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Page No.# 1/17
GAHC010265512019
2026:GAU-AS:6833
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/8046/2019
FAZAL HAQUE @ FAZAR ALI
S/O- LT. GATU MIA @ GHATU SEIKH @ GHUTU SEIKH, RESIDENT OF
VILLAGE PATHLIKUCHI, MOUZA- JANIA, P.S.- BARPETA, DIST- BARPETA,
ASSAM.
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA AND 6 ORS.
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY
OF HOME AFFAIRS, NEW DELHI-1.
2:THE ELECTION COMMISSION
INDIA
REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER
INDIA
NEW DELHI-01.
3:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM
HOME DEPARTMENT
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-781006.
4:THE STATE CO-ORDINATOR
NRC
ASSAM
BHANGAGARH
GUWAHATI-5. PIN- 781005.
5:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BARPETA
Page No.# 2/17
P.O. AND DIST.- BARPETA
ASSAM
PIN6:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (B)
BARPETA
P.O. AND DIST.- BARPETA
ASSAM
PIN- 783380.
7:THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE
BARPETA POLICE STATION
DIST- BARPETA
ASSAM. PIN- 783384
Advocate for the Petitioner
: MR. J AHMED, MS A HUSSAIN,MR. Z RAHMAN
Advocate for the Respondent : ASSTT.S.G.I., SC, F.T,SC, NRC,SC, ECI
BEFORE
Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
Hon’ble MRs. JUSTICE SHAMIMA JAHAN
Advocate for the petitioner
: Shri J. Ahmed, Advocate.
Advocates for the respondents : Shri G. Sarma, SC, Home Deptt.& NRC,
Ms. R.B. Bora, GA, Assam,
Shri N. Kalita, Advocate (on behalf of A.I.
Ali, SC, ECI.)
Shri B. Deka, C.G.C.
Date on which judgment is reserved
: 06.05.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
: 18.05.2026.
Whether the pronouncement is of the
operative part of the judgment?
: NA
Whether the full judgment has been
pronounced?
: Yes
Page No.# 3/17
Judgment & Order
(S.K. Medhi, J.)
The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked
by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting
to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 12.09.2019
passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 1 st, Barpeta, Assam in F.T. Case
No.82/2018. By the impugned judgment, the petitioner, who was the proceedee
before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post
25.03.1971.
2.
The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows:
(i)
A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Barpeta
District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T. Case
No.No.82/2018.
(ii)
As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that
the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written
statement on 20.10.2018 along with certain documents and adduced
evidence through 3 DWs.
(iii)
The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances
and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the
Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as
opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon him
and accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to
be a foreign national post 25.03.1971.
3.
We have heard Shri J. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have
also heard Shri G. Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department& NRC;
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Ms. R.B. Bora, learned GA, Assam, Shri N. Kalita, learned counsel appearing on
instructions of A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of India
and Shri B. Deka, learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the records
which were requisitioned vide an order dated 16.03.2020.
4.
Shri Ahmed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
petitioner could prove his case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that
there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the
said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this
regard, he has referred to the following documentary evidence.
(i) Ext-A is the certified copy of voter list of 1966,
(ii) Ext-B is the certified copy of voter list of 1970,
(iii) Ext-C is the certified copy of voter list of 1993,
(iv) Ext-D is the voter list of 1997,
(v) Ext-E is the Jamabandi Copy,
(vi) Ext-F is the Gaonburah Certificate.
5.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the notice
issued by the Tribunal, the name was mentioned as Fazal Haque son of Gatu
Mia and there was also a mention of the voters list of 1966 in the ERO report
wherein the name has been mentioned as Fayzal Haque. It is submitted that
there was discrepancy with regard to the name in the notice itself and actually,
the name of the petitioner is Fazar Ali. It is submitted that the names of his
parents appear in the voters lists of 1966 and 1970 as Ghatu Seikh and
Sajemon Nessa. There is, however, a slight change in the name of the father in
the voters list of 1970 as Ghutu Seikh. The voters list of 1993 has been relied
Page No.# 5/17
upon wherein the father’s name is written as Gatu Miya and mother’s name as
Sajemon Nessa along with that of the petitioner and some others. The name of
the petitioner has, however, been written as Fazar Ali. The next voters list is of
the year 1997 wherein the name of the petitioner is missing. It is submitted that
in 1997, the petitioner was marked ‘D’ in the voters list.
6.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a Jamabandi of 1958-
65 in which, it appears that the name of Fazal Haque has been inserted. He has
also submitted that a certificate was issued by the Gaonburah which however
could not be annexed to the writ petition.
7.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the case was
established by the petitioner through 3 nos. of witnesses, namely, the petitioner
as DW1, one projected brother Mainul Hoque as DW2 and the Gaonburah as
DW3.
8.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that an
application was made for correcting the evidence in chief of DW2 which was
rejected by the Tribunal and the said rejection is also criticized.
