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2025:KER:26534
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.NAGARESH
FRIDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 7TH CHAITHRA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 9196 OF 2023
PETITIONER:
FEDERAL BANK OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,
CENTRAL OFFICE, FBOA ROAD, ALUVA -683101
REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL SECRETARY SHIMITH P.R
BY ADVS.
P.RAMAKRISHNAN
PREETHI RAMAKRISHNAN (P-212)
C.ANIL KUMAR
ASHA K.SHENOY
PRATAP ABRAHAM VARGHESE
GOKUL KRISHNA
RESPONDENTS:
THE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER (CENTRAL),
KENDRIYA SHRAM BHAVAN, OLIMUGAL,
KAKKANAD, KOCHI, PIN - 682030
THE FEDERAL BANK LTD,
REGISTERED OFFICE, ALUVA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT,
KOCHI - 683101,
REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE PRESIDENT (HR).
BY ADVS.
P.R.AJITH KUMAR, CGC
SRI.BENNY P.THOMAS, SC, BPCL
D.PREM KAMATH
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TOM THOMAS (KAKKUZHIYIL)
ABEL TOM BENNY
K.S.MUHAMMED SHEFIN
BHARATH NAIR
PRAISY THOMAS
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 15.11.2024, THE COURT ON 28.03.2025 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
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CR
N. NAGARESH, J.
`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
W.P.(C) No.9196 of 2023
`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
Dated this the 28th day of March, 2025
JUDGMENT
~~~~~~~~~
The petitioner, a Trade Union representing
the officers of the Federal Bank, is before this Court seeking to
declare that the conciliation officer has no jurisdiction under
Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in respect of
disputes which arise between the officers and the 2 nd
respondent-Bank. The petitioner also seeks to declare that no
industrial dispute exists or is pending before the 1 st
respondent-Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) based
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on the charter of demands submitted by the petitioner to the
2nd respondent-Bank, empowering him to issue notice of
conciliation.
2.
The petitioner states that salary of the officers
of the Bank is determined through negotiated settlements
entered
into
between
the
Indian
Banks
Association
representing the employers and the All India Bank Officers
Confederation to which the petitioner-Association is affiliated.
Other terms and conditions of service of officers of the Bank
are governed by the Federal Bank Limited (Officers Service)
Rules. The settlements arrived at between the IBA and the
Confederation are not settlements under the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act.
3.
According to the petitioner, the right of the
officers to go on strike to compel the 2nd respondent to pursue
their demands is recognised by the service rules applicable to
the Bank officers.
However, the petitioner received Ext.P2
letter dated 24.01.2023 from the 1 st respondent-Conciliation
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Officer proposing to hold joint discussion in respect of an
alleged industrial dispute raised by the petitioner. The joint
discussion was scheduled to be held on 27.01.2023.
4.
It was alleged that an industrial dispute was
raised by the 2nd respondent-Bank in the Samadhan Portal of
Government of India which is registered as ID No.3002450
dated 23.01.2023. The petitioner thereupon submitted a reply
stating that the Association represents the officers category of
employees who are not workmen as defined under Section
2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and hence the 1 st
respondent does not have jurisdiction to initiate conciliation
proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
5.
The petitioner informed the 1st respondent
that the United Forum of Bank Unions has proposed a strike
on 30.01.2023 and 31.01.2023.
The 2 nd respondent
approached this Court filing W.P.(C) No.2979/2023 seeking to
restrain the petitioner from resorting to strike on 30.01.2023
and 31.01.2023. This Court passed Ext.P4 interim order dated
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27.01.2023 as prayed for by the 2 nd respondent. The petitioner
states that the 2nd respondent did not show any interest in
discussing and finding solutions to the issues raised by the
petitioner-Association.
Now, the 1st respondent has issued
Ext.P7 notice dated 08.06.2023 requiring the petitioner to
attend a conciliation meeting proposed to be held on
26.06.2023.
6.
The petitioner states that all the members of
the petitioner-Association fall under the non-workmen category
and do not answer the definition of “workman” as defined
under the Industrial Disputes Act. The provisions of the Act
are not applicable to the employees in the non-workmen
category. The members of the petitioner-Association are not
workmen.
