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2026:CGHC:1113-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPCR No. 3 of 2026
Eshwar Gond S/o Santram Gond Aged About 53 Years R/o Semra,
Bhaisamunda, Sabriya - Dera, P.S. - Gidhori Tundra, District- BalodaBazar-Bhatapara (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1.
State of Chhattisgarh Through - Secretary Department of Home,
Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.)
2.
District Magistrate Baloda-Bazar-Bhatapara, District- BalodaBazar-Bhatapara (C.G.)
3.
Superintendent of Police Baloda-Bazar, District- Baloda-BazarBhatapara (C.G.)
...Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner
For Respondent/State
:
:
Mr. Hemant Gupta, Advocate.
Mr. S.S. Baghel, Government Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
08.01.2026
1.
Digitally
signed by
BRIJMOHAN
BRIJMOHAN MORLE
MORLE
Date:
2026.01.08
17:48:48
+0530
Heard Mr. Hemant Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also
heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Government Advocate, appearing for
the State/respondents.
2.
The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the
following prayers:
“I. This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue
order/orders, writ and direction/directions and may
quashed the order impugned dated 25.11.2025 arising
out of order dated 05.01.2026 and 22.09.2025.
II. Any other relief/relief’s, which this Hon’ble Court
may
think
fit
and
proper
in
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case, with cost of the petition,
may also please be granted to the petitioner.
III. That the Hon’ble Court may also imposed heavy
cost upon the respondent for misusing the legal tool
for their personal revenge, in the interest of justice.”
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a
citizen of India and is entitled to all fundamental rights guaranteed under
Part III of the Constitution of India, including protection against arbitrary
or discriminatory action by the State. The respondents, being State
authorities, are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.
The petitioner is a permanent resident of the address mentioned in the
cause title.
4.
It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that
the office of respondent No. 3, Superintendent of Police, Baloda-Bazar–
Bhatapara, initiated proceedings against the petitioner and issued a
memorandum dated 27.06.2025, proposing action under Section 3(5)(b)
of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (for short, “Act of
1990”), alleging that the petitioner has criminal antecedents and is
involved in petty offences. The memorandum relies on old and stale
criminal cases and security proceedings, including Crime No. 202/2013
under Sections 379, 429, and 34 IPC; Crime No. 91/2015 under
Sections 294, 186, and 427 IPC; and Crime No. 114/2017 under
Sections 147, 148, 149, 294, 323, 506-B, and 325 IPC, all of which
were disposed of with fines. It also relies on Crime No. 133/2017 under
Section 456 IPC, and Crime Nos. 15/2018 and 81/2019 under Section
34(2) of the Excise Act, in which the petitioner was acquitted. Further
reliance is placed on several security-for-good-behaviour proceedings,
namely Istegasha Nos. 83/2003, 97/2003, 334/2005, 297/2009,
1138/2009, 782/2011, 37/2012, and 277/2013 under Sections 107 and
116(3) CrPC, all of which lapsed due to efflux of time. Additionally,
Crime No. 213/2018 under Sections 107 and 118 CrPC, which is purely
preventive in nature, and Case No. 01/2024 under Sections 129 of the
BNS and 125 of the BNSS, stated to be pending, were relied upon. It is
submitted that none of these cases disclose any continuing or
proximate threat to public order so as to justify preventive action under
the Act of 1990.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that, except for
the preventive proceedings noted above, none of the criminal cases
resulted in conviction; most ended in acquittal, fines, compounding, or
closure due to efflux of time. Reliance on such stale and concluded
cases to invoke preventive externment powers is wholly arbitrary and
contrary
to
law.
Pursuant
thereto,
respondent
No.
2,
the
Collector/District Magistrate, issued a notice dated 30.07.2025. Despite
this, respondent No. 2 passed an externment order dated 22.09.2025,
removing the petitioner from District Baloda-Bazar–Bhatapara and
adjoining districts solely on the basis of alleged antecedents, without
recording the mandatory satisfaction under Section 5(3) of the Act of
1990 that the petitioner’s presence was prejudicial to public order or
State security.
6.
It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner
that petitioner preferred a statutory appeal under Section 9 of the Act of
before
Department,
respondent
No.
which
dismissed
was
1,
the
State
Government/Home
mechanically
without
due
appreciation that the alleged cases pertain to the period 2003–2019 and
do not disclose any continuing or imminent threat to public order.
