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In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandip Kumar De
F.M.A. No.816 of 2026
+
CAN 1 of 2026
With
F.M.A. No.951 of 2026
With
F.M.A. No.952 of 2026
With
F.M.A. No.1186 of 2026
Dinesh Soni and Others
-VersusPramod Kumar Pansari and Others
For the appellants
:
Mr. Sayantan Bose,
Mr. Shreyaan Bhattacharyya,
Ms. Dakshayani Basu, ... Advs.
For the respondents
:
Mr. Kallol Basu,
Mr. Samik Sarkar, … Advs.
Heard on
:
15.09.2026, 22.09.2026,
29.09.2026 & 05.10.2026
Reserved on
:
05.10.2026
Judgment on
:
15.10.2026
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1.
The present appeals arise out of the same suit and are taken up for hearing
together accordingly. The genesis of the litigation is an internal dispute
between the members of the Sunrise Towers Apartment Owners Association,
which is a registered Association of the apartment owners of a housing
complex called “Sunrise Towers”. Being aggrieved by certain allegedly
unlawful activities carried out by the present respondent nos.1, 2 and 3,
respectively, the Secretary, President and Treasurer of the said Association
at the relevant point of time, 78 apartment owners, including the defendant
nos. 2 to 5/present appellants, issued a requisition for conducting a Special
General Meeting (SGM) of the Association on May 5, 2026, on several
agenda, including removal of the then incumbent President, Secretary and
Treasurer (respondent nos. 1 to 3 herein) and to pass a resolution for
dissolution/reconstruction of the Board of Managers (BoM). Thereafter, on
May 16, 2026, a reminder was given in that regard to the respondent nos. 1
to 3 and the BoM. On May 18, 2026, respondent nos. 1 to 3 gave a reply to
the notice dated May 5, 2026, inter alia, refusing to convene an SGM.
2.
On May 22, 2026, after the expiry of 15 days from the date of the initial
notice, the said 78 members issued a fresh notice to convene an SGM on
May 30, 2026.
3.
The respondent no. 5/Competent Authority (CA) holding office under the
West Bengal Apartment Ownership Act, 1972 (for short, “the 1972 Act”),
issued an order on May 27, 2026, holding that the SGM requisition dated
May 5, 2026 was valid and, “for convenience”, directing the agenda of the
proposed SGM to be discussed at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) to be
held on May 31, 2026. It was indicated that the SGM agenda would be taken
up first, prior to the deliberations on the AGM agenda, and that the seniormost non-defaulting member of the Association was to preside over the
meeting, since one of the agenda was the removal of the then President.
4.
On May 29, 2026, respondent nos. 1 to 3, along with the respondent no. 4Association, instituted a suit bearing Title Suit No. 1123 of 2026 in the City
Civil Court at Calcutta, primarily seeking a decree of declaration that the
purported notice dated May 5, 2026 and subsequent notice dated May 22,
2026 were illegal, fraudulent and ultra vires the West Bengal Apartment
Ownership Bye-laws, 2022 (for short, “the Bye-Laws”), for a decree of
declaration that the order of the defendant no. 1/respondent no. 5 (CA)
dated May 27, 2026 was illegal, arbitrary, without jurisdiction and contrary
to the Bye-laws, for permanent injunction restraining the defendant nos. 2
to 5/appellants and their men and agents from conducting any meeting or
giving effect to the purported SGM scheduled for May 30, 2026 or any
adjourned, rescheduled or subsequent meeting arising out of the notice
dated May 22, 2026 to be void and ultra vires, as well as for permanent
injunction restraining the respondent nos. 2 to 5 from giving effect to or
acting upon in any manner the resolutions or other outcomes of the meeting
scheduled on May 30, 2026 and from projecting themselves as office bearers
of the Association, and for other consequential reliefs.
5.
