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WP(C) NO. 1992 OF 2021
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“C.R.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D. K. SINGH
THURSDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF APRIL 2025 / 20TH CHAITHRA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 1992 OF 2021
PETITIONER/S:
GAC SHIPPING (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED
GAC HOUSE, P.B NO. 515 SUBRAMANIAN ROAD, WILLINGDON ISLAND, COCHIN 682 003,
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER (OPERATIONS) M.G SAJINATH
BY ADVS.
P.F.ROSY
SNEHA RAJIV
P.DEEPAK (SR.)(K/175/1996)
RESPONDENT/S:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF SHIPPING, ROAD TRANSPORT AND
HIGHWAYS, NEW DELHI 110 001
TARIFF AUTHORITY FOR MAJOR PORTS (TAMP FOR SHORT)
4TH FLOOR, BHANDAR BHAVAN, M.P ROAD, MAZAGON, MUMBAI 400 010
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
COCHIN PORT TRUST, PORT TRUST OFFICE, WILLINGDON ISLAND, ERNAKULAM 682
009 REPRESENTED BY THE CHAIRMAN
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THE CHAIRMAN, COCHIN PORT TRUST, PORT TRUST OFFICE, WILLINGDON ISLAND,
ERNAKULAM 682 009
ADDL 5
COCHIN PORT AUTHORITY
WILLINGDON ISLAND, KOCHI - 682 009, KERALA REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON
ADDL 6
THE CHAIRPERSON
COCHIN PORT AUTHORITY, WILLINGDON ISLAND, KOCHI, KERALA 682 009
[ADDL.R5 & ADDL.R6 ARE IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 20.11.2024 IN I.A.1/2024
IN WP(C)1992/2021].
BY ADVS. T C KRISHNA DSGI
SRI.N.S.DAYA SINDHU SHREE HARI
SRI.M.GOPIKRISHNAN NAMBIAR
SRI.K.JOHN MATHAI
SRI.JOSON MANAVALAN
SRI.KURYAN THOMAS
SRI.RAJA KANNAN
PAULOSE C. ABRAHAM(MAH/58/2006)
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING RESERVED ON 19.03.2025, THE COURT ON 10.04.2025
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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JUDGMENT
“C.R.”
Heard Mr P Deepak learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms Sneha
Rajiv learned for the petitioner, and Mr Daya Sindhu Sreehari learned
Central Government Counsel, Ms T C Krishna learned DSGI and Mr
Poulose C Abraham learned Counsel for the Cochin Port Trust.
Facts:
2.
The petitioner is a streamer agent for foreign vessels calling
at the major ports in the Country including Cochin Port. During the
months of April and May 2020, three foreign vessels, namely MT DELTS
SKY, MT DHT FALCON and MT EVRIDIKI, were called at the Cochin Port
under the petitioner's agency. The invoices dated 13.04.2020, 05.05.2020,
and 21.05.2020 were raised by the Cochin Port Trust (CoPT) for various
vessel-related charges, including port dues, towage, pilotage etc. The
amount demanded under the three invoices was remitted in full by the
petitioner, and the vessels were allowed to sail after the following
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endorsement made in the three invoices, namely"No final bill against this VCN. This may be treated as final bill"
2.
Later, three invoices dated 04.07.2020 were served on the
petitioner demanding "anchorage charges" in respect of the three vessels
in question. The anchorage charges were raised on the strength of the
Trade Circular issued by the Chairman, CoPT, dated 04.07.2020. The
circular dated 04.07.2020 issued by the 3rd respondent would read as
follows:
“Prevent the anchorage charges are being levied by the Port as per раrа
2.3.3 and 2.3.4 of Scale of Rates of CoPT.
As approved by Chairman, it has been decided to collect anchorage
charges as detailed below with effect from 11.03.2020 on ad-hoc basis:
i)
For the vessels calling at Cochin Port and have been allotted nonPort berths or Port berths with no berth hire charges, anchorage
charges will be levied as per para 2.3.4 of the Scale of Rates.
ii)
In the case of the vessels which have been shifted from berth to
anchorage and further sailed from anchorage, the anchorage
charges will be levied on the last berth where the vessel was berthed
as per para 2.3.3 of the Scale of Rates. If the last berth is a non-Port
berth or berth with no berth hire charges, then the anchorage
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charges shall be levied as per para 2.3.4 of Scale of Rates.
iii) In case the vessel is shifted from berth to anchorage and then back
to berth, then the anchorage charges (post shifting from berth to
anchorage) will be levied as per para 2.3.3 of the Scale of Rates
applicable to the berth to which the vessel is shifted from
anchorage. In the case of vessel shifting to a non-Port berth or a
Port berth with no berth hire charges, the anchorage charges as per
para 2.3.4 of the Scale of Rates will be applicable.
The above ad-hoc charges are subject to approval of the Tariff Authority
for Major Ports.”
The three invoices dated 04.07.2020 are under challenge in this writ
petition.
3.
In compliance with the policy direction issued by the
Government of India, the Ministry of Shipping (MoS) under Section 111
of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, (for short, ‘MPT Act’) the Tariff
Authority for Major Ports (TAMP) notified the “Tariff Policy for the Major
Port Trust, 2018”, which was published in the Official Gazette on
16.01.2019. The said Tariff Policy came into effect from the date of its
issue, i.e., 26.12.2018. Taking into consideration the comments and
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suggestions received from Major Port Trusts during the consultation
process, the Policy for Determination of Tariff for the Major Port Trusts,
2015, issued by the Ministry of Shipping dated 30.01.2015 was modified
and the new Tariff Policy for Major Port Trusts, 2018, was issued.
3.1
Clause 1.3 of the Tariff Policy for Major Port Trusts, 2018,
provides that the policy would come into effect from the date of issue
and would be applicable for the determination of tariff in major Ports
due for revision with effect from 01.04.2019. It shall remain in force till
01.04.2022 unless reviewed earlier or extended by the Government.
