Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2025:MLHC:457-DB
Serial No. 01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.A. No. 19 of 2021
Date of Decision: 02.06.2025
Shri. Edwin Sungoh,
S/o. (L) Shri. Loni War
R/o. Khliehrangnah Village, Shangpung
West Jaintia Hills,
Meghalaya
..…Appellant
-VersusThe State of Meghalaya
Through The Commissioner and Secretary
to the Government of Meghalaya
Department of Home (Police)
Civil Secretariat, Shillong
……Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Chief Justice (Acting)
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
: Mr. S.P. Mahanta, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. L.M. Sangma, Adv.
Mr. M. Lyngdoh, Adv.
Mr. D. Dkhar, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. R. Gurung, GA
Ms. S. Shyam, GA
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
Yes/No
2025:MLHC:457-DB
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Per W. Diengdoh, J:
JUDGMENT
1.
This is a case where two persons, a mother and her son-in-law
were said to have been murdered by the appellant herein on 14.05.1992
at the house of the deceased at Khliehrangnah Lum Muchai in the West
Jaintia Hills District of the State. The names of the deceased are Lur @
Lo Rabon (D1) and his mother-in-law, Lakma @ Kma Sungoh (D2).
2.
From the records what could be gathered is that though there was
no initial FIR lodge, however, apparently, the police were informed of
such incident, when on 15.05.1992 one Wanbeit Shullet, the local
Member of the District Council (MDC) came along with the appellant
to the police station at Jowai, whereby the said Mr. Shullet informed the
police that the appellant had committed a double murder. The said
information was noted in the G.D. (General Dairy) Entry vide Jowai P.S.
G.D. Entry No. 500 dated 15.05.1992. The appellant was placed under
custody immediately.
3.
It is also noticed from the records that on forwarding of the said
GDE No. 500 dated 15.05.1992 on 20.05.1992, the Officer Incharge,
Jowai Police station was requested to convert the same as the FIR on the
ground that the relatives of the deceased persons declined to file a formal
complaint. Accordingly, the same being treated as an FIR, it was
registered as Jowai P.S. Case No. 69 of 1992 u/s 302 IPC and
investigation was launched. The Investigating Officer, on completion of
2025:MLHC:457-DB
investigation submitted Chargesheet No. 100 of 1994 dated 29.07.1994
with the opinion that a prima facie case is found well established against
the accused/appellant herein and he was sent to face trial before the
competent court of jurisdiction.
4.
The case was taken up for trial by the learned Additional Deputy
Commissioner, Jowai, West Jaintia Hills, however vide order dated
12.07.2005 it was transferred to the Court of the Judge, Fast Track Court,
Jowai for disposal. Yet again, at the evidence stage of the case, it was
transferred to the Sessions Court, Jowai for final disposal which was
done so. The same being re-registered as Sessions Case No. 89 of 2015.
5.
The prosecution examined 6(six) witnesses in total and exhibited
5(five) documents in all. After all the witnesses have been examined, the
accused/appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. where his
response to the questions put by the Court was noted down. After such
statement was completed, on being asked, the accused/appellant
declined to examine any witnesses from his side.
6.
The learned Trial Court then heard the arguments of the learned
counsels for the respective parties and on consideration of such
argument, appreciation of evidence on record and while applying the law
as is deemed proper, has, vide judgment dated 05.11.2021, held the
accused/appellant guilty of the offence of murder and hence punishable
under section 302 Cr.P.C.
7.
Again, upon hearing the parties on the quantum of sentence, the
learned Trial Court has vide order of sentence dated 08.11.2021
2025:MLHC:457-DB
sentenced the accused/appellant to undergo a sentence of life
imprisonment with fine of ₹ 50,000/- (rupees fifty thousand) only.
8.
On being so convicted, the appellant has preferred this instant
appeal being highly aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and
order dated 15.11.2021 and sentence dated 08.11.2021.
9.