The 1st respondent has no jurisdiction to initiate
conciliation proceedings. The petitioner therefore seeks to set
aside Exts.P2 and P7 notices.
7.
The
1st
respondent-Regional
Labour
Commissioner (Central) filed counter affidavit.
The 1 st
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respondent submitted that when the 2 nd respondent filed a
complaint through “Samadhan” Portal, the 1st respondent
issued notice for conciliation.
The only motive of the 1 st
respondent in issuing notice was to maintain peace in Public
Utility Service like Federal Bank. The 1 st respondent has acted
well within the jurisdiction and parameters of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947.
8.
The 2nd respondent-Bank resisted the writ
petition filing counter affidavit. The 2nd respondent stated that
on
an
earlier
occasion,
the
petitioner
conducted
lightning/illegal strike on 31.05.2017 without any notice. The
2nd respondent filed W.P.(C) No.19137/2017. In the said writ
petition, the petitioner-Association undertook that in the event
of their calling for strike, the same will be done only in strict
compliance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. Taking note of the said submission, the writ petition was
closed as per Ext.R2(b).
This Court, in Ext.R2(b), made it
clear that in the event of the 2 nd respondent calling for a fresh
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strike, it will be done only in strict compliance of the provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act.
The 2nd
9.
respondent
submitted
that
the
contention of the petitioner that Section 22 of the Industrial
Disputes Act will not apply to the petitioner-Association is not
legally correct.
Section 22 explicitly prohibits any person
employed in a Public Utility Service from proceeding on strike
without fulfilling the requirement outlined in Clause (a) to (d) of
sub-section (1) of Section 22. The 2nd respondent-Bank is a
public utility service.
The petitioner used to give notice of
strike under Section 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
to the 1st respondent-Regional Labour Commissioner or other
Conciliation Officers, as evidenced by Exts.R2(f) and R2(g).
The petitioner has acceded to the jurisdiction of the 1 st
respondent.
The petitioner is bound by inter-parte orders
passed by this Court. The writ petition is therefore without any
merit and therefore it is liable to be dismissed.
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10.
Sri.
P.
Chitambaram,
Senior
Counsel,
assisted by the counsel for the petitioner, submitted that in the
judgment in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v.
Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate [1958 (1) LLJ 500
SC], the Apex Court has held that the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 is primarily meant for regulating the relations of
employers and workmen – past, present and future. It draws a
distinction between “workmen” as such and the managerial or
supervisory staff and confers benefits on the workmen only.
The Apex Court, after referring to the words “any person”
occurring in Section 2(k) held that having regard to the scheme
and objects of the Act and its other provisions, the expression
“any person” in Section 2(k) of the Act must be read subject to
such limitations and qualifications as arise from the context.
11.
The Senior Counsel submitted that a dispute
which can be conciliated under the Industrial Disputes Act
must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute as
indicated in Section 2(k) so as to be capable of settlement or
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adjudication.
The Senior Counsel pointed out that the
contention that “any person” employed in Section 2(k) and
Section 18 covers non-workmen, was not accepted by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate
(supra). In Mukand Limited v. Mukand Staff and Officers'
Association [2004 (2) KLT 1], the Hon’ble Apex Court has
held that an Industrial Tribunal cannot adjudicate issues of
salaries of employees, who are not workmen under the Act,
1947.
12.
Apprehension of industrial disputes is a pre-
condition to the exercise of power by a Conciliation Officer.
Rule 71(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules makes it
clear that a notice must be given by workmen. A conciliation
must lead to a settlement under Section 12(3) or under Section
18(1). Else the Conciliation Officer must report a failure under
Section 12(4), in which case the dispute may be referred for
adjudication. In the case of non-workmen, there cannot be a
settlement or a reference to adjudication under the Act, 1947.
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Hence, conciliation proceeding will be futile and a Conciliation
Officer under the Industrial Disputes Act would have no
jurisdiction to initiate a futile proceeding in respect of nonworkmen.
13.
Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent-
Bank submitted that banking industry is a Public Utility Service
as defined under Section 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Taking into account the public interest, the State intended to
have hassle fee operations in Public Utility Services without
any kind of disruptions caused by strikes or lock-outs or any
industrial unrest. A strike conducted by the petitioner without
adhering to the mandatory statutory provisions under Section
22(1) can severely impact the public and the customers of the
Bank.
Therefore, the 1st respondent seized the matter in
conciliation.
14.
The counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted
that the Conciliation Officer is well within his jurisdiction under
Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act to issue notice of
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conciliation on the issue of strike. Section 22(1) mandates that
no person employed in a Public Utility Service shall go on
strike in violation of the statutory provisions. The word used in
Section 22(1) is “no person” and obviously the legislature
intended that officers or workmen should not go on strike in a
Public Utility Service adversely impacting the public.
The
definition of “strike” under Section 2(q) also uses the phrase
“person”. This is to be contrasted with Section 23 relating to
general prohibition of strikes and lock-outs in other industrial
establishments
where
the
phrase
“workman”
is
used.
Therefore, the intention of the legislature is that no person
including officers shall go on strike in a Public Utility Service.
15.
The judgment in
Workmen of Dimakuchi
Tea Estate (supra) is not applicable to the instant case, urged
the counsel for the 2nd respondent. The issue agitated in the
said case was whether Assistant Medical Officers falls within
the definition of “workman” under Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
In the dissenting portion of the judgment in
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Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate (supra), it was held that
no person employed in a Public Utility Service shall go on
strike except on certain conditions and there is nothing in the
Act to show that the word “person” in Section 22(1) means
only a workman.
16.
The counsel for the 2nd respondent stated that
even going by the Act, the officers / managerial employees are
not excluded. They are excluded only from the definition of
“workman”. The Industrial Disputes Act nowhere states that
the statute is not applicable to managerial employees.
17.
It is argued that even under Section 62(1) of
the proposed Industrial Relations Code, it has been provided
that no person employed in an industrial establishment shall
go on strike in breach of contract. It reflects the legislature's
intention in using the word “person”.
18.
The 2nd respondent submitted that right to
strike is not a fundamental right. The Hon’ble Apex Court has
held that there is no fundamental, statutory or equitable/moral
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right exists with the Government employees to go on strike. It
has been so held in T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of
Tamil Nadu and others [AIR 2003 SC 3032]. In the judgment
in All India Bank Employees Association v. National
Industrial Tribunal and others [1961 (2) LLJ 385 SC], the
Hon’ble Apex Court has held that even very liberal
interpretation of Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution cannot lead
to the conclusion that Trade Unions have a guaranteed right to
strike, either as part of collective bargaining or otherwise. As
regards Clause 5.14.1 of the Service Rules of the Bank, the
counsel submitted that the Service Rules cannot recognise
strike which is illegal under the law of the land.
19.
The counsel for the 2nd respondent pointed
out that the petitioner has not challenged validity of Section
22(1) of the Act, thereby accepting that the Section is
constitutional and valid.
Section 22 clearly begins with the
words “no person shall go on strike”. It is therefore very clear
that the legislature never wanted any person to go on strike in
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a Public Utility Service.
20.
I have heard the learned Senior Counsel
assisted by the counsel for the petitioner, the learned Central
Government Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent and the
learned Standing Counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent.
21.
The petitioner which is an Association of
officers of the 2nd respondent-Federal Bank Limited is
challenging Exts.P2 and P7 notices issued by the 1 st
respondent-Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) calling
the petitioner to participate in conciliation proceedings
contemplated under the Industrial Disputes Act. Ext.P2 notice
refers to ID No.300024050 dated 23.01.2023 registered by the
Management in Samadhan Portal of Government of India and
states that unless the petitioner attends the joint discussion
either in person or through a duly authorised representative,
the dispute shall be proceeded with ex-parte. Ext.P2 notice
also invites the attention of the petitioner to the obligations
imposed under Section 22(1), Section 22(2) and Section 33 of
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the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The 1 st respondent has
therefore invoked his powers under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. The question is whether the 1 st respondent can exercise
its powers in relation to any dispute relating to officers of the
Bank, who are not workmen.
