The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
19. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Neeru Rajput And Ors vs Punam Suri President Dav College2 has further reiterated that an injunction directing continuation of employment or professional engagement cannot be granted in view of Section 14(1)(b) read with Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Courts have consistently recognized only limited exceptions to the aforesaid rule, namely: (i) employment under the State or its instrumentalities governed by constitutional or statutory safeguards, (ii) cases falling within the ambit of industrial or labour jurisprudence, and (iii) employment under a statutory body where termination is in violation of CCP(S) No. 242/2025 in MA No. 32/2025 - 16 - RFA No. 2877 of 2025 mandatory statutory provisions. Admittedly, the plaintiff does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions.
20. In the light of the authoritative pronouncements rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High Courts, which are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, it becomes manifest that the plaintiff seeks reliefs which are expressly barred by statute. Even if every averment made in the plaint is assumed to be true, no decree for reinstatement or mandatory injunction could ever be granted. The suit, therefore, is clearly barred by law and does not disclose any cause of action warranting a full-fledged trial. In such circumstances, the Trial Court has rightly exercised its jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure in rejecting the plaint at the threshold, thereby preventing abuse of the process of Court and avoiding needless protraction of civil litigation. This Court finds no infirmity or perversity in the impugned order. Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered in the 'Affirmative'. - 17 - RFA No. 2877 of 2025
21. Point No.(ii) :- For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds to pass the following; (i) The appeal is dismissed. (ii) The order passed by the trial Court rejecting the plaint is hereby confirmed. (iii) It is clarified that the rejection of plaint shall not preclude the plaintiff/Party-in-Person if so advised from seeking appropriate relief for damages in accordance with law subject to limitation. (iv) No order as to cost. SD/(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM)
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
-1-
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.2877 OF 2025 (INJ)
BETWEEN:
DR.DEBAJYOTHI MANDAL
SON OF LATE DR.PRABODH KUMAR MANDAL
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
RESIDING AT
SUN CITY APARTMENTS
FLAT NO.1001, BLOCK 17
IBBALURU
SARJAPUR OUTER RING ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 102
…APPELLANT
(BY SRI.DR.DEBAJYOTHI MANDAL, APPELLANT
- PARTY-IN-PERSON)
AND:
FORTIS HOSPITAL LIMITED
NO.14, CUNNINGHAM ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 052.
REPRESENTED BY
1.
SRI.CHANDRASEKHAR R
FACILITY DIRECTOR
2.
DR.VIVEKANAND JAWALI
CHAIRMAN
DEPARTMENT OF CARDIOVASCULAR SCIENCES
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.SHIRISH KRISHNA, ADVOCATE FOR R.1 AND R.2)
-2-
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SEC.96 OF CPC., AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 4.07.2025 PASSED ON IA NO.3 IN
O.S.NO.6111/2023 ON THE FILE OF I ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, (CCH-02), BENGALURU CITY., ALLOWING THE
IA NO.3 FILED UNDER ORDER 7 RULES 11(a) AND (d) R/W SEC.151
OF CPC., FOR REJECTION OF PLAINT AND ETC.
THIS APPEAL HAS BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT
ON
22.01.2026,
THIS
DAY,
JUDGMENT
WAS
PRONOUNCED THEREIN, AS UNDER:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
CAV JUDGMENT
Though this appeal is listed for admission, with the
consent
of
party-in-person
and
learned
counsel
for
respondent Nos.1 and 2, this matter is heard and reserved
for judgment.
2. The captioned appeal is directed against the order
dated 04.07.2025 passed in O.S.No.6111/2023 by the trial
Court on I.A.No.3 filed by the defendant under Order VII
Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Civil Procedure Code thereby
rejecting the plaint.
-3-
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
3. For the sake of brevity, the ranks of the parties
are referred as they are ranked before the Trial Court.
4. Facts leading to the case are as under;
The plaintiff has instituted the present suit seeking a
direction to the defendant–Hospital to reinstate him into
service and to restore all attendant monetary benefits by
way of a mandatory injunction, together with full back
wages and consequential benefits.
5.
The plaintiff, in the plaint, asserts that he is a
qualified Cardiothoracic Surgeon with over six years of
professional experience, having obtained a Post-Graduate
M.S.Degree in General Surgery, and that he was felicitated
by the American College of Cardiology in the year 2020.
