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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
Crl R No. 25/2026
CrlM No. 625/2026
Reserved on: 16.09.2026
Pronounced on: 25.09.2026
Uploaded on: 25.09.2026
Whether the operative part of Judgment is
Pronounced? FULL
Directorate of Enforcement
….. Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr. S. V. Raju, Additional Solicitor General
(Through Virtual Mode)
Mr. Umar Rahid Wani, Advocate
Mr. Zoheb Hussain, Special Counsel for ED
(Through Virtual Mode)
V/s
Md. Saleem Khan and Others
….. Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Syed Faisal Qadri, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Mir Adnan Zahoor, for R-5
Mr. Shariq J. Reyaz, Advocate for R-2 & 3
Mr. N. A. Ronga, Advocate for R-4
Mr. A. Hanan, Advocate for R-6
Mr. Faizan Ahmad Ganie, CGC for R-7
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR-JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition lays challenge to the order dated 22.03.2026 passed
by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (CBI Cases), Srinagar
(hereinafter referred to as the “Trial Court”), whereby the application,
preferred by the Directorate of Enforcement, Srinagar Office
(hereinafter referred to as the “petitioner”), seeking addition of charges
for offences punishable under Sections 411 and 424 of the Ranbir Penal
Code (“RPC”), came to be dismissed. Challenge is also laid to the order
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dated 30.03.2026, to the extent the aforesaid offences were omitted
while charges were framed against the respondents.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that the charge-sheet presented by the
Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”), arising out of FIR No.
05/2015 registered by CBI, Special Crime-II, New Delhi, for offences
under Sections 120-B, 406 and 409 RPC, itself contains sufficient
material warranting consideration of charges under Sections 411 and
424 RPC as well. According to the petitioner, although it was not a
party to the proceedings and the charge-sheet having been laid by the
CBI, its application merely sought addition of charges in respect of
offences which, as maintained by it, stood disclosed from the material
already forming part of the charge-sheet.
3. It is further contended that this Court as well as the Hon’ble Supreme
Court had granted liberty to the petitioner to move the aforesaid
application. It is submitted that the Trial Court had, by an earlier order,
also upheld the maintainability of the application. In these
circumstances, according to the petitioner, it was not open to the Trial
Court to subsequently dismiss the application on the ground of
maintainability.
4. The petitioner further contends that the finding of the Trial Court that
it lacked locus standi to seek addition of charges is contrary not only to
the Trial Court’s earlier order but also to the orders passed by this Court
and the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Emphasis is placed upon the
observation made by this Court permitting the petitioner to proceed “if
so permitted”, as also upon the liberty subsequently granted by the
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Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is urged that the application seeking addition
of charges was moved pursuant to the aforesaid liberty, which,
according to the petitioner, has not received due consideration at the
hands of the Trial Court.
5. The petitioner, accordingly, assails the impugned order as suffering
from illegality. It is further urged that, even assuming that the petitioner
was a stranger to the criminal proceedings, it was nevertheless entitled
to bring to the notice of the Trial Court that the material placed before
it disclosed, apart from offences under Sections 120-B, 406 and 409
RPC, sufficient grounds for consideration of charges under Sections
411 and 424 RPC. It is also contended that, once the Trial Court had
earlier recognized the maintainability of the application and the
petitioner’s locus to move the same, it could not subsequently revisit
that determination and dismiss the application on the ground of lack of
locus standi, as such a course would amount to an impermissible review
of its own order.
6. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance is placed upon Abdul
Basit v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Choudhary, (2014) 10 SCC 754; Adalat
Prasad, (2004) 7 SCC 338; and Subramanium Sethuraman v. State
of Maharashtra, (2004) 13 SCC 324, to contend that a criminal court
cannot review or recall its own order except where such power is
expressly conferred by law. It is further contended that the impugned
order suffers from non-application of mind inasmuch as the Trial Court
placed reliance upon the judgment rendered in Prakash Industries,
which, according to the petitioner, subsequently came to be set aside by
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the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Enforcement
Directorate v. Prakash Industries, 2025 SCC Online Del 8243.
7. The case, as projected by the petitioner, pertains to the alleged
misappropriation of funds received by the Jammu and Kashmir Cricket
Association (“JKCA”) from the Board of Control for Cricket in India
(“BCCI”) for the development and promotion of cricket in Jammu and
Kashmir. It is stated that the BCCI remitted approximately Rs.112.13
crores to the JKCA and that, during investigation, the CBI found
approximately Rs.43.69 crores thereof to have been allegedly
misappropriated. According to the petitioner, the charge-sheet discloses
that respondent Ahsan Mirza, in conspiracy with the then President of
the JKCA, Dr. Farooq Abdullah; the then General Secretary,
Mohammad Saleem Khan; and bank official, Bashir Ahmad Misger,
allegedly diverted funds belonging to the JKCA into personal accounts
and thereafter utilized the same for private business dealings. It is
alleged that the funds were siphoned off through unauthorized
operations and transactions. The petitioner further asserts that such
diversion was facilitated through unauthorized resolutions and by
obtaining signed cheques on the pretext that payments were to be made
to players, whereas the proceeds thereof were allegedly credited to the
personal account of accused Ahsan Mirza. The funds in question,
according to the petitioner, had been earmarked for the development of
cricket.
