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[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 3881/2024
Dr. Gurdeep Singh S/o Shri Gyan Singh, Resident Of 3/147,
Hanumangarh, Tehsil And District Hanumangarh (Raj.) Presently
Resident Of 1A-33, Shiv Shakti Colony, Shastri Nagar, Jaipur
(Raj.)
----Appellant
Versus
1.
State Of Rajasthan, Through Chief Secretary, Government
Secretariat, Bhagwandas Road, Near Statue Circle, Jaipur
(Raj.)
2.
Dr. H.L. Arora, Retire/the Than Principal S.p. Medical
College, Bikaner (Raj.) At Present Resident Of B-110,
Saraswati Marg, Bajaj Nagar, Jaipur (Raj.)
3.
Dr. A.A. Sulemani, Retired / The Than Professor
(Medicine) S.p. Medical College, Bikaner, Rajasthan At
Present Resident Of Aziz Ahmed Clinic, Jai Narayan Vyas
Colony, Bikaner (Raj.)
4.
Dr. N.S. Purohit, Retired/the Than Professor (Medicine)
S.p. Medical College, Bikaner Rajasthan, At Present A211, Gyan Marg, Tilak Nagar, Jaipur (Raj.) (Deceased).
5.
Dr. M.M. Bagdi, Retired / The Than Professor (Surgery)
S.p. Medical Collage Bikaner At Present Resident Of F-2,
Karni Nagar, Pawanpuri, Bikaner (Raj.)
6.
O.P. Saini, Retired / The Than Registrar, Rajasthan
University, Jaipur At Present Resident Of 50 Rail Nagar,
Bhagwan Path, Kings Road, Shyam Nagar, Jaipur
7.
University Of Rajasthan, Jaipur Through Registrar Jln
Marg, Jaipur
8.
Sardar Patel Medical College, Through Principal Bikaner,
Jaipur
9.
Dr. Meera Purohit W/o Late Shri Dr. N.s. Purohit, R/o A211, Gyan Marg. Tilak Nagar, Jaipur (Raj.) (Deleted By
Order Dated 17.12.2025)
10.
Shaswat Purohit S/o Late Shri Dr. N.s. Purohit, R/o A-211,
Gyan Marg, Tilak Nagar, Jaipur (Raj.) (Deleted By Order
Dated 17.12.2025)
----Respondents
For Appellant(s)
:
Dr. Gurdeep Singh (Present in Person)
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Archit Bohra
Mr. Rahul Verma
Mr. Shretima Bagree
Mr. Divyesh Maheshwari
Mr. Jay Vardhan Joshi
Mr. Narendra Singh Yadav
(2 of 16)
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
[CMA-3881/2024]
Mr. Abhiuday Karan Barwar
Mr. Nitish Kumar Bagri
Mr. Aditya Jain
Mr. Hariom Vyas
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA
Judgment / Order
Date of hearing and conclusion of arguments
20.01.2026
Date on which the judgment was reserved
20.01.2026
Whether the full judgment or only the operative
part is pronounced
Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement
09.02.2026
1.
The present misc. appeal has been filed assailing the order
dated 20.07.2024, passed by the learned Additional District Judge
No.9, Jaipur Metropolitan I, in Civil Misc. Case No. 25/2022 (CIS
No. 60/2022), whereby the application filed by the applicantappellant under Order 33 read with Section 151 CPC was
dismissed.
2.
The facts, shorn of unnecessary details, are that the
applicant-appellant completed his M.B.B.S. course in the year
1991 as a regular student. On 26.04.1991, the results of the final
semester
were
declared,
wherein
the
applicant-appellant
successfully completed his graduation. Thereafter, as part of the
prescribed curriculum, the applicant-appellant joined his internship
at
Primary
Health
Centre,
Napasar,
District
Bikaner
on
07.05.2019. However, on 23.05.1991, the respondents cancelled
the
internship
of
the
plaintiff,
without
affording
him
any
opportunity of hearing.
3.
The applicant-appellant, averred in his application before the
learned Trial Court, that he was subjected to discrimination and
has been a victim of the malafide act of the Respondents for last
(3 of 16)
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
[CMA-3881/2024]
28 years, as he was a member of the Student Council, which had
raised several issues concerning irregularities in the entrance
examination and financial affairs of the Institution. Owing to such
animosity, the respondents allegedly indulged in overwriting the
applicant’s marksheets and viva-voce records, which ultimately led
to the cancellation of his internship. The applicant thus, filed a writ
petition bearing No. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7585/2008 for
awarding his formal degree of MBBS in his favour for the
examination that he has cleared in the year 1990-91 and sought
direction for carrying out his internship. Vide order dated
16.02.2017, the said writ petition was allowed and the respondent
Authority was directed to issue the marksheet and degree and
also allow him to undergo the internship.