22.
Section 2(k) of the Act, 1947 defines the term
“industrial dispute” to mean any dispute or difference between
employers and employers, or between employers and
workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is
connected with the employment or non-employment or terms
of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person.
Section 2(s) defines the term “workman”. “Workman” means
any person “including an apprentice employed in any industry
to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational,
clerical or supervisory work for higher or reward, whether the
terms of employment be express or implied”.
23.
There is no dispute over the fact that the
members of the petitioner-Association are officers of the Bank
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and would not fall within the definition of either “employer” or
“workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act.
24.
Section 12 lays down duties of Conciliation
Officers. Section 12(1) states that where any industrial dispute
exists or is apprehended, the Conciliation Officer may, or
where the dispute relates to a Public Utility Service and a
notice under Section 22 has been given, shall, hold conciliation
proceedings in the prescribed manner.
Sub-section (3) of
Section 12 states that if a settlement of the dispute or of any of
the matters in disputes is arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceedings, the Conciliation Officer shall send a report
thereof to the appropriate Government together with a
Memorandum of Settlement signed by the parties to the
dispute. If no such settlement is arrived at, the Conciliation
Officer shall close the investigation and send to the
appropriate Government a full report setting forth steps taken
by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to
the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof,
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together with a full statement of such facts and circumstances,
and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion, settlement
could not be arrived at.
25.
To discharge the duties or invoke the powers
of conciliation by a Conciliation Officer, there must therefore be
an industrial dispute existing or apprehended. As per Section
2(k), 'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference
between employers and employers, or between employers and
workmen, or between workmen and workmen. A dispute, if
any, existing in the case of the petitioner herein is not between
employer and employer, employer and workmen or workmen
and workmen, because the petitioner is an Association of
Officers and they are neither employer nor raising any issues
of workmen.
26.
Section 22 of Chapter V of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 relating to strikes and lock-outs reads as
follows:
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22. Prohibition of strikes and lock-outs (1)
No person employed in a public utility
service shall go on strike in breach of contract(a)
without giving to the employer
notice of strike, as hereinafter provided, within six
weeks before striking; or
(b)
such notice; or
within fourteen days of giving
(c)
before the expiry of the date of
strike specified in any such notice as aforesaid; or
(d)
during the pendency of any
conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer
and seven days after the conclusion of such
proceedings.
(2)
No employer carrying on any public utility
service shall lock-out any of his workmen(a)
without giving them notice of lockout as hereinafter provided, within six weeks before
locking-out; or
(b)
such notice; or
within fourteen days of giving
(c)
before the expiry of the date of
lock-out specified in any such notice as aforesaid; or
(d)
during the pendency of any
conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer
and seven days after the conclusion of such
proceedings.
(3)
The notice of lock-out or strike under this
section shall not be necessary where there is already
in existence a strike or, as the case may be, lock-out
in the public utility service, but the employer shall
send intimation of such lock-out or strike on the day
on which it is declared, to such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government either
generally or for a particular area or for a particular
class of public utility services.
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(4)
The notice of strike referred to in subsection (1) shall be given by such number of persons
to such person or persons and in such manner as
may be prescribed.
(5)
The notice of lock-out referred to in subsection (2) shall be given in such manner as may be
prescribed.
(6)
If on any day an employer receives from
any person employed by him any such notices as are
referred to in sub-section (1) or gives to any persons
employed by him any such notices as are referred to
in sub-section (2), he shall within five days thereof
report to the appropriate Government or to such
authority as that Government may prescribe, the
number of such notices received or given on that day.
Section 22(1)(d) contemplates conciliation proceedings by a
Conciliation Officer. The Section begins with the words “No
person”. The contention of the 2 nd respondent is that since the
word “workmen” is not used and the word used is “No person”,
a Conciliation Officer gets right to initiate conciliation
proceedings in order to avert strikes and lock-outs in Public
Utility Services.
27.
