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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
Gajendra Nayak and another
….
Petitioners
….
Opposite Parties
-VersusState of Odisha and others
Advocates appeared in this case:
For Petitioners
: Mr. Amit Prasad Bose, Advocate
Mr. L.K. Maharana, Advocate
For Opp. Party/State
: Mr. K.C. Kar, Government Advocate
For Opp. Party/Intervener
: Mr. Manoj Kumar Mohanty, Advocate
For Balasore Municipality/
Opp. Party
: Mr. Karunakar Rath, Advocate
CORAM:
HON’ BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
JUDGMENT
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Date of hearing and Judgment: 11th February, 2026
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------HARISH TANDON, CJ.
1.
The instant review application is filed by a third party to
the writ petition, seeking review of a judgment and order dated 9th
December, 2025 by which a writ of mandamus was issued to
complete the entire exercise as disclosed on the said date in pursuit
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
of securing the eviction of encroachers from the Government land
and demolition of the structures standing thereupon.
2.
After the said judgment and order was passed, the
authorities have proceeded to implement the said order with full
rigour and force, except the portion encroached by the review
petitioners and the structures standing thereupon, as they have
approached this Court by filing the instant review application.
Further fetter put into the authorities to implement the said
judgment and order is the interim order, which was passed in the
instant review application.
3.
Admittedly, the review petitioners are not a party to the
said writ petition, which was filed in the nature of Public Interest
Litigation (PIL), raising a serious concern on a rampant
encroachment of the Government land and making substantial
constructions thereupon. It is a trite law that the persons shall not be
allowed to encroach upon the property which is of a public nature
and simultaneously a corresponding responsibility is imposed upon
the authorities to take prompt and immediate action not only to
prevent the encroachment but also to prohibit such encroachment
thereupon.
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
4.
Perceiving the aforesaid aspect in the mind, we disposed of
the Public Interest Litigation, reminding the authorities of their
solemn duty cast upon them by a statute to take immediate steps.
We are not unmindful of the reality prevalent across the country that
the illegal constructions are mushrooming in and around the
geographical limits of the country and shelter is sought to be taken
on the long or uninterrupted possession. Mere long possession does
not confer any right, more particularly, when such encroachment
leads to such occupation and possession over the Government land.
Though certain rights have been created in the statute enacted in the
State of Odisha, yet the adjudication is required in a properly
instituted proceeding, but the same cannot be said to be an
automatic or an inchoate right, which is indefeasible.
5.
Be that as it may, we are more concerned on the
maintainability and/or entertainability of the instant review
application at the behest of a third party. It is no longer res integra
that a person affected by a judgment and order has a statutory right
of an appeal after obtaining a leave of the Court; equally, it confers
a right on the person to apply for a review as well, provided he is an
aggrieved person. There is no definition of an „aggrieved person‟
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
assigned in any of the statutory documents but in a catena of
decisions rendered by the Courts of the country, any person who is
affected and/or whose right is infringed by an order of the Court
either being a party or an alien to the said proceeding will be
regarded as an „aggrieved person‟. The law in the country does not
put a clog into the remedial measures provided in the statute and,
therefore, the right to remedy is an integral part of access to justice
and its dispensation.
6.
We thus do not find any inhibition into the petitioners to
approach the Court with an application for review, as we find at the
time of passing an interim order that he is likely to be affected or in
fact affected by the judgment and order dated 9th December, 2025.
7.
Having held so, the next question which boils down in the
instant review application is the entertainability thereof within the
settled parameters of law. We are not oblivion of somewhat settled
proposition of law that the High Court, being a Court of record by
virtue of Article 215 of the Constitution of India, has an inherent
and/or plenary jurisdiction to review its own order. Being a Court of
record, it not only can implement its order or put the person to the
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
rigour of law in the event any violation is imminent and evident
from the conduct but also can review its order.
8.
The moment the review application is filed, the grounds
enumerated under Order-47, Rule-1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (“CPC”) has to be borne in mind and while embarking such
journey, if it is found that any of the incidences encompassing the
provisions contained under Order-47, Rule-1 of the CPC is
satisfactorily proved, there is no brindle on the part of the Court to
review its own order.
9.
Ordinarily, there are two types of review jurisdictions
exercised by the Court. There may be an occasion for a procedural
review of the judgment and order and the other aspect of review is
the substantive review. The moment the latter jurisdiction is
exercised, the review application must be determined and/or
adjudicated upon strictly on the parameters set forth in the statute.
The review jurisdiction can never be transformed into a
discretionary jurisdiction, which is ingrained into the system,
subject to the legislative intent. Once the Court is vested with the
discretionary powers to do or refrain from doing anything, such
discretion if exercised by the Court is to some extent immuned from
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
any such interference except such discretion is exercised in a
reasonable, rational and on the substratum of the well-defined legal
principles of law. The moment the substantive review is squeezed
on the grounds specified therein, the question of discretion is
completely erased and the Court must travel on the peripheral of
those statutory provisions.
