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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Dated: SEPTEMBER 14, 2019
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
S.B.: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAI KUMAR BIST, CHIEF JUSTICE.
------------------------------------------------------------------------IA No. 01 of 2018
In
Appeal (Crl.) No. 01 of 2018
(Under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002)
Directorate of Enforcement (PMLA)
through its Assistant Director,
Banibrata Dutta,
Having its office at CGO Complex,
3rd MSO Building, DF Block, 6th Floor,
Salt Lake City,
Kolkata-700 064.
…
Appellant.
Versus
Eastern Institute for Integrated Learning
in Management University, Sikkim
having its office at Main Campus,
8th Mile, Budang, Malbassey,
West Sikkim-737 101
Serviced through: Director, HRDD,
Government of Sikkim, Tashiling,
East Sikkim.
…
Respondent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance:
Dr. Sonali Gopalrao Badhe, Mr. Jigmee Phunchok
Bhutia, Ms. Rajani Rizal, Mr. Amresh Kr. Mondal and
Ms. Minakshi Balmiki, Advocates for the Appellant.
Mr. Shakeel Ahmed, Ms. Zola Megi and Mr. Yogesh
Sharma, Advocates for the Respondent.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
WITH
IA No. 01 of 2019
In
Appeal (Crl.) No. 01 of 2019
(Under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002)
Directorate of Enforcement (PMLA)
through its Assistant Director,
Banibrata Dutta,
Having its office at CGO Complex,
3rd MSO Building, DF Block, 6th Floor,
Salt Lake City,
Kolkata-700 064.
…
Appellant.
Versus
Malavika Foundation,
Branch Office: B-II/66,
Mohan Coperative Industrial Estate,
Mathura Road,
New Delhi-110044.
…
Respondent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance:
Dr. Sonali Gopalrao Badhe, Mr. Jigmee Phunchok
Bhutia, Ms. Rajani Rizal, Mr. Amresh Kr. Mondal and
Ms. Minakshi Balmiki, Advocates for the Appellant.
Mr. Shakeel Ahmed, Ms. Zola Megi and Mr. Yogesh
Sharma, Advocates for the Respondent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------WITH
IA No. 01 of 2019
In
Appeal (Crl.) No. 02 of 2019
(Under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002)
Directorate of Enforcement (PMLA)
through its Assistant Director,
Banibrata Dutta,
Having its office at CGO Complex,
3rd MSO Building, DF Block, 6th Floor,
Salt Lake City,
Kolkata-700 064.
…
Appellant.
Versus
Integrated Institute of Excellence Society,
B-II/I, Mohan Coperative Industrial Estate,
Mathura Road,
New Delhi-110044.
…
Respondent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance:
Dr. Sonali Gopalrao Badhe, Mr. Jigmee Phunchok
Bhutia, Ms. Rajani Rizal, Mr. Amresh Kr. Mondal and
Ms. Minakshi Balmiki, Advocates for the Appellant.
Ms. Gita Bista and Ms. Anusha Basnett, Advocates for
the Respondent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------WITH
IA No. 01 of 2019
In
Appeal (Crl.) No. 03 of 2019
(Under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002)
Directorate of Enforcement (PMLA)
through its Assistant Director,
Banibrata Dutta,
Having its office at CGO Complex,
3rd MSO Building, DF Block, 6th Floor,
Salt Lake City,
Kolkata-700 064.
…
Appellant.
Versus
Eastern Institute for Integrated Learning
in Management University, Sikkim
having its office at Main Campus,
8th Mile, Budang, Malbassey,
West Sikkim-737 101
Serviced through: Director, HRDD,
Government of Sikkim, Tashiling,
East Sikkim.
…
Respondent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance:
Dr. Sonali Gopalrao Badhe, Mr. Jigmee Phunchok
Bhutia, Ms. Rajani Rizal, Mr. Amresh Kr. Mondal and
Ms. Minakshi Balmiki, Advocates for the Appellant.
Mr. Shakeel Ahmed, Ms. Zola Megi and Mr. Yogesh
Sharma, Advocates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------WITH
IA No. 01 of 2019
In
Appeal (Crl.) No. 04 of 2019
(Under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002)
Directorate of Enforcement (PMLA)
through its Assistant Director,
Banibrata Dutta,
Having its office at CGO Complex,
3rd MSO Building, DF Block, 6th Floor,
Salt Lake City,
Kolkata-700 064.
…
Appellant.
Versus
Rai Foundation & Anr.
Office: B-II/66,
Mohan Coperative Industrial Estate,
Mathura Road,
New Delhi-110044.
…
Respondent.
------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance:
Dr. Sonali Gopalrao Badhe, Mr. Jigmee Phunchok
Bhutia, Ms. Rajani Rizal, Mr. Amresh Kr. Mondal and
Ms. Minakshi Balmiki, Advocates for the Appellant.
Ms. Gita Bista and Ms. Anusha Basnett, Advocates for
the Respondent.
------------------------------------------------------------------------AND
IA No. 01 of 2019
In
Appeal (Crl.) No. 05 of 2019
(Under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002)
Directorate of Enforcement (PMLA)
through its Assistant Director,
Banibrata Dutta,
having its office at CGO Complex,
3rd MSO Building, DF Block, 6th Floor,
Salt Lake City,
Kolkata-700 064.