Sub-section (2) of Section 22 provides that no
employer carrying on any public utility service shall lock-out
any of his workmen without giving them notice of lock-out. As
a notice is envisaged to be issued only to “workmen”, it has to
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be concluded that the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs as
contemplated in Chapter V of the Industrial Disputes Act
relates only to strikes and lock-outs by the workmen or
employers. Section 23 of Chapter V of the Industrial Disputes
Act also provides for general prohibition of strikes and lockouts only in so far as it relates to workmen.
28.
It will be profitable to look at the Industrial
Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 to understand the scope of
Section 22 of the Act.
Rule 9 of the Industrial Disputes
(Central) Rules, 1957 lays down the procedure for conciliation
proceedings in Public Utility Services. Rule 9 reads as follows:
9. Conciliation proceedings in public utility
service—
(1)
The Conciliation Officer, on receipt of a
notice of a strike or lock-out given under rule 71 or
rule 72, shall forthwith arrange to interview both
the employer and the workmen concerned with
the dispute at such places and at such times as
he may deem fit and shall endeavour to bring
about a settlement of the dispute in question.
(2)
Where the Conciliation Officer receives
no notice of a strike or lock-out under rule 71 or
rule 72 but he considers it necessary to intervene
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in the dispute he may give formal intimation in
writing to the parties concerned declaring his
intention to commence conciliation proceedings
with effect from such date as he may be inserted
therein.
It is evident from Rule 9(1) that the conciliation proceedings
contemplated under the Rules are for conciliation of disputes
between employer and workmen.
Rule 71 of the Central
Rules, 1957 also envisages a notice of strike to be given by
the workmen in Public Utility Services. The Form L prescribed
under the Rules also contemplates only notice of strike to be
given by Union/Workmen in Public Utility Service.
29.
In Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate
(supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court considered the impact of the
words “any person” appearing in the Industrial Disputes Act
and held that the words should be considered in the context in
which the words are used. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that
the position with regard to Section 33A in which the word
“employee” has to be read as meaning a workman.
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30.
In Mukand Limited (supra), the question
raised was that the words “any person” in Section 2(k) and
Section 18 of the Act whether includes a non-workman who
was a workman but retired, resigned or otherwise left the
services of the employer during the pendency of the dispute
under reference. The Apex Court held that disputes under the
Act can be raised only by the workmen with the employer. The
workmen, however, can espouse the cause of non-workmen if
their community of interest between the workmen and the nonworkmen.
If the non-workmen are given the status and
protection available to the workmen, it would mean that the
entire machinery and procedure of the Act would apply to the
non-workmen with regard to their employment / nonemployment, the terms of employment, the conditions of
labour, etc. which would cast on the employer the onerous
burden of compliance with the provisions of the Act in respect
of the non-workmen. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that such a
situation is not envisaged by the Act which is solely designed
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to protect the interests of the workmen as defined under
Section 2(s) of the Act.
31.
In the judgment in Narendra Kumar Sen and
others v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate)
Tribunal and others [AIR 1953 Bombay 325], the Hon'ble Mr.
Justice Chagla, CJ (as he then was) held that a dispute
contemplated by Section 2(k) is a controversy in which the
workman is directly and substantially interested. It must also
be a grievance felt by the workman which the employer is in a
position to remedy. Both these conditions must be present. It
is primarily in their own terms of employment and their own
conditions of labour that the workmen are interested and it is
only with regard to these that they are entitled to agitate by
raising an industrial dispute. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court
held that the words “any person” cannot be construed
wrenched from its own contexts or divorced from its own
contexts. It must be read in the light of the whole definition of
“industrial dispute” given in Section 2(k).
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32.
It may be noted that even if conciliation
proceedings are initiated when a strike is contemplated in a
Public Utility Service, unless the strike is by workmen, a
Conciliation Officer is not empowered to record a settlement.
The Conciliation Officer is not empowered to send a failure
report unless the dispute is between employer and employer,
employer and workmen or workmen and workmen. A dispute
involving the petitioner who is an Association of Officers, will
not fall under any of the aforesaid categories.
33.
