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2024:MLHC:865
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 304 of 2018
Date of Decision: 20.09.2024
1. Shri. Diwan A. Sangma,
Village Rangmalgre
Aking No. III-28(5),
P.O. Rongmatchok.
West Garo Hills District,
Meghalaya.
2. Smti. Winji Ch. Marak,
Village Rangmalgre
Aking No. III-28(5),
P.O. Rongmatchok.
West Garo Hills District,
Meghalaya.
……..Petitioners
-Versus1.
The Chief Executive Member,
Garo Hills Autonomous District
Council, Tura, Meghalaya.
1(A). Secretary to the Executive Committee,
GHADC.
2.
The Executive Member,
In-Charge Land and Revenue,
Garo Hills Autonomous District
Council, Tura, Meghalaya.
3.
Shri. Mingseng Ch. Marak,
S/o Late Tonang Sangma,
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Village Rangmalgre,
P.O. Rongmatchok,
West Garo Hills District,
Meghalaya.
4.
Smti. Watje Ch. Marak,
Village Rangmalgre,
P.O. Rongmatchok,
West Garo Hills District,
Meghalaya.
……..Respondents
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
: Mr. E.B. Sangma, Adv.
Mr. S. Changkija, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. S. Dey, SC, GHADC (For R 1 & 2)
Mr. S. Deb, Adv. (For R 4)
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT
1.
The petitioners, said to be the Nokma of Rangmalgre III-28(5)
Aking have approached this Court with this instant petition on being
aggrieved by the order of the respondent No. 2/Executive Member, Garo
Hills Autonomous District Council, Tura dated 23.08.2016 whereby the
registration of the Nokmaship of the petitioners have been cancelled, and
also by the order dated 23.03.2018 passed by the respondent No. 1/Chief
Executive Member, Garo Hills Autonomous District Council, Tura, who
2024:MLHC:865
has upheld the said order dated 23.08.2016 in appeal.
2.
Heard Mr. E.B. Sangma, learned counsel for the petitioners who
has submitted that the petitioner No. 2 belongs to the ‘Chambugong Clan’
coming from the lineage of the genealogical tree of the Rangmalgre III28(5) Aking Nokma family, being the biological daughter of late Rakji
Marak who was the daughter of late Gatran Sangma and late Watme
Marak Mechik (female) who were the then Nokma of Rangmalgre III28(5).
3.
The learned counsel has further submitted that after the demise of
the last recorded Nokmas of Rangmalgre Aking, Raban Sangma and
Nosing Marak, an application was filed before the respondent No. 2 by
Shri. Duran Marak, the matrilineal uncle of the petitioner No. 2 for
registration of the names of the petitioner No. 2 and her husband as the
Nokma of Rangmalgre III-28(5) Aking. The application was registered as
GDC-30 A/C of 2003-2004. On an enquiry conducted by the Mouzadar
and after complying with all the formalities, a report dated 18.11.2003
was filed by the Mouzadar and the respondent No. 2 on being satisfied
with the same, has accordingly registered the names of the petitioners
herein as the successor Nokmas of Rangmalgre Aking III-28(5) vide
order dated 03.12.2003.
4.
It is also the submission of the learned counsel that on 24.03.2004
a fresh petition under Section 7 and 8(1) of the Garo Hills Autonomous
District (Social Customs and Usages) Validating Act, 1958 was filed by
the respondent No. 3 herein for registration of the name of the petitioner
No. 2 as the Nokma of the said Rangmalgre III-28(5) Aking. The petition
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was registered as GHADC-Rev/33 A.C/2004.
5.
The respondent No. 2 then directed the Mouzadar to conduct a re-
enquiry on the basis of the said petition dated 24.03.2004 and upon
enquiry, a report dated 07.06.2004 was filed, inter alia, indicating therein
that the petitioners herein have already been registered and appointed as
Nokma of the said Rangmalgre Aking. The respondent No. 2 however,
vide order dated 24.08.2004, has directed that notice be issued to the
parties to appear before him. Notice was accordingly issued upon the
petitioner No. 2 only on 01.03.2007 with direction to appear before the
Court of the respondent No. 2 on 07.03.2007.
6.
The learned counsel went on to submit that the petitioners filed
their written statement on 12.04.2007 to which the respondent No. 3 filed
a rejoinder dated 20.09.2007 to the same, however, without seeking leave
to amend his pleadings, has added new set of facts. Again, the petitioner
has filed a counter to this with a prayer for dismissal of the main petition
but the respondent No. 2 proceeded to frame the issues on the basis of the
suggested issues filed by the parties.
7.
