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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.37624 of 2021 & W.P.(C) No.21486 of 2025
In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India.
………………
….
Dipti Ranjan Sahoo and
Others
Petitioners
-versus….
State of Odisha & Others
For Petitioner
:
For Opp. Parties :
Opposite Parties
Mr. B. Routray, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. S.D. Routray, Advocate
Mr. A. Tripathy, AGA
PRESENT:
THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Date of Hearing:27.01.2026 and Date of Judgment:27.01.2026
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J.
1.
Heard Mr. B. Routray, learned Senior counsel
along with Mr. S.D. Routray, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. A. Tripathy, learned Addl. Govt.
Advocate for the State.
2.
The present Writ Petition has been filed inter alia
challenging order dated 26.11.2021, so passed by the
// 2 //
Govt.-Opp. Party No.1 under Annexure-14. Vide the
said order, benefit of promotion extended in favour of
the petitioners vide order dated 18.02.2019 under
Annexure-7, so issued by Opp. Party No.3 was
cancelled.
3.
It is the main contention of the learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the petitioners that prior to
cancelling the benefit of promotion so extended vide
order dated 18.02.2019 under Annexure-7, since
principle of natural justice was never followed, the said
order is not sustainable in the eye of law.
3.1. In support of his submission, reliance was placed
on the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case
of Menaka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC597, State of Orissa vs. Binapani Das, AIR 1967
SC-1269, State Bank of India And Others Vs.
Rajesh Agarwal & Ors., (2023) 6 SCC 1, Dushyant
Mainali Vs.Diwan Singh Bora & Another, SLP (C )
No.15191 of 2022 and Krishnadatt Awasthy Vs.
// 3 //
State of M.P & Others, Civil Appeal NO(s) 4806 of
2011 (2025 INSC 126).
3.2. In Menaka Gandhi (supra), Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Paragraphs-57, 58 and 61 has held as under:“57. The question immediately arises : does the
procedure prescribed by the Passports Act, 1967 for
impounding a passport meet the, test of this
requirement ? Is it 'right or fair or just' ? The argument
of the petitioner was that it is not, because it provides
for impounding of a passport without affording
reasonable opportunity to the holder of the passport to
be heard in defence. To impound the passport of a
person, said the petitioner, is a serious matter, since it
prevents him from exercising his constitutional right to
go abroad and such a drastic consequence cannot in
fairness be visited without observing the principle of
audi alteram partem. Any procedure which permits
impairment of the constitutional right to go abroad
without giving reasonable opportunity to show cause
cannot but be condemned as unfair and unjust and
hence, there is in the present case clear infringement
of the requirement of Article 21. Now, it is true that
there is no express provision in the Passports Act,
1967 which requires that the audi alteram partem rule
should be followed before impounding a passport, but
that is not conclusive of the question. If the statute
makes itself clear on this point, then no more question
arises. But even when the statute is silent, the law
may in a given case make an implication and apply
the principle stated by Byles, J., in Cooper v.
Wandsworth Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India on 25
January,
Indian
Kanoon
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1766147/ 57 Board of
Works(2). "A long course of decision---, beginning with
Dr. Bentley's case and ending with some very recent
cases, establish that, although there are no positive
words in the statute requiring that the party shall be
heard, yet-the justice of the common law will supply
the
omission
of
(1)
[1974]2S.C.R.348.
(2)
[1863]14C.B.N.S.180. the legislature". The principle of
audi alteram partem, which mandates that no one
shall be condemned unheard, part of the rules of
natural justice. In fact, there are two main principles in
which the rules of natural justice are manifested,
// 4 //
namely, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and audi alteram
partem. We are not concerned here with the former,
since there is no case of bias urged here. The question
is only in regard to the right of hearing which involves
the audi alteram partem rule. Can it be imported in the
procedure for impounding a passport ?
58. We may commence the discussion of this question
with a few general observations to emphasise the
increasing importance of natural justice in the field of
administrative law. Natural justice is a great
humanising principle intended to invest law with'
fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has
grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large
areas of administrative action. Lord Morris of Borth- yGest spoke of this rule in eloquent terms in his address
before the Bentham Club : "We can, I think, take pride
in what has been done in recent periods and
particularly in the field of administrative law by
invoking and by applying these principles which we
broadly classify under the designation of natural
justice. Many testing problems as to their application
yet remain to be solved. But I affirm that the area of
administrative action is but one area in which the
principles are to be deployed. Nor are they to be
invoked only when procedural failures are shown.