4.
Section 47A of the MPT Act envisaged the constitution and
incorporation of a Tariff Authority for Major Ports. Under Section 48, the
Tariff Authority constituted under Section 47A was empowered to frame
a scale of rates at which, and a statement of conditions under which, any
of the services specified thereunder should be performed by a Board or
any other person authorized under Section 42 at or in relation to the
port or port approaches. Section 49 empowered the Tariff Authority to
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provide for the scale of rates and statement of conditions for the use of
property belonging to the Board. Thus, from Section 48 to 51, the Tariff
Authority for Major Ports was given powers for laying down (i) the scale
of rates for services performed by the Board, (ii) scale of rates and
statement of conditions for use of property belonging to the Board, (iii)
fees for pilotage and certain other services, (iv) fixation of port dues, (v)
consolidated rates for the combination of services, (vi) Port due on
vessels in ballast, and (vii) Port due on vessels not discharging or taking
in cargo. Section 50C of the MPT Act provided that every notification,
declaration, order and regulation of the Authority made in pursuance to
the power conferred under the Act should be published in the Official
Gazette.
4.1
Section 111 of the MPT Act conferred power on the Central
Government to issue directions to the Board and the Authority and every
Board shall, in the discharge of its functions under the MPT Act, be
bound by such directions on questions of policy as the Central
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Government may give in writing from time to time. Section 111 of the
MPT Act would read as under:
“111. Power of Central Government to issue directions to Board.(1) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, the
Authority and every Board shall, in the discharge of its functions under
this Act be bound by such directions on questions of policy as the Central
Government may give in writing from time to time:
Provided that the Authority or the Board, as the case may be, shall be
given opportunity to express its views before any direction is given under
this sub-section.
(2) The decision of the Central Government whether a question is one of
policy or not shall be final."
5.
In exercise of the powers conferred under Sections 48, 49 and
50 of the MPT Act, the Tariff Authority for Major Ports notified the
revised Scale of Rates (SoR) and Performance Standards disposing of the
proposal of the Cochin Port Trust for the general revision of its SoR vide
notification dated 22.10.2019.
5.1
Clause 1.1 of Chapter I of SoR defines various terms. ‘Non-Port
Berths’ is defined as any berth other than Port Berths, and ‘Port Berths’
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are those listed under the 2.3.1 Schedule of Berth Hire charges and the
SPM and LNG berths. ‘Single Buoy Mooring (SBM) or Single Point Mooring
(SPM)’ are loading buoys anchored offshore and serve as a mooring point
for tankers to (off) load gas and/or fluid products.
5.2
Chapter II of the Notification dated 22.10.2019 prescribes
vessel-related charges, including Berth Hire Charges, Anchorage
Charges, etc. Clause 2.3 prescribes Berth Hire Charges, and the Schedule
of berth hire charges for berths is given in clauses 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, which
are extracted hereunder:
2.3.1 Schedule of berth hire charges
Sl. No
Name of berths
Rate per GRT per hour
Coastal vessel (in Rs.)
Foreign vessel (in US$)
UTL, SCB, Q2, Q3
0.1990
0.006271
Q1, NCB, BTP, Q5, Q6, Q7, Q10
0.2191
0.116905
Q8, Q9
0.2229
0.117021
Q4, STB, NTB, COT
0.2290s
0.007216
Container Berths at ICTT
0.2328
0.117333
2.3.2 Schedule of Berth Hire Charges for other vessels/ floating
crafts/ bodies
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Sl
Particulars
Rate per GRT per hour or part thereof
No.
Coastal vessel (in Rs.)
Foreign vessel (in US$)
0.2434
0.009104
Berth hire for occupying any
berth
(ii)
Fleeting charges when barges
wait at fleeting areas
Floating Crafts/ bodies
0.3270
0.012233
0.1059
0.003996
(i)
Occupying port berths
0.3270
0.012233
(ii)
Not occupying port berths
but remaining in port water
area
0.1059
0.003996
Inland Waterways Barges
Lash Barges:
(i)
5.3
Similarly anchorage charges for vessels calling for berthing at
Cochin Port are provided in clause 2.3.3 and anchorage charges for
vessels not calling for berthing at Cochin Port are provided in clause
2.3.4, which are extracted hereunder:
2.3.3 Anchorage Charges for vessels calling for berthing at Cochin
Port
(Per GRT per hour)
Sl. No.
Description
Rate
Up to 48 hours at anchorage
Free
48 hours – 96 hours
10% of berth hire charges *
96 hours – 144 hours
15% of berth hire charges *
Beyond 144 hours
20% of berth hire charges *
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* Berth hire charges shall be the rate applicable to that berth where the vessel is
waiting to be berthed.
Note: Port can exempt vessels from paying anchorage charges in exceptional
circumstances including but not limited to lapses on part of the Port. Any waiver
of anchorage charges will require approval from Chairman of the Port or an
equivalent authority.
2.3.4 Anchorage Charges for vessels not calling for berthing at
Cochin Port
Sl.
No.
Description
Coastal vessel (in
Rs.)
Free
Foreign vessel (in US$)
48 hours – 96 hours
0.0233
0.000733
96 hours – 144 hours
0.0349
0.001099
Beyond 144 hours
0.0466
0.001466
Up to 48 hours at anchorage
Free
The above charges are subject to a ceiling limit of 5 months of anchorage charges.
Note: Any waiver of anchorage charges will require approval from the Chairman
of the Port or an equivalent authority.
5.3.1
The note appended to the berth hire charges prescribes
that the berth hire charges shall be collected for the period from
berthing to un-berthing of the vessels. The berth hire at double the
normal rates would be applicable for research vessels, supply vessels,
pleasure yachts, oil rigs and other non-cargo vessels excluding
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Passenger Ships, Navy and Coast Guard Ships and Ships and Barges for
bunkering. The Note also provides that double the normal berth hire
will be applicable on cargo ships idling on the ship’s account for 24 hours
or more during and after operations. Further, it is provided that no
berth hire will be charged on the vessel after the expiry of four hours
from the time the vessel signals its readiness to sail and there shall be a
penalty equal to one day’s berth hire charges for a false signal.