…
Appellant.
Versus
National Centre for Internship & Studies,
64, Navyug Market,
Ghaziabad-201301
Now situated at E-217, Sector-23,
Noida-201301.
…
Respondent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance:
Dr. Sonali Gopalrao Badhe, Mr. Jigmee Phunchok
Bhutia, Ms. Rajani Rizal, Mr. Amresh Kr. Mondal and
Ms. Minakshi Balmiki, Advocates for the Appellant.
Mr. Ajay Rathi, Mr. Rahul Rathi, Mr. Aditya Makkhim,
Ms Phurba Diki Sherpa, Ms. Lidya Pradhan and Ms.
Deechen
Doma
Tamang,
Advocates
for
the
Respondent.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Chief Justice
Facts narrated in all the appeals are almost same.
The facts, which are common in all the appeals and as stated by
the appellant, are being stated hereinafter.
2.
The appellant is the agency for investigating the
offence of money laundering. During the course of investigation
Investigating Officer has located with properties acquired out of
the proceeds of crime to the tune of Rs.137 Crores. Therefore,
the Provisional Attachment Orders under Section 5 of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act , 2002 (hereinafter referred
to as “the PMLA”), were issued by the Investigating Officer.
3.
According to the appellant, the charge against the
University in every appeal is that it created global selling
degrees, diplomas and certificate of various courses through its
established network for which it has not been granted permission
by any competent authority.
The University engaged several
Coordinators functioning all across India for conducting distance
education courses.
These Coordinators made payments to the
University authorities on per student basis, after keeping their
commission.
4.
As offences under Sections 420, 467, 471, 120B of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”),
are scheduled offences, as mentioned in section 2 (1) (y) of the
PMLA, the matter was referred to Enforcement Directorate, by
Sikkim Police for investigation.
5.
Further case of the appellant is that during the course
of investigation conducted under the PMLA, it revealed that
Eastern
Institute
for
Integrated
Learning
in
Management
University, Sikkim, is involved in selling degrees, diplomas and
certificate for various courses for which they were not authorized
to award. The courses were conducted without adhering to any
basic rules and regulations. The University also did not bother to
maintain any standard or quality of education/examination before
awarding the degree and diploma.
The University authorities
with the assistance of various national/regional coordinators
engaged by them duped thousands of innocent students by
fraudulently
selling
unauthorized
degrees,
certificate through distance education courses.
diplomas
and
The University
was also involved in offering another mode of education known
as Collaborative Industry Based Education.
The object of the
said education was to lure hapless students into grandiose
programmes without any approval from any statutory authorities.
It is stated that Eastern Institute for Integrated Learning in
Management University, Sikkim was created only with the object
of duping thousands of innocent students by charging them
exorbitant fees for various lucrative courses and offering them
degrees which were not recognized by any statutory authority.
Some regular courses stated to have been offered by the
University are only with a motive to hoodwink the unsuspecting
students.
6.
Eastern
Management
Institute
University,
for
Sikkim,
Integrated
challenged
Learning
the
in
provisional
attachment order before this High Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.
02 of 2015 on the basis of constitution and adjudication by the
Member, who according to the petitioner was non-legal. The said
writ petition was disposed of on 22.09.2015 in the following
manner:
“(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
The Respondent No. 1 shall take appropriate steps
with the concerned authorities of the Central
Government for appointment of the Judicial Member
of the Adjudicating Authority urgently within a period
of 3 (three) months and not later than that;
On appointment of the Judicial Member, the
Chairman of the Adjudicating Authority shall
constitute the Bench consisting of a Judicial Member
keeping in view the observations made above having
regard to the nature of the lis and the anxiety
expressed by the Petitioner-University;
Soon after it is constituted, the Bench shall then
issue notice upon the Petitioner-University and the
Petitioner-University shall appear before the Bench
and place before it all grievances expressed in the
Petition; and
Since the proceedings before the Adjudicating
Authority was stayed by this Court by order dated
02-04-2015, the period of attachment prescribed
under Sub-Section (1) of Section 5 shall exclude the
period spent during the pendency of the case before
this Court.”
7.
According to the appellant, the order of this High
Court was complied, a Member (Legal) was appointed as
provided under Section 6 of PMLA, and the matter was readjudicated and the Provisional Attachment Order was confirmed.
Against
the
said
Order,
appeals
were
preferred
by
the
respondents before the Appellate Tribunal, Prevention of Money
Laundering (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) on the
ground that the said Confirmation Order was not passed by the
Judicial Member. The Tribunal passed order on 15.06.2017 and
remanded back the matter to the Adjudicating Authority by
setting aside the impugned order by directing the Authority to
comply with the order of this High Court and appoint a Judicial
Member.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order has not
been passed by the Judicial Member despite of directions issued
by the High Court. The Tribunal also observed that the Member
(Legal) may be having the qualifications to become Judicial
Member, but facts remains that his appointment was not made
for as Judicial Member. The Tribunal further observed that none
of the hearing officer was a Judicial Member, within the mandate
of judgment of the High Court and the order was without
jurisdiction. The Tribunal set aside the same and remanded back
the appeals directing the Adjudicating Authority to comply with
the directions of the High Court.