Does natural justice qualify to be described as a
"majestic" conception ? I believe it does. Is it just a
rhetorical but vague phrase which can be employed,
when needed, to give a gloss of assurance ? I believe
that it is very much more. If it can be summarised as
being fair play in action-who could wish that it would
ever be out of action ? It denotes that the law is not
only to be guided by reason and by logic but that its
purpose %, will not be fulfilled; it lacks more exalted
inspiration." (Current Legal Problems, 1973, Vol. 26, p.
16) And then again, in his speech in the House of
Lords in Wiseman v. Borneman(1), the learned Law
Lord said in words of inspired felicity: "that the
conception of natural justice should at all stages guide
those who discharge judicial functions is not merely an
acceptable but is an essential part of the philosophy of
the law. We often speak of the rules of natural justice.
But there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them.
What they comprehend has been analysed and
described in many authorities. But any analysis must
bring into relief rather their spirit and their inspiration
than any precision of definition or precision as to
application. We do not search for prescriptions which
will lay down exactly what must, in various divergent
situations, be done. The principles and procedures are
to be applied which, in any particular situation or set
// 5 //
of circumstances, are right and just and fair. Natural
justice, it has been said, is only "fair play in action."
Nor do we wait for directions from Parliament. The
common law has abundant riches : there we may find
what Byles, J., called "the justice of the common law".
Thus, the soul of natural justice is fair play in action'
and that is why it has received the widest recognition
throughout the democratic world. In the United States,
the right to an administrative hearing is regarded as
essential requirement of fundamental fairness. And in
England too it has been held that 'fair play in action'
demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action
is taken against a person, he must be given an
opportunity to be heard. The rule was stated by Lord
Henning, M.R. in these terms in Schmidt v. Secretary
of State for Home Affairs(1) :-where a public officer has
power to deprive a person of his liberty or his property,
the general principle is that it has not to be done
without his being given an opportunity of being heard
and of making representations on his own behalf". The
same rule also prevails in other Commonwealth
countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It
has even gained access to the United Nations. Vide
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 67, page
479. Magarry, J., describes natural justice "as a
distillate of due process of law". Vide Fontaine v.
Chesterton(2). It is the quintessence of the process of
justice inspired and guided by fair play in action'. If
we look at the speeches of the various law Lords in
Wiseman's case, it will be seen that each one of them
asked the question "whether in the particular
circumstances of the case, the Tribunal acted unfairly
so that it could be said that their procedure did not
match with what justice demanded", ,or, was the
procedure adopted by the Tribunal 'in all the
circumstances unfair'? The test adopted by every law
Lord was whether the procedure followed was "fair in
all the circumstances" and 'fair play in action' required
that an opportunity should be given to the tax payer
"to see and reply to the counter-statement of the
Commissioners" before reaching the conclusion that
"there is a prima facie case against him." The inquiry
must, therefore, always be : does fairness in action
demand that an opportunity to be heard should be
given to the person affected?.
XXX
XXX
XXX
61. This Court, speaking through Hegde, J., in ,I. K.
Kraipak's case quoted with approval the above
passage from the judgment of Lord Parker, C.J., and
proceeded to add : "The aim of the rules of natural
// 6 //
justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to
prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate
only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In
other words they do not supplant the law of the land
but supplement it-Till very recently it was the opinion
of the courts that unless the authority concerned was
required by the law under which it functioned to act
judicially there was no room for the, application of the
rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is
now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural
justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice One fails to
see why those rules should be made inapplicable, to
administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to
draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries
from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were
considered administrative at one time are now being
considered as quasi-.judicial in character. Arriving at a
just decision is the aim of both quasi- judicial enquiries
as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision
in an administrative enquiry may have more far
reaching effect than a decision in a quasi- judicial
enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy
George v. The University of Kerala and Ors. (1969)1
S.C.R. 317 the rules of natural justice are not
embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice
should apply to a given case must depend to a great
extent on the facts and circumstances of that case the
framework of the law under which the enquiry is held
and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons
appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is
made before a court that some principles of natural
justice had been contravened the court has to decide
whether the observance of that rule was necessary for
a just decision on the facts of the case." This view was
reiterated and re-affirmed in a subsequent decision of
this Court in D.F.O. South Khari v. Ram Sanehi
Singh(1). The law must, therefore, now be taken to be
well settled that even in an administrative proceeding,
which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of
natural justice must be held to be applicable.
3.3. In State of Orissa vs. Binapani Das, Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Paragraph-12 has held as under:“12. It is true that some preliminary enquiry was
made by Dr. S, Mitra. But the report of that Enquiry
Officer was never disclosed to the first respondent.
