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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Extraordinary Jurisdiction)
DATED : 7th JULY, 2017
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH : THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
:
Petitioner
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana,
S/o Late M. S. Rana,
Presently posted at
HQ, Project Swastik,
C/o 99 APO
versus
Respondents
:
1.
The Union of India
represented by the Secretary,
Ministry of Defence (Border Roads)
„B‟ Wing, 4th Floor,
Sena Bhawan,
New Delhi – 110 011.
2.
The Joint Secretary (Border Roads),
Ministry of Defence,
„B‟ Wing, 4th Floor,
Sena Bhawan,
New Delhi – 110 011.
3.
The Director General Border Roads,
Headquarters DGBR,
Seema Sadak Bhawan,
Ring Road,
Delhi Cantt.,
New Delhi – 110 011.
4.
The Director,
Central Vigilance Commission,
Satarkta Bhavan,
G.P.O. Complex,
Block „A‟, INA,
New Delhi – 110 023.
5.
The Union Public Service Commission,
Dholpur House,
Shahjahan Road,
New Delhi – 110 069.
6.
The Chief Engineer,
Project Swastik,
C/o 99 APO
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
Application under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Tashi Rapten Barfungpa, Mr. Thinlay Dorjee Bhutia and Ms.
Dorjee Uden Nadik, Advocates for the Petitioner.
Mr. Karma Thinlay Namgyal, Central Government Advocate for
the Respondents.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
The Petitioner, by filing the instant Writ Petition, seeks;
(i)
Quashing of the impugned Inquiry Report dated 19-02-2010,
the impugned Office Memorandum issued by the Director,
Central Vigilance Commission, vide letter dated 13-03-2012,
the impugned Advice dated 11-05-2015 issued by the Union
Public Service Commission and the Impugned Order dated
23-08-2016.
(ii)
A declaration that the Disciplinary Proceeding dated 19-062008 is bad and non est in the eye of law, to accredit his
upgradation and grant his non-functional upgradation, with
effect from 01-04-2011, arrears of salary and all other
service benefits, with interest, from 01-04-2011.
2.
The Petitioner joined the Border Roads Organisation
(BRO) on 20-02-1995, as an Assistant Executive Engineer (Civil),
through the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). He served in
different parts of the country and is presently posted in Sikkim, as
an Executive Engineer, HQ, Project Swastik. The matter goes back
to August 2005, when he was posted in Jaisalmer, Rajasthan and
assigned the task, inter alia, of resurfacing Jaisalmer Bye Pass Road,
comprising of a stretch of 18.655 kms.
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
3.
On completion of the works, a Court of Inquiry was
convened against the Petitioner by the HQ, Director General Border
Roads (DGBR), vide its letter dated 13-10-2005, with the terms of
reference, as follows;
“…………………………………………………………………………….
2.
Terms of Reference:(a)
The mode of execution of resurfacing of
Jaisalmer bye pass, i.e., by manual or by
machine and whether the works documents
maintained accordingly.
(b)
Whether HSD booked during the period
Aug & Sep 05 for the works, in works diary and
charged off in POL documents are justified ?
(c)
Out of 735 labourers mustered against
Jaisalmer bye pass to investigate why 492 CPLs
in
SW
Bill
bearing
Vr
No.
45TF/
95RCC/2306/2408/45TF dated 21 Sep 2005 did
not turn up for receiving their monthly wages
inspite of ample chances / time given by the
paying officer detailed by CE (P) Chetak resulting
in depositing of unpaid amount of Rs. 3.10 Lacs
in single Muster Roll.
It may also be
investigated why large number of CPLs were
recruited with out completion of formalities like
medical examination by medical officer and
without completion of documentation by RCC /
TF and subsequently 492 CPLs so recruited were
discharged upto 01 Sep 2005. The court to also
ascertain the aspect of false mustering in above
cases by physical verification / verification of
thumb impression from forensic Labs in respect
of paid Muster Rolls.
(d)
The court to examine physically in detail
the resurfacing works of 18.645 Kms executed
with 19% BUSG works as reflected / booked as
correction works where as per preliminary
enquiry, hardly any correction works less than
5% carried out.
The actual work done on
ground, booking and justification of resources
including receipt / consumption of contract
materials as per MB, RMR, works diary be
checked by court.