In connection with the said suit, the plaintiffs/respondent nos. 1 to 4 filed
an application for temporary and ad interim injunction under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2, read with Section 151, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(for short, “the CPC”), for temporary and ad interim injunction restraining
the defendant no. 1/CA from giving effect to or acting upon its order dated
May 27, 2026, injunction restraining the defendant nos. 2 to 5/present
appellants from convening, holding or conducting any SGM scheduled for
May 30, 2026 or any adjourned, rescheduled or subsequent meeting arising
out of the notice dated May 22, 2026, as well as injunction restraining the
appellants and their men and agents from giving effect to or acting upon the
resolutions or decision taken in the meeting scheduled on May 30, 2026 or
to act in furtherance thereof, as well as from projecting themselves as office
bearers of the Association.
6.
On May 29, 2026, the ad interim injunction prayed for in connection with
the aforesaid application was refused by the learned Trial Judge, on the
observation that the CA may have considered the contentions raised by the
appellants before passing its order dated May 27, 2026 and that since the
CA was a party, Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure was required to
be complied with.
7.
On May 31, 2026, the AGM of the Association was held. In it, the proposed
SGM agenda were taken up first and, inter alia, the respondent nos. 1 to 3
were removed from their offices of Secretary, President and Treasurer
respectively in the BoM and resolution was taken to resume the election
process.
8.
On June 1, 2026, respondent nos. 1 to 4 filed another application for
injunction, captioning the same under Section 94(e) read with Section 151 of
the CPC, seeking a restraint order on the appellants from granting any
recognition, legitimacy or giving any operational effect to any resolution,
election or minutes “purportedly passed at the fractured assembly” on May
31, 2026.
9.
Vide order of even date, the learned Trial Judge granted injunction
restraining the defendants from conducting any meeting in connection with
the respondent no. 4-Association till June 26, 2026. The said order has
been extended from time to time by subsequent orders.
10. FMA 816 of 2026 has been filed against the parent order of ad interim
injunction dated June 1, 2026 and the other appeals filed against the
subsequent extension orders.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants argues that at least 78 members of the
respondent no. 4-Association signed on the notices dated May 5, 2026 and
May 22, 2026, calling for an SGM. Each of the requisitionists, it is
contended, ought to have been made a party to the suit since the reliefs
claimed in the suit, if granted, would affect the rights of all of them. Thus,
the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and no effective
injunction order could be passed in the absence of the other signatories to
the said notices. It is submitted that the plaintiffs’ assertion regarding
ineligibility five requisitionists on various grounds, including disqualification
for not being members, for having withdrawn their signatures or on account
of their co-owners already being in the Board, even if accepted, would leave
73 signatories. The quorum for calling a requisition meeting as per the
Articles of the concerned Association is 64, that is, one-third of the total
number of 192 members. Thus, even if five are omitted, there still remain 73
requisitionists who formed a valid quorum for calling an SGM.
12. The plaintiffs have argued that 51 out of the signatories to the impugned
notices ought to be disqualified only on the ground of default in payment of
common expenses to the Association. However, it is argued that there is no
bar against defaulting members from calling an SGM for removal of the
Managers of the Association from their offices.
13. Learned counsel places reliance on Bye-law (BL) 10 of the Bye-laws, which
provides for removal of Managers. As per Clause (a) thereof, a Manager may
be removed from office at any SGM of the Association by a vote of the
majority apartment owners present in the meeting. A successor to the
position of the removed Manager, as per the said provision, is to be elected
within 6 weeks through a separate Special Election.
14. On the other hand, BL 11 provides for disqualification for being Managers,
as per which such disqualification applies to members defaulting in making
contribution towards the common expenses assessed by the Association.
However, such disqualification is extended only in respect of voting in any
election of the Managers and to seek election for the office of the Manager,
and not to the removal of a Manager.
15. Although the plaintiffs/respondent nos. 1 to 4 have argued that BL 13
provides for removal of office bearers from such office, including the
President, Secretary and Treasurer, such provision operates in a separate
and distinct field than Clause 10. Whereas BL 13(2) contemplates the
removal of the office bearers from such offices only, BL 10 pertains to
removal of the Managers from such office. It may very well be that a person
is removed as an office bearer but not from the office as Manager. Thus, the
two provisions cannot be confused with each other.