Furthermore, the time limit of four hours prescribed for cessation of
berth hire shall exclude the ship’s waiting period for want of favourable
tidal conditions or on account of inclement weather or due to the
absence of night navigation facilities.
5.4
A reading of clause 2.3.3 of SoR provided the anchorage
charges for vessels calling for berthing at Cochin Port. The anchorage
charges levied under this clause in respect of vessels calling for berthing
at Cochin Port is a percentage of the berth hire charges. Clause 2.3.4 of
SoR deals with anchorage charges for vessels not calling for berthing at
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Cochin Port.
6.
The three vessels in question had called for berthing at
Cochin Port and were berthed at SPM (Single Point Mooring).
As
mentioned above, the SBM or SPM under sub-clause (xx) of Para 1.1 is a
‘Port Berth and the SPM and LNG berths’ but not listed under clause 2.3.1
‘Schedule of Berth Hire Charges’. Thus, ‘vessels calling for berthing at
Cochin Port’ at any one of the port berths mentioned in clause 2.3.1
attracts anchorage charges as per the rate prescribed under clause 2.3.3
whereas the anchorage charges prescribed under clause 2.3.4 would be
applicable for ‘vessels not calling for berthing at Cochin Port’.
6.1
The petitioner’s vessels are not one of those which called for
berthing on the berths mentioned in clause 2.3.1, and, therefore, no
anchorage charges were applicable to them under clause 2.3.3. Thus,
neither the rates prescribed for anchorage charges under clause 2.3.3
nor clause 2.3.4 could have been applied to collect the anchorage
charges. In fact, the anchorage charges were not levied on them.
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6.2
The Cochin Port Trust realized this lacuna in the SoR that for
the vessels calling for berthing at Cochin Port, which are not berthed on
port berths defined in clause 2.3.1, no anchorage charges would be
collected from them, inasmuch as the SPM and LNG berths which are
included in the definition of ‘Port Berths’ under Clause (xvii) of clause
1.1 of Chapter I of notification dated 22.10.2019 do not carry berth hire
charges unlike the other Port Berths specified in clause 2.3.1 of SoR.
Thus, they would not attract the anchorage charges under clause 2.3.3
despite the vessel having called for berthing at Cochin Port for the
reason that the SPM berth did not carry any berth hire charges. For the
aforementioned reasons, the invoices issued in Ext.P1 to P3 did not have
any anchorage charges in respect of the vessels in question either under
clause 2.3.3 or clause 2.3.4 of SoR. The SoR came into effect thirty (30)
days after the date of notification, i.e., 29.11.2019.
7.
The Cochin Port Trust found it necessary to seek clarification
in the SoR and get approval from TAMP to apply anchorage charges in
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these situations under clause 2.3.4. The Cochin Port Trust sought
clarification from TAMP in its letter dated 23.03.2020. The Cochin Port
Trust issued a Trade Circular dated 04.07.2020 deciding to collect
anchorage charges with effect from 11.03.2020 on ad hoc basis, subject to
the approval of TAMP, as follows:
“a. For the vessels calling at Cochin Port and have been allotted non-Port
berths or Port berths with no berth hire charges, anchorage charges will
be levied as per para 2.3.4 of the SOR.
b. In case of the vessels which have been shifted from berth to anchorage
and further sailed from anchorage, the anchorage charges will be levied
on the last berth where the vessel was berthed as per para 2.3.3 of the
SOR. If the last berth is non port berth or berth no berth hire charges,
then the anchorage charges shall be levied as per para 2.3.4 of SOR.
c. In case the vessel is shifted from berth to anchorage and then back to
berth, then the anchorage charges (post shifting from berth to
anchorage) will be levied as per para 2.3.3 of the SOR applicable to the
berth to which the vessel is shifted from anchorage. In the case of vessel
shifting to a non-Port berth or a Port berth with no berth hire charges,
the anchorage charges as per para 2.3.4 of the SOR will be applicable.”
7.1
The CoPT was of the opinion that anchorage charges were
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included in the SoR. Therefore, an Addendum dated 07.08.2020 was
issued to the Trade Circular stating that “the date of implementation of
a collection of Anchorage Charges may be read as 29.11.2019 (i.e., the
date of implementation of revised SoR of CoPT) instead of 11.03.2020.
Thereafter, the invoices in Exts. P5, P6 and P7 were issued to the
petitioner by CoPT for anchorage charges on the three vessels
mentioned above.
These were ad hoc charges levied till the final
approval was received from TAMP. The total amount of these invoices
would come to Rs.68,02,395/-.
8.
Vide Trade Circular dated 04.07.2020 the CoPT proposed to
incorporate a legal fiction/deeming provision whereby ‘vessels calling for
berthing at Cochin Port but berthed at Port Berths with no hire charges’ would
be deemed to fall under the category of ‘vessels not calling for berthing at
Cochin Port’, i.e., vessels anchored in the Outer Port Limits (OPL) for the
purpose of levy of anchorage charges under clause 2.3.4 of the SoR. The
amendment to the SoR was passed by the TAMP on 07.09.2020 and
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notified under Section 48 of the MPT Act on 06.10.2020. The clauses
contained in the Trade Circular of CoPT dated 04.07.2020 were inserted
under clause 2.3.4 of the SoR retrospectively with effect from 29.11.2019,
i.e., the date on which SoR came into force.
8.1
Vide Clause 9.2 of the amendment, the CoPT’s decision to
collect anchorage charges on an ad hoc basis as per the Trade Circular was
also ratified by the TAMP on the grounds that the proposed amendments were
of a clarificatory nature to remove ambiguity.
Petitioners’ submission:
9.
