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Serial No. 23
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 215 of 2021
Date of Order: 13.12.2021
Shri. Droshing Lyngdoh
Vs.
Shillong Cantonment Board & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. S. Dey, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. S.P. Mahanta, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. L.D.N. Thangkhiew, Adv.(For R 1 & 2)
Mr. Philemon Nongbri, Adv. (For R 3 & 4).
Mr. K. Ch. Gautam, Adv. (For R 5).
:
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Oral:
1.
By the instant petition, the writ petitioner seeks to challenge the
settlement of contract by the respondents 1 and 2 with the respondent No. 5,
to collect parking fees at the Cantonment Bazaar Road by work order dated
01.04.2021, on the ground that the respondent No. 5 did not satisfy the
technical criteria of the Tender conditions.
2.
The case as projected by the writ petitioner is that, pursuant to a notice
inviting tender dated 11.01.2021 the writ petitioner along with the respondent
No. 5, and another bidder had tendered their bids which were in two parts that
is, Technical Bid and Financial Bid. The respondent No. 5 was declared the
successful bidder as he put up the highest financial bid at Rs. 35,25000/(Rupees Thirty Five Lakhs Twenty-Five Thousand only) and the respondent
Cantonment Board also deemed that he had the technical expertise and
experience to execute the contract on the certificates furnished by the
respondent No. 5, in spite of the same being questionable.
3.
Mr. S. Dey, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the award of
contract to respondent No. 5 is vitiated, arbitrary and in violation of the Tender
conditions, inasmuch as, the respondent No. 5 did not possess the requisite
experience to be eligible to bid for the contract. Learned counsel submits that
as per the ‘General Instructions to Bidders and Tenderers’ in the tender
document at clause 3.1(6), it has been stipulated that the agency/contractor
must have a minimum one year experience in executing/providing similar
services/works to Central Governments/ State Governments/Cantonment
Boards/Offices etc., for the last financial year upto March, 2020 and that copy
of the work orders and documents were to be attached. It is the pointed
contention of the learned counsel, that the respondent No. 5 did not meet this
requirement and as such, his bid should have been rejected at the technical
stage itself. To substantiate this contention, learned counsel submits that the
acceptance by the respondent Cantonment Board of the experience certificate
dated 19.10.2020 granted to the respondent No. 5, which was issued by the
respondents No. 3 and 4 (Shillong Municipal Board) is erroneous, as on
verification before the respondents No. 3 and 4 by way of an RTI application
filed by the petitioner, it was revealed that he was not the principal contractor
in the said work but perhaps, was just assisting the contractor.
4.
It is further submitted by the learned counsel that, the respondent No. 5
on an earlier occasion, had been disqualified from the tender process as he had
submitted a work experience certificate of work done in collection of parking
fees under the office of the Syiem of Mylliem Syiemship, which on
verification by the petitioner by way of an RTI application revealed that the
work order was not issued to the respondent No. 5, but to one Myntri
Mylliemumlong. He strongly contends that, similarly the work experience
certificate issued by respondents No. 3 and 4 cannot be relied upon and will
not suffice to make the respondent No. 5 an eligible bidder. In support of his
submissions, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment in the case of
Ramana Dayaram Shetty versus International Airport Authority of India
and Others reported in (1979) 3 Supreme Court Cases 489, where he submits
that, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the standard of eligibility laid
down in the notice for tenders cannot be departed from arbitrarily. He
concludes his submission by submitting that, the action of the respondent
Cantonment Board is arbitrary and illegal and as such, the impugned
settlement should be set aside and quashed.
5.
In reply to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, Mr. S.P. Mahanta, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. L.D.N.
Thangkhiew, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 Cantonment
Board, submits that the bid of respondent No. 5, was found to be in order by
the duly appointed Technical Committee as the certificate furnished by the
respondents No. 3 and 4, Shillong Municipal Board was accepted, wherein it
was certified that the respondent No. 5 had successfully executed the contract
work for management of collection of fees from parking lots under the
Shillong Municipal Board for the years 2008-2010. Learned senior counsel
submitted that, along with respondent No. 5, the writ petitioner and one Prince
Leo Kharmalki, were also found to be eligible and as such, the financial bids
were then opened and the Financial Committee by its report dated 10.03.2021,
recommended that the highest rate of Rs.35,25000/- (Rupees Thirty Five
Lakhs Twenty-Five Thousand only) offered by respondent No. 5 be accepted.
Learned senior counsel submits that the entire process was conducted in a
transparent manner and even on an issue, that the quoted rate was abnormally
high, the Cantonment Board took the matter up for consideration and resolved
and approved the highest bid for the contract by the Cantonment Board
Resolution No. 04 dated 22.03.2020. He therefore submits that the allegation
of arbitrariness is without any basis and the writ petition is liable to be
dismissed as being without merit.
6.
Mr. K. Ch. Gautam, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent No. 5
submits that the allegation that he does not possess the experience to execute
the contract is misplaced inasmuch as, the respondent No. 5 has the experience
of providing similar services as required by the Tender conditions. The counsel
submits that, a plain reading of the general clause 3.1(6) reflects that what is
required is minimum one year experience in executing similar services which
the respondent No. 5 possessed by virtue of his services rendered in the
management of the Shillong Municipal Board parking lot. Learned counsel
also refers to Annexure-1 of his affidavit-in-opposition which is a document
executed by the lessee showing that the respondent No. 5 had been entrusted
with such work, and has also drawn the attention of this Court to Annexures4 to 7 which shows that the respondent No. 5 has already deposited the entire
lease amount upto 31.03.2022, the date on which the lease terminates to the
respondents 1 and 2.