4.
Furthermore,
the
respondents
lodged
First
Information
Report No. 199/1991, at Police Station Gandhinagar against the
applicant-appellant.
However,
the
applicant-appellant
was
acquitted in the said criminal case on account of lack of
documentary as well as oral evidence. Due to the pendency of the
criminal proceedings, the applicant-appellant faced a media trial,
as a result of which his career was irreparably damaged and he
lost his opportunity to earn a livelihood. Consequently, the
applicant-appellant
filed
a
suit
for
damages
against
the
respondents along with an application under Order 33 Rule 1, 2
and 3 read with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter
referred as CPC), praying that he be declared an ‘indigent person’
and may be permitted to file suit without the payment of court
fees.
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
5.
(4 of 16)
[CMA-3881/2024]
Thereafter, an enquiry as contemplated under Order 33 CPC
was conducted, and vide order dated 06.07.2022, the applicantappellant was declared an indigent person. The said order was
challenged by Respondent No. 2 – Dr. H.L. Arora, by filing S.B.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13103/2022. The Hon’ble Court allowed the
writ petition, vide order dated 29.03.2022, set aside the order
dated 06.07.2022, and remanded the matter to the learned Trial
Court with a direction to decide the issue afresh after taking into
consideration the statutory requirements under Order 33 CPC.
6.
In pursuance of the order dated 29.03.2022, a fresh enquiry
was conducted by the Chief Ministerial Officer, and the applicantappellant was thereafter declared an indigent person vide order
dated 09.11.2023. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent
no. 2 H.L. Arora, again preferred S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
1470/2024, wherein vide order dated 04.03.2024, the order dated
09.11.2023 was quashed and set aside, and the learned Trial
Court was once again directed to decide the application under
Order 33 CPC afresh in accordance with law with a reasoned order
keeping in view the observations as made in order dated
29.03.2023.
7.
Thereafter, the applicant-appellant filed list of his assets as
per mandatory requirement of order 33 rule 2 CPC on 11.03.2024.
Notices were duly issued and served. The learned Trial Court vide
order dated 20.07.2024, dismissed the application as filed by the
applicant-appellant on the ground of being barred by limitation, no
cause of action and the applicant is not an indigent person.
8.
Aggrieved by the said order, the present miscellaneous
appeal has been preferred by the appellant.
(5 of 16)
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
9.
[CMA-3881/2024]
The appellant present in person submitted that the learned
Trial Court erred while dismissing his application under Order 33
CPC on count of being barred by limitation as his case clearly has
a continuing cause of action, owing to the fact that since 1991 he
had constantly faced hardship due to events such as non-issuance
of his degree and marksheet; initiation of criminal proceedings;
issuance of marksheet with adversary remarks.
9.1
Thus, the wrong was a continuing one and therefore, the
limitation period begins when the series of wrong actions come to
an end. In support of his submission, the appellant placed reliance
on the case of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shakti Bhog
Food Industries Ltd. vs Central Bank of India; (2020) 17 SCC
260, wherein the Court clarified that what is required to be noted
is when the right to sue accrues and not when it first accrues.
Thus, the cause of action in the present case was a continuing one
and accrued only in the year 2020-2022, when the degree was
finally issued without any stigmatic remarks and not in 1991.
Moreover, the final refusal to provide compensation to the
appellant in 2022 crystallized the cause of action and thus, the
learned Trial Court erred while computing the limitation period.
10.
The appellant further submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation; Suo Moto Writ
Petition
(C)
No.
of
2020,
vide
orders
23.03.2020
and
10.01.2022 categorically held that the period from 15.03.2020 to
28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation. In
the present case as the applicant-appellant was awarded his MBBS
degree on 10.01.2020 and he had filed the suit for compensation
on 28.02.2022 i.e. within 2 years from the date of issuance of
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
(6 of 16)
[CMA-3881/2024]
degree with stigmatic remarks. He thus contended that his case
was squarely falling with the extended period of limitation as
provided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Re: Cognizance for
Extension of Limitation (supra) and within Article 113 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act of 1963”).
11.