8. The petitioner further contends that the offences contemplated under
Sections 411 and 424 RPC arise from, and are intrinsically connected
with, the alleged offences under Sections 406 and 409 RPC. Reference
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is made to Section 410 RPC, which defines “stolen property” so as to
include property in respect of which criminal misappropriation or
criminal breach of trust has been committed. Placing reliance upon Mir
Nagvi Askari v. CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643, it is argued that Sections 410
and 411 RPC would be attracted where funds obtained or diverted
through criminal breach of trust are subsequently received by another
accused with the requisite knowledge. It is further contended that the
alleged participation of the accused persons in the conspiracy and the
attendant circumstances constitute material from which the requisite
knowledge regarding the character and source of the property could be
inferred for the limited purpose of consideration of charge.
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has opposed the petition
and submitted that the proceedings had their genesis in FIR No.
27/2012 dated 10.03.2012, initially registered against two persons,
namely, Mohammad Saleem Khan and Ahsan Mirza, for offences
punishable under Sections 120-B, 406 and 409 RPC. During the
pendency of the investigation, a Public Interest Litigation, being Majid
Yaqoob Dar and Another v. State of J&K and Others, PIL No. 08/2014,
came to be instituted before this Court. By order dated 03.09.2015, this
Court transferred the investigation of the aforesaid FIR to the CBI.
Pursuant thereto, the CBI re-registered the case as RC-5(S)/2015CBI/SCU-V/SC-II/New Delhi dated 21.09.2015, in respect of offences
under Sections 120-B, 406 and 409 RPC.
10. According to the respondents, the investigation conducted by the CBI
did not disclose commission of offences under Sections 411 or 424
RPC. The investigation ultimately culminated in presentation of a
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charge-sheet before the Trial Court against the respondents, wherein
respondent No.5 was arrayed as an accused for the first time. It is
submitted that during the pendency of the proceedings arising out of the
said charge-sheet, the Directorate of Enforcement registered ECIR No.
SRZO/01/2018 on the basis of the CBI case. According to the
respondents, the petitioner proceeded on the premise that Section 120B RPC constituted a scheduled offence under the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”) and, on that basis, assumed
jurisdiction to register the ECIR and initiate proceedings under the
PMLA.
11.It is further submitted that one of the accused, Ahsan Ahmad Mirza,
challenged the proceedings initiated by the petitioner by filing
CRM(M) No. 160/2020 before this Court. The said proceedings were
quashed by this Court upon holding, inter alia, that in absence of a
scheduled offence, the petitioner lacked jurisdiction to register the
ECIR and launch prosecution under Section 3 of the PMLA. While
doing so, however, liberty was reserved to the petitioner to approach
the Trial Court for alteration of charge, if otherwise permissible in law.
12.Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that while
quashing the proceedings initiated by the petitioner, this Court had
specifically adverted to the question of applicability of Sections 411
and 424 RPC. It was observed that the Trial Court, on the basis of the
material collected during investigation and placed before it, would be
free to determine what offences were disclosed against the accused
apart from Sections 120-B, 406 and 409 RPC, and whether offences
under Sections 411 and 424 RPC could also be said to have been made
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out. According to the respondents, this Court had further made it clear
that the petitioner could not be permitted to pre-empt the outcome of
the exercise which the competent criminal court was required to
undertake at the stage of consideration of charge/discharge. It is,
therefore, contended that, on the basis of the charge-sheet presented by
the CBI, the offences disclosed were confined to Sections 120-B, 406
and 409 RPC, none of which, according to the respondents, constituted
a scheduled offence for the purposes of the PMLA in the circumstances
of the case.
13.Learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance upon
Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1586, to contend that an offence under Section 120-B IPC would
constitute a scheduled offence for the purposes of the PMLA only
where the criminal conspiracy alleged is directed towards commission
of an offence which is itself included in the Schedule to the PMLA. It
is further contended that neither the investigation conducted by the CBI
nor the proceedings undertaken by the petitioner had, at any earlier
stage, disclosed commission of offences under Sections 411 and 424
RPC. According to the respondents, it was only after the
pronouncement of the judgment in Pavana Dibbur (supra) that the
petitioner moved an application dated 18.09.2024 before the Trial
Court, invoking Section 216 CrPC and seeking addition of charges
under Sections 411 and 424 RPC.
14.Learned counsel submits that the timing of the application is significant.
According to the respondents, the application was not occasioned by
discovery of any fresh material in the predicate-offence proceedings
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pending before the Trial Court, but was moved after the legal basis upon
which the petitioner had asserted jurisdiction under the PMLA was
affected by the law declared in Pavana Dibbur (supra). It is, therefore,
contended that recourse to Section 216 CrPC was intended to overcome
the jurisdictional impediment faced by the petitioner under the PMLA
by securing addition of offences which are stated to be scheduled
offences. On this premise, it is argued that Section 216 CrPC cannot be
employed as a collateral mechanism to reopen or effectively seek
reconsideration of the investigation already conducted by the CBI.