(e)
To bring out the total loss to state due
above
irregularities
and
pin
point
the
responsibility.
…………………………………………………………………………”
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
4.
Pursuant
thereto,
formulated
against
the
two
Petitioner
Articles
vide
of
Charge
Memorandum
were
bearing
No.BRDB/02 (197)/2007-GE.II, dated 19-06-2008. Article II being
relevant for the present purposes is being reproduced hereunder;
“STATEMENT OF ARTICLE OF CHARGES FRAMED
AGAINST SHRI GS RANA, EE (CIV) (GO-2504M)
EX OC 95 RCC/45 BRTF/(P) CHETAK
………………………………..…………………………………………….
ARTICLE-II
1.
That during aforesaid period while functioning as
Officer Commanding the said Shri GS Rana, EE (Civ)
did not maintain long roll, Identity Card register of CPL
and did not ensure medical examination of CPLs before
their recruitment as per instructions/SOP which led into
irregularities in mustering of CPLs.
2.
During Aug 2005, 750 CPLs were paid wages for
the period from 21 Jul 2005 to 20 Aug 2005 according
to
Muster
Roll
Nos.
2306/2362/45
TF
and
2306/2364/45 TF both dated 26 Aug 2005. While
making payment to CPLs for Sep 2005 for the period
from 21 Aug 2005 to 31 Aug 2005, 490 CPLs out of
CPLs
mustered
under
Muster
Roll
No.
2306/2408/45 TF dated 21 Sep 2005 did not turn up
for receiving the payment. Therefore an amount of Rs.
3,10,474/- was deposited into Government Treasury by
means of TR as unpaid wages. To these 490 CPLS an
amount of Rs. 4,30,567/- was paid as wages for Aug
2005 for the period from 21 Jul 2005 to 20 Aug 2005.
These 490 CPLs were later found false mustered which
has been proved by forensic experts thereby causing a
loss of Rs.4,30,567/- to the State.
3.
By the above act, the said Shri GS Rana, EE
(Civ) has failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion
to duty and acted in a manner which was unbecoming
of his official position and status, as held by him,
thereby violated the provisions of Rule 3 (1) (i), (ii)
and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.”
5.
The
aforesaid
Memorandum
was
received
by
the
Petitioner on 30-07-2008, duly acknowledged by him on 31-07-2008,
whereby he denied all Charges.
On appointment of Presenting
Officer and Inquiring Authority, information thereof was forwarded
to him, vide letter dated 20-10-2008, received by him on 01-11-
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
2008. Proceedings before the Inquiry Officer in which the Petitioner
participated, commenced on 07-01-2009 and concluded on 30-072009. As directed, he submitted his defence statement on 27-072009 and a Case Brief on 18-09-2009.
After a spell devoid of
communication, on 19-03-2012 he was supplied with a copy of the
Inquiry Report, dated 01-12-2009, in which he had been exonerated
of all Charges, along with Disagreement Note of the Disciplinary
Authority and copies of the 2nd Stage Advice of the Central Vigilance
Commission
(CVC),
dated
13-03-2012,
advising
sanction
of
prosecution and imposition of suitable major penalty on him and
another personnel. On 31-03-2012, in order to submit an effective
written representation within the period prescribed by relevant
Rules, the Petitioner sought more documents from the Respondent
Authorities. In response, the First Inquiry Report and Disagreement
Note
were
re-furnished
to
him.
He
submitted
a
written
representation on 17-07-2012 confining it to the First Inquiry and
Disagreement Note of the Disciplinary Authority, being oblivious of a
Second Inquiry which had been ordered by the Disciplinary Authority
on 29-01-2010 and Report submitted on 19-02-2010, finding him
partially guilty under Article II, after the Inquiring Authority reexamined the matter.
Meanwhile, on a case registered against
him, on the same issue he appeared before the CBI, ACB, Jodhpur,
on 29-09-2012, wherein the matter stood closed on account of lack
of Prosecution materials.
From 17-07-2012 no communication
ensued between the Petitioner and the Respondent Authorities till
25-05-2015, when he received letter of even date, enclosing copy of
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
the impugned advice dated 11-05-2015 of the UPSC, giving him an
option of submitting a reply within fifteen days.
Through this
communication, he learnt of the further Inquiry against him where
he was found partially guilty.
6.