The appellant thus while relying on the provision under
Article 113 of the Act of 1963 contended that in case there is a
continuing wrong, the limitation runs afresh every day until
cessation. The appellant placed reliance on the judgment passed
in the case of Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. vs Hanuman
Seva Trust; (2006) 5 SCC 658 and Popat and Kotecha
Property vs State Bank of India Staff Association; (2005) 7
SCC 510.
12.
The petitioner also contended that the cause of action was
clearly pleaded in the plaint and thus rejection of the application
under Order 33 CPC on account of no cause of action is without
any basis.
13.
With regard to the indigency of the appellant, he submitted
that he owns no property, house, agricultural land, source of
livelihood, assets or any other source of income, sufficient
enough, to pay the court fees. He merely survives on the
humanitarian aid provided by her aged mother who is also
surviving on the minimal pension received by her. Moreover, he
has only one bank account as primary holder which also has
negligible balance and thus, the court fees i.e. approximately
Rs.93,00,000/- is wholly beyond the means of the appellant to
pay, keeping in view his meagre source of income.
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
14.
(7 of 16)
[CMA-3881/2024]
The appellant lastly submitted that the learned Trial Court
erred while assuming that as he was a qualified doctor, he
definitely had the earning capacity to survive, but it cannot be sole
ground to hold the appellant as indigent person. The appellant
relied on the Judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Mathai M. Paikeday vs C.K.Anthony; (2011) 13 SCC 174
wherein it has been held that the test of indigency is whether the
applicant possesses sufficient means to pay court fee. The
employment status or hypothetical earning capacity is irrelevant
and what matters is actual possession of realizable assets by
which a person can pay the required court fees.
15.
The appellant in person further submitted that in pursuance
of the order of the Court, he had duly submitted the required
affidavits under Order 33 CPC before the learned Trial Court
wherein he has clarified that he is neither in possession of any
property or source of livelihood nor has any means to pay the
requisite court fees. The appellant, thus, submitted that he
squarely qualifies as indigent person as per the parameters of
Order 33 CPC and the learned Trial Court wrongly dismissed his
application as the refusal was wholly untenable and contrary to
evidence available on record.
16.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents,
while supporting the impugned order, submitted that the learned
Trial Court rightly arrived at the conclusion that the appellant was
not found to be an indigent; he had no cause of action to file the
suit and the suit filed by the appellant was time barred. Learned
counsel submitted that the appellant has utterly failed to disclose
his sources of income as required under the provisions of Order 33
(8 of 16)
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
[CMA-3881/2024]
CPC rather he has concealed crucial information from the Court
regarding his sources of income. Moreover, the appellant a Doctor
by profession and is in possession of a highly professional degree,
which is sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that he has the
sufficient means to earn a livelihood and is thus, capable to even
pay the requisite court fees.
17.
Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that
if the appellant was in actuality suffering from indigency, why was
he residing in a metropolitan city like Jaipur and not at his native
place. Further, to prove that he had meagre sources of income, he
ought to have been registered in any beneficial scheme of the
State Agencies such as Jan Adhar Card or Below Poverty Line
Card. However, the appellant has not placed on record any such
registration to prove factum of indigency. The appellant also
averred that he was under debts due to the multiple proceedings,
but has failed to place on record any such document to prove the
loans incurred by him due to the legal proceedings.
18.
Learned counsel for the respondents thus, submitted that the
appellant has failed to discharge the statutory burden cast upon
him under Order 33 CPC, which squarely lies on the appellant to
establish
the
suppression
of
inability
to
pay
the
court
fees
.
Moreover,
essential
facts
and
their
non-disclosure
is
considered as fatal to the proceedings. In the present case, the
appellant has deliberately withheld material facts, which were
necessary for adjudication, such as facts pertaining to him
receiving financial assistance from his mother, inheritance rights
after demise of his father, ownership/possession of residential
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
(9 of 16)
[CMA-3881/2024]
property at Hanumangarh, unexplained bank credits amounting to
Rs.4,61,000/- and recurring deposits and withdrawals.
19.
It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the appellant had no cause of action to file the
present suit as prima facie there was no loss of income. There was
legally no enforceable cause of action, but merely speculative, and
hypothetical claims based on assumed future earnings allegedly
lost due to events that occurred in the year 1991. Thus, merely on
the basis of surmises and conjectures and speculative future
earnings in the absence of any proximate or certain cause of loss,
there can’t be a suit for damages. He, thus, contended that it was
evident from the pleadings that no material fact constituting cause
of action, the reliefs that were prayed for were not on based on
enforceable rights and the pleadings were merely narrative in
nature rather than being juridical.