Supporting the impugned order passed by the Trial Court, learned
counsel submits that the petitioner had failed to sustain the proceedings
initiated against Ahsan Mirza before this Court and that, in the absence
of any scheduled offence forming part of the CBI prosecution, the Trial
Court rightly declined to entertain the petitioner’s application. It is
further contended that, in such circumstances, no proceeds of crime
within the meaning of the PMLA could be attributed to the respondents,
particularly respondent No. 5.
15.Learned counsel further contends that the petitioner cannot supplant or
override the investigative and prosecutorial discretion exercised by the
CBI merely with a view to securing the addition of a scheduled offence
which, according to the respondents, is otherwise not disclosed from
the material on record. It is submitted that, while disposing of the PIL,
the Division Bench of this Court had entrusted the investigation of the
entire matter to the CBI, which, after conducting investigation,
concluded that offences under Sections 120-B, 406 and 409 RPC alone
were made out.The applicability of Sections 411 and 424 RPC is also
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disputed on merits. It is argued that the said provisions contemplate
offences distinct from the principal offence by targeting persons who
receive, retain, deal with or otherwise assist in dealing with property
having the character of stolen property, rather than the principal
offender who is alleged to have committed theft, criminal
misappropriation or criminal breach of trust in respect of such property.
16.On the aforesaid premise, it is contended that the respondents, having
been arraigned as principal offenders for the alleged commission of
offences under Sections 406 and 409 read with Section 120-B RPC,
cannot simultaneously be brought within the ambit of Sections 411 and
424 RPC in respect of the very same property and on the same factual
foundation. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondents has also
referred to Mir Nagvi Askari (supra), which has been relied upon by
the petitioner itself. Particular emphasis is placed upon paragraph 181
of the said judgment to contend that the principle enunciated therein
does not advance the petitioner’s case and, on the contrary, supports the
respondents’ contention regarding the distinct nature and ingredients of
the offence of receiving stolen property vis-à-vis the principal offence,
from which such property derives its character.
17.Heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the record.
18.The Trial Court, in terms of the impugned order, has proceeded to frame
charges against the respondents for offences punishable under Sections
120-B, 406 and 409 RPC. It has, at the same time, observed that any
addition or alteration of charge, if warranted, can be undertaken by the
Court suo motu at any stage of the trial and at any time before
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pronouncement of judgment, particularly after the statements of the
material witnesses have been recorded.
19.The principal challenge urged by the petitioner against the impugned
order is that the Trial Court has negatived its locus standi to maintain
an application seeking addition of charges, without taking into account
the orders passed by this Court as well as by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, whereby liberty had been reserved in favour of the petitioner to
avail the remedy in accordance with law.
20.Attention of this Court has also been invited to the order dated
19.08.2025 passed by the Trial Court. On that occasion, the petitioner
had sought deferment of consideration of its application for addition of
offences on the ground that the main matter was itself listed for
consideration on charge/discharge. In the attending circumstances, the
Trial Court had observed that it could not be said “that the application
of the applicant is not maintainable, when leave has been granted to the
petitioner to apply before this Court for addition of charges”. The
aforesaid observation assumes significance while examining the
subsequent conclusion of the Trial Court that the petitioner lacked locus
standi to maintain such an application.
21.At this stage, it would be apposite to notice the settled principles
governing consideration of a case at the stage of framing of charge. In
Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, AIR 1979 SC 366, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has delineated the parameters within which the
Court is required to exercise its jurisdiction at the stage of charge/
discharge. The Court is required, for the limited purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case has been made out, to consider the material
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placed before it and is vested with the power to sift and weigh such
material for that limited purpose. Where the material gives rise to grave
suspicion against the accused, the Court would be justified in framing
the charge. Conversely, where two views are reasonably possible and
the material gives rise merely to suspicion, as distinguished from grave
suspicion, the Court would be justified in discharging the accused. The
Judge, while exercising such jurisdiction, is not expected to act merely
as a post office or as the mouthpiece of the prosecution. The Court is
required to consider the broad probabilities of the case and the overall
effect of the material and documents placed before it. This exercise,
however, does not extend to undertaking a roving or meticulous enquiry
into the merits and demerits of the prosecution case, which is a matter
for trial.
22.Tested against the aforesaid principles, the manner in which the Trial
Court has dealt with the application preferred by the petitioner requires
consideration. During the course of arguments, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents fairly conceded that, even if the petitioner
were to be regarded as a stranger to the predicate-offence proceedings,
its position could, at the least, be examined from the standpoint of
furnishing information relevant to such proceedings. Reference in this
regard was made to Section 66 of the PMLA to submit that where the
Directorate of Enforcement comes into possession of information or
material which may have a bearing upon investigation of the predicate
offence, such information may be communicated to the investigating
agency concerned. Viewed from this limited perspective, and
particularly when the petitioner had been permitted to move the Trial
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Court, the application could, at the very least, be treated as bringing to
the notice of the Court the petitioner’s contention that the material
already forming part of the CBI charge-sheet disclosed offences under
Sections 411 and 424 RPC as well.