The respondent No. 2 after considering the materials before him
including the written statement and rejoinder and on the basis of the
issues framed by him, after hearing the parties had passed the impugned
order dated 23.08.2016, the petitioners being aggrieved by such order
have preferred an appeal before the respondent No. 1/Chief Executive
Member, GHADC the same being registered as GHADC-Rev./Appl. No.
9 of 2016. A rejoinder to the contents in the memo of appeal was filed by
the respondents No. 3 and 4. The respondent No. 1 after hearing the
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parties had vide the impugned judgment and order dated 23.03.2018
upheld the order of the respondent No. 2 dated 23.08.2016. The
petitioners therefore are before this Court with this instant petition
seeking a direction to set aside and quash the impugned judgment and
order dated 23.08.2016 passed by the Executive Member, Incharge
Revenue, GHADC/respondent No. 2 and the impugned judgment and
order dated 23.03.2018 passed by the Chief Executive Member,
GHADC/respondent No. 1.
8.
The learned counsel has contended that the fact that the
petitioners herein have been registered as the Nokma of the said
Rangmalgre III-28(5) Aking vide order dated 03.12.2003 passed by the
court of the respondent No. 2 itself is a matter of record and is a known
fact as far as the proceedings before the successor/respondent No. 2 is
concerned, as such, the said order having attained finality with no appeal
preferred against the same at the relevant point of time, the respondent
No. 2 vide the impugned judgment and order dated 23.08.2016 could not
have reopened the case on the same facts and circumstances and also on
the same cause of action. The respondent No. 2 not being conferred with
the power of review under the Garo Hills Autonomous District (Social
Customs and Usages) Validating Act, 1958 could not have passed the
impugned order which in essence is a review of the earlier order dated
03.12.2003 (supra) since the power of review is not an inherent power.
The case of Patel Narshi Thakershi & Ors. v. Shri. Pradyumansinghji
Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844, para 4 has been cited in this regard.
9.
The learned counsel has also submitted that the respondent No. 2
had rejected the amendment application filed by the respondent No. 3
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vide order dated 14.06.2012 however, in the impugned judgment and
order dated 23.08.2016 the respondent No. 2 has reconsidered the
contents of the amendment application which fact was reflected in the
said order, which could not have been done so without giving the
petitioners an opportunity to response to such application at the relevant
point of time. In the context of this contention, the learned counsel has
cited the case of A.K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley
Corporation, (1966) 1 SCR 796, para 28.
10.
The learned counsel has reiterated that the order dated 03.12.2003
confirming the status of the petitioners as Nokma of the said Aking in
question, the same could not be disturbed except by a relevant order
passed by a superior court. That the respondent No. 2 vide the said
impugned judgment and order dated 23.08.2016 had cancelled the
Nokmaship of the petitioners, such order or action is ultra vires, illegal
and unjustified and the same cannot escape the scrutiny of law. It is
therefore proper for this Court to set aside and quash the said impugned
order, submits the learned counsel.
11.
Similarly, the appellate authority, that is the respondent No. 1, on
appeal having disregarded the settled issues of facts as far as the status of
the petitioners are concerned and being fully aware of the said order
dated 03.12.2003, have, in a mechanical manner without due application
of mind, in total contravention of the settled principle of justice, equity
and fair play passed the impugned order dated 23.03.2018 which order is
also liable to be dismissed herein, submits the learned counsel.
12.
Mr. S. Dey, learned Standing Counsel, GHADC/respondents No.
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1 and 2 in his submission has recounted the case of the petitioners, that is,
the fact that one Shri. Duran Marak had approached the respondent No. 2
for registration of the names of the petitioners as the Nokma of the said
Rangmalgre III-28(5) Aking, wherein in such application it has been
indicated that the petitioner No. 2 is the daughter of the last recorded
Nokma and as such, is entitled to be named as the said Nokma. However,
this is a suppression of facts inasmuch as the biological daughter of the
last recorded Nokma is Watje Ch. Marak, the respondent No. 4 herein.
The learned Standing Counsel has further submitted that to correct the
anomaly which has occurred in the order dated 03.12.2003 an application
was filed by the respondent No. 3 before the respondent No. 2 seeking
registration of the name of respondent No. 4 as the Nokma though
inadvertently instead of the name “Smti. Watje Ch. Marak” the name
“Smti Winje Ch. Marak” (petitioner No. 2) appeared. However, in course
of the proceedings the respondent No. 3/petitioner had filed an
amendment petition before the respondent No. 2 to correct the mistake
which was allowed and reflected in the impugned order dated
23.08.2016.
13.
It is also the submission of the learned Standing Counsel that the
proceedings before the respondent No. 2 as far as the petition filed by
respondent No. 4 dated 24.03.2004 have been conducted in a fair and
transparent procedure with the relevant parties being issued notice to
appear before the court of the respondent No. 2 and also the filing of the
objection and rejoinder was allowed. Further, both parties having filed
their suggested issues, the respondent No. 2 had framed the issues on
11.06.2009 and the argument of the parties was accordingly heard.
