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IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA No.14 of 2023
Sri Dulal Baidya
son of late Manoranjan Baidya, resident
of village-Sarashima, P.O. Sarashima,
P.S. Belonia, District-South Tripura
……… Appellant
–Versus–
1. Anil Sarkar (Dey),
son of late Cheori Sarkar (Dey)
2. Jagadish Sarkar (Dey),
son of late Cheori Sarkar (Dey)
3. Parimal Sarkar (Dey) @ Bishweshar Sarkar (Dey),
son of late Cheori Sarkar (Dey)
-all are residents of village-Sarashima,
P.O. Sarashima, P.S. Belonia, DistrictSouth Tripura
…….. Respondents
For the Appellant(s)
:
Mr. P. Roy Barman, Sr. Adv.
Mr. K. Nath, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. R. R. Datta, Adv.
Mr. K.L. Pal, Adv.
Date of hearing
:
20.08.2024
Date of delivery of
Judgment & order
:
04.12.2024
Whether fit for reporting
:
YES
NO
√
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
JUDGMENT & ORDER
The appeal arises out of the judgment dated 22.03.2023
passed by the learned District Judge, South Tripura, Belonia in Title
Appeal No.04 of 2022 and related decree thereof, whereby the
learned first appellate court dismissed the appeal by way of
affirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil
Judge (Jr. Division), Belonia, South Tripura in Title Suit No.26 of
2019, whereby the suit of the plaintiff-appellant for declaration of
his right, title and interest in the suit land and recovery of
possession was dismissed.
[2]
The claim of the appellant (hereinafter referred as the
plaintiff) is that the father of the plaintiff was the owner of a total
0.10 acres of land of Mouja-Sarasima recorded in Khatians No.
No.808/1 and 808/2 [described in ‘A’ Schedule of the plaint] and
during his lifetime, he executed one registered ‘Will’ on 07.05.1997
bearing No.III-1198 bequeathing the property in favour of the
plaintiff. The father of the plaintiff died on 16.12.2010. However, as
the respondents (hereinafter referred as the defendants) are the
close relatives of the father of the plaintiff, they were allowed by his
father to use 0.06 acres of land [described in ‘B’ Schedule of the
plaint] and they have been in possession of the suit land. After the
death of the father of the plaintiff, the plaintiff became the owner of
the suit land and requested the defendants to vacate the same and
even served Advocate notice twice, but getting no affirmative
response from the defendants, the plaintiff instituted the suit for
declaration of his right, title and interest and recovery of possession
of said ‘B’ Schedule land.
[3]
The
defendants
in
their
written
statement
have
admitted categorically that father of the plaintiff, namely Lt.
Manoranjan Baidya was the recorded owner of the suit land.
According to them, they are not the relative of the father of the
plaintiff but they are the adjacent neighbours. They denied any sort
of permissive possession over the suit land rather, they are having
50 years of possession in the suit land. According to them, during
the lifetime of late Manoranjan Baidya, he on several occasions,
requested the defendants to vacate the suit land but they denied
and with hostile animus, they started possessing the same more
particularly from 01.01.1996, when both father of the plaintiff along
with the plaintiff and his brother requested them to vacate it and
they flatly refused. They further state that the plaintiff has one
brother and three sisters left by his father as legal representatives
who were also necessary parties in the suit. Regarding the will,
their assertions are that they did not know anything about the
execution of any such will and whether the plaintiff has become
owner of the suit land by virtue of that will. However, they do not
directly challenge the authenticity of the will.
[4]
Before the trial court, the plaintiff examined himself and
another witness, namely Dulal Shome as PW-2 and also proved
certain documents into the evidence including the said will [Exbt.8]
and certified copies of finally published Khatians No.808/1 & 808/2
(Exbts.1 & 2 respectively). Similarly, the defendants No.1 & 3
examined themselves as DW-1 & 2 respectively but did not rely on
any documentary evidence.
[5]
The learned trial court dismissed the suit inter-alia on
the ground that as per the record, the defendants were the
permissive occupiers of the suit land but there was no whisper of
the said fact in the said will and more so, no step was taken by the
father of the plaintiff to evict the defendants therefrom during his
lifetime. Learned trial court even observed further that the said
testator had other children but there was no clarification in the will
as to why he had bequeathed the entire property to the plaintiff
only. Another ground of dismissal of the suit was that the plaintiff
had also failed to clarify as to why he had not taken any action
within 3 years after becoming the owner of the suit property and
therefore, for the above said reasons, doubt arose regarding the
authenticity of the will.