8.
Against the order of the Tribunal dated 15.06.2017
these appeals have been filed.
9.
Before considering the case of the appellant on merit,
this Court is required to consider the applications filed by the
appellant for condonation of delay in filing the appeals, as all the
appeals have been filed with considerable long delay. In Appeal
(Crl.) No. 01 of 2018 there is a delay of 456 days. Similarly in
other appeals; Appeal (Crl.) No. 01 of 2019, Appeal (Crl.) No. 02
of 2019, Appeal (Crl.) No. 03 of 2019, Appeal (Crl.) No. 04 of
2019 and Appeal (Crl.) No. 05 of 2019 there is delay of 571 days
in filing the appeals.
10.
The grounds taken by the appellant in all the
condonation of delay applications are same. It is stated by the
appellant that the appellant has been very vigilant and diligent in
pursuing the appeal and that the reasons for delay in filing the
appeals were beyond the control of the appellant and as such
there are sufficient reasons for condoning the delay. In support
of this submission the appellant has given the facts which are
reproduced hereinafter:
“(a)
The Registry of learned Appellant Tribunal prepared
the certified copy and sent the same vide a letter signed on
30.06.2017, through speed post to the office of the
Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata.
(b)
The impugned Judgment dated 15.06.2017 was
received in the office of the Enforcement Directorate,
Kolkata on 17.07.2017.
(c)
A letter dated 22.08.2017, received from the
Registrar, Adjudicating Authority, addressed to the
Director- Enforcement conveying inter alia that “the Order
of Appellate Tribunal is per incurium, as it has ignored the
decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in case of Pareena
Swarup versus Union of India, and Director may take
appropriate action to either get the order of the Hon‟ble
Tribunal stayed, modified, annulled or take appropriate
action as deemed fit for giving effect to the Order of the
Hon‟ble Appellate Tribunal”.
(d)
A letter dated 05.09.2017, was sent to Head Office
of the Enforcement Directorate, New Delhi by Enforcement
Directorate, Kolkata Zonal Office, seeking instruction
regarding filing of appeal in Hon‟ble Sikkim High Court or
otherwise.
(e)
The Hon‟ble Appellate Tribunal in appeals filed by Rai
Foundation and five others directed the respondents vide
Order dated 15.09.2017, to file reply within eight weeks
and list the matter on 23.03.2017.
(f)
Shri N.K Matta, Department Counsel vide his opinion
dated 09.10.2017, opined that “since it is difficult to give
effect to the directions of the Hon‟ble Sikkim High Court
regarding Judicial Member we may either challenge the
Order of the Hon‟ble High Court before the Division Bench,
with application for condonation of delay or the Central
Government may pass an order giving explanation under
Section 6 of PMLA that Member Judicial and / or Member
Law are same position”.
(g)
Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata sent a letter dated
31.10.2017, to its Head Office, seeking instruction in the
matter.
(h)
On 13.11.2017, Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata
Zonal Office received a letter dated 09.11.2017, from its
H.O with direction that the Judgment / Order, dated
22.09.2017, passed by the Hon‟ble High Court of Sikkim
should be challenged before the Division Bench.
(i)
On 17.11.2017 a letter sent to Mr. Karma Thinlay,
Central Government Counsel, Sikkim High Court from
Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata with request to move a
Writ Appeal against the order dated 22.09.2015.
(j)
Mr. Karma Thinlay, Central Government Counsel,
High Court of Sikkim vide his letter dated 09.01.2018,
intimated that no appeal shall lie in Sikkim High Court,
against any order passed in exercise of criminal
jurisdiction. He also instructed to take up the matter with
the Ministry of Law, Branch Secretariat, Kolkata.
(k)
Letter dated 18.01.2018 sent to H.O of Enforcement
Directorate, Kolkata intimating that the matter is being
taken up with Ministry of Law, Branch Secretariat, Kolkata,
as instructed by Mr. Karma Thinlay.
(l)
U.O. note dated 21.01.2018, sent to Ministry of law,
Branch Secretariat, Kolkata by Enforcement Directorate,
Kolkata.
(m) Ministry of Law, Branch Secretariat, Kolkata vide
opinion dated 31.01.2018, opined that it is not a fit case to
challenge the Order passed by Hon‟ble High Court of
Sikkim.
(n)
Discussion held between Ministry of Law, Branch
Secretariat,
Kolkata
with
Department
Official
on
12.02.2018.
(o)
U.O. note dated 20.02.2018, sent to Ministry of Law,
Branch Secretariat, Kolkata, by Enforcement Directorate,
Kolkata.
(p)
Ministry of Law, Branch Secretariat, Kolkata vide
opinion dated 27.02.2018, opined to challenge the Order
dated 22.09.2015, before Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India.
(q)
Opinion dated 22.07.2018, Ministry of Law, Branch
Secretariat, Kolkata, received in the office of the
Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata on 05.03.2018.
(r)
Letter dated 07.03.2018, sent to H.O of the
Enforcement Directorate with request to file SLP in the
Supreme Court of India.
(s)
H.O vide letter dated 04.06.2018, instructed
Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata to file Review Petition in
Hon‟ble Sikkim High Court.