9.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the evidence
of the witnesses, especially of the projected brother was not rebutted and
therefore, the same have to be considered. In this connection, reliance has
been made upon the case of Sujab Ali (Md.) Vs. Union of India & Ors. ,
reported in 2021 (4) GLT 664 wherein, it has been laid down that a definite
finding is to be given upon evidence rendered by family members.
10. The learned counsel accordingly submits that in view of the availability of
the aforesaid materials, the impugned opinion could not have been rendered
Page No.# 6/17
against the petitioner and therefore, the same requires interference.
11.
Per contra, Shri Sarma, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Department
has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. He submits
that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals)
Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner
or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the
proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely
upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act,
1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However,
in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is
also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would
be given only if necessary. He further submits that the evidence of a proceedee
has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only
thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in.
12.
The learning Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written
statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation
of the case of the proceeding and the written statement in the instant case is
vague and the relevant facts have not been stated. There is no date or year of
the birth of the petitioner and there are inconsistencies with the members of the
family. In this connection, he has relied upon the following observations made
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of
India,reported in(2005) 5 SCC 665:
“17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the
person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to
establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i)
his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of
Page No.# 7/17
birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of birth of his grand parents may
also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1)(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these
facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person
concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence
on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead
evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of
citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be
difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid
points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge
of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”
13.
He has submitted that there is not a single voters list of the petitioner and
the name, Fazar Ali appearing in the voters list of 1993 cannot be the name of
the petitioner which is Fazal Haque. Further, the projected brother as DW2 had
deposed in his cross-examination that in 1993, the petitioner was marked ‘D’
and the petitioner as DW1 had stated on oath that he had not voted even once.
He has further submitted that no link could be established with the projected
father and the certificate issued by the Gaonburah, by no means, could be
deemed as a proof of citizenship, more so in absence of any contemporaneous
records. He has submitted that DW3 in clear terms had stated that he did not
bring the Register Book to the Court. He has also submitted that use of National
Emblem on such certificate is unauthorized. In this regard, he has relied upon
the case of Khudeja Khatoon Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported 2018 (3) GLT
347 and the following observations have been pressed into service:
“13. Ext. B is a certificate dated 13.2.2016 issued by the Gaonburah certifying
that Khudeja Khatoon was the wife of A. Matalib. This certificate also has got
the State Emblem of India embossed on it and that too not as per the statutory
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format. For the reasons mentioned above, this certificate is also liable to be
discarded. However, notwithstanding the same, even if we accept this certificate
at its face value, it only certifies that Khudeja Khatoon was the wife of A.
Matalib; thus no linkage is established with Jonab Ali; whom the petitioner
claimed to be her father.
14. Ext. C is a certificate dated 13.2.2015 of the Gaonburah of Durabandhi
village certifying that Khudeja Khatoon was the daughter of Lt. Jonab Ali. For
the reasons mentioned above, this certificate was also not proved. Mere filing of
a document or marking of a document as exhibit is not enough. The certificate
as well as the contents thereof would have to be proved, so also the
truthfulness thereof, in accordance with law.”
14.
In support of his submission that a certificate has to be proved from
contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the
judgment passed in the case ofRomila Khatun vs. Union of India, reported
in2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into
service.
“20. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the
basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate
and prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing
and proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to
be proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the
truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be
established from the record. A document or the contents of the document
cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge. …”
15. He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum vs.
Page No.# 9/17
Union of India and Ors., reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347 wherein certain
observations regarding exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction have been made which
read as follows:
“9. On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered
opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and
documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and
opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari
jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate
jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts
reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned
opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in
violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from
illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on
evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal
refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no
support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not
been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on
the face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.”
16.
He has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rupjan
Begum vs. Union of India , reported in (2018) 1 SCC 579 wherein it has been
laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly, the
authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents.
17.
The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ
petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated.
18.
The learned counsel for the other respondents have supported the
Page No.# 10/17
submissions made on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court in exercise of
its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the
decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. They have
submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision
making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed.
They have further submitted that the procedure adopted for adjudication of a
reference by a Foreigners Tribunal is summary in nature and there is also a time
frame for completion. He has submitted that there is an issue of national
security by the unabated influx of foreign nationals and before any action is
taken, the proceedee is given an opportunity whereby he or she is required to
prove the citizenship.
19.
The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials
placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been
carefully perused.
20. With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of
the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a
proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts.
In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the
Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is
extracted hereinbelow: “9. Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any
question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction
given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is
not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving
Page No.# 11/17
that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular
class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such
person.”
21.
In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [AIR 1963 SC 1035] which followed
the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Ghaus
Mohammad Vs. Union of India [AIR 1961 SC 1526]in the context of
Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which is extracted hereinbelow“22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or
with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or
description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or
his entry into India or their presence or continued presence including
their arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is
Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a
foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as
the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order
made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises
whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner
or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a
person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi
served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as
he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High
Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima
facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an
order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the
Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that
Page No.# 12/17
onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent .”
22. Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the submissions
and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would confine its
powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the present case
pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the
facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a
Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction.
23.
Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after
discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ
of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic
Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023] has laid
down as follows: “49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something
important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law
governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari.
50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more
particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in
granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of
Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon
which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It
demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or
palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the
Page No.# 13/17
inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is
apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high
prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking.
51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some
action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and
invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction
thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice
between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an
extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded
on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this
flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity
projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the
realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to
be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after
setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the
High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable
consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal
court of appeal which it is not.”
24. In the instant case, the written statement is vague and apparently, has not
met the requirement, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to disclose the following:
(i) his date of birth;
(ii) place of birth
Page No.# 14/17
(iii) name of his parents
(iv) their place of birth and citizenship
Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the grandparents.
It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within the personal
knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State.
25. So far as the voters lists are concerned, those of the years 1966 and 1970
appear to be more or less consistent with slight change in the name of the
projected father as Ghatu and Ghutu. However, after 1970, the next voters list is
of the year 1993 i.e. after long an inordinate 23 years. There is no explanation
at all with regard to the fact as to why voters list of previous years have not
been produced and proved. Furthermore, in the voters list of 1993, the name of
the projected father becomes Gatu Miya and in the same, the petitioner claims
that his name is also there which is, however, Fazar Ali. As mentioned above,
the reference is against Fazal Haque and not against Fazar Ali. The voters list of
1997 does not come to the aid of the petitioner as his name is not there.
26. As regards the Jamabandi, it is seen that the name Fazal Haque has been
inserted vide an order dated 28.01.2005. The same also reveals that there are
certain other names, like Mainul Haque, Jainob Khatun, Moina Khatun and
Mohila Khatun as legal heirs of Gatu Miya and there is no material or
explanation to show how these persons are connected to the petitioner. In any
case, a Jamabandi, cannot by itself be a conclusive determination of one’s
citizenship.
27.
So far as the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that there is a
mention of the of the voter list of 1966 in the ERO report is concerned, on a
careful verification, the said voter list does not contain the name of the
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petitioner.
28.
It is trite that in a matter of the present nature, oral evidence by itself
would not be sufficient and there would be necessity to support the same with
documentary evidence. The petitioner as DW1 in his cross-examination has
made a categorical statement that he did not even vote once. Further, the
projected brother, in his cross-examination as DW2 has stated that in the year
1993 itself, the petitioner was marked ‘D’ in the voter list. Under such
deposition, it further becomes clear that the name Fazar Ali appearing in the
voters list of 1993 proved by the petitioner is of another person.
29. Though the certificate issued by the Gaonburah has not been enclosed in
the writ petition, we have gone through the records and found that the
certificate dated 18.01.2018 is available in page 52 which was marked as Ext-5.
The Gaonburah as DW3 has, however, submitted that he did not bring the
Register Book to the Tribunal though it was maintained. It is settled position of
law that a certificate issued by a Gaonburah has to be proved by producing the
contemporaneous records so as to render it as a relevant piece of evidence.
30. With regard to the rejection of the petition for correcting the evidence-in-
chief of DW2, the projected brother, we are of the opinion that there is hardly
any scope of making correction in the evidence recorded that too, by another
person. We have also verified from the TCRs that the case was heard on
03.08.2019 by the learned Tribunal and 12.09.2019 was fixed for judgment and
the petition was filed on 11.09.2019 i.e. just one day before the pronouncement
of the judgment. We are of the opinion that the approach of the learned
Tribunal was not only justified but also apt inasmuch as, the petition clearly
appears to be a dilatory tactic to delay the proceedings and there was total lack
Page No.# 16/17
of bona fide. It may be mentioned that the proceeding traces way back to 1998
and the reference was registered in the year 2018.
31.
The reliance upon the case of Md. Sujab Ali (supra) is misplaced. In the
instant case, there is not documentary evidence to connect the DW2-the
projected brother with the proceedee, namely, Fazal Haque. As mentioned
above, in the 1993 voters list, the name of one Fazar Ali appears whom the
petitioner claims to be him. Further, DW2 has clearly stated that in the year
1993, the petitioner was marked ‘D’ in the voters list.
32. There is another important aspect of the matter which has been indicated
above. The proceeding was against one Fazal Haque which would be evident
from the reference order as well as notices issued by the Tribunal. On the other
hand, the proceedee has tried to rely upon certain documents having the name
Fazar Ali. There is no documentary evidence at all to connect the two names. It
is also apparent from the evidence, more particularly of the petitioner himself as
DW1 and his projected brother as DW2 that the name Fazar Ali appearing in the
voters list of 1993 cannot be that of the proceedee. The adjudication process is
regarding one Fazal Haque and not of Fazar Ali.
33.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion
that the impugned order dated 12.09.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners’
Tribunal No. 1st, Barpeta, Assam in F.T. Case No.82/2018 does not call for any
interference.
34. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed earlier
stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the
learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law.
Page No.# 17/17
35.
The records of the aforesaid F.T. Case No.82/2018 be returned to the
concerned Foreigners Tribunal forthwith, along with a copy of this order.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
JUDGE
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