10.
The petitioners have relied upon a judgment of the apex
Court rendered in case of Arunima Baruah v. Union of India,
reported in (2007) 6 SCC 120 as a guiding principle in exercising
the review jurisdiction if the material facts are not brought to the
Court. The said report relates to a writ jurisdiction exercised by the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it has
been categorically observed that if a person is guilty of suppression
of material facts, it is open to the writ Court to dismiss such writ
petition by refusing to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction vested
upon it.
11.
We have no quarrel to the proposition of law laid down in
the said judgment that the power of judicial review enshrined under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not only restricted to the
prerogative writs in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, quoRVWPET No.294 of 2025
warranto, habeas corpus, but such exercise should be done when a
person has approached the Court with a clean hand and is not guilty
of suppression of the material facts. A distinction should be borne in
mind between „suppression of fact‟ and „suppression of material
fact‟. Every fact which is not disclosed and does not partake an
integral part of the cause of action, if not disclosed, cannot come
within the purview of “suppression”. However, such fact, which has
a material bearing and has a direct nexus to the cause of action, if
not disclosed and/or included in the pleading, the writ Court may, in
exercise of discretionary jurisdiction, disentitles such errant litigant
as the Court shall not permit any litigant to steal a march through a
judicial fiat and secure the order by committing a fraud on the
Court. The Courts always frowned upon the litigants who have
created an illusory cause of action by suppressing the material facts
and the moment such facts which were latent becomes patent, the
Court will dismiss such writ petition by imposing certain conditions
in the form of cost.
12.
Reverting back to the instant matter, we are not concerned
with the power exercised by the Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution but we are concerned with the review application taken
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
out by the petitioners on the premise that the order/judgment dated
9th December, 2025 was passed on suppression of the material facts
that the petitioners had already approached this Court by filing writ
petition challenging the action of the authorities in securing the
removal and/or demolition of the structure constructed thereupon. It
is further contended that in the said writ petition, a protective order
was passed, which was operative on the day when the said judgment
and order was passed by this Court. Precisely, for such facts being
brought to the notice of the Court on the day when the review
application was admitted, this Court passed an interim order
protecting the right of the review petitioners until the disposal of the
instant review application.
13.
After the review is directed to be returnable upon effecting
the service, it has been brought to our notice, which is also
undisputed that the said writ petition, in which the interim order was
passed has been dismissed and the interim order merged with the
final order of dismissal. It leads to an inescapable inference that the
interim order, which was operative, becomes non-existent having
merged with the final order passed therein and, therefore, there is no
protective umbrella above the head of the petitioners as on this date.
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
14.
We invited the attention of the counsel whether such facts
may lead to either of the grounds incorporated under Order-47,
Rule-1 of the CPC, more particularly, in the perspective of the
subsequent event relating to the dismissal of the writ petition filed
by the review petitioners. It is fervently submitted before us that the
petitioner in the writ petition has suppressed the fact that there is a
pending writ petition and therefore, the order is bad, illegal and
should be recalled. A colour of fraud is sought to be taken in the
review application that once the Court finds that the order has been
obtained fraudulently, it is an ardent duty of the Court to recall the
said order.
15.
We are not unmindful of the settled proposition of law that
the moment an order is obtained by practicing fraud, not only on the
party but also on the Court, such litigant shall not be permitted to
reap the benefit of such order. Fraud is always viewed seriously by
the Courts of the country and in the event the fraud is projected and
substantiated by a convincing material, it is the solemn duty of the
Court to put the clock back and the benefits so obtained be reversed.
We are conscious that the fraud unravels every solemn act and
vitiates every action. Mere using the word or the expression "fraud"
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
is not sufficient but there must be explicit and elaborate particulars
of fraud to be pleaded. Simply because a fraud, which is welldefined under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, is used in the pleading,
it does not ipso facto brings the concept of a fraud unless the
particulars thereof is extensively and precisely adumbrated in the
petition. What may be perceived as suppression but as on the date
of entertaining the petition, such fact, if brought, would not tilt the
decision diametrically opposite to what had already been taken by
the Court.
16.
We are conscious that the Court shall not issue a writ of
mandamus upon the authorities to do a thing either forbidden in law
or in violation of the prohibitory provisions incorporated in the
statute or order of the Court of competent jurisdiction. The law is to
be respected and its enforceability to be ensured not only by the
litigant or a citizenry but by the Courts of the country. It is
incongruous to suggest that the authorities would act contrary to the
law or taking a shelter under the order of the Court when there is a
complete interdict imposed in the legal proceedings.
17.