In
response
to
the
letter
dated
25-05-2015,
the
Petitioner submitted a representation, dated 11-06-2015, stating
therein that, for the Second Inquiry the Disciplinary Authority had
collected evidence behind his back, but denied him an opportunity of
rebutting
the
new
evidence
against
him.
Based
on
this
representation, a letter dated 09-12-2015 was issued by the
Ministry of Defence D. (Vigilance) to the DGBR, relying upon the
decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Others
vs. S. K. Kapoor1, requiring the Authority to furnish copies of relevant
documents to the Petitioner.
In due compliance thereof, the
Petitioner received the documents on 29-12-2015. On 11-01-2016,
the Petitioner submitted his detailed Written Statement in response
to the communication of 29-12-2015 and prayed for exoneration.
That after an elapse of eleven years since the initiation of the
proceedings, which has caused him serious prejudice, mental agony
and trauma, denial of non-functional upgradation w.e.f. 01-04-2011
and non-upgradation of his scale, the impugned Order dated 23-082016 was issued, which reads as follows;
“…………………………………………………………………………..
15.
NOW THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers
conferred by Rule 15 (4) of Central Civil Service
(2011) 4 SCC 589
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, and in
consultation and agreement with the Union Public
Service Commission, the President is inclined to take a
view that justice would be met by imposing the penalty
of “reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay
by one stage for a period of one year with further
direction that the CO will not earn increments of pay
during the period of this reduction and, on the expiry
of such period, the reduction will not have the effect
of postponing his future increments” with immediate
effect on Shri GS RANA, EE (Civil) (GO No.2504M). It
is further direction that a relevant entry in the service
records of Shri GS RANA, EE (Civil) (GO No.2504M) be
made.
…………………………………………………………………………..”
That, Office Memorandum dated 08-01-1971 and 14-10-2013
of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, inter
alia, provides that a Disciplinary Authority is required to take a final
decision after receipt of Inquiry Report within three months and all
major penalty proceedings against
a Government Servant is
required to be completed and final orders issued within eighteen
months from the date of delivery of Charges, respectively, which
have clearly been flouted, hence, the prayers in the Petition.
7.
In the Counter-Affidavit, it was averred that the Writ
Petition is liable to be dismissed, the cause of action having arisen
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
That, the Order of the
Disciplinary Authority dated 23-08-2016 was based on a finding that
the Petitioner had committed lapses in the works which he was to
execute, for which Charges were levelled against him. Admittedly,
the First Inquiry Report was submitted by the Inquiry Officer on 0112-2009 and the dates furnished by the Petitioner pertaining to the
Inquiry were undisputed.
However, while admitting delay in the
proceedings, it was explained that the delay was on account of the
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
active deliberation by the Disciplinary Authority in consultation with
the CVC and UPSC.
The documents being voluminous required
detailed
various
study
by
Authorities,
in
the
administration, to avoid any miscarriage of justice.
channel
of
That, despite
the delay, which was unintentional, the Petitioner was supplied with
copies of all relevant documents, thus no violation or deprivation of
reasonable opportunity to the Petitioner occurred. That, the Report
of the Inquiring Authority is only an enabling document, to assist
the Disciplinary Authority in arriving at his opinion about the guilt of
the Petitioner, but is not binding on the Disciplinary Authority.
Hence, the Petitioner cannot claim exoneration by the Inquiring
Authority unless its findings are accepted in totality by the
Disciplinary
Authority.
A
Departmental
Inquiry
requires
“preponderance of probability” which was established against the
Petitioner, hence, the Writ Petition not being sustainable in law,
deserves a dismissal.
8.
In Rejoinder, it was averred that the Petitioner at the
time of filing the Writ Petition was posted in the State of Sikkim as
Executive Engineer, HQ Project Swastik and the very fact that the
impugned Order dated 23-08-2016 was served on the Petitioner,
within the State of Sikkim, reveals jurisdiction of this Court, as
provided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
9.
While
canvassing
the
point
that
this
Court
has
jurisdiction, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner drew strength from
the decision of the Gauhati High Court in Sri Pratap Kaivarta vs. The
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
Union of India and Others2.
principles
of
natural
justice
It was further contended that the
have
been
violated
as
relevant
documents were not made over to him, on which count, reliance
was placed on Union of India and others vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan3 and
Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others vs. B. Karunakar and
Others4.
That, delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings as no
reasons for the delay have been revealed.
In support of this
submission, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied on State of A. P.
vs. N. Radhakishan5 and P.V. Mahadevan vs. MD, T.N. Housing Board6.
That, the penalty was not commensurate to the offence which
was minor and the Respondents have clearly violated the provision
of Rule 15(2) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1965 [CCS (CCA) Rules], hence, the Petitioner
deserves the reliefs, as prayed.
10.
Per contra, dwelling on the ambit of this Court under
judicial review, Learned Central Government Counsel expostulated
that this Court cannot sit on Appeal on the conclusion of the
Disciplinary Authority and drew attention to the following decisions;
(i)
Praveen Bhatia vs. Union of India and Others7;
(ii)
Registrar General, High Court of Judicature of Madras vs.
K. Muthukumarasamy8;
(iii)
Delhi Police, Through Commissioner of Police and Others
vs. Sat Narayan Kaushik9.
MANU/GH/0315/2015 [WP(C) No.6481 of 2007 dated 12-06-2015]
(1991) 1 SCC 588
(1993) 4 SCC 727
(1998) 4 SCC 154
(2005) 6 SCC 636
(2009) 4 SCC 225
(2014) 16 SCC 555
(2016) 6 SCC 303
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
11.
While gathering strength from the ratio in Chairman, Life
Insurance Corporation of India and Others vs. A. Masilamani10, it was
vehemently argued that delay cannot be a reason for setting aside
the proceedings. It was next contended that the magnitude of the
offence deserved a major penalty, as in the absence of medical
examination and Report of Casual Paid Labourers (CPLs), if a fatality
of any CPL had occured, compensatory payment would have
resulted in enormous financial loss to the Respondents.
That, the
cause of action arose in Jaisalmer, thereby debarring the jurisdiction
of this Court, for which reliance was placed on C.B.I. Anti-Corruption
Branch, Mumbai vs. Narayan Diwakar11, National Textile Corpn. Ltd. and
Others
vs. Haribox Swalram and Others12 and Alchemist Ltd. and
Another vs. State Bank of Sikkim and Others13.
12.
The submissions put forth by Learned Counsel were
heard at length.
pleadings,
the
I have carefully perused and considered the
entire
documents
appended,
as
well
as
the
Judgments cited at the Bar.
13.
The first relevant question for determination would be,
whether this Court has jurisdiction in the instant matter? If this be
answered in the positive, the next query would be, whether the
disciplinary and other proceedings initiated against the Petitioner is
liable to be quashed on grounds of inordinate delay and violation of
the principles of natural justice?
(2013) 6 SCC 530
(1999) 4 SCC 656
(2004) 9 SCC 786
(2007) 11 SCC 335
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
14.
Addressing the issue flagged by Learned Counsel for the
Respondent pertaining to jurisdiction, it would be worthwhile firstly
to contemplate on the provision of the Article 226(2) of the
Constitution of India. This provision reads as follows;
“226. Power of High Courts to issue certain
writs.―(1)………………………………………………….
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue
directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person may also be exercised by any High
Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding
that the seat of such Government or authority or the
residence of such person is not within those territories.
……………………………………………………………”
It is apparent on the face of the provision that even if a part of
the cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, it will
lend jurisdiction in the matter.
15.
It may be beneficially be recapitulated that in 1963, by
the Constitution (Fifteenth) Amendment, Clause (1-A) was inserted
in
Article
of
the
Constitution,
which
was
subsequently
renumbered as Clause (2), by the Constitution (Forty-second)
Amendment Act of 1976. After insertion of this provision the High
Court could issue a writ when the person or the Authority against
whom the writ is issued, is located outside its territorial jurisdiction,
if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the Court‟s
territorial jurisdiction.
In Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of
India and Another14, the Supreme Court held that, although in view of
Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”),
(2004) 6 SCC 254
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
the provisions of Section 20(c) of the CPC would not apply to Writ
proceedings, however, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the
CPC and Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, being in pari
materia,
the
decisions
of
the
Supreme
Court
rendered
on
interpretation of Section 20(c) of the CPC, shall apply to the Writ
proceedings also.
That, keeping in view the expressions used in
Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, indisputably even if a
small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the
Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. That, although
cause of action has not been defined in any statute, but judicially
interpreted would, inter alia, mean every fact which would be
necessary for the Plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support
his right to the judgment of the Court.