Mr P Deepak learned Senior Counsel assisted by Adv Sneha
Rajiv, appearing for the petitioner submits that the amendment brought
in by TAMP in the SoR with effect from 06.10.2020 to levy anchorage
charges on vessels calling for berthing at Cochin Port but berthed at Port
Berths with no hire charges would deem to fall under the category of
vessels not calling for berthing at Cochin Port for the purpose of levy of
anchorage charges under clause 2.3.4 of the SoR is not clarificatory but
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substantive charge levied on the vessels calling for berthing at Cochin
Port but berthed at Port Berths with no hire charges.. Therefore, no
anchorage charges could be levied on such vessels with retrospective
effect, i.e., before the amendment was brought into force.
10.
The three situations for bringing amendment by TAMP as
proposed by the CoPT, in order to say that the amendments are only
clarificatory in nature of clause 2.3.4, i.e., (i) vessels waiting at anchorage
but not calling to be berthed at Cochin Port (those vessels will go from
the Outer Roads only without coming inside); (ii) vessels waiting at
anchorage to be berthed at non-port berth (vessels coming inside); and
(iii) vessels waiting at anchorage to be berthed at Port Berth having no
Berth Hire Charges (vessels coming inside), is completely fallacious
inasmuch as the heading of clause 2.3.4 itself indicate that anchorage
charges under this clause are applicable for vessels not calling for
berthing at Cochin Port. Therefore, the vessels referred to in situations
(ii) and (iii) mentioned above involve vessels coming inside, i.e., vessels
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calling for berthing at Cochin Port, and so, by no stretch of the
imagination it can be said to fall within the ambit of clause 2.3.4. Only
vessels falling in situation (i) can be legitimately said to be covered by
clause 2.3.4. If the amendment in the SoR is not clarificatory, then it has
to be only prospective and cannot be retrospective.
11.
Thus, the petitioner seeks to quash the Trade Circular dated
04.07.2020 to the extent it seeks to collect anchorage charges with effect
from 11.03.2020 on ad hoc basis. The petitioner also challenges Exts.P5,
P6 and P7 invoices levying anchorage charges retrospectively.
Respondent's submission:
12.
On the other hand, Mr Paulose C Abraham learned Counsel
appearing for the Cochin Port Trust and TAMP has submitted that the
amendment brought in in the Trade Circular dated 04.07.2020 along with
the Addendum dated 07.08.2020 issued to the Trade Circular is only to
bring clarity to the existing SoR so as to remove the ambiguity raised by
the Port users, including the petitioner. There is no revision in the rates
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or retrospective application of the SoR as alleged.
The SoR was
implemented on 29.11.2019. The anchorage charges levied are not a new
tariff item. The TAMP has the power to rectify ad hoc charges levied by
the CoPT. Thus, these charges were inbuilt in the SoR, which came into
effect from 29.11.2019.
12.1 The learned Counsel for the Cochin Port Trust further
submits that the CoPT has paid the GST on the anchorage charges for
which the impugned invoices in Exts. P5 to P7 were issued.
Analysis:
13.
The question which requires consideration of this Court is
whether the amendment in SoR is clarificatory or substantive. If it is
clarificatory, then the anchorage charges levied would be justified, and
if it is substantive, i.e., charges are levied for the first time which was not
contemplated in the SoR, will these be given retrospective operation?
14.
It is apt to take note of a few judgments on what amendments
can be said to be substantive and what amendments can be said to be
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clarificatory.
Panchi Devi v. State of Rajasthan1
15.
The Supreme Court, in this case, held that subordinate
legislation is ordinarily prospective in nature. A right or liability which
is created for the first time, cannot be given a retrospective effect.
C J Paul v. District Collector2
16.
The case pertains to the interpretation and/or application of
the provisions of the Stamp Act 1899 as amended by the State of Tamil
Nadu.
The period of limitation so far as Section 47-A is inserted in
the State of Tamil Nadu by Act 24 of 1967 is two years. A limitation
period of four years was provided in terms of the proviso appended to
Section 19-B(4) of the Act but the Statute which was applicable at the
relevant point of time provided for invoking the period of limitation was
four years from the date of registration. Sections 47-A and 19-B of the
(2009) 2 SCC 589
(2009) 14 SCC 564
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Act provided for penalty.
16.1 The Authorities in the State of Tamil Nadu did not initiate
proceedings within two years from the date of the knowledge, as
provided in Section 47-A of the Act. However, in terms of Section 19-B of
the Act, the period of limitation provided was four years from the date
of registration, not from the date of knowledge. Section 47-A prescribes
the limitation for initiation of proceedings thereunder is five years.
16.2 The Supreme Court held that the words “four years” from the
date of registration were inserted by Act 1 of 2000 and only at a later
stage did wisdom dawn on the State Authorities that they would not be
able to find out the evasion of stamp duty within the aforementioned
period, amended the said provision so that the period of limitation
would start from the date of knowledge and not from the date of
registration. Such an amendment cannot be retrospective in nature. It
was held that the Court cannot supply casus omissus.
16.3 Paragraphs 10 to 15 of the said judgment are extracted
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hereunder:
“10. Section 47-A of the Act was inserted in the State of Tamil Nadu by
Act 24 of 1967. Indisputably, the period of limitation was two years for
initiation of a proceedings thereunder. However, Section 47-A of the Act
also underwent an amendment by Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 2000 which came
into force with effect from 6-3-2000 whereby and whereunder the period
of limitation was extended to five years.
11. The liability to pay stamp duty arises on presentation of a document.
Indisputably, the registration office of the State of Kerala had the
requisite jurisdiction to register the document in terms of the provisions
of the Registration Act. The registration authorities of the State of Tamil
Nadu came to know of the registration of the said documents on 30-31996 when they were filed before some authorities. In terms of the
provisions of the Act, the Collector alone would initiate a proceeding for
recovery of deficit stamp duty. The proceeding was initiated on 5-5-1998
but the notices were issued only on 7-6-1998.
