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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RFA 25 OF 2022
1. The Food Corporation of India, having its registered Office at
Khadyasadan, 16-20, Barakhamba Lane, New Delhi, PIN-110001.
Being represented by the General Manager, NEF Region, Jowai Road,
Shillong-3, Meghalaya, (Now General Manager (Region) NEF Region,
Mawlai Mawroh, Shillong-793008),
2. The Divisional Manager (Erstwhile Area Manager),
Food Corporation of India, Divisional Office, Colonel Chowmuhani,
P.O. Agartala, P.S. West Agartala, District-West Tripura, PIN-799001.
….Appellants.
Vrs.
Smt. Namita Paul,
W/o Sri Swapan Kumar Paul,
R/o B.K.Road, Banamalipur, P.O.Dhaleswar,
P.S. East Agartala, District-West Tripura,
PIN-799007.
….Respondent.
RFA 26 OF 2022
1. The Food Corporation of India, having its registered Office at
Khadyasadan, 16-20, Barakhamba Lane, New Delhi, PIN-110001.
Being represented by the General Manager, NEF Region, Jowai Road,
Shillong-3, Meghalaya, (Now General Manager (Region) NEF Region,
Mawlai Mawroh, Shillong-793008),
2. The Divisional Manager (Erstwhile Area Manager),
Food Corporation of India, Divisional Office, Colonel Chowmuhani,
P.O. Agartala, P.S. West Agartala, District-West Tripura, PIN-799001.
….Appellants.
Vrs.
Smt. Namita Paul,
W/o Sri Swapan Kumar Paul,
R/o B.K.Road, Banamalipur, P.O.Dhaleswar,
P.S. East Agartala, District-West Tripura,
PIN-799007.
Present (in both the
appeals):
For the appellants
For the respondents
: Mr. A. Bhaumik, Advocate.
Mr. S. Dey, Advocate.
: Mr. Raju Datta, Advocate.
….Respondent.
Date of hearing
: 31.08.2023
Date of delivery of
judgment & order
: 19.10.2023
Whether fit for reporting
: Yes
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. APARESH KUMAR SINGH
HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
JUDGMENT & ORDER
[ Arindam Lodh, J.]
Since common questions of law and facts are involved in both the
appeals, these were heard together on consent of learned counsel for the
parties and are being taken up for decision by this common judgment.
2.
These appeals under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 read with Order XLI of the Civil Procedure Code,1908 have been filed
challenging the common Judgment and Decree dated 06.07.2022, passed in
Case No. C.S.08/2017 & C.S. 04/2016 by the learned District Commercial
Court, West Tripura, Agartala whereby the Suit bearing No. CS 08 of 2017
filed by the respondent [the original plaintiff] was partly decreed and the Suit
bearing No.CS 04 of 2016 filed by the appellants [the original defendants] was
dismissed.
3.
The facts as narrated in common judgment i.e. in Commercial
Suit No. 08 of 2017 and Commercial Suit No.04 of 2016 by learned Judge,
District Commercial Court, may be reproduced here-in-below for the sake of
convenience since the facts leading to CS 08 of 2017 filed by M/S Namita
Paul being the plaintiff and her defence in CS 04 of 2016 are similar and the
Food Corporation of India ( for short, „FCI‟) and its officials being the
plaintiffs in CS 04 of 2016 and their defence in CS 08 of 2017 are also similar
and identical.
“The plaintiff claimed to be a Transport Contractor and has
been carrying on such business successfully since 1995. The
defendants issued a Notice Inviting Tender(for short NIT) dated
21.08.2009 in two bid tendering system(technical bid and price bid)
for appointment of transport contractors for a period of two years for
transportation of food grains/sugar and other allied materials from
Railway siding(FSD), Churaibari to FSD Arundhutinagar, Agartala.
Estimated value of the work was 4 crores 35 lacs and the scheduled
rate for carrying food grains was prescribed at Rs. 611.22 per MT.
The plaintiff being lowest bidder was accordingly appointed for
transportation of food grains/sugar and other allied materials and
after negotiation rate was fixed at Rs. 913.77 per MT which is 49.5%
above the scheduled rate. The plaintiff commenced the transportation
of food grains in terms of contract w.e.f. 16.11.2009. According to the
plaintiff the rate quoted by the plaintiff was feasible only if she carries
a load ranging from 16 MT to 19 MT per vehicle. Accordingly the
plaintiff did the transportation works carrying loads of 16 to 19 MT
per vehicle and bills submitted by the plaintiff in this connection were
duly cleared by the defendants. The defendants also issued road
movement permits(RMP) for the vehicle indicating gross weight of the
goods to be carried ranging from 16 MT to 19 MT but from the 3rd
week of October, 2010 all on a sudden the plaintiff started facing
difficulties in its transportation within the State of Tripura because of
the fact that the defendants have deviated from the prevailing system of
issuing indents for Truck and instead of issuing indents on the basis of
load capacity of 16 to 19 MT per Truck they started issuing indents on
the basis of reduced load capacity of 8 to 10 MT per Truck. Being
confronted by the situation the plaintiff came to know about the
Supreme Court judgment in the case of Paramjit Bhasin & Ors vs
Union of India & Ors. reported in (2005) 12 SCC 642. In the said case
Hon‟ble the Supreme Court had examined the legality of notifications
issued by various State Governments permitting carriage of excess
weight of goods laying down the law and issued directions to withdraw
such notifications forthwith. Situating thus, the plaintiff started facing
serious difficulties in its transport operation. The defendants were not
allowing more than 8 to 10 MT of load in a Truck whereas from
November, 2009 till 3rd week of October, 2010 the plaintiff carried 16
to 19 MT load in each Truck. Moreover, the rate quoted by the plaintiff
on the basis of carriage of 16 to 19 MT of load in each Truck and the
enforcement of restriction on carriage by Trucks to average 19 tonnes
it became impossible for the plaintiff to carry out its contractual
obligation at the rates quoted by it. The plaintiff, however, continued
to execute the contract sustaining huge loss and kept on carrying food
grains by engaging Trucks with permissible loads. The defendants
vide, their letter dated 18.10.2010 and 19.10.2010 directed the plaintiff
to engage more Trucks otherwise threatened to take action under the
purview of clause X(C) of the agreement. In response the plaintiff vide,
his (sic „her‟) letter dated 23.10.2010 had urged for enhancement of
the rate of transportation in new changed situation. But the defendants
without giving any reply to the letter of the plaintiff issued the letter
dated 06.11.2010 advising the plaintiff to engage more trucks within a
short period and thereafter without issuing any show cause notice even
without giving an opportunity of being heard invoked the clause X(C)
of the agreement and thereby terminated the contract at the risk and
cost of the plaintiff. Not only that the defendants have engaged other
new contractors namely, Sri Abhijit Pal and SMTs. Putul Saha for a
period of six months at unusually much higher rates, i.e., about double
the rate by an order dated 24.12.2010. The plaintiff claimed to have
carried on execution of the contract up to 23.12.2010 but after finding
that the defendants have engaged new contractor had stopped the
transportation from 24.12.2010. The defendants further vide, order
dated 22.06.2011 appointed aforesaid two contractors for carrying out
the remaining portion of the contract for further period of six months
at about the same rate contained in the earlier order dated 24.12.2010.