Thus, we find that the
provisions have been succinctly explained and the phraseology of
cause of action has been clearly defined.
16.
We may usefully refer to a fairly recent decision of the
Supreme Court on the same question, i.e., jurisdiction.
In Nawal
Kishore Sharma vs. Union of India and Others15, the Appellant therein
was employed in the Off-Shore Department of the Shipping
Corporation of India and on medical examination found unfit for
service at sea.
His registration as a seaman was cancelled and a
copy of the letter sent to the Appellant in Bihar, his native place,
where he had settled, after being found medically unfit.
The
Appellant sent a representation from his home to the Respondents,
claiming disability compensation to which, a response was sent by
(2014) 9 SCC 329
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
the employer.
The Supreme Court found that the employer had
issued the order cancelling his registration as seaman to his Gaya
address where he had settled and all claims and representations
were made by the Petitioner from his home address at Gaya, which
were entertained by the Respondent and responded to in his Bihar
address. It was held that the Writ Petition ought not to have been
dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction, as a part or fraction of
cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court.
17.
On
the
bedrock
of
the
said
ratiocination,
while
examining the facts herein, it is undisputed that the impugned
letter/order dated 23-08-2016 issued by the Ministry of Defence,
Respondent No.1, was forwarded to his place of posting, i.e.,
Sikkim. Clearly, a fraction of the cause of action has arisen within
the jurisdiction of this Court. The matter pertaining to jurisdiction is
determined accordingly.
18.
Now, very pertinently to address the issue regarding the
parameters of judicial review in disciplinary matters, this Court is
conscious that the scope of judicial review is to be confined to the
decision-making process and to determine whether the Inquiry was
held by a Competent Authority and Inquiry conducted as per
procedure. It cannot travel into the arena of the decision nor can it
sit as a Court of Appeal. In State of Uttar Pradesh and Another vs. Man
Mohan Nath Sinha and Another16 at Paragraph 14, it is held as follows;
“14. The scope of judicial review in dealing with
departmental enquiries came up for consideration
(2009) 8 SCC 310
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
before this Court in the case of State of A.P. v. Chitra
Venkata Rao [(1975) 2 SCC 557] and this Court held:
(SCC pp.562-63, paras 21 and 23-24)
“21. …….... The High Court is not a court
of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of
the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
against a public servant. The Court is concerned
to determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf and
according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice
are not violated. Second, where there is some
evidence which the authority entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion
that the delinquent officer is guilty of the
charge, it is not the function of the High Court
to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The High
Court may interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against
the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the
rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry
or where the authorities have disabled
themselves from reaching a fair decision by
some considerations extraneous to the evidence
and the merits of the case or by allowing
themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the
very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever
have
arrived
at
that
conclusion.
The
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts
and if there is some legal evidence on which
their findings can be based, the adequacy or
reliability or that evidence is not a matter which
can be permitted to be canvassed before the
High Court in a proceeding for a writ under
Article 226.
…………………..…………………………………..”
The ambit of judicial review in Disciplinary Proceedings having
thus been lucidly laid down, no further discussions need ensue on
this point.
19.
The chronology of the facts reveal that the proceedings
against the Petitioner commenced in the year 2005 and terminated
on 23-08-2016, when the impugned Order was issued, traversing a
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
period of almost eleven years, during which the Petitioner was left in
suspended animation.
It would now be appropriate to peruse the
provision of Rule 15(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Rule 15(1)
provides that the Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the
Inquiring Authority, may for reasons to be recorded by it in writing,
remit the case to the Inquiring Authority for further Inquiry and
Report and the Inquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold
further Inquiry, according to the provisions of Rule 14, as far as may
be. Pausing here for a moment, Rule 14 is the Procedure for major
penalties and provides that no order imposing any penalties
specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 shall be made except after
an Inquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner provided by the
Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, where such Inquiry is held
under that Act.
Rule 15(2) requires the Disciplinary Authority to
forward a copy of the Report of the Inquiry held by it.
If the
Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring Authority, a copy of the
Report of the Inquiring Authority, together with its own tentative
reasons for disagreement with the findings of Inquiring Authority on
any Article of Charge to the Government Servant shall be forwarded,
who, if he so desires, may file a written submission within fifteen
days, irrespective of whether the Report is favourable to him or not.