12. The period of limitation so far as Section 47-A of the Act is concerned
is two years. The limitation of period of four years was provided for in
terms of the proviso appended to Section 19-B(4) of the Act but the
statute which was applicable at the relevant point of time provided for
invoking the period of limitation was four years from the date of
registration.
13. Sections 47-A and 19-B of the Act provide for penalty. A statute of
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limitation conferring jurisdiction upon the statutory authorities to
impose penalty must, therefore, be construed strictly. A penal statute, as
is well known, unless expressly provided, cannot be given a retrospective
effect. (See Ritesh Agarwal v. SEBI.) The amendments carried out by the
State of Tamil Nadu in the Act must, therefore, be held to have a
prospective operation only.
14. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that ordinarily in a case of this
nature, the date of knowledge would be the starting point for computing
the period of limitation. The authorities of the State of Tamil Nadu came
to know of the execution of the deeds of sale dated 1-2-1990 only on 303-1996. They could have initiated a proceeding, if any, within a period of
two years from the said date as provided for in Section 47-A of the Act.
However, in terms of Section 19-B of the Act, the period of limitation
provided was four years from the date of registration and not from the
date of knowledge.
15. Submission of Mr Sundaravardan that the subsequent amendment 5.
carried out by Act 1 of 2000 was only clarificatory in nature cannot be
accepted. The State advisedly used the words "four years" from the date
of registration. Only at a later stage, wisdom dawned on them that they
may not be able to find out the evasion of stamp duty within the
aforementioned period, amended the said provision so that the period of
limitation may start from the date of knowledge and not from the date of
registration. The said amendment is, thus, also not retrospective in
nature. It is now well settled that the court cannot supply casus omissus.
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(See Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector &
ETIO³.)”
Delta Engineers v. State of Goa3
17.
The question which was considered by the Supreme Court in
the said case inter alia was whether the Port Authorities have the power
and authority to claim rental charges for the use of Government riverine
land, retrospectively. The Supreme Court noticed that when the Goa,
Daman and Diu Port Rules 1983 were brought into force on 05.04.1984,
there was no provision for the levy of any fee or charge for the use of
riverine land. The Rules only provided for a fee for the occupation of
open plots. Only by the 1992 Amendment, the words ‘open riverine land’
were added under Entry 21(4)(A-iv) of the First Schedule so as to subject
the occupation of open riverine land to payment of fees. Prior to the
1992 Amendment, the First Schedule to the Rules did not provide for the
levy of any fees for the occupation of riverine land. It was only by the
(2009) 12 SCC 110
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1994 Amendment, with effect from 03.03.1994, that the Rules were
amended by inserting clause (ff) in Rule 2 containing the definition of
“government riverine land” and by inserting Rule 54-A specifically
providing that no government riverine land should be used without
prior written permission of the Captain of Ports and without making
advance payment of rental charges at the prescribed rate.
17.1 Considering the aforesaid provisions, the Court was of the
opinion that prior to the said amendment to the Rules in 1994, neither
the Act nor the Rules authorised or enabled the Government to levy any
fee/charge for the use of Government riverine land.
The Court
considered the question of whether the 1992 Amendment and 1994
Amendment to the Rules were retrospective in operation. Paragraphs
34 to 36 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder:
“34. We may next consider whether the 1992 and 1994 Amendments to
the Rules were retrospective in operation. In Zile Singh v. State of
Haryana this Court held: (SCC p. 8, para 13)
"13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective
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unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. But
the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights
or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the
statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed
to be prospective only...."
(emphasis supplied)
The Amendment Rules do not provide that they are retrospective in
operation. Nor do the circumstances warrant such an inference. In fact,
the contention of the respondents is not that power to levy fees/charges
for use of riverine land was created/vested in the Port Authorities, by
virtue of the Amendment Rules and that such power was given to levy
fees/charges retrospectively. The contention has been that the power to
levy fees/charges existed ever since the Rules came into force on 5-41984 and that position was merely clarified by the Amendment Rules in
1992 and 1994.
35. We have already held that the Amendment Rules of 1992 and 1994 are
not clarificatory, but are provisions investing the Port Authorities with
the power to levy and collect charges for occupation of government
riverine land. Therefore, the demand for charges for use of government
riverine land is valid only from 3-3-1994. Therefore the Port Authorities
could not demand or recover any amount for the period prior to 3-3-1994.
The Port Authorities are therefore liable to refund any amount recovered
within three years prior to the date of the writ petition. Obviously, any
amount paid during a period beyond three years from the date of the writ
petition, is not recoverable as barred by delay and laches.
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36. We therefore allow these appeals in part as follows:
(a) The amendment of Entry 21(4)(A-iv) in the First Schedule, and
insertion of Rule 54-A and Rule 2(ff) by the Goa, Daman and Diu Ports
(Amendment) Rules, 1992 and the Goa, Daman and Diu Ports
(Amendment) Rules, 1994, are upheld.
(b) It is declared that the respondents could not demand or recover any
amount for the use and occupation of government riverine land for the
period prior to 3-3-1994.
(c) Any charge recovered by the respondents from the appellant, towards
occupation of government riverine land for the period prior to 3-3-1994,
shall be refunded to the appellant, if such amount has been received by
the Port Authorities within three years before the date of filing of the
writ petition. The amount, if any, so due shall be refunded with six per
cent interest from the date of receipt till date of repayment within three
months from today. Alternatively, the amount paid by the appellant for
the period prior to 3-3-1994 in entirety (even amounts paid prior to three
years from the date of petition) may be adjusted at the option of the Port
Authorities towards future dues, without any obligation to pay interest.”
Union of India v. Martin Lottery Agencies Limited4
18.
The Supreme Court decided the issue regarding the mode of
(2009) 12 SCC 209
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determination of a particular Statute or provision whether declaratory
or clarificatory. It was held that whether subordinate legislation or a
parliamentary statute is clarificatory or declaratory would depend upon
the nature thereof as well as the object it seeks to achieve.