It may be mentioned that in course of these proceedings before
this Court, the learned Sr. counsel for the appellant, Mr. S.P. Mahanta
has raised the issue of mental disability as far as the appellant/accused
is concerned which, according to him would have a bearing in the
manner the trial has proceeded under such circumstances and if proved,
would vitiate the entire trial and the subsequent order of conviction.
10.
This Court has allowed the parties to be heard on this preliminary
issue and has also caused related medical examination and report to be
filed thereto. In brief, the medical report would say that the accused/
appellant has Mild Intellectual Disability. It is however not certain as to
whether the same was present at the time of the incident or during the
trial or that it was a present and recent mental development as far as the
appellant is concerned. This issue was however not pressed by the
learned Sr. counsel for the appellant and finally, the merits of the appeal
was taken up for hearing.
11.
Heard Mr. S.P. Mahanta, learned Sr. counsel for the appellant
and Mr. R. Gurung, learned GA for the State respondent.
12.
Mr. Mahanta, has contended that because of the infirmities
found in the impugned judgment, the same cannot be made the basis to
secure the conviction.
2025:MLHC:457-DB
13.
The learned Sr. counsel after narrating the brief facts of the case
as has been indicated hereinabove has also read over the deposition of
the 6(six) prosecution witnesses. Thereafter, it is submitted that there
appears to be a lacuna in the prosecution case wherein only on the basis
of the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-5 the learned Trial Court had
convicted the appellant, when such evidence is inconsistent, flimsy and
not reliable at all.
14.
It is also the contention of the learned Sr. counsel that on a police
case being registered and investigation launched the Investigating
Officer has not followed procedure since no statement of the witnesses
was ever recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. This was confirmed by the
Investigating Officer who has deposed as PW-6 when he said “…I have
not examined any witnesses in this case”.
15.
The learned Sr. counsel has also submitted that the investigation
was started on the basis of a General Diary (GD) Entry No. 500 of 1992
which was recorded on 15.05.1992 when allegedly one Shri. Wanbeit
Shullet, MDC of Shangpung Constituency produced the appellant before
the police to say that he has committed a double murder. However, the
IO has failed to produce the said MDC as a prosecution witness, which
omission is fatal to the prosecution case.
16.
The date of the alleged murder was 14.05.1992 as could be
discerned from the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2. But records would
show that the police had gone to the place of occurrence only on
16.05.1992 where they found the two deceased lying in the compound
and the inquest was also carried out at the PO. On the same day, the dead
bodies were taken to the Jowai Civil Hospital where post mortem was
2025:MLHC:457-DB
conducted. Here too, the evidence of the alleged eye-witnesses, that is,
PW-1 and PW-2 are found to be inconsistent inasmuch as whatever they
have stated as the cause of death of the said two deceased persons was
not corroborated with the findings recorded in the Post Mortem Report.
Exhibit 5, the Post Mortem Report which speaks of 6(six) cut wounds
on the head or scalp or on the back of the head about 6-7 inches in depth
while Exhibit 6 speaks of cut wounds at two places. PW-1 and PW-2
however has spoken only about 1 cut wound on the body of the deceased.
Therefore, there is serious variation in the two depiction which points to
inconsistency in the ocular and medical evidence.
17.
There is also no evidence as to motive since during the
investigation by PW-4, PW-1 has stated that the murder happened due
to a family affair but there was no investigation in this regard.
18.
The main thrust of the argument on behalf of the appellant is that
the impugned judgment and order was based entirely on the observations
made by the learned Trial Judge on the basis of the materials found in
the case diary which was converted to evidence as could be noticed from
the findings made in the impugned judgment and order at page 81 of the
paper-book, para 42 wherein it has been observed that “…Though not
exhibited by the prosecution, it is seen in the case diary that PW-4 had
drawn a rough map of the P.O. Perusal of the same indicated that the
P.O. is located to the east of a telephone main post, while there is a road
to the south of the P.O. PW-4 did not indicate if there is any house near
the P.O.” Again, at page 89, para 54 the learned Trial Judge has taken
into evidence that “…As can be seen from the case diary, that PW-4 has
noted that PW-1, PW-2 and Shri. Hambi Sungoh (expired) has stated
2025:MLHC:457-DB
that they were threatened by the accused if they report the matter to the
police, hence they did not file the FIR.” Yet again, at page 92, para 62 it
was observed that “Perusal of the Case Diary of the case shows that the
investigation was initiated by PW-6 on 16.05.1992 till 20.05.1992…”.