(t)
Letter dated 05.07.2018, sent to Mr. Karma Thinlay,
Central Government Counsel, High Court of Sikkim by
Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata with request to draft a
Review Petition.
(u)
Mr. Karma Thinlay, Central Government Counsel,
High Court of Sikkim, vide his letter dated 17.07.2018,
opined that there is no provision in Cr.P.C. 1973, for filing a
revision petition against an order passed by High Court
itself and further stated only recourse is to move the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
(v)
Letter dated 21.08.2018, sent to Sudesh Joshi, SPP
by Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata with request to file
review petition.
(w)
Learned Deputy Legal Advisor, Kolkata Regional
Office, vide her opinion dated 23.08.2018, opined to file
appeal against the order passed by the Tribunal.
(x)
That on the basis of the opinion dated 23.08.2018,
Department decided to file an appeal before the Hon‟ble
High Court of Sikkim, and accordingly the Department
approached the learned SPP‟s of Gangtok for the purpose of
filing the instant appeal. Further vide email dated
13.11.2018, learned Counsel Jigme Phunchok Bhutia, SPP
was instructed to draft the appeal.
(y)
That learned Counsel Jigme Phunchok Bhutia, SPP,
sent to the draft copy of the appeal for final vetting and
sanction to the Regional Office, Kolkata on 23.11.2018.”
11.
The respondents in their objection to the condonation
of delay applications stated that the applications are not
maintainable, in view of the express provision of Section 42 of
the PMLA, as provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not
applicable especially in view of the Section 29 (2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963. It is submitted by the respondents that the
PMLA is a self-contained code and is comprehensive Special
Legislation containing detailed provisions of investigation, search
and seizure, arrest, provisional attachment, filing of complaint
and filing of appeals before the Appellate Tribunal and the High
Court, whereas the Limitation Act, 1963 is a general law. Thus,
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application in view of
the specific proviso of Section 42 of the PMLA. It is also stated
that as per Section 42 of the PMLA an appeal can be filed within
sixty days from the communication of the decision or order.
Proviso to Section 42 of the PMLA further provides that if the
High Court is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid
period of sixty days, it can allow the appeal to be filed within a
further period not exceeding sixty days. Since the appeals have
been filed much later, the appeals deserve to be dismissed.
12.
The matter was argued for more than one day.
Dr.
Sonali Gopalrao Badhe, learned counsel for the appellant argued
the matter at great length, though she did not appear on the last
day.
It was submitted by Dr. Badhe that the appellant was
sincerely persuading the mater on the advice of the Government
Counsel.
Only
after
receipt
of
communication
from
the
Adjudicating Authority, the appeals have been preferred. The
appeals have been filed under Section 42 of the PMLA read with
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. She submitted that the provision
of Section 71 of the PMLA is also to be seen which provides that
“……notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in
any other law for the time being in force”.
She said that this
clearly provides that provision of the Limitation Act shall also be
applicable to the PMLA, as this provision is not inconsistent with
the provision of PMLA. She further submitted that though there
is considerable delay in filing the appeals but in view of the fact
that a huge amount is involved in the matter, the delay in filing
the appeals should be condoned.
She also submitted that the
Hon‟ble Apex Court in the matter of Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy Vs.
Central Bureau of Investigation : MANU/SC/0487/2013: (2013) 7
SCC 439, has observed that the offences of money laundering
are in a calculated manner serious threat to the economy of the
country.
She submitted that in these appeals more than 100
crores of rupees are involved, therefore, delay in filing the
appeals deserves to be condoned.
13.
Learned counsel for the appellant further referred the
judgment
in
the
matter
of
Principal
Secretary,
Transport
Department, Government of Sikkim -Vs- Narmaya Das : 2006
ACJ 150, which reads as under:
“10. As regards the sufficiency or otherwise of the cause
shown in the present case for condonation of delay it is
useful to refer to the following decisions of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in Ram Nath Sao Vs Gobardhan Sao. AIR
2002 SC 1201, wherein it has held as follows:
“(11) Thus it becomes plain that the expression
„Sufficient Cause‟ within the meaning of Section 5 of
the Act or Order 22, Rule 9 of the code or any other
similar provision should receive a liberal construction
so as to advance substantial justice when no
negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is
imputable to a party. In a particular case whether
explanation furnished would constitute „sufficient
cause‟ or not will be dependent upon facts of each
case. There cannot be a strait jacket formula for
accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the
delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear
that the courts should not proceed with the tendency
of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the
petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of
disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished
should be the rule and refusal and exception more so
when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide
can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other
hand, while considering the matter courts should not
lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within
the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to
the other party which should not be lightly defeated
by condoning delay in a routine like manner.
However by taking pedantic and hyper technical view
of the matter the explanation furnished should not
be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable
points of facts and law are involved in the case,
causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the
party against whom the lis terminates either by
default or inaction and defeating valuable right of
such a party to have the decision on merits. While
considering the matter, courts have to strike a
balance between resultant effects of the Order it is
going to pass upon the parties either way.
(Emphasis added)
11. In view of the above, we cannot lose sight of the fact
that the object underlying Section 5 of the Act is to enable
the court to do substantial justice and as such, the court
should approach the question of sufficient cause with the
liberal approach while deciding the application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. A justice-oriented approach
is what is necessary while deciding a question of sufficient
cause in an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act.