16. It is next argued that, in terms of BL 6(2) of the Bye-laws, an SGM can be
called on the requisition of one-third members of the Association to consider
the subjects specified to be the business of an AGM as well as any other
business of general importance in the interest of the Association and within
the scope of the 1972 Act and the Bye-laws. Since serious allegations were
levelled against the President, Secretary and Treasurer, which touch upon
the interests of the functioning of the Association as a whole, the notices
issued by more than one-third members seeking removal of the said office
bearers comes within the ambit of BL 6(2).
17. Thus, the argument of the plaintiffs/respondents, that the power to remove
an office bearer lies only with the Board (BoM) but not in the general body,
is contrary to the Bye-laws.
18. The appellants next contend that the challenge by the plaintiffs to the order
of the Competent Authority dated May 27, 2026 is watered down since the
plaintiff themselves relied on the same in respect of the direction that the
senior-most non-defaulting member would have to be appointed as
Chairman of the AGM. Thus, the plaintiffs cannot approbate and reprobate,
by relying on the order dated May 27, 2026 of the CA on the one hand, and
disputing the other part of the same, whereby the notice for holding SGM
was declared valid and the SGM agenda were directed to be taken up in the
AGM to be held on May 31, 2026.
19. Learned counsel for the appellants further argues that in view of the refusal
of ad interim prayer in respect of the application filed under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, the subsequent application, captioned under
Section 94(e) of the CPC, was not maintainable.
20. Learned counsel submits that the subsequent order of the CA dated August
6, 2026, despite the CA having full knowledge of the pendency of the suit
and that the disputes dealt with by it were sub judice, was unlawful. In any
event, it is submitted that the CA does not have the power or the authority
to invalidate otherwise valid resolutions taken in an SGM/AGM.
21. In reply, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents argues that the suit
primarily challenges the action of the CA, a statutory authority, and is not
limited to mere intra-member disputes. Thus, the argument of non-joinder
of the other signatories to the impugned notices is not tenable in law,
keeping in view the manner in which the suit has been couched.
22. Alternatively, it is argued that non-joinder is a curable illegality at the worst
and does not preclude the court from granting ad interim injunction. Even if
no prior leave is granted under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC, it is argued, the
court is not powerless to grant ad interim injunction. In support of the said
proposition, learned counsel cites a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the matter of Dr. Vimal Sukumar v. D. Lawrence, reported at 2025 INSC
622.
23. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondents next argues that the court has
the power under Section 151, read with Section 94(e) of the CPC, to exercise
inherent jurisdiction and grant injunction, when the irregularity complained
of does not fall squarely within the four corners of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and
2 of the CPC. Section 94 of the CPC, it is contended, is the source of the
Court’s power to grant interim relief, only to be exercised in accordance with
the prescribed rules when the circumstances of the case falls within them.
Otherwise, the court can grant injunction in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction. In support of such argument, learned counsel cites Manohar
Lal Chopra vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, reported at AIR 1962 SC
527, and Vareed Jacob vs. Sosamma Geevarghese and Others, reported at
(2004) 6 SCC 378.
24. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents next argues that
the order of the CA dated August 6, 2026 is independently under challenge
by the present appellant no. 1 in a writ petition bearing WPA 25112 of 2026.
Thus, the Civil Court does not have the power to judge such issue at this
stage.
25. Moving on to the interplay between the Bye-laws, learned counsel for the
plaintiffs/respondents submits that the appellants seek to conflate two
distinct questions – where ultimate authority decides under Bye-law 4 (in a
general body, exercised through a general meeting) and whether a particular
purported exercise of that authority was lawfully convened.
26. The plaintiffs have never made out a case that the BoM is supreme over the
general body in the abstract. The case of the plaintiffs is that the will of the
general body was never validly expressed in the meeting dated May 31,
2026, since the senior-most non-defaulting member, Sri Shreekant Gupta,
was forcibly ousted from the Chair by the appellants, contrary to the order
of the CA dated May 27, 2026, and only 49 of the 192 members of the
Association signed the attendance registrar against the statutory quorum of
64 (1/3rd) under BL 6(5).
27. It is next argued that BL 6 governs the general right of one-third of the
members to requisition an SGM and does not contain any provision for
removal of an office bearer, which specific power is reserved by BL 10. As
per the BL 10, it is the BoM which is to convene an SGM for such removal.