2024:MLHC:865
14.
On the merits of the case of the parties, while adhering to the
principles found in the Garo customary law wherein the right to inherit
property is vested only in one daughter who becomes the heiress and is
known as the Nokna, the Nokna being the rightful daughter of the Nokma
and as such, in the area of inheritance and lineage vis-à-vis appointment
of Nokma, the court of the respondent No. 2 having come to the findings
that the respondent No. 4 is the biological daughter of the last recorded
Nokma and also that her claim to Nokmaship having secured the
approval of the Maharis who have decided to recommend her name to be
appointed as the Nokma, the decision and findings rendered in the
impugned order dated 23.08.2016 cannot be faulted. In this regard, the
order dated 26.09.2014 passed in the case of Smti. Chellish Sangma &
Anr. v. Smti. Labina Sangma & Ors., in WA No. 43 of 2011 by a Division
Bench of this Court, para 4, 5, and 6 was cited in support of this
contention.
15.
The learned Standing Counsel has also refuted the contention of
the petitioners that the respondent No. 2 has no power or authority to
review its own judgment or order and has submitted that the proceedings
before the court of the respondent No. 2 is to be guided by the spirit of
the Code of Civil Procedure in order to render complete justice to the
parties and as such, there is no infirmity or illegality or even irregularity
in the manner and procedure adopted by the respondent No. 2 in the
passing of the said impugned order dated 23.08.2016. The order dated
21.03.2017 passed by this Court in the case of Shri. Munising T. Sangma
& Ors. v. GHADC & Ors., WP(C) No. 314 of 2014, para 5 is cited in this
regard.
2024:MLHC:865
16.
Mr. S. Deb, learned counsel for the respondents No. 3 and 4
respectively, has submitted that the impugned judgment and order of the
respondent No. 2, who is the Executive Member Incharge of Revenue has
covered all the factual aspects of the case between the contesting parties
and has rightly come to the conclusion that the respondent No. 4 is
rightfully the one who should be made the Nokma of the said
Rangmalgre III-28(5) Aking, the appeal made against this finding also
being deservingly rejected.
17.
Reiterating the factual circumstances of the case, the learned
counsel has submitted that the respondent No. 4 is the rightful daughter
of the last and undisputed Nokmas (L) Raban Sangma and Nosing Marak
and was also chosen by the Chras and Maharis as the successor Nokma
or Nokna. On the other hand, the petitioners having failed to prove their
lineage to the last recorded Nokma, have no vested right to claim the
Nokmaship.
18.
The learned counsel has further submitted that by suppressing and
misrepresentation of facts, the petitioners have got themselves registered
as Nokmas and as such, obtaining an order by way of fraud would render
the said order non est in the eyes of law. Therefore, the order dated
03.12.2003 cannot be sustained, the subsequent petition for registration
of the name of the respondent No. 4/Watje Ch. Marak as the Nokma of
the said Aking in question has been dealt with by the learned Executive
Member Incharge Revenue/respondent No. 2 in the light of the materials
on record leading to the conclusion drawn as is evident in the order dated
23.08.2016 whereby the registration of the names of the petitioners as
Nokmas have been cancelled.
2024:MLHC:865
19.
It is the submission of the learned counsel that the order dated
23.08.2016 passed by the respondent No. 2 has been passed based on
sound principles of Garo customary law in connection with Nokmaship
and after proper appreciation of the materials on record. Due procedure in
terms of the judgment in the case of Dore Sangma, (1988) 2 GLR 120,
has been adhered to, the petitioners having failed to prove their claim or
case in the face of the concurrent findings of the respondent No. 2 and
respondent No. 1 have preferred this instant writ petition without any
merits and the same is liable to be rejected.
20.
This Court, without repeating whatever have been stated as far as
the facts and circumstance of the case of the parties is concerned, except
what is necessary to be stated for the purpose of emphasis, inasmuch as
the same have been elaborately enumerated hereinabove, will consider
the relevant issue(s) to be decided which have a bearing on the claim and
counterclaim of the respective parties herein.
21.
On consideration of the factual matrix of the case of the parties,
what is understood is that Shri. Duran Marak, the matrilineal Uncle of the
petitioner No. 2 approached the Executive Member Incharge Revenue,
GHADC in the year 2003 with a prayer for registration of the name of the
petitioner No. 2 and her husband, the petitioner No. 1 as Nokma of the
said Rangmalgiri Aking III-28(5). After due and proper procedure was
followed, in view of the related report of the Mouzadar, the order dated
03.12.2003 was passed confirming the petitioners as the said Nokmas.