23.The Trial Court was, therefore, required to examine that contention on
its own merits and determine whether the material placed along with
the charge-sheet prima facie disclosed the ingredients of the additional
offences sought to be invoked. The impugned order, however, merely
records a prima facie conclusion regarding the existence of offences
under Sections 120-B, 406 and 409 RPC without specifically
examining the petitioner’s contention as to whether the very same
material also disclosed the ingredients of Sections 411 and 424 RPC.
The issue raised in the application, therefore, did not receive a specific
determination on merits.
24.When confronted with the aforesaid aspect, learned counsel for the
respondents fairly conceded that the Trial Court ought to have
considered the application on its merits and dealt with the contention
regarding applicability of Sections 411 and 424 RPC. The failure to
address this aspect, therefore, renders the impugned order vulnerable to
that extent. During the hearing, the parties were also put to notice that
one possible course available to this Court was to remit the matter to
the Trial Court for fresh consideration of the aforesaid issue. Mr. S. V.
Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, as also learned
Senior Counsel Mr. Syed Faisal Qadri and learned counsel Mr. Shariq
J. Reyaz and Mr. N. A. Ronga, however, fairly submitted that, instead
of remanding the matter, this Court may itself examine the issue and
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correct the error, if any, committed by the Trial Court, particularly as
the material on the basis whereof the question is required to be
determined, is already before the Court.
25.It is in the aforesaid backdrop that this Court proceeds to examine the
petitioner’s contention on merits. There is, however, a preliminary
aspect which requires to be clarified. Once the Trial Court had earlier
recorded that the application moved by the petitioner was maintainable,
having regard to the liberty reserved in its favour by the orders passed
by this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it could not have
subsequently declined to consider the application merely by holding
that the petitioner lacked locus standi, without addressing the effect of
those
orders
and
its
own
earlier
determination
regarding
maintainability.
26.The learned ASGI appearing for the petitioner went a step further and
contended that the orders passed by the superior Courts had, in effect,
recognized the petitioner as an interested and necessary party in
proceedings relating to the scheduled offence. It is, however,
unnecessary to pronounce upon that wider proposition for adjudication
of the present controversy. The limited question requiring consideration
is whether, once the petitioner had been permitted to approach the Trial
Court and had placed before it a contention that the material contained
in the CBI charge-sheet disclosed additional offences, the Trial Court
was required to examine that contention in accordance with the settled
principles governing framing or alteration of charge.
27.The answer to that limited question has necessarily to be in the
affirmative. The grant of liberty to approach the Trial Court did not, by
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itself, establish that offences under Sections 411 and 424 RPC stood
made out, nor could it compel the Trial Court to frame such charges. It
did, however, require the Trial Court to consider the contention placed
before it and independently determine, on the basis of the material
forming part of the record, whether the ingredients of the offences
sought to be added were prima facie disclosed. The matter must,
therefore, now be examined on its substantive merits, bearing in mind
that the CBI charge-sheet presently attributes to the respondents’
offences under Sections 120-B, 406 and 409 RPC and that the question
before this Court is whether the material underlying that charge-sheet
additionally furnishes sufficient basis, at the stage of charge, for
attracting Sections 411 and/or 424 RPC.
28.Admittedly, the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 409 RPC
do not find place in Part A of the Schedule to the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”). The significance of the existence of
a scheduled offence as a jurisdictional foundation for proceedings under
the PMLA is no longer res integra. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v.
Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has explained that the authorities under the PMLA cannot
proceed against a person on a notional or presumptive basis that a
scheduled offence has been committed. The scheduled offence must be
registered with the jurisdictional police or be the subject matter of an
enquiry or trial, including proceedings arising out of a criminal
complaint before a competent forum. Equally, where a person is finally
discharged or acquitted of the scheduled offence, or the criminal
proceedings relating thereto are quashed by a court of competent
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jurisdiction, the foundation for proceeding against such person for
money laundering in relation to property linked to that scheduled
offence would cease to survive.
29.In the present case, the petitioner has questioned the judgment rendered
by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Ahsan Mirza’s case, whereby
the proceedings initiated by the petitioner under Sections 3 and 4 of the
PMLA came to be quashed. The said judgment is stated to be under
challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is, however, not
disputed that there is no stay of the operation of the said judgment as
on date. Consequently, unless altered or stayed by a superior forum, the
judgment continues to operate and its legal consequences cannot be
ignored in the present proceedings. The matter has also to be viewed in
the light of Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1586, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained
the circumstances in which an offence of criminal conspiracy under
Section 120-B IPC can constitute a scheduled offence under the PMLA.