20.
Learned counsel for the respondents furthermore while
arguing on the point of indigency argued that the permitting
indigent suit in a proceeding where claim is in crores would
amount to abuse of process as it would weaponize the poverty
jurisdiction and would never advance the cause of access to
justice as any person merely on basis of speculations and decade
old allegations would approach the Court.
21.
Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that
the suit of the appellant was prima facie time barred as all the
events narrated by the appellant pertained to the year 1991 and
the limitation provided for filing the suit for damages and
defamation is one year. He placed reliance on Article 72 of the
Schedule and Section 9 of the Act of 1963 which contemplates the
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
(10 of 16)
[CMA-3881/2024]
time from which the period begins to run and the continuous
running of time, respectively. As averred in the plaint, the
appellant faced discrimination from the respondents in the year
1991, he however approached the Court in 2008 and has no lucid
explanation for the delay in approaching the Court for interregnum
period from 1991 to 2008. Hence, the claim of the appellant is
hopelessly barred by limitation.
22.
Learned counsel for the respondents lastly while dealing with
the issue of extension of limitation period submitted that the
appellant had merely claimed extension on the ground that he was
denied the payment of compensation sought by him through legal
notices served. However, it is a settled position of law that the
parleys and correspondences between the parties do not enlarge
the limitation.
23.
Having heard the parties at length, this Court has carefully
and thoroughly perused the record of the case, including the
pleadings, the reports submitted during the inquiry under Order
33 CPC, the affidavits and documents filed by the appellant, as
well as the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court.
24.
It is a settled principle of law that the provisions of Order 33
CPC are enacted as a facet of access to justice. The object of the
said provisions is to ensure that a person who is unable to pay the
prescribed court fee is not denied the opportunity of approaching
the Court for adjudication of his rights. The expression “indigent
person’’ under Order 33 CPC has to be construed in a pragmatic
and liberal manner, keeping in view the economic realities of the
applicant and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
legislation.
(11 of 16)
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
25.
[CMA-3881/2024]
Under Rule 1 of Order 33 CPC, a person is said to be an
indigent person, if he is not possessed of sufficient means, other
than the property exempt from attachment in execution of a
decree and the subject matter of the suit, to enable him to pay
the fee prescribed by law. The inquiry contemplated under the
said provision is confined to the financial capacity of the applicant
to pay the court fee and not to the merits of the claim, except to
the limited extent as provided under the provision itself.
26.
The jurisprudence evolved around Order 33 CPC makes it
clear that the test of indigency is the actual possession of
realizable assets or means at the time of presentation of the
application sufficient enough to pay the court fees. The Court is
required to examine the nature of the property owned by the
applicant, his source of income, liabilities, dependents, and other
relevant circumstances to ascertain whether he is in a position to
pay
the
requisite
court
fee.
Hypothetical
earning
capacity,
speculative future income or the mere fact that the applicant
possesses a professional qualification cannot, by itself, be a
ground to deny the benefit under Order 33 CPC.
27.
It is equally well settled that the inquiry under Order 33 CPC
is summary in nature and confined to the limited question of
indigency. While conducting such inquiry, the Court must rely upon
the
reports
of
the
concerned
authorities,
affidavits,
and
documentary material produced on record. Unless the documents
are found to be false, fabricated or deliberately suppressed, the
Court ought not to reject the application on conjectures or
assumptions.
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
28.
(12 of 16)
[CMA-3881/2024]
Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, it is evident from the record that the appellant had moved
an application under Order 33 CPC before the learned Trial Court.
Upon conducting an inquiry and on the basis of the report of the
Reader of the court, the learned Additional District Judge No. 9,
Jaipur Metropolitan-I, vide order dated 06.07.2022, had declared
the appellant as an indigent person and notices were issued to the
respondents.
29.
The said order dated 06.07.2022 was challenged by the
respondents by way of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13103/2022,
wherein the order dated 29.03.2023 came to be passed, setting
aside the order dated 06.07.2022 and remanding the matter for
fresh consideration.
30.
From the record it is clear that in pursuance of the order
dated 29.03.2023 of this Court, the learned Trial Court gave
opportunity to defendant no. 2- Shri. H L Arora to file reply to the
application under Order 33 Rule 1,2 and 3 filed by the applicant.