19.
This, according to the learned Sr. counsel is a clear violation of
the provision of Sub-Section 2 of Section 172 Cr.P.C which prohibits
and debars the court from using the case diary as evidence in the case
and on this ground alone, the impugned judgment and conviction is
liable to be set aside and quashed. In this regard, the case of Mahabir
Singh v. State of Haryana, (2001) 7 SCC 148, para 13 and 14 and also
the case of Mohammed Ankoos & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court
of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, (2010) 1 SCC 94, para 27 and 30 are
cited in support of this contention.
20.
Per contra, Mr. R. Gurung, learned GA in his response, has also
led this Court to the evidence of the witnesses and has laid stressed on
the evidence of the wife of one of the deceased, who has witnessed the
actual act where she has narrated how the appellant struck her deceased
husband on the head with a dao and on her mother intervening, the
appellant also struck her on the neck leading to the death of both her
husband and her mother.
21.
The learned GA has also submitted that the incident was seen not
only by PW-1 but also by her sister who has deposed in court as PW-2.
The statement of PW-2 is also identical with what was said and seen by
PW-1 and as such, there is corroboration. Under such circumstances, the
case not being one where circumstantial evidence has to be resorted to,
therefore, the ocular evidence of the two eye-witnesses barring minor
2025:MLHC:457-DB
discrepancies can be relied upon to convict the accused which was done
so by the learned Trial Judge. However, as far as minor discrepancies
are concerned, it is to be noted that PW-1 and PW-2 are rustic villagers
who were in a state of shock when the incident happened and more so,
after 20 years or so when they stood before the witness stand in court,
some variation or discrepancies in their account of the incident cannot
be ruled out. However, this would not weaken the prosecution case, the
case of Birbal Nath v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2023 SCC Online SC
1396, para 21 was cited by the learned GA to overcome any objection in
this respect.
22.
The learned GA has then submitted that this is a case of double
murder and on the clinching evidence on record, the impugned judgment
and sentence may not be interfered with.
23.
At this juncture, this Court would examine the facts and
circumstances of this case and what has transpired at the trial keeping in
mind the issue involved and the approach of the learned Trial Court
culminating in the passing of the impugned judgment and sentence as to
whether the same is justified or not.
24.
Perusal of the records would show that the genesis of the case
stems from the appearance of the appellant before the concerned police
station on 15.05.1992. Some portion of the records would indicate that
it was the said Shri. Wanbeit Shullet, MDC who had produced the
appellant before the police, another source says that it was the appellant
himself who had surrendered before the police. Be that as it may, it was
under such circumstances that the police came to know of the incident
involving the death of two persons at Khliehrangnah, West Jaintia Hills
2025:MLHC:457-DB
District under Jowai Police Station. Accordingly, a General Diary Entry
was made taking note of the information given and the accused/
appellant was taken into custody on 15.05.1992.
25.
It is also a fact as has been submitted by the learned Sr. counsel
for the appellant that no formal FIR was lodged by the family members
of the deceased or by anyone for that matter. However, the Officer-inCharge, Jowai Police Station on 20.05.1992 has noted that on the
opinion of the IO, the information received at the P.S was treated as the
FIR and Jowai P.S. Case No. 69 of 1992 under Section 302 IPC was
registered and investigation was directed to be conducted. In this
respect, the Supreme Court in the case of Superintendent of Police, CBI
& Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175, para 16 has observed
that GD Entry may be treated as FIR in an appropriate case, where it
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. As such, there is no
doubt that the initiation of the case against the appellant is proper.