The authorities, being conscious of such proposition, they did
not affect the possession of the review petitioners nor demolished
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
the said structure. Even if, there was no reflection and/or disclosure
of the pending writ petition in which the interim order was passed
but as on the date, there is no subsisting interim order as the writ
petition filed by the petitioners stood dismissed by the learned
single Judge. There is no fetter on the part of the Court to take into
account the subsequent event, which would lead to the same
decision and/or conclusion to be arrived at.
18.
In case of Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji
Cricket Club, reported in (2005) 4 SCC 741, the apex Court held
that there is no absolute bar imposed in the Court while exercising
its review jurisdiction in taking into consideration a subsequent
event in the following:
“93. It is also not correct to contend that the Court
while exercising its review jurisdiction in any situation
whatsoever
cannot
take
into
consideration
a
subsequent event. In a case of this nature when the
Court accepts its own mistake in understanding the
nature and purport of the undertaking given by the
learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Board and its correlation with as to what transpired in
the AGM of the Board held on 29-9-2004, the
subsequent event may be taken into consideration by
the Court for the purpose of rectifying its own mistake.
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
94. In Rajesh D. Darbar v. Narasingrao Krishnaji
Kulkarni [(2003) 7 SCC 219: JT (2003) 7 SC 209] this
Court noticed: (SCC p. 222, para 4)
“4. The impact of subsequent happenings may now be
spelt out. First, its bearing on the right of action,
second, on the nature of the relief and third, on its
importance to create or destroy substantive rights.
Where the nature of the relief, as originally sought, has
become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of
relief will be more efficacious on account of
developments subsequent to the suit or even during the
appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief is moulded,
varied
or
reshaped
in
the
light
of
updated
facts. Patterson v. State of Alabama [294 US 600: 79 L
Ed 1082 (1934)] illustrates this position. It is
important that the party claiming the relief or change
of relief must have the same right from which either the
first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent
events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive
of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation
except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may
influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs.
Conversely, where rights have already vested in a
party, they cannot be nullified or negated by
subsequent events save where there is a change in the
law
and
it
is
made
applicable
at
any
stage. Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
Chaudhuri [AIR 1941 FC 5: 1940 FCR 84] falls in this
category. Courts of justice may, when the compelling
equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs — cannot
deny rights — to make them justly relevant in the
updated
circumstances.
Where
the
relief
is
discretionary, courts may exercise this jurisdiction to
avoid injustice. Likewise, where the right to the remedy
depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or
absence of certain basic facts at the time the relief is to
be ultimately granted, the court, even in appeal, can
take note of such supervening facts with fundamental
impact.
This
Court's
judgment
in Pasupuleti
Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders [(1975) 1
SCC 770: AIR 1975 SC 1409] read in its statutory
setting, falls in this category. Where a cause of action
is deficient but later events have made up the
deficiency, the court may, in order to avoid multiplicity
of litigation, permit amendment and continue the
proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the
other side. All these are done only in exceptional
situations and just cannot be done if the statute, on
which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits, by its
scheme or otherwise, such change in cause of action or
relief. The primary concern of the court is to implement
the justice of the legislation. Rights vested by virtue of
a statute cannot be divested by this equitable doctrine
(see V.P.R.V.
Chockalingam
Chetty v. Seethai
Ache [AIR 1927 PC 252: 26 All LJ 371]).””
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
19.
The aforesaid principles of law that there is no absolute
fetter put into the Court exercising the review jurisdiction to take
into account the subsequent event is further fortified by a 3-Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court in case of Government of NCT of
Delhi, through its Secretary, Land and Building Department v.
M/s. K.L. Rathi Steels Limited, reported in 2024 INSC 454 in the
following:
“60. Netaji Cricket Club (supra) was followed in
Jagmohan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2008) 7 SCC 38.
It was held there that Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC does
not preclude the High Court or a court to take into
consideration any subsequent event and that if
imparting of justice in a given situation is the goal of
the judiciary, the court may take into consideration (of
course on rare occasions) the subsequent events.”
20.
In view of the law enunciated in the above reports and
taking into account the subsequent event that as on the day, the writ
petition in which the injunction was passed in favour of the
petitioners, stood dismissed and there is no interdict having
subsisted in implementing the order and removal of the
encroachment including the exercise of the allied powers conferred
upon the authorities. We, thus, do not find any justification in
entertaining the review application nor we find any of the grounds
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
relatable to exercise of the review jurisdiction by the Court to have
been proved by cogent materials.
21.
With these observations, the review petition is dismissed
but in the circumstances with no order as to costs.
(Harish Tandon)
Chief Justice
(M.S. Raman)
Judge
Sisira/
S. Behera
RVWPET No.294 of 2025
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SISIRA KUMAR BEHERA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 17-Feb-2026 14:07:31
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