18.1 The Supreme Court referred to Bennion’s Statutory
Interpretation and G P Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation,
where it was said: “An amending Act may be purely clarificatory to clear a
meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A
clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect and,
therefore, if the principal Act was existing law when the Constitution came into
force, the amending Act also will be part of the existing law." The Supreme
Court further said that if by reason of an explanation, substantive law
may be introduced, it will have no retrospective effect. The expressions
like “for the removal of doubts” are not conclusive. The question as to
whether subordinate legislation or parliamentary statute would be held
to be clarificatory or declaratory or not would depend upon the nature
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thereof as well as the objective it seeks to achieve. If two views are not
possible, resorting to clarification and/or declaration may not be
permissible.
18.2 Paragraph 43 of the said judgment reads as follows:
“43. The question as to whether a subordinate legislation or a
parliamentary statute would be held to be clarificatory or declaratory or
not would indisputably depend upon the nature thereof as also the object
it seeks to achieve. What we intend to say is that if two views are not
possible, resort to clarification and/or declaration may not be
permissible.”
Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi v. Vatika Township
Private Limited5
19.
The Constitution Bench considered whether legislation has a
retrospective operation or prospective operation. The general rule of
construing the Statutes to have prospective effect, however, this general
rule would not apply to curative or clarificatory Statutes. Unless the
(2015) 1 SCC 1
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legislation is for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a
former legislation or to explain a former legislation, legislations which
modified accrued rights or impose obligations or new duties or attach a
new disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative
intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective operation.
19.1 Paragraphs 41 and 42 of the said judgment, which are relevant
for the purposes of the decision in the present case, are extracted
hereunder:
“41. We would like to embark on a discussion on some basic and
fundamental concepts, which would shed further light on the subject
matter.
41.1
No doubt, there is no scope for accepting the Libertarian theory
which postulates among others, no taxation by the State as it amounts to
violation of individual liberty and advocates minimal interference by the
State. The Libertarianism propounded by the Australian-born economist
philosopher Friedrich A. Hayek and American economist Milton
Friedman stands emphatically rejected by all civilised and democratically
governed States, in favour of strongly conceptualised “welfare state”. To
attain welfare state is our constitutional goal as well, enshrined as one of
its basic feature, which runs through our Constitution. It is for this
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reason, specific provisions are made in the Constitution, empowering the
legislature to make laws for levy of taxes, including the income-tax. The
rationale behind collection of taxes is that revenue generated therefrom
shall be spent by the governments on various developmental and welfare
schemes, among others.
41.2
At the same time, it is also mandated that there cannot be
imposition of any tax without the authority of law. Such a law has to be
unambiguous and should prescribe the liability to pay taxes in clear
terms. If the concerned provision of the taxing statute is ambiguous and
vague and is susceptible to two interpretations, the interpretation which
favours the subjects, as against there the revenue, has to be preferred.
This is a well established principle of statutory interpretation, to help
finding out as to whether particular category of assessee are to pay a
particular tax or not. No doubt, with the application of this principle,
Courts make endeavour to find out the intention of the legislature. At the
same time, this very principle is based on “fairness” doctrine as it lays
down that if it is not very clear from the provisions of the Act as to
whether the particular tax is to be levied to a particular class of persons
or not, the subject should not be fastened with any liability to pay tax.
This principle also acts as a balancing factor between the two
jurisprudential theories of justice – Libertarian theory on the one hand
and Kantian theory along with Egalitarian theory propounded by John
Rawls on the other hand.
41.3
Tax laws are clearly in derogation of personal rights and
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property interests and are, therefore, subject to strict construction, and
any ambiguity must be resolved against imposition of the tax. In Billings
v. U.S.[14], the Supreme Court clearly acknowledged this basic and longstanding rule of statutory construction:
“Tax Statutes . . . should be strictly construed, and, if any ambiguity be found to exist,
it must be resolved in favor of the citizen.
Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 578, 583; United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, 374;
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Herold, 198 F. 199, 201, aff'd 201 F. 918; Parkview Bldg.
Assn. v. Herold, 203 F. 876, 880; Mutual Trust Co. v. Miller, 177 N.Y. 51, 57.”
41.4
Again, in United States v. Merriam[15], the Supreme Court
clearly stated at pp. 187-88:
“On behalf of the Government it is urged that taxation is a practical matter and
concerns itself with the substance of the thing upon which the tax is imposed rather
than with legal forms or expressions. But in statutes levying taxes the literal meaning
of the words employed is most important, for such statutes are not to be extended by
implication beyond the clear import of the language used. If the words are doubtful,
the doubt must be resolved against the Government and in favor of the taxpayer. Gould
v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153”
41.5
As Lord Cairns said many years ago in Partington v. Attorney-
General[16]:
“…as I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation it is this : If the person sought
to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the
hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown,
seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the
subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might
otherwise appear to be.
42. There are some other circumstances which reflect the legislative
intent. The problem which was highlighted in the Conference of Chief
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Commissioners on the rate of surcharge applicable is noted above. In
view of the aforesaid difficulties pointed out by the Chief Commissioners
in their Conference, it becomes clear that as per the provisions then
enforced, levy of surcharge in the block assessment on the undisclosed
income was a difficult proposition. It is for this reason retrospective
amendment to Section 113 was suggested. Notwithstanding the same, the
legislature chose not to do so, as is clear from the discussion hereinafter.
42.1
“Notes on Clauses” appended to Finance Bill, 2002 while
proposing insertion of proviso categorically states that “this amendment
will take effect from 1st June, 2002”. These become epigraphic words,
when seen in contradistinction to other amendments specifically stating
those to be clarificatory or retrospectively depicting clear intention of
the legislature. It can be seen from the same notes that few other
amendments in the Income Tax Act were made by the same Finance
Act specifically making those amendments retrospectively. For example,
clause 40 seeks to amend S.92F. Clause iii (a) of S.92F is amended “so as to
clarify that the activities mentioned in the said clause include the
carrying out of any work in pursuance of a contract.” This amendment
takes effect retrospectively from 01.04.2002. Various other amendments
also take place retrospectively. The Notes on Clauses show that the
legislature is fully aware of 3 concepts:
(i) prospective amendment with effect from a fixed date;
(ii) retrospective amendment with effect from a fixed anterior date; and
(iii) clarificatory amendments which are retrospective in nature.