20.
Bearing the above provisions in mind, we may walk back
in time and examine whether there was compliance of the Rules set
out above. The Terms of Reference were set out on 13-10-2005,
almost three years later, the Articles of Charge were formulated
against the Petitioner on 19-06-2008. No explanation for this delay
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
has been extended by the Respondents. The proceedings before the
Inquiring Authority, in which the Petitioner participated, commenced
on 07-01-2009 and concluded on 30-07-2009. It emanates that the
Inquiring Authority had submitted his Report on 01-12-2009
exonerating the Petitioner on all counts, but no intimation regarding
this state of affairs was made to the Petitioner.
Instead, the
Disciplinary Authority remitted the case on 29-01-2010 to the
Inquiring Authority for further Inquiry.
Vide letter dated 19-03-
2012 the Disciplinary Authority served a copy of the First Inquiry
Report and copy of the 2nd Stage Advice of the CVC to the Petitioner,
when infact, by this time the Second Inquiry had already drawn to a
close, wherein the Petitioner without his participation, had been
found partially guilty of the offence under Article II. For undisclosed
reasons, the Disciplinary Authority concealed the fact of the Second
Inquiry Report while making over the First Inquiry Report and 2nd
Stage Advice of CVC to him on 19-03-2012.
Consequently, the
Petitioner being unaware of the Second Inquiry confined his
response dated 17-07-2012 to the aforesaid two documents. It was
only on 25-05-2015 after almost three long years of his response
and five years after completion of Second Inquiry, a communication
was sent to him, enclosing a copy of the impugned Advice of the
UPSC dated 11-05-2015, that he learnt of the Second Inquiry
conducted against him and completed on 19-02-2010.
The above
facts clearly reveal that the conduct of the Disciplinary Authority
who took its own time to conduct the proceedings, i.e., from 2005
onwards, and deemed it fit to complete it only on 23-08-2016 with
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
the impugned Order with no valid reasons afforded for the delay.
Relevant documents were submitted belatedly to the Petitioner,
inasmuch as although the First Inquiry was completed on 01-122009, copy was sent to him on 19-03-2012.
The Second Inquiry
Report although completed on 19-02-2010, was sent to him only on
25-05-2015, more than five years, after conclusion of Inquiry. The
act of the Disciplinary Authority in choosing not to disclose the fact
of Second Inquiry to the Petitioner is indeed violative of the
principles of natural justice, as it is clear that no opportunity of
either putting forth his case in defence or hearing was afforded to
the Petitioner.
After the First Inquiry Report was remitted to the
Inquiring Authority for re-examination, it was incumbent upon the
Disciplinary Authority to have informed the Petitioner that the
matter was being re-examined and an opportunity undoubtedly
should have been afforded to him to put forth his stand on the
issue.
In other words, the Petitioner ought to have been put to
notice, that, the Disciplinary Authority being in disagreement with
the findings of the First Inquiry Report had in terms of Rule 15(1) of
the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, remitted the matter for re-examination.
Not only was the above fact concealed from the Petitioner, but the
Second Inquiry Report was also not made over to him, clearly
establishing mala fide on the part of the Respondent Authorities as
they have adopted a cloak and dagger approach.
The provisions of
Rule 15(1) and (2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, having already
been put forth hereinabove, goes without saying have been clearly
flouted by the Disciplinary Authority.
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
21.
On this count, it would be appropriate to refer to the
decision of S.K. Kapoor1, wherein it was held that it is a settled
principle of natural justice that if any material is to be relied upon
in departmental proceedings, a copy of the same be supplied in
advance to the Charge-Sheeted employee, so that he may have the
chance to rebut the same.
Further, in B. Karunakar4 it was, inter
alia, held that when the Inquiry Officer is not a Disciplinary
Authority, the delinquent employee has the right to receive a copy
of the Inquiry Officer‟s Report, before the Disciplinary Authority
arrives at its conclusion with regard to the guilt or innocence of the
employee, with regard to the Charges levelled. That right is a part
of the employee‟s right to defend himself against the Charges
levelled against him. The denial of the Inquiry Officer‟s Report,
before the Disciplinary Authority takes its decision on the Charges,
is the denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his
innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.
22.