The defendants further vide., demand notices dated 19.03.2011,
02.04.2011, 18.06.2011,11.07.2011, 07.09.2011 claimed certain
amounts on account of purported extra expenditure at the purported
risk and cost of the plaintiff for carrying out the remaining portion of
the transportation work under contract.
The plaintiff further stated that the defendants in its NIT
dated 21.08.2009 did not mention the condition of compliance with the
prescription against excess load beyond the maximum permissible
limit in terms of the notification of the Govt. of India. On the contrary
it resorted to practice of ignoring the aforementioned prescription and
allowed the plaintiff to carry its contract work of transportation by
loading transport vehicles beyond the prescribed maximum weight.
The plaintiff, therefore, contended that the conduct of the defendants
was arbitrary, illegal and caused serious prejudice to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff further claimed to have carried the food grains for a period of
twelve months valued at Rs. 1,52,26,860/- and thereby earned Rs.
15,22,686/- towards profit and as such, if he (sic „she‟) had carried the
goods for remaining twelve months he(sic „she‟) could have earned Rs.
15,22,686/- as profit. In fine, the plaintiff prays for declaration that-(i)
the order No. Cont.9/NEFR/TC/CBZ-ADNR/09, dated 24.11.2010; (ii)
the order No. Cont.9/DO-AGT/TC/CBZ-ADN/Ad-hoc/2010, dated
24.12.2010; (iii) the order No. Cont.9/NEFR/TC/CBZ-ADNR/09/9532,
dated 02.11.2011; (iv) the order No. Cont.9/NEFR/TC/CBZADNR/Adhoc/2011/6322, dated 22.06.2011 and the demand notices
dated 19.03.2011, 02.04.2011, 18.06.2011, 11.07.2011, 07.09.2011 are
illegal arbitrary and wrong. The plaintiff further claimed for recovery
of security deposit of Rs. 18,48,843/- and a sum of Rs. 15,22,686/towards loss of profit along with 12% interest per annum thereon.”
4.
Being summoned, the defendants [appellants herein] appeared
and contested the suit by filing written statement and on the basis of the
pleadings, learned trial Court had framed the following issues in both the
suits:
Issues in CS 08 of 2017
I.
Is the suit maintainable in its present form and nature?
II.
Has the plaintiff got any cause of action to institute this suit?
III.
Are the order bearing Nos.(i) No. cont.9/NEFR/TC/CBZADNR/09,
dated 24-11-2010 issued by defendant No.5, (ii) No.
cont.9/DOAGT/TC/CBZ-ADNR/Ad-hoc/2010, dated 24-12-2010
issued by defendant No.4, (iii) letter bearing No.
cont.9/NEFR/TC/CBZ-ADNR/2009/9532, dated 01-11-2011 issued
by defendant No.2, (iv) No.cont.9/NEFR/TC/CBZADNR/Adhoc/2011/6322, dated 22-06-2011 issued by defendant no.2 AND (v)
Demand Notices, dated 19-03-2011, 02-04-2011, 18-05-2011, 1107-2011 and 07-09-2011 issued by defendant no.4 void and illegal?
IV.
Is the plaintiff entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 18,48,843/- as security
deposit from the defendants ? If so, is the plaintiff entitled to interest
thereon @ 12% p.a.?
V.
Is the plaintiff entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 15,22,686/- towards
loss of profit from the defendants? If so, is the plaintiff entitled to
interest thereon @ 12% p.a.?
VI.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get any decree as prayed for?
VII.
To what relief/reliefs the parties to this suit are entitled?
Issues in CS 04 of 2016
I.
Is the suit maintainable in its present form and nature?
II.
Have the plaintiffs any cause of action to file the instant suit?
III.
Are the plaintiffs entitled to get a sum of Rs.1,89,86,602/- from the
defendants? If so, are the plaintiffs entitled to any interest thereon?
5.
IV.
Are the plaintiffs entitled to a decree, as prayed for?
V.
What other relief/reliefs the plaintiffs are entitled?
On the basis of aforesaid issues, evidences were adduced by the
parties. Thereafter, having heard the arguments of learned counsel appearing
for the parties, the learned Commercial Court partly decreed the Commercial
Suit No.08 of 2017 in favour of the plaintiff/respondent and dismissed the
Commercial Suit No. 04 of 2016 filed by the defendant-FCI/appellants by the
impugned common judgment.
6.
The operative portion of the judgment reads as follows:
“In the result, CS 8 of 2017 stands decreed partly on contest.