However, in the order sheet dated 27.07.2023 of the learned Trial
Court, it is recorded that defendant no. 2 did not want to file any
reply. Further, in pursuance of the order dated 29.03.2023, trial
court found that the inquiry earlier made was by a incompetent
official i.e Reader of the Court and thus, directed fresh inquiry to
be conducted by the Chief Ministerial officer of the learned Trial
Court, which is mandatory requirement as per Order 33 Rule 1A
CPC.
31.
In the said inquiry, as many as nine specific parameters were
framed, namely: ownership of immovable property; movable
assets; bank accounts; PAN and income tax returns for last five
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
(13 of 16)
[CMA-3881/2024]
years; sale or purchase of property in last seven years; possession
of BPL/Aadhar/Ration cards; loans from relatives or friends;
details of rented accommodation and expenditure thereon; and
any other source of income. Necessary documents were also
sought from the concerned authorities to verify the said aspects.
32.
In the inquiry, the applicant-appellant submitted an affidavit
along with supporting documents. The Tehsildar, Hanumangarh,
certified that no agricultural or residential property stood in the
name of the applicant-appellant. The Income Tax Department
reported that no PAN was registered in his name and no income
tax returns had been filed for the last five years. It also emerged
that the applicant-appellant had only about Rs.15,000/- in his
bank account and the amount of Rs.4,51,463/- received upon the
death of his father had already been distributed amongst family
members and other beneficiaries. No sale or purchase of property
in the last seven years was reported. The applicant-appellant
possessed only an Aadhar and ration card in the name of his
father. He was residing in a rented accommodation in Jaipur and
had no independent source of income, surviving only on financial
assistance from his mother.
33.
The Chief Ministerial Officer, after considering the responses
and documents, submitted a report dated 12.03.2024 confirming
the aforesaid facts on all the nine parameters. The learned Trial
Court, vide order dated 01.06.2024, recorded that prima facie the
applicant-appellant appears to be an indigent person in light of the
report, though the matter was kept to be decided after hearing
both the parties. The order sheet dated 01.06.2024 is reproduced
below:
(14 of 16)
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
[CMA-3881/2024]
”cdqyk; i{kdkjku mifLFkrA cgl lquh xbZ] i=koyh dk voyksdu fd;k
x;kA ek-jkt-m-U;k;k- ds ,l- ch-flfoy fjV fiVh’ku uEcj 13103@2022 MkW,p-,y- vjksMk cuke MkW- xqjnhi flag ds ekeys esa fn;s x;s vkns’k fnukad
29-03-2023 esa ikfjr funsZ’kksa ds vuqlkj oknh xqjnhi flag ds laca/k esa vkns’k
33 fl-iz-la- dh tkap ds rgr ;g ns[kuk gS fd D;k og nkos ds U;k;’kqYd
dks vnk djus ds fy, Ik;kZIr lk/ku ugha j[krk gSA bl Øe esa oknh us vkns’k
33 fu;e 2 fl-iz-la- ds rgr py vpy lEifRr;ksa ds laxr ewY;
(corresponding value) dks izdV fd;k gSA oknh us blds fy, fyf[kr
izkFkZuk i= e; lEifRr lwph o e; 'kiFk i= dks is’k fd;k gSA bl lwph dh
tkap ds laca/k esa U;k;ky; }kjk iwoZ esa gh eq[; fyfid oxhZ; vf/kdkjh ls tks
fjiksVZ izkIr gqbZ gS] mlds ijh{k.k ls izdV gksrk gS fd oknh xqjnhi ds uke
mlds x`g ftys guqekux<+ esa dksbZ d`f"k Hkwfe ;k lEifRr ugha gSA oknh ds
cSad [kkrs esa Hkh vf/kdre 4]51]463-81 #i;s dk Mh-Mh- tek gksuk izdV gksrk
gS tks mls mlds firk dh e`R;q ds mijkar [kkrs esa crkSj ukWfeuh izkIr gksuk
izdV gqvk gS] mls Hkh pkj fgLlksa esa ckaVk tkuk izdV fd;k gSA oknh }kjk
xr ikap o"kksZa esa vk;dj fooj.kh Hkh izLrqr ugha djuk izdV gksrk gSA vxj
xqjnhi flag us dksbZ lEifRr Ø; dh gks rks ;g Hkh izdV ugha gksrk gS] D;ksafd
mlus Lo;a us ,slk 'kiFk i= is’k fd;k fd mlus fiNys 7 o"kksZa esa dksbZ vpy
lEifRr foØ; ugha dh gSA oknh dk dksbZ ch-ih-,y- dkMZ ugha cuk gSA jk’ku
dkMZ Hkh mlds firk ds uke ls cuk gSA mlus viuk [kpkZ Hkh viuh ekrk ls
izkIr djuk 'kiFk i= esa dgk gSA MkW- xqjnhi flag t;iqj esa fdjk;s ds edku
esa jgrk gS] blds leFkZu esa fdjk;kukek dh izfr is’k dh gS mldk dksbZ
jkstxkj ugha gksuk] dkuwuh ekeyksa esa yEcs le; ls my>s jgus ls LFkk;h
jkstxkj ugha gksuk dFku fd;s x;s gSaA bl laca/k esa izkFkfed rkSj ij ladfyr
dh xbZ lk{; ls ;g izFken`"V~;k izdV gksrk gS fd oknh ds ikl U;k;’kqYd
vnk djus ds fy, Ik;kZIr lk/ku ugha gS] ijUrq bl laca/k esa i{kdkjksa dks lquk
tkdj gh vkns’k 33 fu;e 5 fl-iz-l-a ds rgr vfxze dk;Zokgh ds laca/k esa
fu"d"kZ fn;k tk ldrk gSA vr% foi{khx.k dks uksfVl tkjh dj ;k lwpuk
nsdj ryc fd;k tk,A
i=koyh okLrs lquokbZ ckcr vkns’k 33 fu;e 5 fl-iz-la- fnukad 02-072024 dks is’k gksA”
34.
