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[2026:RJ-JP:6130-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Civil Contempt Petition No. 3/2026
In
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.663/2015
Dr. Madhu Jain Daughter Of Khem Chand Jain D/o Khem Chand
Jain, Aged About 59 Years, R/o K-70A, Madan Villa, Krishan
Ganj, Ajmer, Rajasthan - 305001.
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
Dr. Om Prakash Bairwa, Commissioner, College Education
Block -4, Shiksha Sankul, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Jaipur
302015, Rajasthan
2.
Sh. Shri Kuldeep Ranka, Additional Chief Secretary Higher
And Technical Education Government Secretariat, Jaipur,
Rajasthan.
3.
State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Department Of
Higher Education, Government Secretariat Jaipur,
Rajasthan.
4.
Management Comitee Shri Pragya Mahavidyala, Through
Its Secretary, Shri Pragya Mahavidyala, Ajmer Bijainagar,
Rajasthan 305624.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s)
:
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Himanshu Kala for
Mr. Ajatshatru Mina
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN
Order
10/02/2026
1.
Though, the contempt petition has been listed in the defect’s
category, however, on the prayer of counsel for petitioner, the
petition has been heard finally.
2.
In the contempt petition, petitioner has alleged disobedience
of the final judgment dated 06.11.2015 passed in DB Special
Appeal (Writ) No. 663/2015: State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs.
(2 of 8)
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[CCP-3/2026]
The Management Committee Sh. Bhagwan Das Todi College
qua petitioner.
3.
Indisputably, the petitioner did not file any appeal before the
Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal or
writ petition before the High Court, for adjudication of her dues,
and has preferred this contempt petition, alleging disobedience of
the directions issued in case of Bhagwan Das Todi (supra).
4.
At the outset, counsel for petitioner does not dispute that the
issue of disobedience as raised in these contempt petition, is
squarely covered by the order dated 21.08.2025 passed by the
Coordinate
Bench
in
D.B.
Civil
Contempt
Petition
No.
1666/2018: Dr. Anil Kumar Mathur Vs. Mr. Ashutosh A.T.
Pednekar,
Commissioner,
College
Education
&
Special
Secretary and other connected matters, hence, it has been
prayed that the contempt petition may also be disposed of in
terms of order dated 21.08.2025.
5.
We have gone through the order dated 21.08.2025 passed in
case of Dr. Anil Kumar Mathur (supra), wherein the Coordinate
Bench of this High Court has dismissed the contempt petitions,
after following the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered
in cases of J.S. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar & Ors.[(1996) 6
SCC 291] and Snehasis Giri Vs. Subhasis Mitra [(2023) 18
SCC 529]. We deem it apposite to reproduce the relevant part of
discussion and findings of the Coordinate Bench as under:
"12. We are reminded of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in
the case of J.S. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and Others-(1996) 6
SCC 291, wherein three Judges bench of the Supreme Court has
observed as under:“6. The question then is whether the Division
Bench) was right in setting aside the direction issued
by the learned single Judge to redraw the seniority list.
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[CCP-3/2026]
It is contended by Mr. S.K. Jain, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant, that unless the learned
Judge goes into the correctness of the decision taken
by the Government in preparation of the seniority list
in the light of the law laid down by three Benches, the
learned Judge cannot come to a conclusion whether or
not the respondent had wilfully or deliberately
disobeyed the orders of the Court as defined under
Section 2(b) of the Act. Therefore, the learned single
Judge of the High Court necessarily has to go into the
merits of that question. We do not find that the
contention is well founded. It is seen that, admittedly,
the respondents
had prepared the seniority list on
2.7.1991 Subsequently promotions came to be made.
The question is whether seniority list is open to review
in the contempt proceedings to find out, whether it is
in conformity with the directions issued by the earlier
Benches. It is seen that once there is an order passed
by the Government on the basis of the directions
issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of
action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The
preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may
be right or may or may not be in conformity with the
directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for
the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of
judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the
wilful violation of the order. After re-exercising the
judicial review in contempt proceedings, afresh
direction by the learned single Judge cannot be given
to redraw the seniority list. In other words, the learned
Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider the
matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would
not be permissible under Section 12 of the Act.