26.
There is also the contention of the learned Sr. counsel that from
the deposition of PW-6 who was the IO at the relevant point of time, he
has stated that no witnesses have been examined. However, records
would show that in course of investigation three witnesses, including
PW-1 and PW-2 have had their statement recorded by the IO. This
would not have much impact on the outcome of the case since such
statement have not been used for contradiction by the defence in the
cross-examination of the PWs. Suffice it to say that the witnesses who
have been listed by the IO in his chargesheet have been summoned as
prosecution witnesses in court.
2025:MLHC:457-DB
27.
To appreciate the evidence recorded, it would be proper to again
refer to the evidence tendered by the PW-1 Smti. Wanngaitlang Sungoh
who is the wife of the deceased Lo Rabon and also the daughter of the
other deceased Lakma Sungoh as well as the evidence of PW-2 Smti.
Samjur Sungoh who is the sister of PW-1.
28.
PW-1 is the wife of (L) Lo Rabon. She recalled what happened
on the day of the incident, though she cannot recall the date, month or
year, understandably as her deposition in court was recorded on
18.11.2015 when the incident actually took place on 14.05.1992, that is,
almost after 23 years. She however recalled on that day she saw her
husband coming from the pine groves. At that point of time, she also
saw the appellant stabbing her husband on the head with a dao (cutting
implement). When her mother Lakma Sungoh asked the appellant why
he killed her husband, the appellant also struck her mother on the neck
resulting in her death. This witness has further deposed that both the
victim died on the spot, following which the appellant dragged the
bodies and put them together inside the compound when he fled from
the place of occurrence.
29.
This part of her testimony could not be shaken in the cross
examination by the defence counsel since PW-1 has reiterated that she
saw the accused/appellant dragging her deceased husband from the
village footpath to her compound and even when her mother was stabbed
by the accused/appellant she was standing nearby and had rushed to the
place where her husband was lying to find out if he is still alive. This
would only confirm the fact that this witness has seen the actual incident
with her own eyes, she therefore qualifies as an eye-witness in the case.
2025:MLHC:457-DB
30.
As to the manner in which the two deceased persons were killed,
PW-1 on being confronted, in her cross-examination has stated that, “…I
remember that my husband was stabbed by the accused on his head and
my mother was cut at the back side of her neck…” Further, she said that,
“…It is a fact that the accused had used the dao to commit the
offence…” The post mortem report would corroborate this statement
when it is seen from such report that as regard the deceased Lo Rabon
under the heading “external appearance” on wounds-position, size and
character, the findings are “Six cut wounds on the head (scalp) all in the
back of the head – Occipital region. Size 6”- 7” and deep to the bone.”
Then as regard Lakma Sungoh, the findings as far as wounds-position,
size and character are concerned reads as follows:“(1) Cut wound in the head (scalp) on the right parital region.
The wound is 6” long and goes deep through the bone.
(2) Cut wound in the base of the neck on the back side size 6”
long and piercing the bone.”
31.
Though the learned Sr. counsel for the appellant would content
that PW-1 has not been able to accurately described the manner in which
the two deceased person were killed which is contrary to the medical
evidence, this Court on appreciation of the evidence in this connection
finds that this contention cannot be sustained inasmuch as it is not
expected for PW-1 in the state of mind that she was at that relevant point
of time to examine the deceased persons as to where exactly were the
wounds inflicted on them. The fact that she saw the accused/appellant
striking her husband on the head and thereafter striking her mother on
the neck is sufficient enough to prove that the deceased were subjected
2025:MLHC:457-DB
to grievous assault by the accused/appellant which resulted in their death
on the spot.
32.