Merely because Section 120-B finds mention in Part A of the Schedule
would not, by itself, render every offence of criminal conspiracy a
scheduled offence; the conspiracy must relate to commission of an
offence which is itself a scheduled offence. Thus, on the basis of the
offences presently forming the subject matter of the CBI prosecution,
namely Sections 120-B, 406 and 409 RPC, the petitioner cannot derive
jurisdiction under the PMLA merely by treating Section 120-B RPC, in
isolation, as the scheduled offence.
30.It is in this backdrop that the application seeking addition of offences
under Sections 411 and 424 RPC assumes significance. The effect of
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the relief sought by the petitioner is that, if either of the offences sought
to be added is found prima facie disclosed and forms part of the
predicate-offence proceedings, the same may have a consequential
bearing upon the petitioner’s jurisdiction under the PMLA. That
consequence, however, can neither constitute a ground for adding a
charge nor, by itself, furnish a ground for refusing to add one. The
question must be determined solely on the basis of the material forming
part of the predicate-offence proceedings and the ingredients of the
offences sought to be invoked. The jurisdictional consequences which
may thereafter follow under the PMLA are distinct from the exercise
which the criminal court is required to undertake while determining
whether the material before it warrants framing or alteration of charge.
31.Viewed thus, the locus of the petitioner, at least for the limited purpose
of bringing relevant material or information to the notice of the Trial
Court, could not have been altogether negatived. This is particularly so
when the petitioner had earlier been granted liberty to approach the
Trial Court and the Trial Court itself had treated its application as
maintainable. The Trial Court, therefore, adopted an unduly restrictive
approach in rejecting the application merely on the ground of absence
of locus standi. Once the application had been entertained as
maintainable, the appropriate course was to examine whether the
material relied upon therein, which essentially formed part of the CBI
charge-sheet itself, prima facie satisfied the ingredients of Sections 411
and/or 424 RPC. The Trial Court having failed to undertake that
exercise, its order, to that extent, cannot be sustained. This conclusion,
however, does not dispense with the necessity of independently
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examining whether the additional offences sought by the petitioner are
in fact disclosed from the material on record.
32.The stand taken by the CBI in its objections to the present petition also
assumes relevance. The CBI has maintained that its investigation
disclosed commission of offences under Sections 120-B, 406 and 409
RPC and that the Trial Court has accordingly framed charges against
the respondents for those offences. It has further maintained that the
investigation did not disclose material warranting incorporation of
charges under Sections 411 and 424 RPC.The CBI has also adverted to
the observation of the Trial Court that the power to alter or add a charge
can be exercised suo motu at any stage of the trial before
pronouncement of judgment, should the evidence subsequently brought
on record justify such a course. Thus, according to the investigating
agency which conducted the predicate-offence investigation, the
material presently available warranted charges under Sections 120-B,
406 and 409 RPC alone, without foreclosing the statutory power of the
Trial Court to alter or add a charge at an appropriate subsequent stage.
33.The prosecution case, as emerging from the CBI charge-sheet, is
essentially one of criminal misappropriation and criminal breach of
trust in respect of funds received by the JKCA from the BCCI. It is
alleged, inter alia, that Ahsan Ahmad Mirza was illegally permitted to
function as Treasurer of the JKCA during the relevant period and was
extended undue favour by the other accused. It is further alleged that he
acted in collusion with Bashir Ahmad Misger, then Senior Executive
Manager of the concerned bank, who facilitated the operation of
existing JKCA bank accounts and the opening and operation of
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additional accounts in an unauthorized manner, thereby causing
wrongful gain to Ahsan Ahmad Mirza and others and a corresponding
wrongful loss to the JKCA. The amount alleged to have been
misappropriated has been quantified at approximately Rs.43.69 crores.
Upon completion of investigation, the CBI presented the charge-sheet
on 16.07.2018. The accusation therein was that the concerned accused
had entered into a criminal conspiracy and, in furtherance thereof,
committed criminal breach of trust and misappropriation of JKCA
funds. The offences found by the investigating agency to be disclosed
were accordingly under Section 120-B read with Sections 406 and 409
RPC against Mohammad Saleem Khan, Ahsan Ahmad Mirza, Mir
Manzoor Gazanfar, Bashir Ahmad Misger, Dr. Farooq Abdullah and
Gulzar Ahmad Beigh. It is also borne out from the record that accused
Mir Manzoor Gazanfar (A-3) and Gulzar Ahmad Beigh were tendered
pardon by the competent Magisterial Court vide order dated
10.07.2018.
34.During the course of hearing, learned ASGI sought, in particular, to rely
upon the role attributed to Bashir Ahmad Misger to contend that the
material disclosed receipt of misappropriated or stolen property. The
charge-sheet, however, attributes to him participation in and facilitation
of the alleged conspiracy itself. His alleged role, as projected by the
CBI, was in facilitating the operation and opening of bank accounts and
thereby assisting the diversion or misappropriation of the funds. It is on
that factual premise that he has been arraigned as a participant in the
principal conspiracy. The distinction is material because the question
under Section 411 RPC is not merely whether the property can answer
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the description of “stolen property”, but whether the person sought to
be charged under Section 411 received or retained such property with
the requisite knowledge or reason to believe that it was stolen property,
as distinguished from being a principal participant in the very offence
through which the property acquired that character.