[6]
Learned first appellate court while endorsing such
observations of the trial court, further observed that the plaintiff in
his cross-examination failed to mention as to how his father
became the owner of 0.10 acres of land. Even the learned first
appellate court also observed that the will was executed in the year
1997 but the testator died in 2010 and therefore, there was a long
gap between the execution of the will and the death of the testator
and moreover, it was not clear as to why the plaintiff did not take
any initiative to evict the defendant No.2 from the suit land during
the lifetime of his father. With all these observations, the learned
first appellate court also dismissed the appeal.
[7]
The appeal was admitted by this court on the following
substantial questions of law:
[i] Whether findings of both the courts below are
perverse?
[ii] Whether the decree has been passed on
consideration of irrelevant facts and issues?
[8]
During hearing, Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant seriously challenges the
impugned judgment and decree on the ground that there was no
direct challenge regarding the authenticity of the will by the
defendants but both the learned courts below had swayed away
with certain extraneous facts going beyond the pleadings of the
parties leading to perverse findings and making out a third case
beyond the cases of the parties. Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior
counsel also argues that the attesting witnesses of the will were
dead and even the scribe i.e. the deed writer was also no more and
therefore, another witness conversant with the handwriting of the
attesting witnesses and the scribe was examined and the will was
duly proved. Learned senior counsel also argues that during crossexamination, DW-1 specifically denied the ownership of the father
of the plaintiff in the suit land and therefore, they were barred from
claiming adverse possession in the suit land and moreover, he
himself also denied the fact of adverse possession in his evidence
going contrary to his own pleadings.
[9]
Mr. R.R. Datta, learned counsel appearing for the
defendant-respondents on the other hand, submits that permissive
possession of the defendants was not proved by the plaintiff as the
same was not mentioned in the will and that itself was a patent
ambiguity in the will and moreover, the will was also not properly
proved in terms of Sections 67 & 68 of the Indian Evidence Act by
producing the attesting witnesses. The next point of argument of
Mr. Datta, learned counsel is that the ROR was not a document of
title and the plaintiff in his cross-examination also admitted that he
did not know as to how his father got the property and therefore,
ownership of father of the plaintiff was also not proved. According
to learned counsel, sufficient reasoning was given by both the
learned courts below and therefore, re-appreciation of evidence was
not permissible in the second appeal and the second appeal was in
fact not maintainable.
[10]
Mr. Datta, learned counsel also raises a point that under
Article 58 of the Limitation Act, the suit ought to have been filed
within 3 years from the date of death of the testator and therefore,
it was time barred. Another point raised by Mr. Datta, learned
counsel is that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties
as another brother and sisters of the plaintiffs were not impleaded
in the suit and moreover, out of a total 0.10 acres of land, as per
ROR, the rest 0.04 acres of land excluding the ‘B’ Schedule land
was in possession of one Jahar Chowdhury but no relief was
claimed against him. Mr. Datta, learned counsel also relies on the
following decisions:
(i) Jahar Lall Paul v. Asit Kumar Pal and others,
AIR 2014 (NOC) 163 (CAL) wherein the following were
noted:
Succession Act (39 of 1925), Ss.63,222- Probate of WillGrant
of
Will
not
containing
the
statement/endorsement that the attesting witnesses
had signed in presence of the testatrix-Statement by
attesting witness that he signed on Will in presence of
executor found false as executor was not there at time of
execution and registration of Will-Non-compliance with
requirements of proof of Will-Grant of probate, not
proper.
(ii)
Damodar
Lal
vs.
Sohan
Devi
&
Ors.,
Devi (2016) 3 SCC 78, wherein it was observed by the Apex
Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of the
Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless
the findings are based on no evidence or are perverse. It was
also observed that even if the finding of fact is wrong, that by
itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding
should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it
should be based only on conjectures and surmises. The safest
approach on perversity is the classic approach on the
reasonable man’s inference on the facts. To him, if the
conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is
possible, there is no perversity. If not, the finding is perverse.
(iii) Israel Gaddi vs. Karuna Dutta Mishra and
others, AIR 2023 Patna 36, and the relevant paragraph-27
as referred is extracted below:
27. The plea of adverse possession in alternative has
been taken by the respondent. The learned appellate
Court rightly noted that burden of proof always lies on
the plaintiff. Case must stand or fall on own pleadings
and proof of plaintiff's case. The plaintiff cannot take
benefit of weakness of the defendant. The trial Court
also noted that defendants has also taken the plea of
adverse possession but the case of plaintiff is going on
its own demerit in the plaint itself. So, it will be futile to
discuss in detail about the case of defendant.
[11]
Taking note of the rival submissions of the parties, the
first point falls for consideration of the court is that what is the
proper procedure to prove a will and whether the same was
complied with by the plaintiff in the instant case.