Therefore, the Division Bench has exercised the power
under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court
Ordinance being a judgment or order of the single
Judge; the Division Bench corrected the mistake
committed by the learned single Judge. Therefore, it
may not be necessary for the State to file an appeal in
this Court against the judgment of the learned single
Judge when the matter was already seized of the
Division Bench.
7. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. It may be
open to the aggrieved party to assail the correctness of
the seniority list prepared by the State Government, if
it is not in comformity with the directions issued by the
High Court, if they so advised, in an appropriate forum.
No costs"
12.1. The view taken by the Supreme Court in J.S.Parihar (supra) has
been reiterated in Snehasis Giri Vs. Subhasis Mitra- (2023) 18 SCC
529. In Snehasis Giri (supra), it was held that in contempt
proceedings of almost like persons, interim orders were passed on the
basis that benefits were not confined and relief not granted only to the
parties to the litigation but that the directions had the effect of in rem
adjudication. The Court, therefore, directed the respondent contemnors
to verify from the record with respect to entitlement of all the contempt
petitioners but urged that there are express directions of this Court to
release salaries of the contempt petitioners without insisting on
verifying genuineness of their claims. Considering all the aspects,
Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:-
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[CCP-3/2026]
"10. Furthermore, there is merit in the respondents’
submission that the court, in contempt proceeding cannot
enlarge its scope and examine matters which are not part
of its remit, i.e. extent of the direction or orders contained
in the judgement of which contempt is being alleged. In
fact, in the decision in Sudhir Vasudeva (supra), it was
held as follows:
“19. The power vested in the High Courts as well
as this Court to punish for contempt is a special
and rare power available both under the
Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if
misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the
individual charged with commission of contempt.
The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty
in the Courts to exercise the same with the
greatest of care and caution. This is also
necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of
a contempt plea involves a process of
selfdetermination of the sweep, meaning and
effect of the order in respect of which
disobedience is alleged. The Courts must not,
therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the
order which is alleged to have been flouted or
enter into questions that have not been dealt with
or decided in the judgment or the order violation
of which is alleged. Only such directions which are
explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly selfevident ought to be taken into account for the
purpose of consideration as to whether there has
been any disobedience or wilful violation of the
same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor
can the plea of equities be considered. The Courts
must also ensure that while considering a
contempt plea the power available to the Court in
other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal
is not trenched upon. No order or direction
supplemental to what has been already expressed
should be issued by the Court while exercising
jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law;
such an exercise is more appropriate in other
jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above.
The above principles would appear to be the
cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the
Bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath
Ganguly[(2002) 5 SCC 352], V.M. Manohar Prasad
v. N. Ratnam Raju [(2004) 13 SCC 610], Bihar
Finance Service House Construction Coop. Society
Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami [(2008) 5 SCC 339] and
Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV [(2006) 1
SCC 613].
11. In the present case too, this court is of the opinion
that the respondents’ stand that without verification of the
petitioners' appointment and whether the procedures
prescribed were duly followed in respect of matters such
as fulfilling eligibility conditions (essential qualifications
and relevant experience); availability of vacancy; staff
pattern in respect of madrasas where recognition was
granted and if so for what period; whether the institution
was aided and recognized or not or recognized and nonaided, and if so for what duration; whether a duly
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[CCP-3/2026]
empowered selection body or bodies considered the
candidature of the claimant before he/she was appointed
and whether the committee or body selecting the
individual/claimant was constituted in accordance with the
rules or guidelines, etc is justified. In these circumstances,
this court is of the opinion that further proceedings cannot
be continued as no determination can be made unless
there is a due verification in regard to the employment of
each of the petitioners.