35.Section 410 RPC gives an extended meaning to the expression “stolen
property” and brings within its ambit, inter alia, property in respect of
which criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust has been
committed. Property subjected to criminal breach of trust may,
therefore, acquire the character of stolen property for the purposes of
the succeeding provisions. That proposition, however, does not by itself
attract Section 411 RPC against every person implicated in the
underlying criminal breach of trust. Section 411 addresses the distinct
offence of dishonestly receiving or retaining stolen property with
knowledge or reason to believe that the property is stolen. The
distinction between the principal offender and the receiver of stolen
property assumes importance in this regard.
36.The judgment in Mir Nagvi Askari (supra), relied upon by the
petitioner, itself elucidates this distinction. In that case, the property
which had become stolen property by reason of criminal breach of trust
committed by the principal offenders was transferred to and received
by another accused. It was in that factual setting that the ingredients of
Section 411 were found established against the recipient. The decision
recognizes that the provisions relating to receiving stolen property are
directed against a class of offenders distinct from the principal thief,
robber, misappropriator or person committing criminal breach of trust.
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The principal offender in respect of the offence by which the property
becomes “stolen property” does not, merely on that account, become a
receiver of such stolen property. For attracting Section 411 RPC,
therefore, the material must prima facie disclose, apart from the stolen
character of the property, its receipt or retention by the person
concerned and his knowledge or reason to believe, at the relevant time,
that the property was stolen. There must consequently be material
indicating a receipt or retention distinguishable from the very act of
misappropriation or criminal breach of trust through which the property
acquired its character as stolen property.
37.When the material in the present case is tested against the aforesaid
principles, the reliance placed by the petitioner upon Mir Nagvi Askari
(supra) does not advance its case. The respondents have been projected
in the CBI charge-sheet as participants in the principal conspiracy
through which the JKCA funds were allegedly misappropriated or
subjected to criminal breach of trust. The case against Bashir Ahmad
Misger, in particular, is that he facilitated the unauthorized banking
operations which enabled the alleged diversion of funds. The material,
as presently placed, does not disclose a distinct subsequent receipt by
him of property which had already acquired the character of stolen
property through an antecedent act of criminal misappropriation or
criminal breach of trust committed by another. In other words, the
allegation against him is of participation in and facilitation of the
principal offence and not of subsequently receiving or retaining the
property as stolen property. The same distinction applies to the other
respondents who, on the prosecution case itself, have been arraigned as
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participants in the conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust and
misappropriation.
38.The essential factual foundation necessary for invoking Section 411
RPC is, therefore, absent at this stage. A person cannot, merely because
he is alleged to have participated in the criminal breach of trust by
which the property acquired the character of “stolen property”, be
treated on that very factual foundation as a receiver of such stolen
property. Such an approach would obliterate the distinction maintained
by Sections 410 and 411 RPC between the principal offence and the
subsequent receipt or retention of the property derived therefrom.
Consequently, on the material presently forming part of the CBI chargesheet, no prima facie case for addition of a charge under Section 411
RPC is made out against the respondents. The mere fact that the alleged
misappropriated funds would answer the statutory description of
“stolen property” under Section 410 RPC does not, without satisfaction
of the independent ingredients of Section 411 RPC, justify framing of
a charge for dishonestly receiving stolen property.
39.At the cost of repetition, it needs to be noticed that the material placed
before the Court does not disclose a distinct money trail demonstrating
receipt or retention of the allegedly misappropriated funds by any of the
respondents in the character of a receiver of stolen property. During the
course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded
that what emerges from the CBI charge-sheet is the transfer of JKCA
funds into certain personal accounts in furtherance of the alleged
scheme of misappropriation. Such transfer, however, forms part of the
very transaction constituting the alleged criminal breach of trust and
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misappropriation attributed to the principal offenders. It does not,
without something more, establish a subsequent and distinct receipt or
retention of property in the character contemplated by Section 411
RPC.
40.Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to emphasize that an amount
of Rs.50.00 lakhs was parked, at the instance of Bashir Ahmad Misger,
in the account of Nisar Ahmad Sultan and was thereafter transferred to
the personal account of Ahsan Mirza. Reference was also made to the
personal account of Gulzar Ahmad Beigh, into which JKCA funds were
allegedly transferred and thereafter passed on to Ahsan Mirza. Even if
the aforesaid allegations are taken at their face value for the limited
purpose of consideration of charge, the role attributed to Bashir Ahmad
Misger is essentially that of facilitating the diversion and
misappropriation of JKCA funds by the co-accused. The allegation,
therefore, is of his participation in the common design to
misappropriate the funds and not of his subsequently receiving or
retaining property which had already acquired the character of stolen
property independently of his participation in the principal offence.
Significantly, no material has been pointed out to show that any part of
the allegedly misappropriated amount was received in his personal
account as stolen property.