[12]
In this context, relevant decision rendered in Babu
Singh and others. vs. Ram Sahai @ Ram Singh, (2008) 14
SCC 754 can be taken care of, wherein the followings were
observed by the Apex Court:
14. In terms of Section 68 of the Act, although it is not
necessary to call more than one attesting witness to
prove due execution of a will but that would not mean
that an attested document shall be proved by the
evidence of one attesting witness only and two or more
attesting witnesses need not be examined at all. Section
68 of the Act lays down the mode of proof. It envisages
the necessity of more evidence than mere attestation, as
the words 'at least' have been used therein. When
genuineness of a will is in question, apart from execution
and attestation of will, it is also the duty of a person
seeking declaration about the validity of the will to
dispel
the
surrounding
suspicious
circumstances
existing, if any. Thus, in addition to proving the
execution of the will by examining the attesting
witnesses, the propounder is also required to lead
evidence
to
explain
the
surrounding
suspicious
circumstances, if any. Proof of execution of the will
would, inter alia, depend thereupon.
15. The Court, while granting probate of the will, must
take into consideration all relevant factors. It must be
found that the will was product of a free will. The
testator must have full knowledge and understanding as
regards the contents thereof. For the said purpose, the
background facts may also be taken note of. Where,
however, a plea of undue influence was taken, the onus
wherefor would be on the objector and not on the
offender. [See Savithri vs. Karthyayani Amma & Ors.,
(2007) 11 SCC 621]
16. Section 69 of the Act reads, thus :
"Section 69 Proof where no attesting witness found.-If no
such attesting witness can be found, or if the document
purports to have been executed in the United Kingdom, it must
be proved that the attestation of one attesting witness at least
is in his handwriting, and that the signature of the person
executing the document is in the handwriting of that person."
17. It would apply, inter alia, in a case where the
attesting witness is either dead or out of the jurisdiction
of the court or kept out of the way by the adverse party
or cannot be traced despite diligent search. Only in that
event, the Will may be proved in the manner indicated
in Section 69, i.e., by examining witnesses who were
able to prove the handwriting of the testator or
executant. The burden of proof then may be shifted to
others.
[13]
Later on, in Ashutosh Samanta (D) by Lrs. and ors.
vs. SM Ranjan Bala Dasi and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 255
also, the said principle rendered in Babu Singh case was reiterated
with the observation that in the event where attesting witnesses
may have died, or cannot be found, the propounder is not helpless,
inasmuch as Section 69 of the Evidence Act is applicable in that
case. The Apex Court in this case also took note of another earlier
decision rendered in K. Laxman vs. Padmini, Civil Appeal
No.7082 of 2008 decided on 03.12.2008 and extracted the
following paragraph of the said decision:
“Since both the attesting witnesses have not been
examined, in terms of Section 69 of thte Act it was
incumbent upon the Appellant to prove that the
attestation of at least one attesting witness is in his
handwriting and that the signature of the person
executing the document is in the handwriting of that
person…….”
[14]
Admittedly the present will is an unprivileged will which
as per Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act is required to be
mandatorily attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has
seen the testator sign or affix his mark on the will or has seen
some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the
direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a
personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark, or the
signature of such other person; and each of witnesses is required to
sign the will in the presence of the testator. But it is not necessary
that more than one witness is required to be present at the same
time, and no particular form of attestation is also prescribed.
[15]
Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act [now Section 67 of
the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023] stipulates that if a
document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as
evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the
purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness
alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving
evidence; provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting
witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being a will,
which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the
Indian Registration Act, 1908, unless its execution by the person by
whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied.
Therefore, the above said provision mandates examination of at
least one attesting witness in proving the will if he is alive and
subject to the process of court and also capable of giving evidence.
[16]
Section 69 of the Indian Evidence Act [now Section 68 of
the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023] also stipulates that if no
such attesting witness can be found, it must be proved that the
attestation of the attesting witness at least is in his handwriting,
and that the signature of the person executing the document is in
the handwriting of that person. Therefore, as per the above said
provision when the attesting witnesses are not alive, two things are
required to be proved by the person attempting to prove a will into
evidence; firstly, that attestation of one witness at least was in his
handwriting and secondly, that the signature of the person
executing the document was in his handwriting.
[17]
In the instant case in hand, PW-2 namely Dulal Shome
deposed that the will was executed by Manoranjan Baidya in favour
of his son Dulal Baidya and it was written by deed writer,
Krishnadhan Muhuri who died 25 years back and he was acquainted
with the hand writing of the said scribe Krishnadhan Muhuri. He
also identified the handwriting of said Krishnadhan Muhuri in the
will. He further deposed that the attesting witnesses of the will
namely, Nirmal Chandra Sen, Prafulla Malakar and Benimadhav
Mahajan were also deed writers who were no more and he also
identified the signature of those attesting witnesses and the learned
trial court ultimately, took the will into evidence marking it as
Exbt.8 as a whole. Such procedure as adopted by the learned trial
court
for
making
the
entire
document
containing
different
signatures as Exbt.8 as a whole in strict sense was not proper. It
would be better if separate scrutiny would be given for separate
signatures and separate marking for the contents of the will.