As regard the contention of discrepancies in the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly that of PW-1, this Court would agree
with the explanation put forth by the learned GA and the authority cited,
that is, the case of Birbal Nath (supra) is found noteworthy. Para 21 of
the same is hereby reproduced as:
“21. The contractions in the two statements may or may not be
sufficient to discredit a witness. Section 145 read with Section
155 of the Evidence Act, have to be carefully applied in a given
case. One cannot lose sight of the fact that PW-2 Rami is an
injured eye witness, and being the wife of the deceased her
presence in their agricultural field on the fateful day is natural.
Her statement in her examination in chief gives detail of the
incident and the precise role assigned to each of the assailants.
This witness was put to a lengthy cross examination by the
defence. Some discrepancies invariably occur in such cases
when we take into account the fact that this witness is a woman
who resides in a village and is the wife of a farmer who tills his
land and raises crops by his own hands. In other words, they are
not big farmers. The rural setting, the degree of articulation of
such a witness in a Court of Law are relevant considerations
while evaluating the credibility of such a witness. Moreover, the
lengthy cross examination of a witness may invariably result in
contradictions. But these contradictions are not always sufficient
to discredit a witness. In Rammi v. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC
649, this Court had held as under:
“24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite
possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true
witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant
details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can
successfully make his testimony totally non-discrepant. But
courts should bear in mind that it is only when
discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so
incompatible with the credibility of his version that the
2025:MLHC:457-DB
court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious
a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the
narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of
two witnesses or as between two statements of the same
witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.”
33.
Another aspect of the matter is the issue of corroboration. In this
connection, PW-2 Smti. Samjur Sungoh in her deposition in court has
stated that on the day of the incident around 3:00 pm she was grinding
paddy in the compound of the house while her mother was also sitting
nearby. She then saw the accused/appellant came with a dao (ka wait) to
their compound and straightaway chopped Lo Rabon with a dao and also
chopped her mother. Thereafter, the accused/appellant pulled both the
dead bodies and kept them together after which he left the place. This
witness in her cross-examination has also stated that the deceased Lo
Rabon was chopped on the head while her mother was hit at the back of
the neck. Incidentally, this witness is the sister of PW-1. The evidence
of this witness as far as the identity of the accused/appellant and that of
the deceased Lo Rabon and Lakhmi Sungoh and also the manner in
which the assault was committed by the accused resulting in the death
of the two deceased persons has not been able to be controverted in the
cross-examination. This part of the evidence put in juxtaposition with
the evidence of PW-1 will only lead to one conclusion, that is, that there
is corroboration in the same and no doubt whatsoever would arise as to
the complicity of the accused/appellant in the case and also his direct
involvement as far as the death of the two deceased persons
aforementioned is concerned. Apart from the fact that ocular and
medical evidence speaks in one language.
2025:MLHC:457-DB
34.
Yet another aspect of the matter to be considered is the fact that
PW-1 in her deposition has stated that on the day of the incident she
along with two persons, that is, Smti. Samjur Sungoh and Smti. Iorita
Sungoh were present on the spot. Smti. Samjur Sungoh is her elder sister
(who was examined as PW-2) and Smti. Iorita Sungoh is her niece who
was about 15-16 years at that time. All of them did not raise any alarm
apparently out of shock at the sudden turn of events. PW-2 even went
on to say in her cross-examination that there was another witness who
had seen the incident on that day, that is, her husband Hambi Niang.
Apart from these persons who have witnessed the incident, the name of
another person, that is, Shri. Wanbeit Shullet has also figured in these
proceedings as the person who had produced the accused/appellant
before the police at the Jowai Police Station. The argument of the
learned Sr. counsel for the appellant is that the prosecution in failing to
produce Shri. Wanbeit Shullet as a witness in the case, his role being
vital, the prosecution has failed to establish its case.
35.
To answer this contention, it can be said that for the prosecution
to establish a foolproof case all available relevant evidence has to be
produced in court. However, it is not necessary that each and every piece
of evidence, including production of a large number of witnesses has to
be resorted to in this respect. The law of evidence does not require any
particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact.
