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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
WP(Crl) No.283/2023
CrlM No.810/2023
Reserved on: 17.09.2026
Pronounced on: 25.09.2026
Uploaded on: ______________
Operative part or full judgment: Full
Owais Ahmad Shunda
S/O Abdul Hamid Shunda
R/O Maisuma,
District Srinagar.
…Petitioner(s)
Through: Adv. Shabir Ahmad Bhat vice
Adv. M.Ashraf Wani.
Vs.
1. Union Territory of J&K
through Financial Commissioner,
Home Department,
Civil Sectt. Srinagar.
2. District Magistrate,
Srinagar.
3. Sr. Superintendent of Police,
Srinagar.
4. SHO Police Station Maisuma.
…Respondent(s)
Through: Sr.AAG Mohsin Qadri with
Assisting Counsel Haris Khan.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M. A. CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. The instant petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India seeking quashing of detention Order
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No.DMS/PSA/28/2022 dated 08.04.2022 passed by the
respondent No.2-District Magistrate, Srinagar, under the
Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (for short, “the
Act”).
2. The main grievance of the petitioner is that the aforesaid
detention order, though passed on 08.04.2022, has never
been executed upon the petitioner; that the petitioner has
continued to remain at liberty and despite the passage of
considerable time, the respondents have neither executed
the detention order nor placed on record any satisfactory
explanation for the delay in its execution; that the
detention order has been founded upon case FIR Nos.
54/2009, 55/2009 and 74/2009 registered under Sections
307, 147, 148, 149, 147, 332, 336, 427, 436 RPC in Police
Station, Maisuma and alleged activities which are remote
in point of time; that there is no activity attributed to the
petitioner since 2017, whereas the impugned detention
order came to be passed only on 08.04.2022; that the
petitioner had already been enlarged on bail in the
criminal cases relied upon by the detaining authority.
3. Respondents, though have not produced the detention
record, however, contended in the counter affidavit filed on
their behalf that the purpose of the preventive detention is
detaining a person and not to punish him for something he
has done but to prevent him from doing it; that where
individual liberty comes into conflict with an interest of the
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‘security of State’ or ‘Public Order’, then the liberty of the
individual must give way to the larger interest of the
nation; that in view of the activities of the petitioner, the
police recommended his preventive detention and in this
behalf submitted dossier supported by relevant material to
the
District
examination
Magistrate
concerned,
found
preventive
the
who
after
detention
of
its
the
petitioner necessary, the impugned detention order was
passed with the sole aim and object to deter the petitioner
from acting in alleged activities, prejudicial to the ‘security
of the State’.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while reiterating the
grounds urged in the petition, would argue that the very
fact that the detention order of the petitioner had remained
unexecuted for such a long period demonstrates that there
was no immediate or compelling necessity to detain the
petitioner; that the continued liberty of the petitioner for
such an extended period has snapped the live and
proximate link between the alleged prejudicial activity and
the preventive purpose sought to be achieved by the
impugned order; that the detention order has, in any
event, lost its efficacy with the passage of time and if the
respondents still consider preventive detention necessary,
they would have to consider the matter afresh on the basis
of the circumstances obtaining at the relevant time.
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5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, exadverso, contended that the impugned order has been
passed after due consideration of the material placed
before the detaining authority and upon its subjective
satisfaction that preventive detention of the petitioner was
necessary; that even grant of bail in criminal offence
cannot debar the detaining authority to order preventive
detention of an individual when preventive detention of
such individual is found necessitated, as is the case in
respect of the petitioner herein.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the
submissions made at the bar.
7. Preventive detention constitutes an exceptional measure
affecting the cherished right of personal liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution. The power of
preventive detention, though constitutionally recognised,
has to be exercised strictly in accordance with the
constitutional and statutory safeguards.
8. The distinction between preventive detention and punitive
detention is fundamental. Preventive detention is not
intended to punish a person for an act already committed,
but to prevent him from engaging in prejudicial activities
in future. Consequently, there must exist a live and
proximate link between the past conduct relied upon and
the necessity of preventing the person from acting in a
prejudicial manner in future.