22.
It is also noticed that from the contents of the said order dated
03.12.2003, the Executive Member Incharge Revenue has noted that on
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there being no objections from any quarters and on the statements of the
clan people, the same was passed.
23.
Further, as is evident from records is found the application dated
24.03.2004 filed by Shri. Mingseng Ch. Marak/respondent No. 3 seeking
registration of the name of Smti. Winje Ch. Marak, who is the petitioner
No. 2 herein as the Nokma of the self-same Rangmalgre Aking. This
application was assumed to be an objection to the registration of the
names of the petitioners as Nokmas since the Executive Member has
caused issuance of notices and has also called upon the parties to file
their written statement.
24.
Again, it could not be understood as to how and under what
provision and procedure an application seeking to reinforce the name of
the petitioner No. 2 as Nokma was considered or taken as an application
objecting to such registration. From the impugned order dated
23.08.2016, the Executive Member has observed that after the filing of
the said application dated 24.03.2004 by Shri. Mingseng Ch. Marak, an
application dated 17.05.2012, for amendment of the same was
subsequently filed by Shri. Mingseng Ch. Marak. This amendment
application was however not allowed by the Executive Member vide
order dated 14.06.2012.
25.
However, it is surprising to note that the Executive Member in the
impugned order dated 23.08.2016 has referred to this amendment
application and has allowed the same, by doing so, the whole course of
the case between the parties have been changed inasmuch as according to
the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, such amendment
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seeks to correct the name of “Winji Ch. Marak”, the petitioner No. 2 to
that of “Smti Watje Ch. Marak”, the respondent No. 4 herein, which
would in essence be considered or taken as an application of objection to
the registration of the name of the petitioners as Nokmas, following
which, notices to the contesting parties and filing of written statement
and rejoinder can be allowed. But having rejected the amendment
application, the Executive Member could not have proceeded with the
proceedings culminating in the passing of the said impugned order. The
impugned order dated 23.03.2016 was therefore passed without any basis
and not in accordance with due procedure, the same has even verged on
the threshold of violation of the principle of natural justice as the said
amendment application was not made known to the petitioners who were
parties in the said proceedings before the Executive Member.
26.
This would lead to one conclusion, that is, that the said
application filed by Shri. Mingseng Ch. Marak/respondent No. 3 before
the Executive Member dated 24.03.2004 is an application for review of
the order dated 03.12.2003. However, there being no specific provision of
review under the Garo Hills Autonomous District (Social Customs and
Usages) Validating Act, 1958 and the power to review not being an
inherent power as was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Patel Narshi Thakershi (supra) relied upon by the petitioner, the
Executive Member could not have made such related observations in the
order dated 23.08.2016. The said order is therefore liable to be set aside
and dismissed.
27.
This aspect of the matter was also not noticed or discussed by the
appellate authority, that is, the Chief Executive Member/respondent No. 1
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in his order dated 23.03.2018, also impugned herein.
28.
This Court would not go into the merits of the case of the
respective parties as the respondents herein have collectively argued on
the merits of the case to say that the petitioners have got their names
registered as Nokmas by suppression of facts and therefore the impugned
orders passed are justified in this regard. The reliance of the respondents
No. 1 and 2 on the case of Smti. Chellish Sangma (supra) was also based
on this premise. However, this Court would agree with the petitioners
who have placed reliance on the case of Mohammed Hanif v. State of
Assam, (1969) 2 SCC 782 wherein at para 5, extracts of which is
reproduced herein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:“5. It is true that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
226 is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the High Court not
for the purpose of declaring the private rights of the parties but
for the purpose of ensuring that the law of the land is implicitly
obeyed and that the various tribunals and public authorities are
kept within the limits of their jurisdiction. In other words, the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is a supervisory
jurisdiction, a jurisdiction meant to supervise the work of the
tribunals and public authorities and to see that they act within the
limits of their respective jurisdiction. In a proceeding under
Article 226 the High Court is not concerned merely with the
determination of the private rights of the parties; the only object
to such a proceeding under Article 226 is to ensure that the law of
the land is implicitly obeyed and that various authorities and
tribunals act within the limits of their respective jurisdiction….”
29.
In view of the observations and discussion made hereinabove, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated
23.08.2016 as well as the order dated 23.03.2018 have been passed
beyond jurisdiction and not in conformity with the accepted procedure,
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the same are therefore hereby set aside and quashed. Consequently, the
prayer of the petitioners in this regard is also hereby allowed.
30.
The records as produced by the learned Standing Counsel,
GHADC are hereby also returned to him.
31.
Petition disposed of. No costs.
Judge
TIPRILYNTI KHARKONGOR
Date: 2024.09.20 13:43:28
PDT
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