28. BL 13, it is argued, is a specific and exclusive provision for removal of the
office bearers. In the present case, plaintiff nos. 2, 3 and 4 (respondent nos.
1 to 3) held the offices of Secretary, President and Treasurer respectively, as
distinct from ordinary Managers of the Board. Thus, the SGM in question
was to be held within the contemplation of BL 13, if at all. BL 13 requires
that at least two-third of the Managers must vote in the meeting and that
the meeting shall be convened by the President, on the requisition of at least
one-third of the Managers. In view of non-compliance of the same, the
impugned notices as well as the resultant meeting were bad in law.
29. It is reiterated that BL 10 itself requires the SGM to be convened on the
requisition of the BoM and not of apartment owners as under BL 6.
30. Insofar as the bar under BL 11 is concerned, it is argued that the question
as to whether such disqualification pertains only to voting and candidature
in an election or also extends to a removal resolution at an SGM under BL
10 is one of the questions now sub judice in the suit. Thus, such issue
ought not to be pre-decided at this stage.
31. The order of the CA dated May 27, 2026, it is submitted, proceeded on the
basis that a defaulter list was relevant as to who could participate in the
May 31, 2026 meeting. As per the subsequent order of the CA dated August
6, 2026, defaulters were strictly prohibited from voting on any agenda item
concerning election, removal or recall of office bearers. Thus, the subsequent
meeting, in any event, is vitiated.
32. It is further argued that there was an omnibus prayer in the application
under Section 94(e), read with Section 151 of the CPC, to “pass such other
or further order(s)” as the court may deem fit and proper in the interest of
justice. Thus, the court was permitted to mould the reliefs to the proven
facts. Accordingly, the argument that the injunction granted was beyond the
prayers cannot also be accepted.
33. It is argued that the subsequent application under Section 94(e), read with
Section 151, CPC was on a subsequent cause of action. As such, the refusal
of ad interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 could not stand
in the way of allowing the same. In any event, the prior refusal was primarily
on the ground of non-compliance of Section 80(2) of the CPC and not on
merits.
34. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents next argues that since the
order of the CA dated May 27, 2026 to appoint the senior-most nondefaulting member was violated, the impugned meeting dated May 31, 2026
was bad in law.
35. It is submitted that an illegitimately installed Chair vitiates the proceeding
over which it presides. In respect of such contention, learned counsel cites
Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad and Others vs. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad, reported
at (2005) 11 SCC 314, where the Chairman of an AGM stepped aside and
nominated another to preside, and the entire meeting and the resolutions
passed thereat were held illegal and void. Again, in Nazir Hoosein and
Another vs. Darayus Bhathena and Others, reported at (2000) 5 SCC 601, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that once the removal of the original Chairman
is found to be patently illegal, the legal basis of the new leadership collapses
and all resolutions passed in a meeting at the behest of the respondents,
where he presided as a Chairman, were held to be patently illegal, having no
force of law.
36. Lastly, learned counsel argues that this court ought not be asked, at the
interim stage, to adjudicate on the validity of the SGM/AGM or the orders of
the CA, since it would tantamount to pre-judging the issues involved in the
suit and the writ petition challenging the subsequent order of the CA dated
August 6, 2026.
37. The minutes of the SGM, it is further argued, were never placed before the
BoM and, thus, cannot be said to be valid.
38. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the following issues acquire
relevance in the opinion of the Court for a complete adjudication of the lis at
hand;(i)
Validity of the orders passed by the CA on May 27, 2026 and August 6,
2026;
(ii)
Validity of the impugned notices dated May 2, 2026 and May 22, 2026;
(iii)
Whether the impugned order was beyond the appellants’ prayers;
(iv)
Effect of refusal of ad interim injunction in connection with the
application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 on the validity of the
impugned order;
(v)
Non-joinder of all signatories.