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9. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that an
unexplained and unreasonable delay between the passing
of a detention order and its execution may snap such live
and proximate link and cast serious doubt upon the
genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority. In Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil
Nadu reported as (1979) 1 SCC 465, the Supreme Court
explained that a live and proximate link must exist
between the grounds of detention and the purpose of
detention and that such link may be snapped where there
is a long and unexplained delay between the detention
order and the arrest of the detenue. The Court, however,
recognised that where the delay is satisfactorily explained
or is attributable to the detenue's own conduct in evading
arrest, the position may be different.
10.
In “A. Mohammed Farook v. Jt. Secretary to
Government of India” reported as (2000) 2 SCC 360, the
Supreme Court dealt specifically with delay in execution of
a detention order and held that the detaining as well as
executing authorities are required to explain satisfactorily
any unreasonable delay in securing the detention of the
proposed detenue. In the absence of such explanation, the
subjective satisfaction underlying the detention order
stands
seriously
undermined.
The
subsequently been consistently followed.
principle
has
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11.
Likewise, in Shafiq Ahmed v. District Magistrate,
Meerut reported as (1989) 4 SCC 556, the Supreme Court
found that undue delay in execution, depending upon the
facts and circumstances of the case, could demonstrate
absence of a real and genuine apprehension that the
proposed detenue was likely to act prejudicially. The
Supreme
Court
has
subsequently
relied
upon
this
principle in considering delayed execution of preventive
detention orders. More recently, in Sushanta Kumar
Banik v. State of Tripura [2022 INSC 1053], the
Supreme
Court
reiterated
that
where
there
is
unreasonable delay between the date of the detention
order and the actual arrest of the detenue, and such delay
is not satisfactorily explained, it throws considerable doubt
upon
the
genuineness
of
the
requisite
subjective
satisfaction and snaps the live and proximate link between
the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention. The
principle is also reflected in Sama Aruna v. State of
Telangana reported as (2018) 12 SCC 150, wherein the
Supreme Court held that preventive detention must rest
upon a reasonable prognosis of future conduct based upon
past conduct and surrounding circumstances, and that
stale incidents cannot furnish the necessary live and
proximate link with the imperative need for preventive
detention.
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12.
In the present case, the material placed before the
Court reveals an unusual feature. The detention order was
passed on 08.04.2022, yet the same was not executed
upon the petitioner until 21.08.2023. It is pertinent to
note that this Court, during the pendency of the present
proceedings, vide order dated 21.08.2023 stayed the
operation of the impugned detention order. Consequently,
the period subsequent to 21.08.2023, during which the
order remained stayed by this Court, cannot obviously be
attributed to the respondents as a period of delay in
execution.
13.
The question, therefore, is whether
the period
between the passing of the detention order on 08.04.2022
and the passing of the interim order dated 21.08.2023
has been satisfactorily accounted for by the respondents.
The counter affidavit placed on file does not disclose any
convincing explanation demonstrating that the petitioner
was absconding, evading arrest, or otherwise frustrating
genuine and continuous efforts on the part of the
executing agency to secure his detention during the
aforesaid period. This aspect assumes significance because
the justification for preventive detention is founded upon
the existence of an immediate preventive necessity. Where
a detention order is passed but is not executed for a
considerable
period,
the
detaining
and
executing
authorities are expected to satisfactorily explain the delay.
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If the delay is attributable to the proposed detenue, the
position may be different. However, where the delay
remains unexplained and is not attributable to the
petitioner, it assumes constitutional significance.
14.
the
In the present case, there is no material placed before
Court
to
demonstrate
that
the
petitioner
had
absconded or had deliberately evaded execution of the
detention order during the period from 08.04.2022 (date
of detention order) to 21.08.2023 (date of stay order). The
subsequent non-execution of the detention order is
explained by the order of this Court dated 21.08.2023,
whereby its operation was stayed. Thus, the period covered
by the judicial stay cannot be treated as an unexplained
administrative delay; nevertheless, the respondents were
required to explain the substantial period of more than
four and a half month, preceding the stay. The matter
assumes
greater
significance
when
the
nature
and
chronology of the alleged activities relied upon by the
detaining authority are considered. As projected before this
Court, the last activity attributed to the petitioner dates
back to 2017, whereas the detention order came to be
passed on 08.04.2022. Thereafter, the order remained
unexecuted for a further substantial period until this
Court stayed its execution on 21.08.2023.