It
is
his
specific
case
that
the
defendant–Hospital,
represented by its Facility Director, Mr. Anand Angadi, and
its Chairman, Dr. Vivekanand Jawali, being fully aware of
his professional credentials and experience, held several
rounds of discussions with him. Consequent upon such
deliberations,
the
defendant
offered
the
plaintiff
-4-
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
engagement as a Consultant in Cardiothoracic Surgery,
pursuant
to
which
an
employment
contract-cum-
appointment letter came to be executed by both parties on
26.05.2023.
6.
The
premature
gist
of
the
termination
of
plaintiff’s
his
grievance
engagement,
is
the
which,
according to him, is in breach of the terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract. The plaintiff contends that the
unilateral termination of his services is contrary to Clause
No.11 of the contract and amounts to rescission of
contractual obligations without adherence to the agreed
procedure. It is further alleged that the manner in which
the termination was effected caused humiliation and injury
to
his
professional
standing,
thereby
necessitating
institution of the present suit.
7. The defendant–Hospital, represented by its Facility
Director and Chairman, upon service of summons, entered
appearance and filed an application under Order VII Rule
11(a) and (d) read with Sections 9 and 151 of the Code of
-5-
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
Civil Procedure seeking rejection of the plaint. The
principal contention urged therein is that, even assuming
the plaint averments to be true in their entirety, the reliefs
sought are barred by law, inasmuch as the contract in
question is one of personal service, determinable in
nature, and expressly not an employment contract, and
therefore incapable of enforcement through a civil court. It
is contended that the suit is barred under the provisions of
the Specific Relief Act and consequently not maintainable.
8.
The Trial Court, after affording opportunity of
hearing to both parties, by the impugned order, allowed
the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 and rejected
the plaint. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff has
preferred the present appeal.
9. This Court has heard the plaintiff-party appearing
in person and the learned counsel appearing for the
defendant. The records have been carefully perused, with
particular emphasis on the averments made in the plaint.
-6-
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
10. Upon consideration of the rival submissions, the
following points arise for consideration:
(i)
Whether the Trial Court was justified in
rejecting the plaint under Order VII
Rule 11(a) and (d) read with Sections 9
and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
on the ground that the suit seeks
enforcement of a contract of personal
service barred under Sections 14(1)(b),
14(1)(c)
and
Section
41(e)
of
the
Specific Relief Act, 1963?
(ii)
What order?
Findings on Point No.(i):-
11. Before this Court averts to the plaintiff's case,
it would be apposite for this Court to advert to the
pleadings and prayer sought in the plaint.
The relevant
paragraph of the plaint and the prayer sought in the plaint
are extracted, which reads as under;
"9.
The termination of clause No.11 of the
contract, form 1 to 5 envisages and explicit reasons
for immediate termination, but in case of the
-7-
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
plaintiff, the said clauses of termination are not
mentioned in the "one-liner termination mail' dated
04.07.2023. Hence, the action of the defendants in
terminating the services of the plaintiff from the said
Hospital is one-sided, opposed to the principles of
natural justice, illegal labour practice and also in
gross violation of the termination clauses mentioned
in
Clause
No.11
of
the
employment
contract
agreement dated 26.05.2023.
10.xxxxx.
11.xxxx
12.
The plaintiff submits that it is very
pertinent to note that the plaintiff had been residing
and practicing in West Bengal and had been
registered with the West Bengal Medical Council
bearing 61899 dated 10.07.2006.
In view of call
from the defendants to joint the said hospital, the
plaintiff was constrained to shift from West Bengal
to Karnataka and got his name registered in the
Karnataka Medical Council bearing No.161636 dated
09.07.2023 and the same is produced before the
Honourable Court as Document No.8.
In view of
voluntary call from the defendants to the plaintiff to
joint their hospital, the plaintiff was under the
impression that the defendants wishes to have a
long term association of 2 years as mentioned in the
contract, and jointed the services and shifted his
-8-
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
base from West Bengal to Karnataka.
