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Civil

Ganesh Prakash Saini vs State of Raj and Ors

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Court
Rajasthan High Court
Date
30 July 2026
Case No.
CW 17474/2017
Result
Allowed
Bench
Ganesh Ram Meena
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19. (10 of 10) [CW-17474/2017] The stay application and pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (GANESH RAM MEENA),J 316/ARTI SHARMA

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Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 323, Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 341, Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 324, Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 143, Indian Penal Code, 1860

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[2026:RJ-JP:31173] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17474/2017 CNR: RJHC021120942017 | URN: CW / 30044U / 2017 Ganesh Prakash Saini Son Of Shri Om Prakash Saini, Caste - Mali Obc And Resident Of 358/33, Pal Beesla, Church Road, Ajmer ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan Government, Through Department Of Its Secretary Secondary To The Education, Secretariat, Jaipur. 2. The Director, Secondary Education, Directorate - Rajasthan, Bikaner 3. The Deputy Director, Secondary Education, Ajmer Division, Ajmer 4. The District Education Officer, Secondary- Ist, Ajmer 5. The Principal Secretary, Department Of Personnel Ka-2, Government Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Priya Jain For Respondent(s) : Mr. Devansh Sharma, Dy.G.C. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA Order 30/07/2026 1. This petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 14.08.2017 passed by the respondent No. 2 - the Director, Secondary Education, Directorate, Rajasthan, Bikaner, whereby the petitioner's candidature for the post of Physical Training Instructor ('PTI') Grade-III, was rejected. (2 of 10) [2026:RJ-JP:31173] 2. [CW-17474/2017] The brief facts of the case are that an advertisement was issued on 18.09.2013 by the RPSC for recruitment to the post of PTI Grade-II and III under the provisions of the Rajasthan Educational Subordinate Service Rules, 1971 (for short, 'Rules of 1971'), wherein 2858 posts were shown for the post of PTI GradeIII. Thereafter, a category-wise bifurcation of the posts came to be issued by the RPSC on 02.09.2014, wherein total posts for OBCGeneral were shown as 385 for PTI Grade-III. The petitioner appeared in the exam for the said post, and subsequently, an appointment order was issued to him by the respondent No. 4 The District Education Officer, Secondary-1st, Ajmer on 05.06.2016 in the Running Pay Band 9300-34800, Grade Pay 3600. An FIR came to be registered against the petitioner on 19.11.2014 at Police Station - Alwar Gate, Ajmer. Subsequently, after issuance of the appointment order, when the respondents sent the antecedents of the petitioner for verification to the police, it was revealed that a challan has been filed against the petitioner under Sections 143, 341, 323 and 336 IPC. Pursuant to this, directions were issued to respondent No. 4 by respondent No. 3 - the Deputy Director, Secondary Education, Ajmer to not allow the petitioner to join the duties. 3. Being aggrieved by the said directions, the petitioner preferred a writ petition before the Court, wherein an interim order was passed on 17.08.2016 directing the respondents to keep one post vacant for the petitioner until final decision of the petition. The said petition finally came to be decided by the Court on 08.03.2017. (3 of 10) [2026:RJ-JP:31173] 4. [CW-17474/2017] In pursuance of the said judgement dated 08.03.2017, a representation was filed by the petitioner before the respondent No. 2 on 28.03.2017 which came to be decided by the respondents on 14.08.2017, whereby the petitioner was held as not entitled for appointment. 5. The criminal case filed against the petitioner came to be decided by the Court of learned Additional Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate First Class No. 6, Ajmer (for short, 'the learned trial Court') vide its order dated 13.03.2018, whereby the petitioner was held guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 143, 341, 323 and 324 of IPC, but was also extended the benefits of Sections 4 and 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (for short, 'the Act of 1958') subject to certain conditions. 6. Against the said decision dated 13.03.2018, an appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge No. 5, Ajmer (for short, 'the learned Appellate Court'), which came to be dismissed on 25.01.2019. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as on the last date of submitting the application form for recruitment to the post of PTI Grade-III i.e. 20.10.2013, no criminal case was pending against the petitioner and an FIR came to be registered only after 13 months of filling the application form. He submits that the said offences are an outcome of a civil dispute pertaining to construction between the neighbours, and as per Rule 12 of the Rules of 1971, appointment. the petitioner cannot be debarred from [2026:RJ-JP:31173] (4 of 10) [CW-17474/2017] The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the impugned decision dated 14.08.2017 was passed by the respondents in accordance with the circular dated 15.07.2016, however, the said decision stands contrary to the mandate given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (2016) 8 SCC 471. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents in the reply to the present petition submits that the respondents have not defied the order dated 08.03.2017 since as per Rule 12 of the Rules of 1971, at the time of appointment, the candidate should not have been involved in any offence of moral turpitude. 9. Considered the submissions made at Bar and also perused the material available on record. 10. The basic issue for consideration before this Court is 'Whether the 'benefit of probation' after conviction in a criminal case is a disqualification for public employment?' 11. The relevant provisions of the Act of 1958 are as under:"4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct — (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such [2026:RJ-JP:31173] (5 of 10) [CW-17474/2017] period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond. (2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case. (3) When an order under sub-section (1) is made, the court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender. (4) The court making a supervision order under subsection (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender. (5) The court making a supervision order under subsection (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned. xxx xxx xxx [2026:RJ-JP:31173] (6 of 10) [CW-17474/2017] ... 