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MOHAMMED
AADIL KHAN
Date: 2026.09.25
18:20:54 +0530
CGHC010362342026
2026:CGHC:41076
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 1216 of 2026
1 - Dwarika Prasad Sahu Son of Shri Alakh Ram Sahu, Aged About 60 Years, Caste
Teli, R/o Village Aruni, Post Gorkapar, Tahsil Gunderdehi, District Balod (C.G.)
... Petitioner
versus
1 - Lokeshwar Prasad Sahu Son of Shri Dwarika Prasad Sahu, Aged About 34
Years, Caste Teli, R/o Village Aruni, Post Gorkapar, Tahsil Gunderdehi, District
Balod (C.G.)
2 - Smt. Minakshi Sahu, Widow of Late Rupeshwar, D/o. Shri Ishwar Sahu, Aged
About 30 Years, R/o Village Aruni, Po. Gorkapar, Tahsil Gunderdehi, District Balod
(C.G.) Presently resided at Village Siyanmara, Tahsil Gunderdehi, District Balod
(C.G.)
3 - The State of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, District Balod (C.G.)
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Pushpendra Kumar Patel and Mr. Utkarsh Patel,
Advocates.
For State
:
Mr. Malay Kumar Jain, Panel Lawyer.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
Order on Board
21-09-2026
1.
The present is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
filed by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 25-08-2026 passed
by the learned Principal District Judge, Balod in Misc. Civil Appeal
No.02/2026 whereby the miscellaneous appeal filed by the petitioner has
been dismissed and the order dated 17-04-2026 passed by learned Civil
Judge, Senior Division Gunderdehi, District Balod in Civil Suit No. 06A/2025
has been affirmed.
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is plaintiff
before the learned trial Court who is prosecuting a suit against the
defendants for declaration of title, possession, declaring the gift deed dated
19-03-2019 as null and void and also declaring the mutation order passed by
revenue court null and void and also for permanent injunction with respect to
the suit property total area of 0.85 hectares of three different khasra numbers
recorded in the name of defendant No.1 and total area 0.88 hectare of three
different khasra numbers recorded in the name of defendant No.2, situated at
village Arjuni, Tahsil Gunderdehi, District Balod. He would submit that the suit
property was initially owned by grand-father of the plaintiff and after his death
it was recorded in the name of father of the plaintiff namely, Alakh Ram. The
defendant No.1 is son of the plaintiff and defendant No.2 is the widowed
daughter-in-law of the plaintiff. The defendants have got executed a gift deed
from father of the plaintiff on 19-03-2019. The father of the plaintiff died on
27-05-2020 and when the defendants tried to get their names mutated into
revenue records the plaintiff came to know about the gift deed and then he
challenged the same before the learned trial Court. He would further submit
that the gift deed executed by the father of the plaintiff has been challenged
and he is praying that till pendency of the suit the defendants may not create
any third party interest and shall not alienate the suit property. However, the
learned trial Court as well as the learned appellate Court rejected the
application filed by the petitioner/plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the
CPC holding that while granting temporary injunction, it may affect the right
and title of the other party. He would further submit that merely by staying
alienation the property, rights of the parties shall not be affected and it is only
to secure the ultimate outcome of the decree. Therefore, the impugned
orders suffer from perversity and jurisdictional error and the same are liable
to be set aside by allowing the application filed by the plaintiff under Order 39
Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC.
3.
I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the document
annexed with the petition.
4.
From perusal of copy of the plaint annexed with the petition, Annexure-P/3 it
transpires that the defendant No.1 is son of the plaintiff and defendant No.2
is his sister-in-law. The alleged gift deed was executed by the father of the
plaintiff on 19-03-2019 in favour of defendant No.1 and husband of defendant
No.2, who were brothers. The said gift deed was executed on 19-03-2019
and on the basis of the said gift deed the name of both these persons were
recorded in the revenue record. The husband of defendant No.2, namely,
Rupeshwar died on 07-10-2023 and father of the plaintiff, namely, Alakh Ram
died on 27-05-2020. After death of husband of defendant No.2 when they get
their name mutated in the revenue record, the plaintiff raised objection by
saying that both the defendants have got their name mutated on the basis of
forged and fabricated gift deed which has been challenged by him in the suit.
The defendant No.1 and the husband of defendant No.2 are not any stranger,
but both of them are sons of the plaintiff, in whose favour the gift deed was
executed by father of the plaintiff meaning thereby the grand-father executed
a gift deed in favour of his grand-sons which has been challenged by the
plaintiff. The claim of the plaintiff in the application for grant of temporary
injunction that the defendants may be restrained from alienating the suit
property till final adjudication of the suit is squarely covered under Section 52
of the Transfer of Property Act, there is no need to pass any specific order for
the same. The application filed by the plaintiff has been rejected by learned
trial Court as well as learned appellate Court after considering the facts and
circumstances of the case as well as the pleadings made by the respective
parties. The learned trial Court as well as learned appellate Court have
concurrently held that the plaintiff has no prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable loss and no temporary injunction could be
granted in his favour.
5.
In the case of “Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar
Patil”, 2010 (8) SCC 329, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:“40. Same principles have been followed by this Court
in Mani Nariman Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena
[(1991) 3 SCC 141], wherein it has been held that in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High
Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior
court or tribunal only in a case where there is no
evidence or where no reasonable person could
possibly have come to the conclusion which the court
or tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that
except to this "limited extent" the High Court has no
jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact (see
SCC pp. 149-50, para 18). In coming to the above
finding, this Court relied on its previous decision
rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata
S. Guram [(1986) 4 SCC 447]. The decision in
Chandavarkar is based on the principle of the
Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh
[Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] and
Nagendra Nath [Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of
Hills Division and Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398]
discussed above.