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42.2
Thus, it was a conscious decision of the legislature, even when
the legislature knew the implication thereof and took note of the reasons
which led to the insertion of the proviso, that the amendment is to
operate prospectively. Learned counsel appearing for the assessees
sagaciously contrasted the aforesaid stipulation while effecting
amendment in Section 113 of the Act, with various other provisions not
only in the same Finance Act but Finance Acts pertaining to other years
where the legislature specifically provided such amendment to be either
retrospective or clarificatory. In so far as amendment to Section 113 is
concerned, there is no such language used and on the contrary, specific
stipulation is added making the provision effective from 1st June, 2002.
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Prasad Verma6
20.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that any legislation or an
instrument having the force of law would be clarificatory, declaratory or
explanatory in nature and purport if it is brought in to supply an obvious
omission or to clear up doubts qua any prior law. Paragraph 21 of the
said judgment is extracted hereunder:
“21. The proposition has been so well laid that we do not wish to burden
(2017) 5 SCC 665
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the present rendition by referring to other rulings in the same vein.
Suffice it to state that any legislation or instrument having the force of
law, if clarificatory, declaratory or explanatory in nature and purport, in
order to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts qua any prior
law, retrospective operation thereof is generally intended. Applying this
test, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, either in the parent
Act or the Rules or the notifications involved, we are thus of the
unhesitant opinion that on a conjoint reading of Rule 26 and the two
notifications, the enhanced rate of royalty at Rs 100 per cubic metre for
boulder, gravel and shingle, which are used or are capable of being used
for making chips would be realisable w.e.f. 1-4-2001 and axiomatically
thus, the respondents are liable to discharge the demand, therefor, as
raised in terms thereof. The respondents were fully aware of the
amended rate of Rs 100 per cubic metre for the minerals extracted by
them, and thus, the reasoning of the High Court that they might not have
passed on the burden to their purchasers is without any factual basis and
being clearly speculative is untenable. The High Court, in our view, had
clearly erred in interpreting the relevant legal provisions and the
Notification dated 26-12-2001 in particular in holding that the enhanced
rates, as fixed by the Notification dated 24-3-2001, would be payable for
the minerals involved, as extracted from the two areas, mentioned in the
Notification dated 26-12-2001 on and from that date. The determination
made by the High Court is thus indefensible and consequently, the
impugned decision¹ is hereby set aside.”
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Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit v. Dr Manu7
21.
After conducting a survey of the case law, the following
principles were culled out to hold whether a Statute or an instrument
having the force of law is curative or clarificatory and, therefore, has a
retrospective operation.
21.1 Paragraphs 52 and 53 are extracted hereunder:
“52. From the aforesaid authorities, the following principles could be
culled out:
i) If a statute is curative or merely clarificatory of the previous law,
retrospective operation thereof may be permitted.
ii) In order for a subsequent order/provision/amendment to be
considered as clarificatory of the previous law, the pre-amended law
ought to have been vague or ambiguous. It is only when it would be
impossible to reasonably interpret a provision unless an amendment is
read into it, that the amendment is considered to be a clarification or a
declaration of the previous law and therefore applied retrospectively.
iii) An explanation/clarification may not expand or alter the scope of the
original provision.
2023 SCC OnLine SC 640
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iv) Merely because a provision is described as a clarification/explanation,
the Court is not bound by the said statement in the statute itself, but must
proceed to analyse the nature of the amendment and then conclude
whether it is in reality a clarificatory or declaratory provision or whether
it is a substantive amendment which is intended to change the law and
which would apply prospectively.
53. Applying the law as discussed hereinabove to the facts of the present
case, we are of the view that the subsequent Government Order dated
29th March, 2001 cannot be declared as a clarification and therefore be
made applicable retrospectively. The said order has substantively
modified the Government Order dated 21st December, 1999 to the extent
of stating that teachers who had already got the benefit of advance
increments for having a Ph.D. degree, would not be eligible for advance
increments at the time of their placement in the selection grade. As noted
above, the law provides that a clarification must not have the effect of
saddling any party with an unanticipated burden or withdrawing from
any party an anticipated benefit. However, the Government Order dated
29th March 2001 has restricted the eligibility of lecturers for advance
increments at the time of placement in the selection grade only to those
who do not have a Ph.D. degree at the time of recruitment and
subsequently acquire the same.”
21.2
Thus, an explanation or clarification cannot expand or
alter the scope of the original provision, and clarification must not have
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the effect of saddling any party with an unanticipated burden or
withdrawing from any party an anticipated benefit.
Discussion:
22.
Applying these principles in the present case, the Trade
Circular dated 04.07.2020 for the first time sought to collect anchorage
charges from the vessels calling for berthing at Cochin Port other than
vessels mentioned in clauses 2.3.1 for which the Schedule of berth hire
charges were provided in clause 2.3.2 by the deeming fiction in clause
2.3.4.
22.1 This is the liability which is being fastened for the first time
on the vessels on which otherwise the anchorage charges were not
levied. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the amendment brought
in SoR in 2019 to include the vessels other than vessels mentioned in
clause 2.3.1 for which the schedule of berth hire charges are provided in
clause 2.3.2 to collect the anchorage charges under clause 2.3.4 of SoR by
incorporating a deeming provision is not a clarificatory amendment but
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a substantive amendment.
23.
A legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a
retrospective operation. The idea is that a current law should govern
current activities. The law passed today cannot apply to the events of
the past. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit, i.e., the
law looks forward, not backwards.