12. Further, it also becomes clear from the above that
where arguable points of facts and law are involved the
explanation furnished should not be brushed aside taking
hyper technical view of the matter. It is indeed wellestablished that merits of the case may also be taken into
consideration in excusing the delay. In Urban Improvement
Trust V. Poonam Chand : AIR 1997 Raj 134, it has been
held as follows:
“(19) Now it must be taken to be well settled
principle of law that before rejecting applications
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and dismissing
appeals as barred by lapse of time, the courts of law
are required to put a glance as a condition precedent
on the merits of the appeals and unless the appeals
are found to be hopelessly devoid of merits ordinarily
efforts should be made to decide the appeals on
merits.”
In addition to the above, recent decision of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court rendered in Divisional Manager, Plantation
Division, Andaman and Nicobar V. Munnu Barrick : AIR
2005 SCW 109, leaves no room for doubt that where
serious questions of law are raised by appellants the courts
should take a liberal view on the application for
condonation of delay.
13. ………. It is well settled that laches and delay defeats
equity and justice. However, a meritorious matter should
not be thrown out on the ground of technical considerations
as well as delay when cause of delay has been shown with
reasons by the party concerned. It is also well settled that
in the matter of condonation of delay the court should
adopt liberal approach and the reasons for adopting such
approach has been highlighted in the above foregoing
paras keeping in view the decision of Hon‟ble Apex Court
rendered in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag V. Katiji :
AIR 1987 SC 1353, wherein the Supreme Court laid down
about the liberal approach to be adopted on principle as it
is realised that:
(1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
lodging and appeal late.
(2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As
against this when delay is condoned the highest that
can happen is that a cause would be decided on
merits after hearing the parties.
(3) „Every day‟s delay must be explained‟ does not
mean that a pedantic approach should be made.
Why not every hour‟s delay, every second‟s delay?
The doctrine must be applied in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner.
(4)
When substantial justice
and
technical
considerations are pitted against each other, cause
of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the
other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate
delay.
(5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately; or on account of culpable negligence, or
on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a
serious risk.
(6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not
on account of its power to legalize injustice on
technical grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do so.
14. Therefore, keeping in view the above legal position and
the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in hand,
we are of the opinion that sufficient cause has been shown
by the petitioner department for condoning the delay in the
institution of the present appeal. Accordingly, we are
inclined to condone the delay of 853 days and allow the
application in the interest of substantial justice.”
14.
Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted
that if the applications for condonation of delay under Section 42
of the PMLA read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act are not
considered by this Court, it will cause serious prejudice and
respondents will sway away with the properties and will not be
available for the purpose of trial.
She also submitted that the
proceeds of crime are more than 100 crores of rupees and the
appellant has a very good case on merit, therefore, the
applications for condonation of delay should be allowed.
15.
Mr. Shakeel Ahmed, Mr. Ajay Rathi and Ms. Gita Bista,
learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the
delay condonation applications.
They submitted that provisions
of Section 42 of the PMLA clearly mandates that the appeal has
to be filed within 60 days but in terms of its proviso further 60
days' grace period can be granted by the High Court (who is
appellate authority in terms of Section 42 of the PMLA) to
entertain the appeal but not further period not exceeding to 60
days. The proviso to Section 42 of the PMLA makes the position
crystal clear that the High Court, being an Appellate Court in
terms of Section 42 of the PMLA, has no statutory power to allow
the appeal to be presented beyond the further period not
exceeding 60 days. The language used in Section 42 of the PMLA
and its proviso makes the position clear that the legislature
intended the High Court, while acting as an appellate court, to
entertain the appeal by condoning delay only upto 60 days after
the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring an
appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 from the provisions of the PMLA as crucial
word/ capping 'further period not exceeding sixty days' has been
used in the proviso of Section 42 of the PMLA by the legislation.
They submitted that in view of the specific proviso of Section 42
of the PMLA, the High Court has no statutory discretionary power
to condone the delay beyond 60 days as stipulated in the said
proviso. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted
that many other Special Acts like the Arbitration & Conciliation
Act, 1996, Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, Securities
and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, the Companies Act,
2013, the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, the Income Tax
Act, 1961, the Central Excise Tax Act, 1944, and the Electricity
Act, 2003 have similar provisions wherein, being Special Acts,
certain period of limitations with the clear words 'Not Exceeding'
or 'But not thereafter' have been provided in these statutes itself
which are related to filing of an Appeal/Objections after the lapse
of the prescribed statuary period of limitation.
Section 35 of
FEMA, 1999 has almost identical and similar wordings as
compare to section 42 of the PMLA. Both section 35 of FEMA,
1999 and PMLA provides period of filing of appeal against the
order of Tribunal within sixty days with the proviso of a further
period not exceeding sixty days.
16.
In support of their submissions, the learned counsel
for the respondents relied on the following judgments:
(i)
(2019) 2 SCC 455 : Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. Vs.
Union of India,
(ii)
(2018) 3 SCC 41 : Bengal Chemists and Druggists
Association Vs. Kalyan Chowdhury,
(iii)
(2017) 5 SCC 42 : Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd.