Thereafter,
a
bare
perusal
of
the
order
sheet
dated
02.07.2024 reveals that the learned Trial Court ordered for
issuance of notice to respondents by registered post under Order
(15 of 16)
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
Rule
(Wrongly
mentioned
[CMA-3881/2024]
as
Order
Rule
but
subsequently corrected vide order sheet dated 06.07.2024). Thus,
the learned Trial Court proceeded under Order 33 Rule 6 and
hence was required to permit the parties to adduce evidence as
required under Order 33 Rule 6 CPC, but this Court on perusal of
the record finds that the learned Trial Court on 02.07.2024,
refused the application of defendant no. 8 , who wanted to adduce
evidence, to disprove the case of the plaintiff and thus violated the
provision of Order 33 Rule 6 CPC.
35.
This Court is also of the opinion that after the order dated
01.06.2024 is passed, and notice under order 33 rule 6 having
been issued, without permitting defendant no. 8 to disprove the
indigency of the applicant- appellant, could not have dismissed the
application by applying the provisions of Order 33 Rule 5, as
before passing any order under Order 33 Rule 7, a compliance of
Order 33 Rule 6 giving opportunity to disprove ought to have been
given.
36.
This Court also on perusal of the order sheet dated
09.05.2024 finds that the applicant-appellant had stated that
whatever information has been collected by the Inquiry Officer
may be treated as evidence and no further evidence is required to
be given. Thus, if the learned Trial Court had permitted defendant
no. 8 to disprove the material available on record in order to
decide the application of the applicant-appellant as an indigent
person, then this Court would have directly decided the present
appeal on merits as there is sufficient material of the appellant
being an indigent person and to the effect that the appellant had
clearly disclosed the cause of action in the suit and had also
[2026:RJ-JP:5808]
(16 of 16)
[CMA-3881/2024]
disclosed as to how the suit was within limitation. But since, no
opportunity was given to the defendant no. 8 to disprove the fact
of applicant not being an indigent person, this Court therefore,
refrains itself from passing order on merits and deems it
appropriate to remand the matter back to the learned Trial Court
to give an opportunity to the defendants to disprove the case of
the applicant in regard to indigency.
35.
Accordingly, the present appeal is hereby partly allowed.
The impugned order dated 20.07.2024 passed by the learned
Additional District Judge No. 9, Jaipur Metropolitan-I, in Civil Misc.
Case No. 25/2022 is quashed and set aside.
36.
The matter is remanded back to the learned Trial Court to
give opportunity to the defendants to disprove the application of
applicant-plaintiff as required under Order 33 Rule 6 CPC and
thereafter, pass an order as per the provisions of Order 33 Rule 7
CPC. The learned Trial Court shall complete this exercise within
period of two months from the date of receipt of the certified copy
of this order. The trial court shall not be influenced by this order in
any manner while deciding the appellants application.
37.
The record of the learned Trial Court along with the copy of
this order be sent immediately to the learned Trial Court. All
parties are directed to remain present before the learned Trial
Court on 23.02.2026.
38.
No order as to costs.
39.
All pending applications stand disposed of.
(BIPIN GUPTA),J
Anandtanwar/1
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