39. The aforesaid issues are decided as follows:-
(i)
Validity of the orders passed by the CA on May 27, 2026 and
August 6, 2026
40. In order to ascertain the validity and binding effect of the two orders passed
by the CA, the relevant provisions of the 1972 Act and the Bye-laws are
required to be considered. Under the paradigm of the said Act and the Byelaws, there are only four key provisions which define the contours of the
CA’s powers.
41. Section 10A of the 1972 Act empowers the CA to receive and decide on
declarations under Section 2 of the said Act or amendments thereto. Section
13 of the said Act confers authority on the CA to frame Bye-laws with the
prior approval of the State Government. Section 16B (1) empowers the CA to
pass directions on the Association if its Manager/BoM fails to perform its
functions under the Act or the Bye-laws, whereas sub-section (2) thereof
confers authority on the CA to remove a Manager or supersede the BoM if
their function is detrimental to the interest of the Association or against
public
interest,
upon
giving
a
show-cause
notice.
Such
period
of
removal/supersession may be extended up to six months at a time, up to
three years in total.
42. BL 39 of the Bye-laws stipulates that if difficulty arises in giving effect to the
provisions of the Bye-laws, the CA may, by guidelines, make such provisions
(not inconsistent with the Bye-laws) as may appear to the CA to be
necessary for removing the difficulty.
43. Conspicuously, none of the aforesaid provisions empowers the CA to
adjudicate upon the day-to-day affairs or the functioning of an Association.
The CA, in the first order dated May 27, 2026, invoked BL 39, and its
second order dated August 6, 2026, Section 16B as well as BL 39.
44. In any event, since Sections 10A and 13 operate in complete different fields
than those relevant in the present context, those are being left out of the
zone of the present consideration.
45. BL 39 can be ruled out at the outset, since it confers power on the CA to
formulate guidelines which are necessary for removing any difficulty in
giving effect to the provisions of the Bye-laws in general. The power to frame
such guidelines for clarification of the effect of Bye-laws and to remove
difficulties in respect thereof is of a general nature and cannot be read to
confer power in the CA to pass specific directions in respect of particular
meetings or specific functioning of the Association.
46. Insofar as Section 16B is concerned, sub-section (2) thereof relates to
supersession or removal of the BoM or Manager if their function is
detrimental to the interest of the Association or public interest, that too
upon giving show-cause notice. Since the CA has not resorted to such
measure in either of the orders in question, the said provision also does not
come into play.
47. Thus, it is only Section 16B (1) of the 1972 Act which is required to be
considered in the present context. As per the same, the CA can issue
directions if the Association, through its Manager/BoM, fails to perform its
functions under the Act or Bye-laws.
48. However, from the tenor of the orders dated May 27, 2026 and August 6,
2026, it is not found that the directions incorporated therein were on the
premise of the failure of the Manager or the BoM to discharge their
functions. The CA, in the first order dated May 27, 2026, proceeded to
adjudicate on the validity of specific notices issued by members of the
Association and also to determine the mode in which the meetings were to
be conducted, which is entirely beyond the scope of Section 16B (1), since it
was not specifically observed by the CA that the BoM or the Manager had
failed to discharge their functions. In fact, the direction incorporated
therein, to appoint the senior-most non-defaulting member as the Chairman
of the AGM, was de hors BL 6(4), which mandates that the SGM shall be
presided over by the President or, in his absence, by a member to be chosen
by the members present in such meeting. In the present case, it is the
member chosen by the members who were present in the meeting who
chaired the same on May 31, 2026. Hence, such an exercise of the CA
beyond jurisdiction in arbitrarily directing the senior-most member to be
appointed as Chairman, being de hors the Bye-laws, was a nullity.
49. Insofar as the order dated August 6, 2026 is concerned, the CA traversed
palpably beyond its jurisdiction in invalidating meetings held by the
members of the Association in terms of the requisition notices dated May 5,
2026 and May 22, 2026, which notices were held to be valid by the CA itself
in its earlier order dated May 27, 2026, without recording satisfaction in any
manner as to the specific infractions in the said SGMs. The only purported
violation cited was that the senior-most member was not appointed as
President, which we have already held to be de hors the Bye-laws. The
invocation of Section 16B (1), thus, was a misnomer and the CA usurped
jurisdiction beyond its charter as per the Bye-laws. In any event, BL 39 does
not apply in the present case, since the order in question was not for
framing of guidelines in general to give effect to the provisions of the Byelaws.