The charges cannot be given
retrospective effect but will operate only prospectively, i.e., from the
date of the amendment brought in in the SoR on 07.09.2020, which was
notified only on 06.10.2020. The introduction of a deeming fiction for
the first time ought not to change the character of past transactions.
Conclusion:
24.
In view of the discussions above, this Court holds thus:
(i)
The invoices issued to the petitioner for anchorage charges in
Exts.P5 to P7 are set aside. The petitioner is not liable to pay the
anchorage charges for the three vessels over and above the charges
collected in Exts. P1 to P3.
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(ii)
However, if the Cochin Port Trust has collected the anchorage
charges from other vessels that have not come before this Court, they
are not entitled to a refund of the said anchorage charges collected by
the CoPT.
(iii) As the petitioner is not liable to pay the anchorage charges
prior to 06.10.2020, the CoPT may take up a case with the GST Authorities
for a refund of the GST paid on the anchorage charges sought to be levied
on the three vessels in question.
Result:
As aforementioned, the writ petition is allowed. However, no order
as to costs.
All Interlocutory Applications regarding interim matters stand
closed.
Sd/D K SINGH
JUDGE
jjj
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) 1992/2021
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1
TRUE COPY OF THE INVOICE DTD 13-04-2020 RAISED ON MT DTH
FALCON FOR AN AMOUNT OF RS. 1,61,01,302.64
EXHIBIT P2
TRUE COPY OF THE INVOICE DTD 05-05-2020 RAISED ON MT DELTA
SKY FOR AN AMOUNT OF RS. 97,69,814.62/-
EXHIBIT P3
TRUE COPY OF THE INVOICE DTD 21-05-2020 RAISED ON MT EVRIDIKI
FOR AN AMOUNT OF RS., 13180722.18/-
EXHIBIT P4
TRUE COPY OF THE TRADE CIRCULAR DTD 04-07-2020 ISSUED BY THE
3RD RESPONDENT WITH THE APPROVED OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT
EXHIBIT P5
TRUE COPY OF THE INVOICE DTD 04-07-2020 RAISED ON MT DTH
FALCON FOR AN AMOUNT OF RS. 5,52,402/-
EXHIBIT P6
TRUE COPY OF THE INVOICE DTD 04-07-2020 RAISED ON MT DELTA
SKY FOR ANA AMOUNT OF RS. 33,85,202.52/-
EXHIBIT P7
TRUE COPY OF THE INVOICE DTD 04-07-2020 RAISED ON MT EVRIDIKI
FOR AN AMOUNT OF RS. 28,64,790.85/-
EXHIBIT P8
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DTD 06-10-2020 ISSUED BY THE 2ND
RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P9
TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT EVIDENCING AMOUNTS DEDUCTED
BY COCHIN PORT TRUST FROM THE RUNNING ACCOUNT OF THE
PETITIONER.
Exhibit P10
TRUE COPY OF THE SCREENSHOT OF GSTR 2B-AUTO DRAFTED ITC
STATEMENT.
Exhibit P11
TRUE COPY OF THE GSTR 2A STATEMENT OF JULY 2020.
Exhibit P12
TRUE COPY OF THE GSTR 2B STATEMENT FOR AUGUST 2020.
Exhibit P13
TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER BEARING NO. SN/001 DTD. 11.11.2020
PREFERRED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 4TH RESPONDENT.
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Exhibit P14
TRUE COPY OF THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT DTD. 11.11.2020 ISSUED BY
THE OFFICE OF THE 4TH RESPONDENT.
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
Exhibit R4(a)
Exhibit R4(b)
Exhibit R4(c)
Exhibit R4(d)
True copy of SOR as notified in the Gazette of India on 30.10.2019 vide
Gazette No.378
True copy of the Addendum Trade Circular dated 07.08.2020
A true copy of the ‘Customer Line Item Display’ of the petitioner’s
deposit account from 26.06.2020 to 06.08.2020 generated SAP program
used by Port Trust
TRUE COPY OF THE TARIFF POLICY FOR MAJOR PORT TRUST, 2018’
DATED 16.1.2019 NOTIFIED BY THE TARIFF AUTHORITY FOR MAJOR
PORTS
Exhibit R4(e)
TRUE COPY OF THE WORKING GUIDELINES TO OPERATIONALIZE THE
TARIFF POLICY FOR MAJOR PORT TRUSTS, 2018’ DATED 30.1.2019
NOTIFIED BY THE TARIFF AUTHORITY FOR MAJOR PORTS
Exhibit R4(f)
TRUE COPY OF BILL DATED 19.5.2022 IN RESPECT OF THE VESSEL
ASTRO PHOENIX
Exhibit R4(g)
TRUE COPY OF BILL DATED 24.5.2022 IN RESPECT OF THE VESSEL
ASTRO PHOENIX
Exhibit R4(h)
TRUE COPY OF BILL DATED 18.6.2024 IN RESPECT OF THE VESSEL
CARIBBEAN 1
Exhibit R4(i)
TRUE COPY OF BILL DATED 19.6.2024 IN RESPECT OF THE VESSEL
CARIBBEAN 1
Exhibit R4(j)
TRUE COPY OF BILL DATED 27.1.2023 IN RESPECT OF THE VESSEL
ROYAL SESA
Exhibit R4(k)
TRUE COPY OF BILL DATED 13.2.2023 IN RESPECT OF THE VESSEL
ROYAL SESA
Exhibit R4(l)
TRUE COPY OF BILL DATED 23.2.2023 IN RESPECT OF THE VESSEL
ROYAL SESA
Exhibit R4(m)
TRUE COPY OF THE STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR
OPENING DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS WITH THE COCHIN PORT AUTHORITY
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Annexure R2(a)
Annexure R2(b)
A true copy of the copy of the said Order No.TAMP/10/2019-COPT
dated 07.09.2020
A copy of the said letter of the Fourth Respondent dated 18.09.2020
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