In this regard, the authority cited by Mr. R. Gurung, learned GA
appearing for the State respondent is found relevant, the same being the
case of Ram Prasad v. State of U.P, (1974) 3 SCC 388 wherein at para
13 and 14 the following is found:-
2025:MLHC:457-DB
“13. Considerable stress has been laid by Mr. Anthony upon the
fact that, besides the four eye-witnesses who have been
examined in this case, the occurrence, according to the first
information report, had also been witnessed by Baddal, Shankar
and Hubba. These persons were, however, not examined as
witnesses at the trial. It is also pointed out that in addition to
these persons, the occurrence was also witnessed by Sham Lal
and Hubba (this Hubba is different from Hubba whose name was
mentioned in the first information report), who also arrived at
the scene of occurrence. Sham Lal and Hubba too were not
examined as witnesses. The non-examination of these witnesses,
in our opinion, would not introduce an infirmity fatal to the
prosecution case. It is no doubt true that the prosecution is bound
to produce witnesses who are essential to the unfolding of the
narrative on which the prosecution is based. Apart from that, it
cannot be laid down as a rule that if a large number of persons
are present at the time of the occurrence, the prosecution is
bound to call and examine each and every one of those persons.
The answer to the question as to what is the effect of the nonexamination of a particular witness would depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case. In case enough number of
witnesses have been examined with regard to the actual
occurrence and their evidence is reliable and sufficient to base
the conviction of the accused thereon, the prosecution may well
decide to refrain from examining the other witnesses. Likewise,
if any of the witnesses is won over by the accused party and as
such is not likely to state the truth, the prosecution would have a
valid ground for not examining him in court. The prosecution
would not, however, be justified in not examining a witness on
the ground that his evidence even though not untrue would go in
favour of the accused. It is as much the duty of the prosecutor as
of the court to ensure that full and material facts are brought on
the record so that there may be no miscarriage of justice. The
discharge of such a duty cannot be affected by the consideration
that some of the facts if brought on the record would be
favourable to the accused. In case the court finds that the
prosecution has not examined witnesses for reasons not tenable
or not proper, the court would be justified in drawing an
inference adverse to the prosecution.
2025:MLHC:457-DB
14. So far as the present case is concerned, we find that the
prosecution has examined four eye-witnesses of the occurrence
and their evidence has been found by the trial Court and the High
Court to be reliable, convincing and sufficient to warrant the
conviction of the accused. It has not been shown to us that the
evidence of the persons who were not examined as witnesses was
essential for the unfolding of the narrative on which the
prosecution was based. The present is not a case wherein the
witnesses not examined could have given evidence on a point
regarding which the witnesses actually examined were not in a
position to depose. We are, therefore, of the view that the failure
of the prosecution to examine the persons mentioned above as
witnesses would not justify interference with the judgments of
the High Court and the trial Court.”
36.
Accordingly, when the quality of evidence of even a single
witness is found to be of sterling quality, conviction of an accused can
be based on such evidence. In the case in hand, this Court has found that
the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 to be reliable and factual duly attested
to by the medical evidence as to the manner and mode of the death of
the two deceased persons, therefore it is not necessary for the trial court
to record the evidence of such witnesses whose evidence may not affect
the outcome of the findings and conclusion thereof.
37.
This Court would have stopped at this juncture, but for the sake
of doing complete justice to the case of the respective parties, other
aspects of the case may be looked into. For example, take the case of
motive. PW-1 in her deposition has stated that the accused is the uncle
of her (L) husband and that her husband has no grudge with the accused
during his lifetime. However, in the light of the opinion of this Court as
far as the appreciation of the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 is concerned,
it would be proper to say that in this particular case the prosecution is
not required to establish motive. In this regard, the case of Chandan v.
2025:MLHC:457-DB
The State (Delhi Admn.), (2024) 6 SCC 799 would aptly answer this
question when at para 9, 10 and 11 of the same the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has observed as follows:
“9. The argument of the defence that the prosecution has not
been able to establish any motive on the accused for committing
this dastardly act is in fact true, but since this is a case of
eyewitness where there is nothing to discredit the eyewitness, the
motive itself is of little relevance. It would be necessary to
mention some of the leading cases on this aspect which are as
under.