& Ors.,
(iv)
(2010) 5 SCC 23 : Chhatisgarh State Electricity Board
Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and
Others,
(v)
(2009) 5 SCC 791 : Commissioner of Customs and
Central Excise Vs. Hongo India Private Ltd. & Anr.,
(vi)
(2001) 8 SCC 470 : Union of India Vs. Popular
Construction Co.,
(vii) (2009) 317 ITR 305 ALL : Commissioner of Income
Tax-I & Ors. Vs. Mohd. Farooq & Ors.,
(viii) (1999) 8 SCC 532 : Lachhman Das Arora Vs. Ganeshi
Lal & Ors.,
(ix)
MANU/GT/0074/2014-By Principal Bench of National
Green Tribunal consisting of Chairperson, Member
Judicial and three Members (Expert) : Sunil Kumar
Samanta Vs. West Bengal Pollution Control Board,
(x)
AIR 2017 KER 12 : Kavitha G. Pillai Vs. Joint Director,
(xi)
(2011) 15 SCC 30 : Ketan V. Parekh Vs. Special
Director Directorate of Enforcement and Anr.,
(xii) (2017) 140 SCL 40 (Bombay) : Chhagan Chandrakant
Bhujbal Vs. Union of India,
(xiii) MANU/RH/0070/2019 : Anoop Bartaria Vs. Deputy
Director Enforcement,
(xiv) (2007) 2 SCC 322 : D. Gopinathan Pillai Vs. State of
Kerala & Anr., and
(xv) (2008) 7 SCC 619 : Tata Motors Limited
Pharmaceutical Products of India Ltd. & Anr.
17.
Vs.
I have considered the submissions of learned counsel
for the parties.
18.
Against the order of the Appellate Tribunal an appeal
may be filed in the High Court under Section 42 of the PMLA.
Section 42 of the Act is as follows:
“42. Appeal to High Court.— Any person aggrieved
by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal
may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty
days from the date of communication of the decision
or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any
question of law or fact arising out of such order:
Provided that the High Court may, if it is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said
period, allow it to be filed within a further period not
exceeding sixty days.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, "High
Court" means—
(i) The High Court within the jurisdiction of which the
aggrieved party ordinarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain; and
(ii) Where the Central Government is the aggrieved
party, the High Court within the jurisdiction of which
the respondent, or in a case where there are more
than one respondent, any of the respondents,
ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally
works for gain.”
19.
From the bare perusal of this Section, it is clear that if
any person is aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate
Tribunal, he may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty
days from the date of communication of the decision or order of
the Appellate Tribunal to him.
Proviso to this Section provides
that if the High Court is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the
said period of sixty days, the High Court may allow it to be filed
within a further period not exceeding sixty days.
Thus, the
proviso clearly mandates the High Court not to allow the
appellant to file an appeal after a further period of sixty days.
20.
We can say same things in these words also.
The
PMLA has clearly given the power to the High Court to condone
the delay of sixty days in filing the appeal. Under Section 42 of
the PMLA, an appeal can be filed within a period of sixty days and
beyond the period of sixty days the Act has given power to the
High Court to entertain an appeal within a further period not
exceeding sixty days. At the same time the PMLA has made it
clear that the High Court cannot entertain an appeal beyond
further period of sixty days, thus, the permissible limit of
extended period of sixty days is permissible. The legislation has
made it very clear that the High Court can allow appeal to be
filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.
“not
exceeding sixty days” clearly means that no appeal can be
entertained after exceeding period of sixty days.
21.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has dealt with the
issue of condonation of delay under section 35 of the Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999, which is same as Section 42 of
the PMLA, in a case titled as Ketan V. Parekh Vs. Special
Director, Directorate of Enforcement and Anr., reported in (2011)
15 SCC 30. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held as under:"18. The question whether the High Court can
entertain an appeal under Section 35 of the Act
beyond 120 days does not require much debate and
has to be answered against the appellants in view of
the law laid down in Union of India v. Popular
Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470 , Singh
Enterprises v. CCE, (2008) 3 SCC 70, CCE &
Customs v. Punjab Fibres Ltd., (2008) 3 SCC
73, Consolidated
Engg.
Enterprises v. Irrigation
Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169, CCE & Customs v. Hongo
India (P) Ltd. , (2009) 5 SCC 791 and Chhattisgarh
SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission,
(2010) 5 SCC 23."
22.
In similar cases which came before the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in which the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has clearly
held that delay cannot be condoned where legislation has made
its intention clear that „not exceeding‟ and „but not thereafter‟
etc.
23.
In Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Union of India :
(2019) 2 SCC 455, the Supreme Court has held that delay
beyond the three months plus thirty days under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act cannot be condoned. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court
held as under:
“7. The issue which has been raised before this
Court is whether the learned Single Judge was
justified in condoning a delay of 514 days by the
respondent in filing the application under Section 34.
In dealing with this issue, this Court needs to assess
whether the benefit of Section 5 and Section 14 of
the Limitation Act can be extended to the
respondent, and if so, whether a delay beyond the
specific statutory limitation prescribed under Section
34(3) of the 1996 Act could be condoned.
X
X
X
18. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the
proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the
application for setting aside the award on the
grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34
could be made within three months and the period
can only be extended for a further period of thirty
days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter.