The plaintiff is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 15,22,686/- (Rupees
Fifteen lakhs twenty two thousand six hundred eighty six) only along with
6% interest per annum thereon from 24-12-2010 till the date of
realization towards loss of profit. The plaintiff is also entitled to get an
amount of Rs. 18,48,843/- (Rupees Eighteen lakhs forty eight thousand
eight hundred forty three) only towards refund of security deposits. The
amount towards refund of security deposits shall be paid within three
months failing which the amount shall carry 6% interest per annum from
the date of filing this suit on 19-01-2012 till the date of realization.
CS 04 of 2016, however, stands dismissed.
To feel contrive for their (defendants) reproachable conduct,
there is no order as to cost.
Prepare decree accordingly.
Original copy of the Judgment be maintained in CS 8 of 2017
and a certified copy of the Judgment be maintained in CS 4 of 2016.
Both the suits accordingly, stand disposed of on contest.”
7.
Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the findings of learned
Commercial Court, the appellants/defendants have preferred the instant
appeals.
8.
In both the appeals, heard Mr. Arijit Bhaumik, learned counsel
appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. Raju Datta, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent.
9.
Mr. Bhaumik, learned counsel for the appellants challenging the
impugned common judgment and order passed by the learned Commercial
Court mainly raised his plea that learned trial Court had failed to appreciate
that the respondent/plaintiff being a contractor was under a contractual
obligation to execute the transportation work as per work order dated
12.11.2009 wherein the contract period was for a duration of 2 years i.e. upto
15.11.2011, but, the respondent/plaintiff suspended the work after 24.12.2010.
The appellants/Corporation issued several letters of notices to the
respondent/plaintiff and in spite of that she did not improve her performance.
It was submitted by Mr. Bhaumik, learned counsel that under compelling
circumstances, the appellants/Corporation had to impose Clause X(c) of the
agreement i.e. in the event of failure of the original contractor in supplying
adequate number of trucks and labourers etc. the appellant/Corporation can
have the alternative remedy to get the work done by engaging other labourers,
trucks, etc. at the cost of the original contractor. It was the further contention
of Mr. Bhaumik, learned counsel that as per Clause X(c) of the agreement, the
contractor is duty bound to bear all the additional charges, expenses, cost or
losses that the appellants/Corporation may incur or suffer thereby. Thus,
according to Mr. Bhaumik, learned counsel, in the present case in executing
the work through ad hoc Contractors, the appellants/Corporation had incurred
total expenditure of Rs.1,89,86,602/- which the respondent/contractor is liable
to pay. It is averred by Mr. Bhaumik, learned counsel that the
appellants/Corporation never allowed the respondent/contractor to carry over
load than the permissible limits and when a judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in Paramjit Bhasin & Ors. Vrs. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 12 SCC
642 came into force, the respondent/contractor had to carry load within the
permissible limits, for which the respondent/contractor suspended the work. It
is further strenuously argued by Mr. Bhaumik, learned counsel that learned
trial Court came to an erroneous findings that the ad hoc contractors were
appointed at higher rate, but, the appellants/Corporation did not enhance the
rate of the respondent/contractor pursuant to her letter dated 23.10.2020. It is
the assertion of the corporation that the ad hoc contractors were appointed at
higher rate on emergent situation. Thus, Mr. Bhauwmik, learned counsel
unequivocally submitted that due to unprofessional activities and negligence
on the part of the respondent/contractor, the appellants/Corporation had
suffered a huge loss in carrying out the remaining part of the contract work
through appointment of ad hoc contractors and as a result of which the
respondent/contractor is not entitled to refund of any security deposit, rather
the
same
will
be
adjusted
against
the
loss
suffered
by
the
appellants/Corporation. Accordingly, Mr. Bhaumik, learned counsel for the
appellants/Corporation prayed for setting aside the impugned judgment and
order passed by learned Commercial Court.
10.
Mr.
Raju
Datta,
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
respondent/contractor refuting the submissions of learned counsel for the
appellants mainly contended that on the basis of Road Movement Permit (for
short, RMP) issued by the FCI/appellants, the respondent/contractor carried
the food grains at the quantum of 16 Metric tons (MTs) to 19 Metric tons
(MTs), but, subsequently the appellants/Corporation did not allow the
respondent/contractor to transport same quantity of food grains for which the
respondent/contractor had suffered financial loss. Mr. Datta, learned counsel
again submitted that Clause X(c) of the agreement has not been fully complied
with by the appellants/Corporation as the letter dated 19.10.2010 is not at all
be treated a notice under Clause X(c), rather it is a general letter to 7(seven)
contractors and in the said letter it is not specifically stated as to how and in
what manner the contractor failed to supply trucks to the appellants. More so,
before engagement of new contractors, no notice under Clause X(c) was
issued to the respondent, therefore, the appointment of new contractors is
absolutely arbitrary and illegal according to Mr. Datta, learned counsel.
Further, Mr. Datta, learned counsel agitated before this Court that the
appellants/Corporation could not submit any scrap of paper/document to prove
that they had suffered any loss due to the act of the contractor/respondent and
on failure of such proof, they cannot be permitted to forfeit the security
deposit as sought for in the instant appeals. On the issue of forfeiture of
security deposit by a contractor, Mr. Datta, learned counsel had drawn
attention of this Court to the decisions rendered by the Division Bench of this
Court in RFA 14 of 2016, RFA 16 of 2019 along with RFA 17 of 2019
wherein this Court had decided identical issues between the same parties. As
such, Mr. Datta, learned counsel urged that the respondent/contractor did not
commit any breach of contract and the Corporation did not suffer any loss due
to any fault of the respondent/contractor and according to learned counsel, the
respondent/contractor is entitled to get refund of the security deposit.
11.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
findings of the impugned judgment passed by learned Commercial Court,
West Tripura, Agartala.
12.