Hence the
subsequent developments by the defendants is
abruptly terminating the services of the plaintiff
without any notice or valid reasons is nothing but a
breach of contract between the plaintiff and the
defendants. The defendants of course have paid the
plaintiff two months salary along with termination of
services, but the plaintiff will not be disentitled to
seek relief sought for in this suit.
Hence, the
plaintiff filed the present suit for the relief of seeking
restoration of his services in the defendant hospital
by reinstatement. Hence, the plaintiff is left with no
other option than to file the present suit for the
reliefs set out in the plaint.
13. The cause of action for the suit arose on
26th day of May 2023, when the plaintiff was
appointed by the defendants by signed contract, and
on 12th day of June, 2023, when the plaintiff joined
the services in the said hospital as per the contract,
and on 04th day of July, 2023, when the plaintiff was
terminated by "one-liner mail" by the defendants,
and on 19th day of July, 2023, when the notice
seeking reinstatement was issued by the plaintiff,
and subsequently on 5th day of August 2023, when
the defendants issued an untenable reply is well
within jurisdiction of this Honourable Court.
-9-
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
PRAYER
Wherefore,
Honourable
Court
the
plaintiff
may
be
prays
pleased
that
to
this
pass
a
judgment and decree against the defendants in
favour of the plaintiff as under:
a)
Directing the defendants to reinstate the
services of the plaintiff in the said hospital as he
was appointed initially in the same rank/designation
including financial benefits, by means of mandatory
injunction with full back wages and consequential
benefits.
b)
And grant such other reliefs as this
Honourable Court may deed fit to grant including
cost of this suit, in the interest of justice and
equity."
(emphasis supplied)
12. A conjoint reading of the plaint averments
unmistakably discloses that the plaintiff was engaged as a
Consultant in the Department of Cardiothoracic Surgery at
the defendant–Hospital. The defendant, upon entering
appearance, has filed an application seeking rejection of
the plaint, contending that the suit does not disclose any
- 10 -
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
cause of action and that the reliefs sought therein are
expressly barred by law. The principal ground urged by the
defendant is that the engagement letter relied upon by the
plaintiff constitutes a contract of personal service, which is
not specifically enforceable in view of the embargo
contained under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963.
13. This Court has carefully perused the plaint
averments as well as the engagement letter dated
26.05.2023. A plain and meaningful reading of the said
engagement letter clearly establishes that the plaintiff was
engaged purely in the capacity of a Consultant to render
professional medical services to the defendant–Hospital
and
not
as
a
regular
engagement,
duties
framework
governing
employee.
entrusted
the
and
The
nature
the
contractual
relationship
of
unmistakably
indicate that the contract is founded upon personal
qualifications, skill and volition of the parties.
- 11 -
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
14.
Before
proceeding
to
examine
the
legal
consequences flowing from such engagement, this Court
deems it appropriate to extract Clause 11(a) and Clause
11(b) of the engagement contract dated 26.05.2023,
which read as under:
"11. TERMINATION
(a)
This engagement shall be terminated by
either party upon 2 month(s) prior written
notice to the other.
(b)
This engagement shall be terminated with
immediate effect upon the occurrence of
any of the following:
(i)
Death of the engaging doctor;
(ii)
Your providing false, inaccurate or
incomplete
information
Company
regarding
background
(including
limited
to
background),
your
to
the
your
but
not
educational
registration
and/or
previous engagement history;
(iii) Your conduct is considered by the
Company
as
detrimental
to
its
interest or in violation of one or
more terms of this engagement
letter,
code
of
conduct
of
the
- 12 -
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
Company or good medical practice
guidelines or you fail to refuse to
carry out your obligations herein;
(iv) Expiry of Registration certificate
issued by Medical Council of India
and/or State Medical Council as the
case may be and the same being
not renewed within stipulated period
as
prescribed
in
terms
of
any
specific regulation or otherwise;
(v) Acceptance of consideration in cash
from any patient (s) for providing
medical services to them in terms of
this Engagement Letter."
15. A plain reading of Clause 11(a) and Clause 11(b)
of the engagement contract unequivocally demonstrates
that both parties were conferred with liberty to terminate
the engagement by issuing notice in terms of the contract.