The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the
proviso makes it clear that the extension cannot be
beyond thirty days. Even if the benefit of Section 14
of the Limitation Act is given to the respondent,
there will still be a delay of 131 days in filing the
application. That is beyond the strict timelines
prescribed in sub-section (3) read along with the
proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The delay of
131 days cannot be condoned. To do so, as the High
Court did, is to breach a clear statutory mandate.
X
X
X
21. Under the circumstances, we are of the
considered opinion that in view of the period of
limitation prescribed in Section 34(3), the learned
Single Judge of the High Court was not justified in
condoning the respondent's delay of 514 days in
filing the application. The judgment rendered by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta on
27-4-2016, in
Union of India
v. Simplex
Infrastructures Ltd. [Union of India v. Simplex
Infrastructures Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Cal 12045] is
set aside and the appeal is allowed. The petition
under Section 34 stands dismissed on the ground
that it is barred by limitation. There shall be no order
as to costs. ”
24.
Similarly in the matter of Bengal Chemists and
Druggists Association vs. Kalyan Chowdhury : (2018) 3 SCC 41,
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that limitation period of 45 days
in Section 421 (3) plus additional 45 days grace period are
peremptory and mandatory nature and no further time can be
granted beyond this total period.
The Supreme Court held as
under:
“4. A cursory reading of Section 421(3) makes it
clear that the proviso provides a period of limitation
different from that provided in the Limitation Act,
and also provides a further period not exceeding 45
days only if it is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal
within that period. Section 433 obviously cannot
come to the aid of the appellant because the
provisions of the Limitation Act only apply “as far as
may be”. In a case like the present, where there is a
special provision contained in Section 421(3)
proviso, Section 5 of the Limitation Act obviously
cannot apply.
5. Another very important aspect of the case is that
45 days is the period of limitation, and a further
period not exceeding 45 days is provided only if
sufficient cause is made out for filing the appeal
within the extended period. According to us, this is a
peremptory provision, which will otherwise be
rendered completely ineffective, if we were to accept
the argument of the learned counsel for the
appellant. If we were to accept such argument, it
would mean that notwithstanding that the further
period of 45 days had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal
may, if the facts so warrant, condone the delay. This
would be to render otiose the second time-limit of 45
days, which, as has been pointed out by us above, is
peremptory in nature.
6. We are fortified in this conclusion by the judgment
of this Court in Chhattisgarh SEB v. CERC
[Chhattisgarh SEB v. CERC, (2010) 5 SCC 23] . The
language of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003,
which is similar to the language contained in Section
421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, came up for
consideration in the aforesaid decision. The issue
that arose before this Court was whether Section 5
of the Limitation Act can be invoked for allowing the
aggrieved person to file an appeal beyond 60 days
plus the further grace period of 60 days. This Court
held that Section 5 cannot apply to Section 125 of
the Electricity Act in the following terms: (SCC p. 32,
para 25)
“25. Section 125 lays down that any person
aggrieved by any decision or order of the
Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within
60 days from the date of communication of
the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso
to Section 125 empowers this Court to
entertain an appeal filed within a further
period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there
was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within
the initial period of 60 days. This shows that
the period of limitation prescribed for filing
appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is
substantially different from the
period
prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing
suits, etc. The use of the expression “within a
further period not exceeding 60 days” in the
proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the
outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days.
There is no provision in the Act under which
this Court can entertain an appeal filed against
the decision or order of the Tribunal after
more than 120 days.”
The aforesaid judgment was reiterated and followed
in ONGC Ltd. V. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corpn.
Ltd. [ONGC Ltd. V. Gujarat Energy Transmission
Corpn. Ltd., (2017) 5 SCC 42 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ)
47] , SCC at para 5.
7. It now remains to deal with the decisions cited by
the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant. The first is the judgment in Guda
Vijayalakshmi v. Guda Ramachandra Sekhara Sastry
[Guda Vijayalakshmi v. Guda Ramachandra Sekhara
Sastry, (1981) 2 SCC 646 : (1981) SCC (Cri) 574] .
In that case, a transfer petition was filed under
Section 25 CPC, 1908 in this Court. A preliminary
objection was taken stating that in view of Sections
21 and 21-A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,
Section 25 would not be applicable. This was turned
down by this Court stating that Section 21 would not
apply to substantive provisions of the Code as apart
from procedural provisions. Equally, Section 21-A of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 only dealt with
transfers “in certain cases”. This being so, the wide
and plenary power conferred on this Court to
transfer any suit, appeal or other proceedings from
one High Court to another High Court or from one
civil court in one State to another civil court in any
other State was held not to be entrenched upon by
Sections 21 and 21-A of the Hindu Marriage Act. We
fail to see how this judgment, in any manner,
furthers the proposition sought to be canvassed on
behalf of the appellant, which is that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act would continue to apply even after a
second period of 45 days is peremptorily laid down.
This judgment, therefore, does not carry the matter
any further.