The case of the appellants/Corporation in these appeals are
centered round mainly on the issue of non-performance of the contractual
obligations of the respondent/contractor in fulfilling the terms and conditions
of the agreement made in between them. It is the case of the
appellants/Corporation that they had rescinded the contract entered into with
the plaintiff/respondent since the plaintiff suspended the work after
24.12.2010 violating the terms and conditions of the work which resulted the
public distribution system in serious crisis and disruption affecting the public
interest. The appellants vide their several communications informed the
plaintiff/respondent that failure to perform the contract may make her liable to
make good the losses suffered by the Corporation, but, the plaintiff/respondent
did not pay any heed to such communications of the appellants/Corporation.
Thereafter, the appellants/Corporation was compelled to invoke Clause X(c)
of the agreement vide communication dated 24.11.2020. It is therefore,
noticed from the case records that the defendants/Corporation had invited
„Limited Spot Tender Notice‟ dated 03.12.2010 for appointing ad hoc
contractors for transportation of food grains with higher rate than that of the
rate as quoted by the plaintiff/respondent. The defendant/appellants claimed to
have paid an amount of Rs.644.84 per MT extra to the ad hoc contractors
involving an extra expenses of Rs.71,06,186/- for the period from 24.12.2010
to 23.06.2011. The defendant/appellants further claimed that they have paid an
amount of Rs.642.61 per MT extra to the ad hoc contractors involving an
amount of Rs.1,18,80,416/- for the period from 24.06.2011 to 15.02.2012.
Again, it is claimed by the defendant/appellants that due to breach of contract
on the part of the plaintiff, they had to incur an amount of Rs.1,89,86,602/and, consequently they sought for relief i.e. recovery of the said amount from
the plaintiff/respondent with appropriate interest thereon.
13.
Now, as we have seen from the evidence of plaintiff/respondent
being PW-1 that as per the contract the plaintiff/respondent was allowed to
carry goods with the load capacity ranging from 16 MTs to 19 MTs per
vehicle, but surprisingly, the appellants/defendants had restricted the load to 8
to 10 MTs per truck. Resultantly, the plea of the plaintiff/respondent was that
due to restriction on the ground of load capacity the plaintiff/respondent had to
suffer severe difficulties. The plaintiff/respondent claimed enhancement of the
rate, but the appellant/defendants Corporation terminated/cancelled the
contract entered into with the plaintiff/respondent, vide communication dated
24.11.2010 which led the plaintiff/respondent to suffer huge professional loss.
The said communication may be reproduced hereunder for the sake of
convenience:
“No.F.Cont.9/NEFR/TC/CBZ-ADNR/09
dated 24.11.2010
To
M/s Namita Paul
B.K.Road, Banamalipur,
Agartala-1
M/s. R.K. Saha & Sons,
Old Thana Lane,
Agartala-1
Sub: Transport contract on regular basis for two years for transportation
of food grain/sugar/allied materials from Railway siding/FSD
Churaibari to FSD Arundhatinagar, Agartala.
Ref: This Office letter No.F9/NEFR/HTC/Misc-Corres./2008-09 dated
18.10.10., 19.10.10,4/6.11.10 issued by Area Manager, Agartala.
Sir,
Kindly refer to this office letter of even no.dtd. 12.11.09
appointing you as transport contractor on regular basis for two years for
transportation of food grain/sugar/allied materials from Railway
Siding/FSD Churaibari to FSD Arundhatinagar, Agartala and you had
joined for the work on 16-11-2009.
2.
Whereas your performance being not to the satisfaction of the
Corporation, you were repeatedly requested/advised to improve your
performance. In this connection the communications cited above may be
referred. As your performance in executing the work entrusted to you has
not been satisfactory, you were repeatedly requested to improve
performance by placing trucks to clear the wagons indented to you and to
transport stocks to the destination depots. Despite repeated requests to you
from Area Manager, Agartala you have not paid any heed and the
placement of trucks at Churaibari in the month of October & November
2010 has drastically come down thus causing depletion of stock position of
food grains in the depots at Agartal a. FCI has been faced with extreme
difficulty to meet the PDS & other requirements of the State Govt. The
position has now reached an alarming level and may lead to food crisis in
the State of Tripura.
3.
In spite of repeated notices & letters you cared a little to
improve your performance and behaved in a most un-workman like manner
and thus putting the corporation to continuous loss and injury whereas
because of your un-workman like performance and as you have not
responded to the repeated requests to improve performance, the
undersigned has no other option but to take action as per tender clause.
4.
Whereas the FCI is of the opinion that you have failed to
carry out the contract work as per agreement and also there is no chance
of any further improvement in performance and in the process the
Corporation cannot afford to sustain further loss and allow the Public
Distribution System suffer due to lack of supply of food grains at the depots
in Agartala.
5.
Now, in exercise of the powers vested upon the undersigned
under Clause-X, hereby invoke upon you X‟C‟ of the contract agreement
entered between you and the Corporation for transportation of food grain,
sugar, allied materials from Railway Siding/FSD Churaibari to FSD
Arundhatinagar, Agartala and to get the work done at your risk & cost for
the remaining period of the contract with you and you shall be liable to
make good to the Corporation all, the additional charges/expenses, cost of
losses that the Corporation may incur or suffer thereby.
Yours faithfully,
(B.B.Singh)
Dy. GENERAL MANAGER”
(emphasis supplied)
14.
In view of the above facts, it would be useful to have glance at
Clause X & XI of the agreement which prompted the appellants/Corporation
to revoke the contract entered into with the plaintiff/respondent. Clause X &
XI of the contract reads as follows:
X. Summary Termination:
“(a)
In the event of the contractors having been adjudged
insolvent or going into liquidation or winding up their business or
making arrangements with their creditors or failing to observe any of
the provisions of this contract or any of the terms and conditions
governing the contract, the General Manager shall be at liberty to
terminate the contract forthwith without prejudice or any other rights
or remedies under the contract and to get the work done for the
unexpired period of the contract at the risk and cost of the contractors
and to claim from the contractors any resultant loss sustained or costs
incurred.