As rightly pointed out by the Senior Counsel
representing the petitioner, if the Conciliation Officer cannot
record a settlement of dispute under Section 12(3) and if he
cannot send a failure report under Section 12(4), since the
party involved is an officers association, then there is no
meaning in holding conciliation proceedings.
34.
Section 4 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
provides for appointment of Conciliation Officers by the
appropriate Government.
Section 4 also would show that
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appointment
of
Conciliation
Officers
by
appropriate
Government is for the purpose of promoting settlement of
“industrial disputes”. Therefore, a Conciliation Officer under
Act, 1947 can act only when an industrial dispute as defined
under Section 2(k), is subsisting or apprehended.
35.
The contention of the 2nd respondent that the
petitioner was earlier party to writ petitions in respect of similar
matters and has conceded that they will not resort to strive
without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes
Act cannot be accepted, as the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in
the judgment in Workmen of M/s. Hindustan Lever Limited
and others v. Management of M/s. Hindustan Lever
Limited [(1984) 1 SCC 728] that there is no estoppel against a
statute even in industrial jurisprudence even when there are
binding agreements between the parties.
36.
Since the dispute between the petitioner-
Association and the 2nd respondent-Bank does not constitute
an industrial dispute as defined under Section 2(k) of the
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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Ext.P2 and P7 notices are
ultravires the powers of the 1 st respondent. Exts.P2 and P7
notices are therefore quashed.
It is declared that the 1 st
respondent has no jurisdiction under Section 22 to conciliate
over the disputes which arise between the petitioner and the
2nd respondent.
The writ petition is allowed as above.
Sd/N. NAGARESH, JUDGE
aks/22.03.2025
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) 9196/2023
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS
Exhibit P-1
TRUE COPY OF THE BYE-LAWS
PETITIONER ASSOCIATION
OF
THE
Exhibit P-2
TRUE COPY OF NOTICE DATED 24.01.2023
RECEIVED BY THE PETITIONER FROM THE 1ST
RESPONDENT
Exhibit P-3
TRUE COPY OF REPLY DATED 25/01/2023
SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE
1ST RESPONDENT
Exhibit P-4
TRUE COPY OF INTERIM ORDER DATED
27.01.2023 IN WP (C ) NO. 2979/2023
Exhibit P-5
TRUE COPY OF COUNTER AFFIDAVIT DATED
16/2/2013 FILED BY THE PETITIONER IN WP
(C) NO. 2979/2023
Exhibit P-6
TRUE COPY OF NOTICE DATED 29.05.2023
ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER WITH ANNEXURE
Exhibit P-7
TRUE COPY OF NOTICE OF
DATED 08.06.2023 ISSUED
RESPONDENT
CONCILIATION
BY THE 1ST
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT R2(a)
TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION DATED
05.06.2023 ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF
LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT
EXHIBIT R2(b)
TRUE
COPY
OF
THE
JUDGMENT
DATED
13/07/2017 IN WP(C) 19137 OF 2017 OF
THIS HONOURABLE COURT
EXHIBIT R2(c)
TRUE COPY OF THE STRIKE NOTICE DATED
25.07.2022 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER.
2025:KER:26534
W.P.(C) No.9196/2023
: 29 :
EXHIBIT R2(d)
TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED
08.08.2022 in W.P.(C) No. 25547/2022 OF
THIS HONOURABLE COURT
EXHIBIT R2(e)
TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED
11.08.2022 I.A. NO. 1 OF 2022 IN W.P.
(C) NO. 25547/2022 OF THIS HONOURABLE
COURT.
EXHIBIT R2(f)
TRUE COPY OF THE STRIKE NOTICE DATED
13.01.2017 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT R2(g)
TRUE COPY OF THE STRIKE NOTICE DATED
15.12.2017 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER
EXHIBIT R1(a)
True
copy
of
the
Letter
No.FBOA/F20/16/2015-17 Issued by the
petitioner to the second respondent
dated 14.06.2016 marking a copy to the
1ST Respondent
EXHIBIT R1(b)
True copy of the proceedings
meeting held on 05.07.2016
of
the
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