It is an admitted position, as reflected from paragraph
No.12 of the plaint itself, that the defendant exercised
such contractual right and, in compliance with the terms of
the agreement, paid two months’ service fee to the
plaintiff in lieu of notice. On a holistic reading of the plaint
- 13 -
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
averments and the nature of reliefs sought, it clearly
emerges that the duties undertaken by the plaintiff as a
Medical Consultant necessarily involved personal skill,
specialised professional expertise, clinical judgment, and
independent discretion. Such engagement, by its very
nature, rests upon mutual confidence, trust and volition of
the parties. Consequently, this Court is of the considered
view that the contract in question squarely falls within the
prohibitions enumerated under Section 14 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963.
16.
Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act expressly
declares that contracts which involve performance of
continuous
duties
that
the
Court
cannot
supervise,
contracts
which
are
dependent
upon
personal
qualifications, skill, or volition of the parties, and contracts
which are, by their very nature, determinable, cannot be
specifically enforced. The present contract attracts all the
aforesaid categories. Once the contract itself is rendered
incapable of specific enforcement, the consequential relief
of
mandatory
injunction
directing
reinstatement
into
- 14 -
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
service is legally impermissible and wholly unsustainable in
law.
17.
The statutory bar contained under Section
41(e) of the Specific Relief Act operates with full force in
the
present
case.
The
said
provision
categorically
mandates that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent
the breach of a contract, the performance of which would
not be specifically enforced. When the substantive relief of
enforcing continuation of service is barred by law, the
ancillary
or
auxiliary
relief
of
injunction
necessarily
collapses. A civil court cannot do indirectly what it is
expressly prohibited from doing directly.
18. The law relating to contracts of personal service
is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in
Jitendra Nath Biswas vs. Empire of India and Ceylon
Tea Co. Ltd. and Another1, has authoritatively held that
an employee of a private establishment, whose services
are terminated, cannot seek reinstatement or back wages
(1989) 3 SCC 582
- 15 -
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
by instituting a civil suit, as a contract of personal service
is not
specifically
enforceable. The
remedy, if
any,
available to such a person lies only in a claim for damages.
The consistent and settled judicial view is that Courts will
not
enforce
professional
private
contracts
engagement
by
of
employment
granting
reliefs
or
of
reinstatement or continuation of service.
19. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Neeru
Rajput
And
Ors
vs
Punam
Suri
President
Dav
College2 has further reiterated that an injunction directing
continuation of employment or professional engagement
cannot be granted in view of Section 14(1)(b) read with
Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Courts
have consistently recognized only limited exceptions to the
aforesaid rule, namely: (i) employment under the State or
its
instrumentalities
governed
by
constitutional
or
statutory safeguards, (ii) cases falling within the ambit of
industrial or labour jurisprudence, and (iii) employment
under a statutory body where termination is in violation of
CCP(S) No. 242/2025 in MA No. 32/2025
- 16 -
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
mandatory statutory provisions. Admittedly, the plaintiff
does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions.
20. In the light of the authoritative pronouncements
rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High
Courts, which are squarely applicable to the facts of the
present case, it becomes manifest that the plaintiff seeks
reliefs which are expressly barred by statute. Even if every
averment made in the plaint is assumed to be true, no
decree for reinstatement or mandatory injunction could
ever be granted. The suit, therefore, is clearly barred by
law and does not disclose any cause of action warranting a
full-fledged trial. In such circumstances, the Trial Court
has rightly exercised its jurisdiction under Order VII Rule
11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure in rejecting
the plaint at the threshold, thereby preventing abuse of
the process of Court and avoiding needless protraction of
civil litigation. This Court finds no infirmity or perversity in
the impugned order. Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered
in the 'Affirmative'.
- 17 -
RFA No. 2877 of 2025
21.
Point No.(ii) :- For the foregoing reasons,
this Court proceeds to pass the following;
ORDER
(i)
The appeal is dismissed.
(ii)
The order passed by the trial Court
rejecting
the
plaint
is
hereby
confirmed.
(iii) It is clarified that the rejection of
plaint
shall
not
preclude
the
plaintiff/Party-in-Person if so advised
from seeking appropriate relief for
damages
in
accordance
with
law
subject to limitation.
(iv) No order as to cost.
SD/(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM)
JUDGE
NBM
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