15.
Thus, there exists not merely a considerable gap
between the alleged prejudicial activity and the passing of
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the detention order, but also a substantial period between
the passing of the detention order and the attempt to
secure its execution, without the respondents furnishing a
satisfactory explanation for such delay for the period
preceding the judicial stay.
16.
The cumulative effect of these circumstances is that
the live and proximate link between the alleged past
conduct and the necessity for preventive detention has
been snapped. The Court is conscious that mere passage
of time, by itself, is not invariably sufficient to invalidate a
detention order. Each case has to be examined on its own
facts.
However,
where
the
delay
in
execution
is
substantial, is not attributable to the proposed detenue,
and remains unexplained for the period during which the
authorities were free to execute the order, the continued
efficacy of the original subjective satisfaction becomes
seriously questionable vitiating the detention order itself.
17.
It is also necessary to deal with the contention that
since the detention order has never been executed, the
petitioner ought not to be permitted to challenge it. The
law does not impose an absolute bar upon judicial review
at the pre-execution stage. In Additional Secretary to the
Government of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia reported as
1992 Supp (1) SCC 496, the Supreme Court recognised
the power of the constitutional courts to interfere with a
P a g e | 10
detention order even before its execution in appropriate
cases.
18.
The present case is, therefore, one where interference
at the pre-execution stage is justified because the
challenge is not founded merely upon an assessment of
the sufficiency of the material before the detaining
authority. Rather, the challenge goes to the continued
validity of the preventive exercise itself, having regard to
the extraordinary and unexplained delay in execution and
the consequent snapping of the live and proximate link. It
is also necessary to clarify that the submission that the
detention order automatically ceased to have validity
merely because six months elapsed from the date of its
passing cannot, by itself, be accepted as a proposition of
law. Section 18 of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety
Act, 1978 prescribes the maximum period of detention
with reference to the date of detention, and not simply the
date
on
which
the
detention
order
was
passed.
Nevertheless, this does not come to the aid of the
respondents in the facts of the present case. The issue
before the Court is not whether the statutory maximum
period of detention has mechanically expired, but whether,
after such a prolonged and unexplained period during
which the order has remained unexecuted, the original
subjective satisfaction can still furnish a valid basis for
preventive detention.
P a g e | 11
19.
On the facts noticed above, the answer has to be in
the negative. Preventive detention must bear a reasonable
and
proximate
relationship
with
the
circumstances
prevailing at the time when detention is sought to be
affected. A detention order cannot be allowed to remain
suspended indefinitely and then be executed years later on
the assumption that the circumstances which prevailed
when the order was passed continue unchanged. The
Court is, therefore, satisfied that the prolonged nonexecution of the impugned detention order in absence of a
satisfactory explanation, coupled with the remoteness of
the activities relied upon by the detaining authority, has
destroyed
the
live
and
proximate
nexus
which
is
indispensable to a valid preventive detention order.
20.
For the foregoing reasons and having regard to the
totality of the circumstances, particularly the considerable
remoteness
of
the
alleged
prejudicial
activities,
the
substantial delay between the passing of the detention
order and its execution, the absence of any satisfactory
explanation for the period preceding the order of stay
dated 21.08.2023, and the consequent snapping of the
live and proximate link between the alleged past conduct
and the necessity for preventive detention, the petition
deserves to be allowed.
21.
The
petition
is,
accordingly,
allowed
and
the
detention order bearing No. DMS/PSA/28/2022 dated
P a g e | 12
08.04.2022
passed
by
the
respondent
No.2-District
Magistrate, Srinagar against the petitioner, is hereby
quashed. The respondents shall not execute or act upon
the aforesaid detention order against the petitioner. It is,
however,
clarified
that
the
period
subsequent
to
21.08.2023, during which the impugned detention order
remained stayed by the order of this Court, has not been
treated as a period of unexplained delay on the part of the
respondents.
22.
The petition stands disposed of accordingly along-
with pending application(s).
(M. A. CHOWDHARY)
JUDGE
Srinagar
25.09.2026
Muzammil. Q
Whether the order is reportable: Yes / No
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