12. Furthermore, this court, in lawful exercise of contempt
jurisdiction, cannot examine the merits of a decision,
whether the state or the madrasa’s stand that any of the
petitioners is entitled to the benefits of being treated as an
employee, having regard to the concerned rules and
regulations. In J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar this court
explained the limited scope of contempt proceedings, as
follows, in the facts of the case:
“6. The question then is whether the Division
Bench was right in setting aside the direction
issued by the learned Single Judge to redraw
the seniority list. It is contended by Mr S.K.
Jain, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, that unless the learned Judge goes
into the correctness of the decision taken by
the Government in preparation of the seniority
list in the light of the law laid down by three
Benches, the learned Judge cannot come to a
conclusion whether or not the respondent had
wilfully or deliberately disobeyed the orders of
the Court as defined under Section 2(b) of the
Act. Therefore, the learned Single Judge of the
High Court necessarily has to go into the
merits of that question. We do not find that
the contention is well founded. It is seen that,
admittedly, the respondents had prepared the
seniority list on 2-7-1991. Subsequently
promotions came to be made. The question is
whether seniority list is open to review in the
contempt proceedings to find out whether it is
in conformity with the directions issued by the
earlier Benches. It is seen that once there is
an order passed by the Government on the
basis of the directions issued by the court,
there arises a fresh cause of action to seek
redressal in an appropriate forum. The
preparation of the seniority list may be wrong
or may be right or may or may not be in
conformity with the directions. But that would
be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved
party to avail of the opportunity of judicial
review. But that cannot be considered to be
the wilful violation of the order. After reexercising the judicial review in contempt
proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned
Single Judge cannot be given to redraw the
seniority list. In other words, the learned
Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to
consider the matter on merits in the contempt
proceedings. It would not be permissible
under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, the
Division Bench has exercised the power under
[2026:RJ-JP:6130-DB]
(6 of 8)
[CCP-3/2026]
Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court
Ordinance being a judgment or order of the
Single Judge; the Division Bench corrected the
mistake committed by the learned Single
Judge. Therefore, it may not be necessary for
the State to file an appeal in this Court against
the judgment of the learned Single Judge
when the matter was already seized of the
Division Bench. "
12.2. The Supreme Court exercising its powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, thereafter constituted a Committee to examine
the claims of the petitioners.
13. We noticed that in none of the orders passed by the Court, the
question regarding maintainability of the contempt petition was
examined.
14. It would be apposite to notice the provisions of Section 2 (b) of
Contempt of Court’s Act, 1971 (for short ‘ the Act of 1971’):“2. Definitions……...
(a)-------------(b) "civil contempt" means willful disobedience to any
judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process
of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a
court;”
14.1. Section 12 of the Act of 1971 reads as under:“12. Punishment for contempt of court.— (1) Save
as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any
other law, a contempt of court may be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to
six months, or with fine which may extend to two
thousand rupees, or with both:
Provided that the accused may be discharged or the
punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being
made to the satisfaction of the court.
Explanation.—An apology shall not be rejected merely
on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the
accused makes it bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a
sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1)
for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court
subordinate to it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section,
where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the
court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends
of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is
necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple
imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil
prison for such period not exceeding six months as it
may think fit.
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court
in respect of any undertaking given to a court is a
company, every person who, at the time the contempt
was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible
to, the company for the conduct of business of the
company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to
be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be
enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention
in civil prison of each such person:
Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any such person liable to such
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[CCP-3/2026]
punishment if he proves that the contempt was
committed without his knowledge or that he exercised
all due diligence to prevent its commission.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection
(4), where the contempt of court referred to therein
has been committed by a company and it is proved that
the contempt has been committed with the consent or
connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the
part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer
of the company, such director, manager, secretary or
other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the
contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with
the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of
such director, manager, secretary or other officer.
Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-sections (4) and
(5),_
(a) “company” means any body corporate and includes
a firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in
the firm.”
14.2. Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed the law as laid down in J.S.
Parihar (supra) and Snehasis Giris (supra).