(b)
The General Manager shall also have without prejudice to
other rights and remedies, the right, in the event of breach by the
contractors of any of the terms and conditions of the contract to
terminate the contract forthwith and to get the work done for the
unexpired period of the contract at the risk and cost of the contractors
and/or forfeit the security deposit or any part thereof for the sum or
sums due for any damages, losses, charges, expenses or costs that may
be suffered or incurred by the Corporation due to the contractor‟s
negligence or un-workman like performance of any of the services
under the contract.
(c)
The contractors shall be responsible to supply adequate and
sufficient labour, scales/trucks/carts/any other transport vehicle for
loading/unloading, transport & carrying out any other services under
the contract in accordance with the instructions issued by the General
Manager or an officer acting on his behalf. If the contractors fail to
supply the requisite number of labour, scales and trucks/carts, the
General Manager shall at his entire discretion without terminating the
contract, be at liberty to engage other labour, scales, trucks/carts, etc.
at the risk and cost of the contractors, who shall be liable to make
good to the Corporation all additional charges, expenses, cost or
losses that the Corporation may incur or suffer thereby. The
contractors shall not, however, be entitled to any gain resulting from
entrustment of the work to another party. The decision of the General
Manager shall be final and binding on the contractors.
XI. Security Deposit:
(a)
The contractor shall furnish within a week of the acceptance
of their tender, security deposit as prescribed in the invitation to
tender failing which the contract shall be liable to cancellation at the
risk and cost of the contractors and subject to such other remedies as
may be open to the General Manager under the terms of the contract.
The contractors at their option may deposit fifty per cent of the
prescribed security
(b)
The security deposit will be refunded to the contractors on
due and satisfactory performance of the services and on completion of
all obligations by the contractors under the terms of the contract and
on submission of a No Demand Certificate, subject to such deduction
from the security as may be necessary for making up of the
Corporations claims against the contractor.
(c)
In the event of termination of the contract envisaged in
Clause-X, the General Manager, shall have the rights to forfeit the
entire or part of the amount of security deposit lodged by the
contractors or to appropriate the security deposit or any part, thereof
in or towards the satisfaction of any sum due to the claimed for any
damages, losses charges, expenses or costs that may be suffered or
incurred by the Corporation.
(d)
The decision of the General Manager in respect of such
damages, losses, charges, costs or expenses shall be final and binding
on the contractors.
(e)
In the event of the security being insufficient or if the security
has been wholly forfeited, the balance of the total sum recoverable as
the case may be shall be deducted from any sum then due or which at
any time thereafter may become due to the contractors under this or
any other contract with the Corporation. Should that sum also be not
sufficient to cover the full amount recoverable the contractors shall
pay to the Corporation on demand the remaining balance due.
(f)
Whenever the security deposited falls short of the specified
amount the contractors shall make good the benefit so that the total
amount of security deposit shall not at any time be less than the
specified amount.
15.
On perusal of Clause X(c) of the agreement, we find that if the
contractors fail to supply the requisite number of labourers, scales and
trucks/carts, the General Manager at his entire discretion without terminating
the contract shall be at liberty to engage other labourers, scales, trucks/carts,
etc. at the risk and cost of the contractors, who shall be liable to make good to
the Corporation all additional charges, expenses, cost or losses which the
Corporation may incur or suffer thereby. Here, the expression „without
terminating the contract‟ is very significant. We have noticed that the
appellants had rescinded the contract entered into with the plaintiff/respondent
and thereby engaged new ad hoc contractors vide communication dated
22.06.2011 on urgent basis without terminating the contract. Therefore, as per
Clause X(c) of the agreement, in case the contractor fails to place requisite
number of trucks for carrying necessary quantity of food grains, the appellants
would be at liberty to engage other contractor/s for carrying food grains and
other allied materials without terminating the contract at the risk and cost of
the actual contractors.
16.
On the other hand, Clause XI(c) deals with the forfeiture of
security deposit lodged by the contractors. A plain reading of Clause XI(c)
makes it clear that in the event of termination of the contract envisaged in
Clause X, the competent authority of Food Corporation of India would have
the right to forfeit the security deposit. To say it otherwise, as a part of the
contract agreement, it can only be forfeited if contract is terminated. That
apart only in the event of termination of the contract, the FCI can claim
damages, losses, charges, expenses of costs suffered by the Corporation. In the
instant case, noticeably, the FCI/appellants preferred to engage other
contractors at their own discretion without terminating the contract. As
such, according to us, since other contractors were appointed by the
FCI/appellants during existence of the contract, i.e., without termination of the
contract, they cannot invoke the forfeiture clause as provided under XI(c) of
the agreement.
17.
Furthermore, we have noticed that the FCI/appellants allowed
the contractor/respondent for carrying loads having quantity ranging from 16
to 19 MTs per vehicle and bills submitted by the plaintiff/respondent against
such transportation were duly cleared by the FCI/appellants. It is also revealed
from the records that the appellants/Corporation used to issue RMP for the
vehicles mentioning gross weight of the goods to be carried ranging from 16
to 19 MTs which act and conduct by necessary implication indicates that there
was tacit contract between the appellants/Corporation and the contractor that
the contractor would carry loads of 16 to 19 MTs per vehicle. The acts and
conducts of the parties to the lis, clearly establish the fact that the rates for
carrying
food
grains
and
allied
materials
were
offered
by
the
contractor/respondent on the mutual understanding that the food items would
be carried having quantity ranging from 16 to 19 MTs per vehicle which was
also accepted by the appellants/Corporation. The appellants/Corporation had
also paid the bills raised by the contractor/respondent having full knowledge
of the fact that the contractor/respondent was carrying food grains ranging
from 16 to 19 MTs per vehicle till 3rd week of October, 2010 when the
appellants/Corporation suddenly started issuing RMP/indents mentioning load
capacity ranging from 8 to 10 MTs per vehicle.
