
16.
Taking
into
consideration
the
overall
facts
and
circumstances of the case and also, having regard to the cases
cited above, the Court is of the opinion that denying livelihood to a
candidate/petitioner would frustrate the very object of the Act of
1958.
17.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the civil writ
petition filed by the petitioner is allowed and the impugned order
dated 14.08.2017 passed by the respondent No. 2, rejecting
petitioner's appointment to the post of PTI Grade-III, is set aside.
18.
The respondents are directed to allow appointment to
the petitioner on the post of PTI
Grade III
pursuant to
advertisement dated 18.09.2013 and appointment order dated
05.06.2016 within a period of 60 days from the date of order with
consequential benefits like seniority and pay fixation, etc. as per
his merit in the selection. However, he would be entitled only for
the notional monetary benefits for intervening period.
[2026:RJ-JP:31173]
19.
(10 of 10)
[CW-17474/2017]
The stay application and pending applications, if any,
also stand disposed of.
(GANESH RAM MEENA),J
316/ARTI SHARMA
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