15. The petitioners’ contention of the judgment in the case of Bhagwan
Das Todi (supra) being in rem and, therefore, no separate
petition/application would require to be filed is found to be
misconceived. The claims of the contempt petitioners are based upon
separate set of fact with regard to the period of engagement, the
institutes are different, the question as to when the employee was
posted on the aided post and what aid was being received against their
posts are all facts for which, finding is required to be given in each
individual case. Such findings cannot be given in contempt proceedings.
No reply can be received on facts in contempt proceedings. The nature
of their termination/retirement/disengagement from such institution
would also be looked into.
16. A close reading of the concluding para of the judgment passed in
Bhagwan Das Todi’ (supra), clearly shows that the Hon’ble Division
Bench has held that the said judgment is not confined to the employees
therein but also applies to several other employees who have either
filed the writ petition or raised objections before the learned Tribunal. In
the said context the Hon’ble Division Bench has held that the principle
laid down in the said case would also be applicable in case of other
similarly situated persons. The ‘term similarly situated’ used in the said
para cannot be read in isolation but the same is required to be read in
the context, which clearly shows that the intention of the Hon’ble
Division Bench is to make the principle laid down in the said case
applicable also with regard to the petitioners who have already raised
their grievance and submitted their independent claims before this
Hon’ble Court or before the learned Tribunal. The intention of the
Hon’ble Division Bench emerging of the said judgment read in its
entirety is very clear that although the individual employee was
required to establish their entitlement with regard to the benefits
arising from their services rendered in the aided institution, however
the said entitlement was to be adjudicated in view of the principles laid
down in the case of Bhagwan Das Todi’ (supra). In our opinion the
contempt petitioners have misconstrued the intention of the Hon’ble
Division Bench and without first getting their entitlement / claim
independently adjudicated before this Hon’ble Court or before the
learned Tribunal have straightway proceeded to file the contempt
petition before this Hon’ble Division Bench meaning thereby the
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[CCP-3/2026]
contempt of Court is alleged without there being any adjudication of
their independent entitlement, which is not permissible in the eye of
law.
16.1. We have also noticed that in respect of most of the contempt
petitioners, the compliance / compliance in part has already been made,
however, looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
individual cases, some benefits have not been extended to some of the
contempt petitioners; which in our view, this gives rise to a separate
cause of action to the petitioners, however they have contended that
the complete compliance of the judgment passed in the case of
Bhagwan Das Todi’ (supra) has not been made.
17. It is reiterated that the scope of interference by this Court in
contempt proceedings are very limited and the fresh adjudication of the
claims of the contempt petitioners with regard to the part of benefits
not allowed by the State Government / Educational Institution looking
to their peculiar facts cannot be done in the contempt proceedings.
Since the respondents herein have considered the claim of the
contempt petitioners and have already passed respective orders in the
individual cases. The grievance, if any, left can be adjudicated before
the appropriate authority / Court / Tribunal, however the same would
not amount to wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order passed by
this Hon’ble Court and, therefore, also the present contempt
proceedings are not maintainable.
18. We are also aware of the limited power of the Court while deciding
the contempt proceedings and we refrain from enlarging the scope of
contempt petition, especially when there is an availability of statutory
forum of Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutional Tribunal
(for short ‘ the Tribunal’), which is competent to examine the claim of
the individuals and pass orders relying upon the orders passed in the
case of Bhagwan Das Todi (supra). The directions issued by the
Tribunal are akin to a decree passed by the civil Court and is executable
in terms of Section 27 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational
Institutions Act, 1989.
19. We, therefore, find that there is no deliberate or willful
noncompliance of Court's order on behalf of the respondents. The
contempt petitions are wholly misconceived and the same are
accordingly, dismissed.
20. No costs.
21. A copy of this order be placed in each connected file. "
6.
Accordingly, the present Contempt Petition stands dismissed,
in terms of order dated 21.08.2025 (supra).
7.
Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
(ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J
Sachin Sharma/36
(SUDESH BANSAL),J
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