8. Reliance placed on Partap Singh v. Directorate of
Enforcement [Partap Singh v. Directorate of
Enforcement, (1985) 3 SCC 72 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 312
: 1985 SCC (Tax) 352] is equally misplaced. In this
case, Section 37 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act, 1973 was involved. Section 37(2) provides that
the provisions of the Code relating to searches shall,
so far as may be, apply to searches directed under
Section 37(1). This Court held that the expression
“so far as may be” has always been construed to
mean that those provisions may generally be
followed to the extent possible. In the fact scenario
of that case, it was held that to give full meaning to
the expression “so far as may be”, sub-section (2) of
Section 37 should be interpreted to mean that
broadly the procedure relating to search as enacted
in Section 165 shall be followed.
9. This case again does not take the matter any
further. In fact, the ratio of the judgment as far as
this case is concerned is that the expression “so far
as may be” only means to the extent possible. If not
possible, obviously the Limitation Act would not
apply. We have already held that it is not possible for
Section 5 of the Limitation Act to apply given the
peremptory language of Section 421(3).
10. The third judgment is Mangu Ram v. MCD
[Mangu Ram v. MCD, (1976) 1 SCC 392 : 1976 SCC
(Cri) 10] . In this judgment, Section 417 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 provided for special
leave to appeal from an order of acquittal. Section
417(4) required that the application for special leave
should be made before the expiry period of 60 days
from the date of the order of acquittal. Applying
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, this Court held
that Section 5 of the Limitation would not be
impliedly excluded in such case despite the
mandatory and peremptory language contained in
Section 417(4) CrPC. This Court held that all periods
of limitation are cast in such mandatory and
peremptory language and, therefore, Section 5 could
not be said to be impliedly excluded.
11. This case again is wholly distinguishable. It
applies only to a period of limitation which is given
beyond which nothing further is stated as to whether
delay may be condoned beyond such period. In the
present case, Section 421(3) does not merely
contain the initial period of 45 days, in which case
the aforesaid judgment would have applied. Section
421(3) goes on to state that another period of 45
days, being a grace period given by the legislature
which cannot be exceeded, alone would apply,
provided sufficient cause is made out within the
aforesaid grace period. As has been held by us
above, it is the second period, which is a special
inbuilt kind of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the
special statute, which lays down that beyond the
second period of 45 days, there can be no further
condonation of delay. On this ground therefore, the
aforesaid judgment also stands distinguished.
12. One further thing remains — and that is that the
learned counsel for the appellant pointed out the
difference between the expression used in the
Arbitration Act as construed by Popular Construction
[Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8
SCC 470] and its absence in the proviso in Section
421(3). For the reasons given above, we are of the
view that this would also make no difference in view
of the language of the proviso to Section 421(3)
which contains mandatory or peremptory negative
language and speaks of a second period not
exceeding 45 days, which would have the same
effect as the expression “but not thereafter” used in
Section 34(3) proviso of the Arbitration Act, 1996.”
25.
In Chhatisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission and Others :
(2010) 5 SCC
23, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that outer limit for filing of
an appeal is 120 days. No provision in the Electricity Act, 2003
in which court can entertain an appeal after more than 120 days
delay, as under: ”25. Section 125 lays down that any person
aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal
can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from
the date of communication of the decision or order of
the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this
Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further
period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was
sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial
period of 60 days. This shows that the period of
limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections
111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the
period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing
suits, etc. The use of the expression “within a further
period of not exceeding 60 days” in the proviso to
Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for
filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in
the Act under which this Court can entertain an
appeal filed against the decision or order of the
Tribunal after more than 120 days.
X
X
X
32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that
Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by
this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the
decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of
120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity
Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125
of the Electricity Act which may attract the
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read
with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of
the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation
for filing an appeal against the decision or order of
the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become
nugatory. ”
26.
A larger Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise vs. Hongo India
Private Ltd. & Another : (2009) 5 SCC 791, held that High Court
has no power to condone delay beyond period specified in
Section 35 H of the Central Excise Act. It is held as under: “32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in
Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the
position clear that an appeal and reference to the
High Court should be made within 180 days only
from the date of communication of the decision or
order. In other words, the language used in other
provisions makes the position clear that the
legislature intended the appellate authority to
entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up
to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the
preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal.
In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by
showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period,
there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore,
justified in holding that there was no power to
condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed
period of 180 days.”
27.
In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the
view that the High Court cannot breach statutory mandate and
cannot
make
the
provisions
of
Limitation
Act
applicable.
Consequently, the appeals filed by the appellant are held not
maintainable as the same have been filed beyond the prescribed
period of limitation as provided under Section 42 of the PMLA.
28.
The applications for condonation of delay in filing the
appeals are rejected.
Consequently, all the appeals stand
dismissed. Applications for stay also stand dismissed.
29.
Before parting, I put a word of appreciation to those
Advocates who have appeared in this case, namely Dr. Sonali
Gopalrao Badhe, Mr. Shakeel Ahmed, Mr. Ajay Rathi and Ms. Gita
Bista.
Though I appreciate the assistance given by Dr. Sonali
Gopalrao Badhe to the Court but her sincere efforts could not
help the appellant.
I have no hesitation in saying that
officers/officials involved in the matter were either negligent or
did not work for the interest of the institution. Delay could have
been avoided.
Therefore, I leave open to the Director of the
appellant/ competent authority to get an enquiry conducted and
take appropriate action in the matter.
30.
Assistant Director of the appellant at Kolkata is
directed to send a copy of this order to the Director at
Headquarter.
Chief Justice
14.09.2019
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