Section 5(3) of the Act of 1990 mandates a clear and objective
satisfaction that externment is necessary to prevent acts prejudicial to
public security or the maintenance of essential services. In the present
case, no such finding was recorded, nor was any material presented
demonstrating present danger or proximate nexus. It is further
submitted that the impugned orders are arbitrary, mala fide, and
violative of principles of natural justice. Preventive legislation cannot be
invoked to penalize a citizen for past criminal cases that have ended in
acquittal or closure, nor can it be used as a substitute for ordinary
criminal law.
7.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further stated that the
externment order seriously infringes the petitioner’s fundamental rights
under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The petitioner has already
suffered more than three months of exclusion, and there is no allegation
of any act during this period affecting public order. No finding has been
recorded by respondent No. 2 demonstrating any actual or imminent
threat posed by the petitioner to the security of the State or the public.
The continued operation of the impugned order unjustly stigmatizes the
petitioner as an antisocial element. Finally, it is submitted that the
mechanical rejection of the petitioner’s appeal violates Article 22(5) of
the
Constitution,
which
requires
meaningful
and
expeditious
consideration of representations.
8.
In view of the above, it is prayed that the impugned orders dated
22.09.2025 and 25.11.2025 be quashed as arbitrary, illegal, and
unconstitutional.
9.
On the other hand, learned State counsel strongly opposed the
submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and supported the
impugned orders. It is submitted that the petitioner is a habitual
offender, consistently involved in criminal and preventive proceedings
over a long period. He further submits that the authorities acted not on a
solitary incident, but on the cumulative effect of the petitioner’s past
conduct, which, according to police assessment, reveals a tendency to
disturb public peace and tranquility. It is further contended that the
preventive action was initiated strictly in accordance with the provisions
of the Act of 1990, after due application of mind to the relevant material,
and that both the District Magistrate and the appellate authority
exercised their statutory jurisdiction lawfully and reasonably. It is thus
urged that no case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution
is made out.
10.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have
examined the pleadings, the impugned externment order dated
22.09.2025, the appellate order dated 25.11.2025, and the material
available on record with due care and circumspection.
11.
The record reveals that the petitioner has been involved in several
criminal cases and preventive proceedings over the years, including
proceedings under Sections 107 and 116 of the CrPC. Although many
of these criminal cases ended in acquittal or fines, the authorities
considered the frequency, continuity, and nature of such proceedings in
concluding that the petitioner is a habitual offender. Preventive
jurisdiction under the Act of 1990 is not invoked to punish an individual
for past conduct, but to prevent the likelihood of repetition of acts
prejudicial to public order.
12.
The externment order reflects that respondent No. 2, the District
Magistrate, recorded satisfaction regarding the necessity of preventive
action against the petitioner. The Act of 1990 vests wide discretion in
the competent authority to pass such orders based on subjective
satisfaction formed from the material placed before it. This Court, while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not sit
in appeal over such satisfaction, nor does it re-appreciate the
sufficiency of evidence, unless it is shown that the decision-making
process is vitiated by arbitrariness, mala fides, non-consideration of
relevant material, or violation of statutory or constitutional safeguards.
13.
The petitioner’s contention that the cases relied upon are old or
resulted in acquittal cannot, by itself, be a decisive factor. Preventive
measures operate in a distinct field from punitive criminal law and are
based on assessment of future conduct in light of past behavior. The
adequacy or sufficiency of the material relied upon is not for this Court
to determine, so long as the authority acted within the bounds of law.
14.
It is also evident from the record that the petitioner was served
with notice, afforded an opportunity of hearing, and permitted to submit
a reply. The petitioner further availed the statutory remedy of appeal
under Section 9 of the Act of 1990. The appellate authority considered
the grounds raised and affirmed the externment order. While the
petitioner alleges that the appeal was rejected mechanically, the Court
does not find total non-application of mind or denial of opportunity so as
to vitiate the appellate order.
15.
As regards the challenge based on Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution, it is well settled that reasonable restrictions in the interest
of public order can be imposed by law. Preventive externment, when
exercised in accordance with statutory provisions and procedural
safeguards, cannot be said to per se violate fundamental rights. In the
present case, the authorities have acted within the framework of the Act
of 1990.
16.
Having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the case,
this Court is of the considered view that the impugned orders cannot be
said to be wholly arbitrary, illegal, or without jurisdiction so as to warrant
interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. However, it is clarified that
this Court has not examined the matter as an appellate authority on
merits, and all contentions, factual as well as legal, remain open to be
urged before the appropriate forum in accordance with law.
17.
Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. Sd/Sd/(Arvind Kumar Verma)
Judge
Brijmohan
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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