18.
Admittedly, the quantity of loads containing food grains to be
carried per vehicle and the types of vehicles to be used for transportation are
not mentioned in the instrument of contract entered into between the parties to
the lis in expressed terms. The raising of bills by the contractor/respondent for
carrying food grains ranging from 16 to 19 MTs per vehicle since
commencement of the transportation till 3rd week of October, 2010 and
payment of such bills by the appellants/Corporation make it clear that both the
parties by necessary implication without saying anything expressly in the
contract and to give business efficacy to the transactions, although tacit
formed a part of the contract. Furthermore, such tacit contract between the
appellants/Corporation and the contractor/respondent appeared to be decided
at the very inception of the contract that the contractor/respondent would
transport maximum quantity of loads of food items per vehicle. Added to it, it
is aptly proved by the conduct of the appellants/Corporation that they used to
issue RMP in favour of the contractor/respondent categorically mentioning the
quantity of loads ranging from 16 to 19 MTs, because a carrier like the present
contractor/respondent cannot carry loads beyond the permissible limits
mentioned in the RMP. So, from the acts and conducts of the
appellants/Corporation and the contractor/respondent, it comes to light that
they clearly intended to carry food grains ranging from 16 to 19 MTs per
vehicle at the time of entering into the contract.
19.
Here, the principle of business efficacy can be invoked to read a
term in an agreement or contract so as to achieve the result or the consequence
intended by the parties acting as prudent businessmen. Business efficacy
means the power to produce intended results. In Satya Jain v. Anis Ahmed
Rushdie, (2013) 8 SCC 131, after examining the classic test of business
efficacy which was proposed by Bowen, L. J. in The Moorcock, (1889) LR
14 PD 64 (CA), held that: –
“… This test requires that a term can only be implied if it is necessary
to give business efficacy to the contract to avoid such a failure of
consideration that the parties cannot as reasonable businessmen have
intended. But only the most limited term should then be implied- the
bare minimum to achieve this goal. If the contract makes business
sense without the term, the courts will not imply the same. The
following passage from the opinion of Bowen, L.J. in The Moorcock,
(1889) LR 14 PD 64 (CA), sums up the position:
“… In business transactions such as this, what the law desires to effect
by the implication is to give such business efficacy to the transaction
as must have been intended at all events by both parties who are
businessmen; not to impose on one side all the perils of the
transaction, or to emancipate one side from all the chances of failure,
but to make each party promise in law as much, at all events, as it
must have been in the contemplation of both parties that he should be
responsible for in respect of those perils or chances…”
… The business efficacy test, therefore, should be applied only in cases
where the term that is sought to be read as implied is such which could
have been clearly intended by the parties at the time of making of the
agreement…”
20.
We have had the advantage of going through the judgment passed
by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Nabha Power Limited (NPL) v. Punjab
State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL) & Anr., (2018) 11 SCC 508,
where it was observed that “the significant issue was the principle of “business
efficacy to the transactions” which are intended at all events by parties who
are businessmen.” [SCC.p.525, para 35]
21.
Again, the aforesaid principle was relied upon in Shirlaw v.
Southern Foundaries (1926) Ltd., (1939) 2 K.B. 206: (1939) 2 All ER
113(CA) as also referred to in Nabha Power (supra), and it was observed that,
„prima facie that which in any contract is left to be implied and need not be
expressed is something so obvious that it goes without saying; so that, if,
while the parties were making their bargain, an officious bystander, were to
suggest some express provision for it in their agreement, they would testily
suppress him with a common “Oh, of course!” ‟ [SCC.p.525, para 36]
22.
Thereafter, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that “The aforesaid,
thus, extended a word of caution while applying The Moorcock test, by
bringing forth “The Officious Bystander Test” of „Oh, of course!‟ ”
[SCC.p.526, para 37]
23.
In the case of Nabha Power (supra) the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
(comprising of Rohinton Fali Nariman and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.) while
discussing the legal principles for interpretation of commercial contract has set
forth certain judicial pronouncements relevant for determination of the issue
starting from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in The Moorcock to the
case of Satya Jain (supra) and ultimately, had summed up the principles
which had been evolved for interpreting the terms of a commercial contract in
question. The Court said that the parties indulging in commercial activities or
transactions act in a commercial sense. The Apex Court in Nabha Power
(supra) has ultimately viewed that:“The development of law saw the “five condition test” for an
implied condition to be read into the contract including the “business efficacy”
test. It also sought to incorporate “the Officious Bystander Test” [Shirlaw v.
Southern Foundaries (1926) Ltd.]. This test has been set out in B.P. Refinery
(Westernport) Proprietary Ltd. v. Shire of Hastings ,1977 UKPC 13: (1977)
180 CLR 266 (Aus) requiring the requisite conditions to be satisfied: (1)
reasonable and equitable; (2) necessary to give business efficacy to the
contract; (3) it goes without saying i.e. the Officious Bystander Test; (4)
capable of clear expression; and (5) must not contradict any express term of
the contract. The same penta-principles find reference also in Investors
Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building Society [Investors
Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building Society, (1998) 1
WLR 896: (1998) 1 All ER 98 (HL)] and Attorney General of Belize v. Belize
Telecom Ltd. [Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom Ltd., (2009) 1
WLR 1988 (PC)] Needless to say that the application of these principles
would not be to substitute this Court's own view of the presumed
understanding of commercial terms by the parties if the terms are explicit in
their expression. The explicit terms of a contract are always the final word
with regard to the intention of the parties. The multi-clause contract inter se
the parties has, thus, to be understood and interpreted in a manner that any
view, on a particular clause of the contract, should not do violence to another
part of the contract.”
24.