12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction — Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under section 4, is subsequently sentenced for the original offence." 12. It is trite law that the Act of 1958 embodies the theory of reformation, which shifts focus from retributive incarceration to rehabilitation of the first-time offenders. The Hon'ble Apex Court, while emphasizing the purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act, in the case of Lakhvir Singh v. State of Punjab, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 25 observed as under: “…to give the benefit of release of offenders on probation of good conduct instead of sentencing them to imprisonment. Thus, increasing emphasis on the reformation and rehabilitation of offenders as useful and self-reliant members of society without subjecting them to the deleterious effects of jail life is what is sought to be subserved…” 13. Further, the Delhi High Court in the case of Rajesh v. Union of India and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 7320 observed as under:"13. In the context of this legal question, notice may first be taken of the Division Bench decision of this Court in Shaitan Singh Meena. The petitioner therein was a candidate for the post of “Limb Maker Carpenter” in the Artificial Limb Centre of the Government. He was convicted of offences under Sections 323, 341, 447 and 324/34 IPC, in a case arising out of a land dispute between members of the (7 of 10) [2026:RJ-JP:31173] [CW-17474/2017] family, but was released on probation under the Act. Upon consideration of prior authorities, the Division Bench drew a distinction between cases of disqualification from appointment, which Section 12 of the Act covers, and cases avoiding dismissal from a post, which is not covered by Section 12 of the Act. The Division Bench also recorded the following conclusions: “24. The above three decisions of the DB explain the legal position as regards grant of the benefit of probation and consequently Section 12 POA even while convicting a person. The object of Section 12 POA is to remove the disqualification attaching to the conviction. Another factor to be noted is that in each of the above three decisions, there was an additional issue regarding non-disclosure by the Petitioners of their involvement in the criminal case. Yet, that did not come in the way of their being held not disqualified for appointment to the respective posts in government service. 25. The present case stands on an even better footing since it is not the case of the Respondents that there is any suppression of facts by the Petitioner while applying for the post. It so happened that the conviction for the aforementioned offences came about on 1st December 2016, after the Petitioner had already successfully cleared the requisite tests in November 2016. The fact of his conviction emerged during the police verification that took place in January 2017. Further, the conviction was not for offences involving moral turpitude. It was for relatively minor offences arising out of a dispute over land between families. xxx xxx xxx 31. As already noticed hereinbefore the Respondent is seeking to use the conviction of the Petitioner for evidently non-serious offences to disqualify him for appointment in government service by ignoring the fact that he has been released on probation thereby defeating the very object of the Section 12 POA. The Court is, (8 of 10) [2026:RJ-JP:31173] [CW-17474/2017] therefore, not able to accept the submission of the Respondents that the conviction of the Petitioner in the aforementioned case would come in the way of his being appointed to the post of Limb Maker Carpenter in the ALC notwithstanding Section 12 POA.” While arriving at this conclusion, the Court ultimately directed appointment of the petitioner to the said post. ... 19. In summary, I am of the view that the petitioner is entitled to the protection from disqualification enshrined in Section 12 of the Act, following the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Shaitan Singh Meena. Although the petitioner was convicted of offences under Sections 498A and 406 IPC, he was released on probation by the Appellate Court after the proceedings between him and the complainant [his wife] had been settled. This order was passed without any objection of the complainant. The marriage of the petitioner and the complainant had also been dissolved by mutual consent. The post for which the petitioner was offered appointment was not such as to require such a lasting effect of his conviction, so as to disentitle the benefit of the statutory provisions. E. Conclusion: 20. Consequently, the petition is allowed, and the impugned order of AAI dated 09.12.2024 is set aside." 14. Considering the judgements cited above, it can be deduced that release of an offender on probation under Section 12 of the Act of 1958 removes the disqualification attached to a conviction under any law for the purpose of public employment, although it does not completely wipe out the conviction. 15. In the present case, FIR came to be registered after 13 months from the last date for filling the application form for the (9 of 10) [2026:RJ-JP:31173] [CW-17474/2017] post of PTI Grade-III, which implies that the petitioner had not lied or suppressed any information at the time of filling the declaration in the said application form. Further, the respondents themselves have admitted in their communication dated 14.08.2017 that the offences alleged against the petitioner, do not constitute moral turpitude. While it is an undeniable fact that a teacher must possess unimpeachable integrity, however, denying appointment to a candidate solely based on a first-time conviction, for which the candidate has already been extended the statutory benefit of probation by the learned trial Court, does not appear to be the right approach. 16. Taking into consideration the overall facts and circumstances of the case and also, having regard to the cases cited above, the Court is of the opinion that denying livelihood to a candidate/petitioner would frustrate the very object of the Act of 1958. 17. In view of the foregoing discussion, the civil writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed and the impugned order dated 14.08.2017 passed by the respondent No. 2, rejecting petitioner's appointment to the post of PTI Grade-III, is set aside. 18. The respondents are directed to allow appointment to the petitioner on the post of PTI Grade III pursuant to advertisement dated 18.09.2013 and appointment order dated 05.06.2016 within a period of 60 days from the date of order with consequential benefits like seniority and pay fixation, etc. as per his merit in the selection. However, he would be entitled only for the notional monetary benefits for intervening period. [2026:RJ-JP:31173] 19. (10 of 10) [CW-17474/2017] The stay application and pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (GANESH RAM MEENA),J 316/ARTI SHARMA

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