41.The knowledge attributed to Bashir Ahmad Misger regarding the
unauthorized diversion of JKCA funds may have relevance to the
allegation of conspiracy and his participation in the principal
transaction, but such knowledge cannot, by itself, substitute the
essential requirement of dishonest receipt or retention of stolen property
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contemplated under Section 411 RPC. Knowledge that property is
being misappropriated and participation in such misappropriation are
conceptually distinct from receiving or retaining property, already
rendered stolen property, with knowledge or reason to believe that it
bears such character. It is in this backdrop that the stand taken by the
CBI in its objections assumes significance. The investigating agency
has categorically maintained that its investigation did not yield material
warranting invocation of Sections 411 and 424 RPC. The material
referred to by the petitioner does not prima facie disclose a distinct act
of receipt or retention so as to attract Section 411 RPC against the
respondents.
42.The petitioner has, nevertheless, invoked Section 216 CrPC in support
of its plea for addition of charges and has contended that a charge may
be added or altered at any stage of the proceedings. The proposition,
stated in such broad terms, requires qualification. Section 216 CrPC
undoubtedly confers wide power upon a criminal court to alter or add
to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced. The statutory
power, however, vests in the Court and its exercise must be founded
upon material on record which prima facie discloses the offence sought
to be added. An application filed by a party or an informant may bring
relevant material or an omission to the notice of the Court, but the
jurisdiction exercised under Section 216 remains that of the Court. The
provision cannot be understood as conferring upon a party an
independent right to insist upon addition of a particular charge
irrespective of whether its ingredients are disclosed from the material
before the Court.
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43.In this regard, reference may appropriately be made to Anant Prakash
Sinha v. State of Haryana and another, (2016) 6 SCC 105. In that
case, an application was moved by the informant seeking addition of a
charge under Section 406 IPC on the basis of allegations relating to
criminal breach of trust in respect of her stridhan. The accused had
initially been charge-sheeted for offences under Sections 498-A and
323 read with Section 34 IPC and charges had been framed accordingly.
During the course of trial, the informant moved an application under
Section 216 CrPC pointing out that her statement recorded under
Section
CrPC
contained
specific
allegations
regarding
misappropriation of stridhan. The Magistrate examined the material
already forming part of the record, including the allegations relating to
stridhan, and found that a prima facie case for addition of a charge
under Section 406 IPC was disclosed.
44.The matter eventually reached the Hon’ble Supreme Court, where the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 216 CrPC was examined in the
context of the material available before the Trial Court. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court held, in substance, that an application by an informant
bringing an omission or defect in the charge to the notice of the Court
cannot be rejected merely because the statutory power under Section
216 is exercisable by the Court. Such an application may serve the
purpose of drawing the Court’s attention to material warranting
alteration or addition of a charge, whereupon the Court is required to
exercise its own independent judgment.
45.The principles emerging from Anant Prakash Sinha (supra) make it
clear that the power under Section 216 CrPC is intended to enable the
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Court to correct a defect in, or omission from, a charge whenever the
material before it so warrants. Thus, where an offence is prima facie
disclosed from the material already produced before the Court but a
charge in respect thereof has inadvertently not been framed, the Court
is not rendered powerless merely because the trial has commenced.
Equally, if evidence subsequently recorded during trial discloses the
necessity of altering or adding a charge, the Court may exercise the
power at that stage as well, subject to the safeguards prescribed by law.
The controlling consideration is, therefore, whether the charge
proposed to be added or altered accords with the material available
before the Court. The power cannot be exercised merely because an
application seeking such addition has been filed; nor can the Court
decline to consider relevant material merely because the omission is
brought to its notice by a person other than the prosecuting agency.
What ultimately governs the exercise is the existence of material
furnishing a prima facie foundation for the proposed charge.
46.It would also be incorrect to construe Section 216 CrPC as meaning that
a charge already framed can be altered or supplemented only after
further evidence has been recorded during trial. The expression “at any
time before judgment is pronounced” is of sufficient amplitude to
permit alteration or addition of charge even on the basis of material
already forming part of the record, where the Court discovers that a
charge which ought to have been framed has been omitted or that the
charge as framed requires correction. At the same time, the exercise of
such power is circumscribed by the requirement of fairness to the
accused. Whenever a charge is altered or added, the Court must ensure
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that the accused is afforded an adequate and effective opportunity to
meet the altered accusation and that the course adopted does not
occasion prejudice or failure of justice. The procedural safeguards
accompanying the power of alteration of charge are intended precisely
to preserve the right of the accused to a fair trial.
47.Thus, Anant Prakash Sinha (supra) does not support the proposition
that the filing of an application under Section 216 CrPC necessarily
warrants addition of the charge sought therein. What the decision
recognizes is that an informant or other person having a permissible
basis to approach the Court may bring an omission to its notice;
thereafter, it is for the Court, upon an independent consideration of the
material on record, to determine whether the ingredients of the
proposed offence are prima facie disclosed. Applying the aforesaid
principles to the present case, the application moved by the petitioner
could not have been rejected solely on the ground that the petitioner
lacked locus standi, particularly in view of the liberty earlier reserved
in its favour. To that limited extent, the approach adopted by the Trial
Court cannot be sustained. The application was required to be
considered as bringing to the notice of the Trial Court an alleged
omission in the charges framed by it.