Anyway, this is purely a procedural matter of technical nature
which can be ignored but what is lacking in the evidence is that that
none of the witnesses of the plaintiff proved the signature of the
testator in the will which according to Section 69 of Evidence Act is
compulsory. Therefore, the will was not duly proved by the plaintiff
only on that ground.
[18]
Apart from the said will, the plaintiff also proved the
death certificate of Manoranjan Baidya [Exbt.4] which bears the
date of death of Manoranjan Baidya as 16.12.2010. The plaintiff
also proved two Khatians bearing No.808/1 and 808/2 [Exbts.1 & 2
respectively] and Khatian No.808/1 more particularly refers to the
suit land under Schedule ‘B’ of the plaint, wherein at column No.16
names of the defendants are shown to be the permissive
possessors under the testator. It is also admitted by the defendants
in the written statement that the father of the plaintiff was the
owner of the suit land. Therefore, the question of the ownership of
the suit land by the father of the plaintiff is not under challenge in
the suit. No separate mutated Khatian, if any, in the name of the
present plaintiff is proved into evidence by him to show that the
plaintiff was recognized by the Government as Riyat of the suit land
on the basis of the said will. In such a situation, the will appears to
be a vital document to establish sole ownership of the plaintiff in
this suit land. The defendants in their written statement have
claimed adverse possession over the suit land w.e.f. 01.01.1996.
However, before it is decided as to whether the defendants have
been able to prove their adverse possession in the suit land, it
appears to the court that for bringing all the materials into evidence
in a proper way to administer proper justice to the parties, the
plaintiff should be given a scope to adduce further evidence to
prove the will properly and thereafter, to decide the matter afresh
keeping in view of the evidences placed by both the parties into
evidence. The court is also simultaneously not oblivious of the fact
that already the defendants have suffered some financial loss in
defending the suit both in the learned trial court as well as in the
learned first appellate court and finally before this court.
[19]
The court is also constrained to observe that both the
learned trial court and the learned first appellate court have
travelled beyond the pleadings of the parties by observing different
extraneous factors which gives an impression that both the courts
below scrutinized the case of the plaintiff and the ‘Will’ with
spectacle of suspicion. At least the observations of the learned trial
court, such as non-mentioning the name of the defendants in the
Will as the permissive occupier or their eviction from the suit land
by the testator and that the testator despite having other children
did not clarify in the will as to why he did not bequeath any land in
favour of his other children and further observation of the learned
first appellate court that the plaintiff during the lifetime of his father
never approach the defendants to vacate the suit land and that
there was a long gap between the date of execution of the will and
the death of the testator, create such impression.
[20]
Law does not confer any power upon the learned trial
court or the learned first appellate court to create a third case of
the parties which are not at all pleaded by them and therefore, they
should refrain from doing so. Law never says that if there is a long
gap between the date of execution of the will and the death of the
testator, the Will shall be rendered invalid nor there is anything
obligatory for the testator to mention the name of the permissive
occupier, if any, in the land which is going to be bequeathed.
[21]
As the court is of the view that for fair ends of justice
the plaintiff should be given a scope to adduce a further evidence
for proving the will properly by remanding the matter, the question
of limitation and non-joinder of parties as raised by the learned
counsel, Mr. Datta for the respondents are kept open for decision
by the learned trial court.
[22]
In view of the above discussions, the appeal is allowed.
The judgments of the learned trial court and the learned first
appellate court and the related decrees are set aside. The matter is
remanded to the learned trial court with the following directions:
(i) The learned trial court will give a scope to the
plaintiff, not exceeding two successive dates for
examining any other witness by the plaintiff only with
reference to proving the will.
(ii) Thereafter, the learned trial court will give a
further scope to the contesting defendants not more
than
two
successive
dates
for
adducing
further
rebuttal evidence on their part in this regard. The
learned trial court will thereafter hear the argument of
both the sides and pronounce the judgment on all
issues.
As already stated that the defendants are also defending
their case by incurring expenses since filing of the suit, a cost of
Rs.10,000/- is imposed upon the plaintiff to be paid to the
contesting defendants as condition precedent. Unless the same is
paid, the learned trial court will not allow the plaintiff to adduce any
further evidence and in that case, there will be also no question for
providing opportunity to the defendants to produce their further
evidence, rather straightway the learned trial court will pronounce
the judgment on all issues after hearing the argument of both the
sides.
With such observations, the second appeal is accordingly
disposed of on contest.
Send down the LCRs forthwith
with copy of this
judgment and order.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
signed by SUJAY GHOSH
SUJAY GHOSH Digitally
Date: 2024.12.05 16:03:33 +05'30'
Sujay
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