It was urged by the Respondents that in view of the
findings of the Disciplinary Authority, this Court ought not to
interfere in the decision thereof, for which attention of this Court
was drawn to Praveen Bhatia7. The Appellant therein was issued an
Order for Compulsory Retirement as he failed to submit his
property returns for the years 1981 to 1986 and the Return was
belatedly filed after about six years on 28-03-1992. The conduct
was found unbecoming of an Officer of the Air Force.
The High
Court accepted the stand of the State-Respondent and dismissed
the Petition.
The Supreme Court dismissed the Appeal of the
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
Petitioner, as from the records, it was evident that the prescribed
period for filing the property return was 6 months and although the
Appellant was aware of the requirement, he chose not to file his
return. The facts and the offence in Praveen Bhatia7 are clearly
distinguishable from the facts in the case under discussion,
inasmuch as the Charge under which the Petitioner herein was
found to be guilty was for not conducting a medical inquiry of the
CPLs, while in Praveen Bhatia7 the Appellant had failed to abide by
the
prescribed
period
of
filing
property
returns
which
was
transgression of the Conduct Rules. In my considered opinion, the
magnitude of the two offences cannot be compared.
23.
In
A.
Masilamani10
relied
on
by
Learned
Central
Government Counsel for the Respondents, it was held that, whether
or not the Disciplinary Authority should be given an opportunity to
complete the Inquiry afresh from the point that it stood vitiated,
depended upon the gravity of the delinquency involved and the
magnitude of misconduct alleged against the employee. The matter
therein was remitted for de novo Inquiry from the stage that the
Inquiry stood vitiated as the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was of the view
that Charges were grave inasmuch as the Appellant, an employee of
the
LICI
had
after
taking
Housing
Loan,
committed
certain
irregularities and deviations with respect of the construction of the
said house and the loan had been obtained upon non-disclosure of
the facts in entirety. In the case at hand, the records and the
submissions
of
Learned
Counsel
indicate
that
the
criminal
proceedings initiated against the Petitioner before the CBI Court was
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
closed due to lack of materials for Prosecution, while in the
Disciplinary Proceedings the Petitioner was found guilty of not
getting the CPLs medically examined and obtaining their Reports.
The magnitude of the delinquency in the said case and the case at
hand do not merit comparison.
24.
In this context,
we
may also
keep in view
the
requirement in Article 311(2) of the Constitution which provides that
“No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or
reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been
informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable
opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges”.
25.
The Respondent Authorities have admitted the delay
caused by them, but given a frail argument that, it was on account
of the voluminous documents that required to be studied and the
journey of the documents through various Authorities in the channel
of administration that caused the delay.
On this count, we may
usefully refer to the decision of P.V. Mahadevan6, in which the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court quashed the disciplinary proceedings on the ground
of delay holding that;
“11. ……….…… Keeping a higher government
official under charges of corruption and disputed
integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and
distress to the officer concerned. The protracted
disciplinary enquiry against a government employee
should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests
of the government employee but in public interest and
also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the
minds of the government employees. ……………..….”
26.
In N. Radhakishan5, it was observed as under;
WP(C) No.35 of 2016
Shri Gajendra Singh Rana vs. The Union of India and Others
“19. ……….. It is the basic principle of
administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a
particular job has to perform his duties honestly,
efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he
deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty
prescribed. Normally disciplinary proceedings should be
allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but
then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to
the charged officer unless it can be shown that his is to
blame for the delay or when there is proper
explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary
proceedings. Ultimately the court is to balance these
two diverse considerations.”
27.
Thus, on the entirety of the facts and circumstances and
discussions placed hereinabove, the Inquiry is evidently vitiated on
account of the inexplicable inordinate delay, coupled with the fact
that the procedure prescribed in Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules,
1965, have not been complied with.
28.
Consequently, the Writ Petition is allowed.
29.
The impugned Inquiry Report dated 19-02-2010, Office
Memorandum dated 13-03-2012, Advice dated 11-05-2015 and the
Impugned Order dated 23-08-2016, reflected in Paragraph 1(i)
above are quashed and set aside. The Disciplinary Proceeding dated
19-06-2008 is non est in the eyes of law.
30.
Accordingly,
necessary
consequential
reliefs
to
the
Petitioner to follow in accordance with Law.
31.
No order as to costs.
Sd/( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
07-07-2017
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