'The rafter the first respondent was required to show
cause why April 16, 1907, should not be accept das
// 7 //
the date of birth and without recording any evidence
the order was passed. We think that such an enquiry
and decision were contrary to the basic concept of
justice and cannot have any value. It is true that the
order is administrative in character, but even an
administrative
order
which
involves
civil
consequences as already stated must be made
consistently with the rules of natural justice after
informing the first respondent of the case of the State,
the evidence in support thereof and after giving an
opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and
meeting or explaining the evidence. No such steps
were admittedly taken; the High Court was, in our
judgment, right in setting aside the order of the
State.”
3.4. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Agarwal
in Para 41 & 42 has held as follows:“41. In State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei [State of
Orissa v. Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269], a twoJudge Bench of this Court held that every authority
which has the power to take punitive or damaging
action has a duty to give a reasonable opportunity
to be heard. This Court further held that an
administrative
action
which
involves
civil
consequences must be made consistent with the
rules of natural justice : (AIR p. 1271, para 9)
“9. … The rule that a party to
whose
prejudice
an
order
is
intended to be passed is entitled
to a hearing applies alike to
judicial tribunals and bodies of
persons invested with authority
to
adjudicate
upon
matters
involving civil consequences. It is
one of the fundamental rules of
our
constitutional
set-up
that
every citizen is protected against
exercise of arbitrary authority by
the State or its officers. Duty to
// 8 //
act
judicially
would
therefore
arise from the very nature of the
function
intended
to
be
performed : it need not be shown
to be super-added. If there is
power to decide and determine to
the prejudice of a person, duty to
act judicially is implicit in the
exercise of such power. If the
essentials of justice be ignored
and an order to the prejudice of a
person is made, the order is a
nullity. That is a basic concept of
the rule of law and importance
thereof
transcends
the
significance of a decision in any
particular case.”
42. In Maneka
Gandhi v. Union
of
India [Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] , a
seven-Judge Bench of this Court held that any person
prejudicially affected by a decision of the authority
entailing civil consequences must be given an
opportunity of being heard. This has been reiterated
in a catena of decisions of this Court.”
3.5. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dushyant
Mainali,
in para-5 of the said judgment held as
follows:
5. There is no necessity to reiterate that
even the Courts, including a highest court of
the Country, are bound by principle of
natural justice. Nobody can be condemned
unheard.
// 9 //
3.6. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnadatt
Awasthy
in para-68 of the said judgment held as
follows:
68.
The principle of audi alteram
partem is the cornerstone of justice,
ensuring that no person is condemned
unheard.
This principle transforms
justice from a mere technical formality
into a humane pursuit. It safeguards
against arbitrary decision-making, and
is needed more so in cases of unequal
power dynamics.”
3.7. It is also contended that taking into account the
interim order passed by this Court on 30.11.2021,
petitioners are continuing in the promotional post in
terms of order dated 18.02.2019 as on date. It is
further contended that since petitioners were allowed to
continue in their promotional post, their claim for
further promotion though was recommended and no
final decision was taken, W.P.(C) No.21486 of 2025 has
been filed claiming the benefit of further promotion.
4.
Even though learned Addl. Govt. Advocate relying
on the stand taken in the counter affidavit supported
the impugned order, but fairly contended that prior to
cancelling the benefit, principle of natural justice has
// 10 //
not been followed with issuance of any show-cause to
the petitioners.
5.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
considering the submissions made, this Court finds
that petitioners were extended with the benefit of
promotion to the post in question in terms of order
dated 18.02.2019 so issued by Opp. Party No.3 under
Annexure-7. However, such benefit was cancelled vide
the impugned order issued by the Govt.-Opp. Party
No.1 on 26.11.2021 under Annexure-14.
5.1. Since prior to cancelling the benefit of promotion
so issued vide order dated 18.02.2019, petitioners were
never provided with opportunity of hearing with
issuance of the show-cause, placing reliance on the
aforesaid decisions, it is the view of this Court that
such an order could not have been passed.
5.2. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court while
quashing order dated 26.11.2021 under Annexure-14,
remits the matter to Opp. Party No.1 to take a fresh
decision on the issue involved by issuing appropriate
// 11 //
show-cause to each of the petitioner and by giving
them due opportunity of hearing. This Court directs
Opp. Party No.1 to take a fresh decision as directed
hereinabove within a period of 4 (four) months from the
date of receipt of this order. Till a fresh decision is
taken,
interim
order
passed
by
this
Court
on
30.11.2021 shall continue. Claim of the petitioners to
get the benefit of further promotion which is the
subject matter of challenge in connected W.P.(C)
No.21486 of 2025, shall be subject to the final decision
to be taken by the Govt as directed.
6.
Both
the
Writ
Petitions
stand
disposed
of
accordingly.
(Biraja Prasanna Satapathy)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
Dated the 27th January, 2026/Basudev
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BASUDEV SWAIN
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 29-Jan-2026 16:12:39
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