7.
The maintainability question of the instant writ petition is also raised by
the learned counsel who submits that, apart from being a challenge to a
contract, the writ petitioner has sought to bring in disputed facts and is seeking
an injunction against the respondent No. 5 and the other respondents, apart
from other directions. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel has placed
reliance on the judgment of Galaxy Transport Agencies, Contractors,
Traders, Transports and Suppliers versus New J.K Roadways, Fleet Owners
and Transport Contractors and Others reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC
1035, with regard to exercise of judicial review in the interpretation of the
terms of contract and submits that it is not for the Court to interpret a clause
particularly, when there was no perversity in the interpretation.
8.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The short question that has
arisen, apart from other aspects such as, maintainability which though has a
bearing but will not be gone into for the purposes of disposal of the writ
petition, is whether the acceptance of the Technical Bid of respondent No. 5
can be said to be arbitrary, illegal or visited by mala fides.
9.
The respondents No. 1 and 2 as stated, had floated the tender calling for
bids, technical and financial bids on 11.01.2021 and as per, the General
Instructions to Bidders/Tenderers, the relevant clause in question being clause
3.1(6), is quoted hereinbelow:
“3.1 General
6. The Agency/Contractor must have minimum one year
experience in executing/providing similar services/works to
Central
Government/State
Government/Cantonment
Boards/offices or reputed public/private sector organizations for
the last financial year i.e upto March, 2020. Copy of work
order/documents are to be attached.”
This clause is the only basis on which the writ petitioner’s case is
founded upon. A plain reading thereof, shows that the requirement for a
bidder is to have a minimum one-year experience in executing or
providing similar services of works and that copy of such work orders or
documents were to be attached in the bid document. It is not disputed that
a duly constituted Technical Committee of the Cantonment Board had
scrutinized the bids and accepted the experience certificate furnished by
the respondent No. 5, and held his technical bid to be eligible, thus paving
the way for the opening of the financial bid of which he was found to be
the highest bidder and consequently was awarded the contract.
10.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a series of decisions, has outlined the
scope of judicial review in such matters, and has settled the law in such matters
of interpretation of contract. In the judgment cited by the learned counsel for
the respondent No. 5 itself, i.e., Galaxy Transport Agencies, Contractors,
Traders, Transports and Suppliers versus New J.K Roadways, Fleet Owners
and Transport Contractors and Others (supra) in Para-14 and 18, this
position is clearly spelt out and the same is reproduced herein below:
“14. In a series of judgments, this Court has held that the
authority that authors the tender document is the best person to
understand and appreciate its requirements, and thus, its
interpretation should not be second-guessed by a court in judicial
review proceedings. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur
Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818, this Court held:
“15. We may add that the owner or the employer of
a project, having authored the tender documents, is the
best person to understand and appreciate its requirements
and interpret its documents. The constitutional courts
must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the
tender documents, unless there is mala fide or perversity
in the understanding or appreciation or in the application
of the terms of the tender conditions. It is possible that the
owner or employer of a project may give an interpretation
to the tender documents that is not acceptable to the
constitutional courts, but that by itself is not a reason for
interfering with the interpretation given.
18. Insofar as Condition No. 27 of the N.I.T. prescribing work
experience of at least 5 years of not less than the value of Rs. 2
crores is concerned, suffice it to say that the expert body, being
the Tender Opening Committee, consisting of four members,
clearly found that this eligibility condition had been satisfied by
the Appellant before us. Without therefore going into the
assessment of the documents that have been supplied to this
Court, it is well settled that unless arbitrariness or mala fide on
the part of the tendering authority is alleged, the expert
evaluation of a particular tender, particularly when it comes to
technical evaluation, is not to be second-guessed by a writ court.
Thus, in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517,
this Court noted:
“22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to
prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias
and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or
decision is made “lawfully” and not to check whether
choice or decision is “sound”. When the power of judicial
review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of
contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind.
A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders
and awarding contracts are essentially commercial
functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a
distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is
bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in
exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a
procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice
to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will
not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at
the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes.
The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always
seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful
tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and
business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of
some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to
self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power
of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences,
either interim or final, may hold up public works for years,
or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and
may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court
before interfering in tender or contractual matters in
exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself
the following questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the
authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone;
or
Whether the process adopted or decision made is so
arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the
decision is such that no responsible authority acting
reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have
reached”;
(ii) Whether public interest is affected.
If the answers are in the negative, there should be no
interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting
or imposition of penal consequences on a
tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse
(allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and
franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require
a higher degree of fairness in action.”
11. The above quoted judgment in the considered view of this Court will be
applicable, inasmuch as, the interpretation of the said clause 3.1(6) is well
within the ambit of the Technical Committee, who found the certificate
furnished by the respondent sufficient. It can also be added that this is not a
case of arbitrary or whimsical grant of public largesse, or that public interest
or revenue has suffered in any manner.
12. In the facts and circumstances of the case, wherein the only point as
mentioned above is interpretation of the clause 3.1(6) which the respondents
No. 1 and 2, found respondent No. 5 to be eligible in terms of the said clause,
and in the backdrop of the rulings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, no case has
been made out for any interference by this Court.
13. For the reasons aforementioned, the writ petition being devoid of merit,
is accordingly dismissed.
14.
No order as to costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
13.12.2021
“D.Thabah-PS”
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