48.That, however, does not carry the petitioner any further on merits. The
decisive question remains whether the material forming part of the CBI
charge-sheet prima facie satisfies the essential ingredients of Sections
411 and 424 RPC. Section 216 CrPC is a procedural source of power
to alter or add a charge; it cannot supply substantive ingredients of an
offence which are otherwise absent from the material on record. Insofar
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as Section 411 RPC is concerned, for the reasons already recorded
hereinabove, the material presently available does not disclose a
distinct receipt or retention of stolen property by the respondents in the
capacity contemplated by that provision. Their alleged acts form part
of the principal transaction of conspiracy, misappropriation and
criminal breach of trust itself. The mere movement of funds through
different accounts in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy cannot,
without material disclosing the requisite distinct receipt or retention of
stolen property, justify addition of a charge under Section 411 RPC.
49.Reverting to the facts of the present case, and having regard to the
material available before the Trial Court as also the stand taken by the
CBI, this Court finds no infirmity in the conclusion of the Trial Court
that, at this stage, there exists sufficient material for proceeding against
the respondents for offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 406 and
409 RPC. The Trial Court has, at the same time, kept the issue of
alteration or addition of charge open by observing that, should the
evidence recorded during the course of trial disclose commission of any
other offence, the Court would not be denuded of its power to alter or
add to the charge in accordance with law.
50.The mere insistence of the petitioner that charges under Sections 411
and 424 RPC ought also to have been framed cannot, in the absence of
material prima facie satisfying the ingredients of those offences, furnish
a basis for their incorporation. As discussed hereinabove, the material
forming part of the CBI charge-sheet does not, at this stage, prima facie
disclose the essential ingredients necessary for framing charges under
Sections 411 and 424 RPC.
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51.It cannot, therefore, be said that the Trial Court acted merely as a
mouthpiece of the CBI or abdicated its judicial function while
proceeding to frame charges under Sections 120-B, 406 and 409 RPC.
The conclusion of the Trial Court regarding the absence of locus standi
of the petitioner to move the application was undoubtedly erroneous
and, for the reasons already recorded, cannot be sustained. That error,
however, does not ipso facto entitle the petitioner to the substantive
relief of addition of charges under Sections 411 and 424 RPC.
52.The petitioner has not been able to point to sufficient material which,
even when treated as information brought to the notice of the Trial
Court, would prima facie warrant addition of the aforesaid offences.
Section 411 RPC contemplates dishonest receipt or retention of stolen
property with the requisite knowledge or reason to believe as to its
character, whereas Section 424 RPC requires the existence of material
satisfying its distinct ingredients relating to dishonest or fraudulent
concealment or removal of property, or assistance in such concealment
or removal. On the material presently forming part of the charge-sheet,
the necessary factual foundation for attracting either provision has not
been demonstrated. The accusations emerging from the CBI chargesheet
are
essentially
founded
upon
the
alleged
criminal
misappropriation and criminal breach of trust committed pursuant to a
conspiracy amongst the principal offenders. On the material presently
available, the ingredients necessary for framing additional charges
under Sections 411 and 424 RPC are not prima facie made out.
53.This conclusion, however, cannot be construed as placing any fetter
upon the statutory jurisdiction of the Trial Court under Section 216
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CrPC. Should any material emerge during the course of trial which
prima facie discloses commission of an offence under Sections 411 or
424 RPC, or any other penal provision, it shall remain open to the Trial
Court to exercise its power of alteration or addition of charge, strictly
in accordance with law and after observing the procedural safeguards
available to the accused.
54.In view of the foregoing discussion, the petition is partly allowed. The
impugned order passed by the Trial Court, insofar as it holds that the
petitioner had no locus standi to move the application seeking addition
of charges, is set aside.
55.The prayer of the petitioner seeking addition of charges under Sections
411 and 424 RPC, however, does not merit acceptance on the basis of
the material presently available and is, accordingly, rejected. It is
clarified that the rejection of the petitioner’s prayer for addition of
charges under Sections 411 and 424 RPC is confined to the material
presently available before the Trial Court and shall not operate as an
impediment to the exercise of powers under Section 216 CrPC if, at any
subsequent stage of the trial, further material or evidence emerges
warranting alteration or addition of charge. Any such exercise shall be
undertaken independently by the Trial Court, on its own merits and in
accordance with law, uninfluenced by the rejection of the petitioner’s
present prayer.
(SANJAY PARIHAR)
JUDGE
SRINAGAR
25.09.2026
“Imtiyaz”
Whether the order is speaking: Yes
Whether the order is reportable: Yes
Imtiyaz Ul Gani
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this document
25.09.2026 14:09
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