41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in
Laxmikant
Revchand
Bhojwani
v.
Pratapsing
Mohansingh Pardeshi [(1995) 6 SCC 576]. In SCC
para 9 at pp. 579-80 of the Report, this Court clearly
reminded the High Court that under Article 227 that it
cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all
species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise
must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and
flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and
justice.
42. Same views have been taken by this Court in
respect of the ambit of High Court's power under
Article 227 in Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri
Gosavi [AIR 1968 SC 222] (see AIR pp. 222-34, para
5 of the Report) and the decision of this Court in
Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan [(1970) 2 SCC
717]. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh
[Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] about
the scope of Article 227 was again followed in
Almedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel
Ramnandis [(1972 1 SCC 898].
43*. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court
in Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC
675], a two-Judges Bench of this Court discussed the
principles of interference by the High Court under
Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev
Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], this
Court held that a writ of certiorari is maintainable
against the order of a civil court, subordinate to the
High Court (SCC p. 688, para 19 of the Report). The
correctness of that ratio was doubted by another
Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam v.
Chhabi Nath [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the
Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench
is pending. But insofar as the principles on the scope
of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is
concerned, there is no divergence of views.
44. In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the
Report, the following principles have been laid down in
Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai
[(2003) 6 SCC 675] and they are set out:
"38.(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping
the subordinate courts within the bounds of
*
Ed.: Para 43 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./84/2010 dated 2608-2010.
their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has
assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have
or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it
does have or the jurisdiction though available is
being exercised by the court in a manner not
permitted by law and failure of justice or grave
injustice has occasioned thereby, the High
Court may step in to exercise its supervisory
jurisdiction."
45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on
the same lines and extracted below: (Surya Dev Rai
case [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6
SCC 675], SCC pp. 695-96)
"38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to
correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the
following requirements are satisfied: (i) the
error is manifest and apparent on the face of
the proceedings such as when it is based on
clear ignorance or utter disregard of the
provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or
gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.
(6)
*
*
(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and
the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised
sparingly and only in appropriate cases where
the judicial conscience of the High Court
dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or
grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution
and circumspection need to be exercised, when
any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought
to be invoked during the pendency of any suit
or proceeding in a subordinate court and the
error though calling for correction is yet capable
of being corrected at the conclusion of the
proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred
thereagainst
and
entertaining
a
petition
invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of
the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow
and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings.
The High Court may feel inclined to intervene
where the error is such, as, if not corrected at
that very moment, may become incapable of
correction at a later stage and refusal to
intervene would result in travesty of justice or
where such refusal itself would result in
prolonging of the lis.
(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or
supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself
into
a
court
of
appeal
and
indulge
in
reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or
correct errors in drawing inferences or correct
errors of mere formal or technical character."
49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this
Court, the following principles on the exercise of High
Court's
jurisdiction
under
Article
of
the
Constitution may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is different from a petition under
Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by
the High Court under these two articles is also
different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227
cannot be called a writ petition. The history of
the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High
Courts is substantially different from the history
of conferment of the power of superintendence
on the High Courts under Article 227 and have
been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in
exercise of its power of superintendence under
Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the
orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor
can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court
of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal
subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative
statutory mode of redressal has been provided,
that would also operate as a restrain on the
exercise of this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High
Courts
in
exercise
of
their
power
of
superintendence have been repeatedly laid
down by this Court. In this regard the High
Court must be guided by the principles laid
down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath,
AIR 1954 SC 215] and the principles in
Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath,
AIR 1954 SC 215] have been repeatedly
followed by subsequent Constitution Benches
and various other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh
[Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC
215], followed in subsequent cases, the High
Court
in
exercise
of
its
jurisdiction
of
superintendence can interfere in order only to
keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it,
"within the bounds of their authority".
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by
such tribunals and a courts by exercising
jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not
declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is
vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and
(f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its
power of superintendence when there has been
a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals
and courts subordinate to it or where there has
been a gross and manifest failure of justice or
the basic principles of natural justice have been
flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence
High Court cannot interfere to correct mere
errors of law or fact or just because another
view than the one taken by the tribunals or
courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In
other words the jurisdiction has to be very
sparingly exercised.
(i) The High Court's power of superintendence
under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any
statute. It has been declared a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v.
Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 (L&S)
577]
and
therefore
abridgment
by
a
constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of
a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of
the
Civil
Procedure
Code
by
the
Civil
Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does
not and cannot cut down the ambit of High
Court's power under Article 227. At the same
time, it must be remembered that such
statutory amendment does not correspondingly
expand
the
High
Court's
jurisdiction
of
superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be
exercised
on
equitable
principle.
In
an
appropriate case, the power can be exercised
suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and
unfettered power of the High Court under
Article 227, it transpires that the main object of
this article is to keep strict administrative and
judicial control by the High Court on the
administration of justice within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both
administrative and judicial, is to maintain
efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the
entire machinery of justice in such a way as it
does not bring it into any disrepute. The power
of interference under this article is to be kept to
the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice
does not come to a halt and the fountain of
justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to
maintain public confidence in the functioning of
the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High
Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of
judicial intervention is not to be exercised just
for grant of relief in individual cases but should
be directed for promotion of public confidence
in the administration of justice in the larger
public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for
protection of individual grievance. Therefore,
the power under Article 227 may be unfettered
but its exercise is subject to high degree of
judicial discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this
power will be counterproductive and will divest
this extraordinary power of its strength and
vitality.”
6.
In view of the settled proposition of law as has been held by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) and also in
view of the facts and circumstances of the present case and after having
gone through the orders passed by the learned appellate Court as well as
learned trial Court, this Court does not find any perversity or jurisdictional
error in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for grant of temporary
injunction.
7.
Accordingly, the present writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Aadil
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