In the case on hand, what has been gathered, as we said earlier,
that there is no express terms as regards the quantity of loads to be carried and
types of vehicles to be used for transportation of food grains. On the contrary,
it is established by their acts and conducts that both the parties had intended to
carry loads having quantity of food grains ranging from 16 to 19 MTs using a
vehicle having capacity of transporting such quantity of loads which was a
term that went without saying, a term necessary to give business efficacy to
the contract, a term which, although tacit, formed part of the contract which
the parties having felt prudent made for themselves. Further, according to us,
it was an unexpressed term sought to be read as implied which had been
clearly intended by the parties at the time of making of the contract. That
apart, such unexpressed term cannot be said to be unreasonable and
inequitable
in
absence
of
any
restriction
imposed
by
the
appellants/Corporation while carrying loads ranging from 16 to 19 MTs of
food
grains.
Thus,
the
implied
condition
as
aforesaid
that
the
contractor/respondent would carry food grains having quantity of loads
ranging from 16 to 19 MTs per vehicle satisfies the “five condition test” or
“Penta-test” as laid down in Nabha Power (supra). The sudden change in
issuing RMP indicating reduced quantity of loads i.e. ranging from 8 to 9 MTs
is obviously a clear deviation from the contract the parties to the lis intended
to be mutually performed from the very inception of the contract. Resultantly,
the appellants/Corporation cannot take the plea of breach of contractual
obligations by the contractor/respondent while forfeiting her security deposit
and they are liable to release the security deposit immediately as indicated in
the judgment and decree passed by learned Commercial Court.
25.
Thus, the learned Commercial Court rightly came to a finding
that forfeiture of security deposit lodged by the contractor/respondent was
absolutely illegal and arbitrary and accordingly, we are not inclined to
interfere with the findings returned by learned Commercial Court on this
aspect.
26.
Now coming to the issue whether the appellants are entitled to
claim an amount of Rs.18,48,843/- as security deposit due to un-workmanlike
performance
as
well
as
negligence
on
the
part
of
the
plaintiff/contractor/respondent in carrying out the remaining part of the work
for which, they claimed that they had suffered huge loss.
27.
To appreciate the case in hand, an important question necessary to be
dealt with and answered that when a party to a contract suing another party,
fails to make out a case of any actual loss or damage, thereby disentitling his
claim compensation, can forfeit compensation, can forfeit the security deposit
of the another on the ground of non-performance of the contract.
28.
To answer this question, it would be apposite to refer to Sections
73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. For brevity, Section 74 may be
reproduced first, which reads as under.
74 Compensation for breach of contract where penalty
stipulated for:- [When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named
in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if
the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party
complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or
loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party
who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding
the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated
for.”
29.
On careful reading of Section 74, it becomes aptly clear that the
party complaining of breach of contract is not required to prove the extent of
real or actual or factual loss or damage, but clearly suggests grant of
reasonable compensation, however, subject to the condition that it shall not
exceed the amount specifically mentioned, i.e. stipulated as penalty in the
contract. In other words, proof of actual loss or damage suffered in fact is
dispensed within the expression of Section 74. In this regard reference may be
made to the decision in Fateh Chand Vrs. Balkishan Dass [AIR 1963 SC
1405]; Kailash Nath Associates Vrs. Delhi Development Authority [(2015) 4
SCC 136], in which the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held categorically that, in
a case coming under the purview of Section 74 of the Contract Act, a party
claiming compensation under this Section does not necessarily need to prove
that actual loss or damage has been caused. To say it otherwise, what is
necessary to prove that there is apparent breach of contract which is emanated
from plain and simple reading of the expressed terms of the contract, and in
that case, the party complaining of breach of contract would be entitled to
penalty to the extent of the amount it is indicated/mentioned in the clause of
the contract itself, but not beyond that.
30.
In the instant case, it is not the case of the appellants/Corporation
that they have invoked Section 74 and claimed reasonable compensation or
penalty to the extent it is stipulated in any of the clauses of the contract.
31.
Now, Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act reads thus:“73.Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of
contract-When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by
such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the
contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby,
which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach,
or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to
result from the breach of it.
Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and
indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach.”
32.
On conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, in our opinion,
the expression “loss or damage” would necessarily mean and indicate that the
party complaining of breach must have suffered some visible loss or damage
which apart from being faced with the mere act of breach of contract. This is
because every breach of every contract need not necessarily result in actual
loss or damage. According to us, compensation payable under Sections 73,74
as also under Section 75 is only for loss or damage caused by the breach and
not of the mere act of breach. To summarize, if in case the breach has not
resulted in or caused any loss or damage to a party, he cannot claim
compensation.
33.
In the context of the case, we may gainfully refer the decision of
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rampur Distillery and
Chemical Co. Ltd., [(1973) 1 SCC 649: AIR 1973 SC 1098], where it was
held that a party to a contract taking security deposit from the other party to
ensure due performance of the contract, is not entitled to forfeit the deposit on
ground of default when no loss is caused to him in consequence of such
default.
34.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the instant case,
we may easily come to a conclusion that since the appellants/Corporation have
failed to meet the requirements of Sections 73, 74 as also Section 75 of the
Indian Contract Act in substantiating any loss or damage caused to them as a
consequence of any default on the part of the contractor/respondent to justify
their claims for compensation, they are not entitled to forfeit the security
deposit on the ground of breach of contractual obligations by the
contractor/respondent.
35.
Here, we may profitably refer to a decision of a Division Bench
of our own High Court in a case between the same parties [Smt. Namita Paul
Vrs. Food Corporation of India & Ors.], Case No. RFA 14 of 2006 had
observed thus:
“20. Since, the defendants have failed to prove their actual
cost and risk, suffered by them, in our considered view they cannot be
permitted to forfeit the security deposit as it is well settled that even under
Section 73 of the Contract Act only the actual damage suffered by the
person by the act of the other person in the contract can be realised as the
damage. In this case, since the defendants have utterly failed to plead the
account of loss and risk and prove that “loss and risk”, they cannot be
permitted to realise any damage from the plaintiff. Hence, the decision as
communicated by the letter dated 12.07.2010 is bad in law particularly
that part which reads as follows :
“3. Whereas, vide this Office letter of even number dated
01/07/10, tender agreement Clause X(c) was invoked upon you
to get the work done at your risk and cost without terminating
the contract. But that also failed to evoke any response from
your side.