10. In Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 3
SCC 219], it was held that it is a well-settled principle in criminal
jurisprudence that when ocular testimony inspires the confidence
of the court, the prosecution is not required to establish motive.
Mere absence of motive would not impinge on the testimony of
a reliable eyewitness. Motive is an important factor for
consideration in a case of circumstantial evidence. But when
there is direct eyewitness, motive is not significant. This is what
was held: (SCC pp. 224-25, para 12)
“In case the prosecution is not able to discover an impelling
motive, that could not reflect upon the credibility of a
witness proved to be a reliable eyewitness. Evidence as to
motive would, no doubt, go a long way in cases wholly
dependent on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence
would form one of the links in the chain of circumstantial
evidence in such a case. But that would not be so in cases
where there are eyewitnesses of credibility, though even in
such cases if a motive is properly proved, such proof would
strengthen the prosecution case and fortify the court in its
ultimate conclusion. But that does not mean that if motive
is not established, the evidence of an eyewitness is rendered
untrustworthy.”
11. The principle that the lack or absence of motive is
inconsequential when direct evidence establishes the crime has
been reiterated by this Court in Bikau Pandey v. State of Bihar,
[(2003) 12 SCC 616], Rajagopal v. Muthupandi, [(2017) 11 SCC
120], Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh, [(2017) 11 SCC 195].”
2025:MLHC:457-DB
38.
As to the non-recovery and non-production of the murder
weapon, here too, the same would not damage the prosecution case since
it is well settled that in the light of reliable and trustworthy eye-witnesses
to the incident, for convicting an accused recovery of the weapon used
in commission of the offence is not sine qua non.
39.
To the charge of the appellant that the impugned judgment is
defective and non-sustainable since the finding of conviction of the
appellant was based on the materials found in the case diary, the
provision of Section 172 sub-Section 2 of the Cr.P.C being attracted,
that is, that a criminal court though is entitled to use the materials found
in the case diary, it cannot however use such information as evidence in
the case, reference being made to the latter part of para 42 of the
impugned judgment as well as para 54 of the same, this Court on perusal
of such portions of the judgment has found that at para 42 the learned
trial judge had made reference to the particulars of the PO based on the
map drawn by the IO which was included in the case diary. There is no
objection to the place of occurrence by the defence in course of
examination of the witnesses as such, this contention is found irrelevant
since it was not the basis made for the conviction. At para 54, the learned
Trial Judge has made an observation that what is revealed from the case
diary is the fact that PW-1 and PW-2 along with one Hambi Sungoh
(expired) did not file the FIR as they were threatened by the
accused/appellant. This piece of information is also not relevant or
decisive as has been observed above, the GD Entry has eventually been
treated as the FIR in this case. Consequently, the contention of the
appellant in this regard has no basis, therefore, the authorities cited in
this connection are also not applicable to the facts of the case herein. It
2025:MLHC:457-DB
is also seen that the learned Trial Judge had passed the impugned
judgment mainly on the basis of the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 as eyewitnesses, the question of reliance on the evidence found in the case
diary does not arise as there is nothing found in the observations and
findings of the learned Trial Judge to suggest that the conviction was
based on the strength of the materials found in the case dairy.
40.
On an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the
case of the appellant vis-à-vis the impugned judgment and sentence, this
Court finds that the said judgment and sentence has been rendered on
firm legal foundation. The same is hereby upheld.
41.
Consequently, this appeal is found to be devoid of merits and is
hereby rejected.
42.
Appeal disposed of. No costs.
43.
Send back the Trial Court records.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(H. S. Thangkhiew)
Chief Justice (Acting)
TIPRILYNTI KHARKONGOR
Date: 2025.06.02 18:10:08 IST
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review