(4) Whereas, FCI is of the opinion that you have totally failed
to carry out the contract work as per agreement and there is no
chance of any improvement and in the process the Corporation
cannot afford to sustain further loss and allow the public
distribution system to suffer for your total failure to carry out
the work.
(5) Therefore, the above captioned contract awarded to you
vide our appointment letter of even number dated 17/11/2008 is
hereby terminated with immediate effect as per Clause X(a) &
X(b) of the Contract agreement (MTSF) entered between your
and the Food Corporation of India and the fresh tender is
being invited to get the work done for the unexpired/remaining
period of contract at your risk and cost.”
21. In the said letter dated 12.07.2010 [Exbt.11], it has been stated that
the said decision is without prejudice to the right of the FCI to take action
against the plaintiff as per clauses and sub-clauses of the tender
agreement in order to make good of additional charges, expenses, cost or
losses that the corporation may suffer or incur to get the work done at the
plaintiff‟s risk and cost. There is no dispute that the counter claim for
realising losses as was instituted by the defendants has been dismissed
and no appeal has been preferred therefrom. In this conspectus of fact,
the defendants cannot forfeit any part of the security deposit without
showing that they suffered loss for “sudden stoppage of the
transportation” by the plaintiff. Hence, the judgment dated 11.05.2016
stands interfered with. It is stated that the plaintiff is entitled to the refund
of the security deposit as maintained by the defendants to the extent of
Rs.54,00,000/-. However, in the context of the case, we are not inclined to
grant any interest. The refund of the security deposit to the extent as
noted above shall be made within a period of two months from the date of
the decree. In the event of failure, the plaintiff will be at liberty to execute
the decree.”
36.
Here, in the instant case, it has been transpired that the contract
was terminated followed by forfeiture of security deposit. Applying the law as
analyzed and interpreted the provisions embodied in Sections 73, 74 and 75 of
the Indian Contract Act vis-à-vis the principles laid down in case of Smt.
Namita Paul (supra), we are of the firm opinion, that unless and until actual
loss incurred by the appellants/Corporation is established, forfeiture of
security deposit must be held to be illegal and arbitrary, and in that situation,
the entire security deposit has to be refunded to the contactor.
37.
hold
Having taken into consideration the aforesaid observations, we
that
the
learned
trial
Court
had
rightly
decided
that
the
plaintiff/respondent is entitled to get refund of the security deposits to the tune
of Rs.18,48,843/- (Rupee Eighteen lakhs forty eight thousand eight hundred
forty three) only. As such, on this issue also no interference is called for.
38.
Next,
if
we
look
upon
the
contentions
of
the
contractor/respondent where she had demanded her loss of profit to the tune of
Rs.15,22,686/-, we find that the plaintiff/respondent had claimed that she had
executed the work of the appellants/Corporation for a period of 12 months and
thereby she had realized her payment towards that period of work done by her.
But, her plea was that if she could have performed her work for the remaining
period of 12 months, she could have earned profit at least for such amount
i.e.Rs.15,22,686/-.
Learned
trial
Court
had
allowed
the
claim of
contractor/respondent awarding Rs.15,22,686/- against loss of profit. In that
view of the findings, we feel it necessary to reiterate again that the
contractor/respondent has failed to justify her claim that as to how she
incurred loss of profit to the extent of Rs.15,22,686/-. More so, since all the
bills
raised
by
the
contractor/respondent
had
been
paid
by
the
appellants/Corporation for the period she carried out the work without any
deduction, according to us, there was no visible loss or damage suffered by the
contractor/respondent. Accordingly, on the issue of loss of profit, the
contractor/respondent is not entitled to get any compensation towards her loss
of profit and as a corollary, the direction given in the judgment and decree
passed by learned Commercial Court awarding damages to the tune of
Rs.15,22,686/- in favour of the contractor/respondent is liable to be set aside
and quashed.
39.
For the reasons stated and discussed in the foregoing paragraphs,
we find no infirmity in the judgment and decree dated 06.07.2022, passed by
learned Commercial Court in Commercial Suit No.08 of 2017 and
Commercial Suit No. 04 of 2016 to the extent of direction passed upon the
appellants/Corporation to release the security deposit in favour of the
contractor/respondent, which is hereby affirmed and upheld. However, we are
not in agreement with the learned Commercial Court in awarding damages as
held to be suffered by the contractor/respondent to the tune of Rs.15,22,686/(Rupees fifteen lakhs twenty two thousand six hundred eighty six) and thus,
this part of the judgment passed by learned Commercial Court is set aside and
quashed.
40.
As a sequel, the Appeal No.RFA 26 of 2022 filed by the
FCI/appellants against the judgment passed in connection with Commercial
Suit No.4 of 2016 whereby and whereunder they raised claim for awarding
damages in favour of them, stands dismissed and the Appeal No.25 of 2022
filed by the same appellants/Corporation against the judgment passed in
connection with Commercial Suit No.08 of 2017 is allowed in part to the
extent that the contractor/respondent is held entitled to get the refund of
security deposit along with interest as indicated in the judgment and decree
passed by learned Commercial Court in C.S. 08 of 2017. The amount payable
to the contractor/respondent as a consequence of this judgment be remitted in
favour of her within 45 (forty five) days from the date of receipt of the copy of
this judgment.
41.
All pending Interlocutory Applications are disposed of in the
light of this judgment and order.
(ARINDAM LODH), J
(APARESH KUMAR SINGH),CJ
signed by SANJAY GHOSH
SANJAY GHOSH Digitally
Date: 2023.11.16 16:59:26 +05'30'
sanjay
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