50. Thus, both the said orders of the CA were de hors jurisdiction and were
prima facie exercises in nullity.
51. The plaintiff/respondents have vociferously argued that this court cannot
enter into the merits of the said orders. However, such argument is
misplaced, since even if the issue is sub judice in the suit, the court, at the
time of consideration of prayers of ad interim injunction, can, and ought to,
prima facie consider the legality of such contentions. In fact, the CA itself, in
its order dated August 6, 2026, made the said order subject to the outcome
of the suit, thus, explicitly recognising the supremacy of the adjudication of
the Civil Court over its decision.
52. Mere pendency of a writ petition cannot also coming the way of the Civil
Court
adjudicating
such
issue
prima
facie,
more
so,
since
the
plaintiff/respondent nos.1 to 4 themselves have invoked the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court by seeking injunction, in connection with which the validity
of the orders of the CA are of major relevance.
53. Accordingly, it is hereby held that the orders dated May 27, 2026 and
August 6, 2026 passed by the CA were de hors the law and without
jurisdiction and thus, do not have any binding effect insofar as the validity
of the impugned acts of the parties are concerned. However, we hasten to
add here that such observation is tentative and stands on a prima facie
footing, meant only for the purpose of adjudication of the legality of the
impugned ad interim order.
(ii)
Validity of the impugned notices dated May 2, 2026 and May 22,
54. Some of the provisions of the Bye-Laws of 2022 are to be considered for
deciding this issue, which are reproduced hereinbelow:
“6. Special General Meeting of Association.– (l) The President may convene
Special General Meeting as and when the Board decides to convene such
Special General Meeting.
(2) On requisition of one-third members of an Association a Special General
Meeting of such an Association may be held as often as may be necessary
to consider all of or any of the subjects specified to be the business of the
Annual General Meeting and any other business of general importance in
the interest of the Association and within the scope of the Act and these
bye-laws. After receiving the requisition, the President shall convene
Special General Meeting within 15 days of receiving the same. If the
President does not convene the meeting within the said period, then the
persons who made the requisition shall hold the meeting within the next 15
days from the date of expiry of convening meeting by the President after
giving notice of such meeting to all the members.
(3) A notice of a Special General Meeting stating the place, date and hour of the
meeting together with a list of businesses to be transacted thereat, shall be
sent by the President to every member at least seven clear days before the
date of the meeting and no business other than those mentioned in the said
list shall be transacted at such meeting. Notice may be sent by email or any
other electronic mode.
(4) The Special General Meeting shall be presided over by the President or, in
his absence, by a member to be chosen by the members present in such
meeting.
(5) Subject to the minimum of three, the quorum for a Special General Meeting
shall be one third of the total number of the members.
(6) All questions which may come up before any Annual or Special General
meeting shall be decided by a majority of the members present and voting,
and in the event of equality of votes, the President or, in his absence, the
member presiding the meeting shall have and exercise a second or casting
vote. Voting shall be made by any method the President or the member of
the Association presiding over the meeting may deem fit and the majority
members present agree on it. Every decision shall be taken in the form of
resolution and the decision of the general meeting shall be binding on the
Board and all the members of the Association : Provided that if within half
an hour from the time appointed for the meeting there is no quorum, the
meeting shall stand adjourned ordinarily to the same day on the next week
to be held at the same place and time and the fact of the adjournment shall
be notified at the office of the Association or at or at any other conspicuous
place or places within the compound of the property and shall also be
informed through electronic mode to all the members.
(7) Every Association shall cause minutes of proceeding of Annual or Special
General Meeting to be recorded in a book kept for the purpose. The
minutes are to be drawn up by the Secretary of the Association and shall
be duly signed by the President or the person presiding over the meeting
immediately on the termination of the meeting or as early thereafter as
possible.
(8) An Association shall observe such other procedure in regard to the
transaction of its business in a general meeting as may be determined by
its members in consistent with these bye-laws.
…
10.
Removal of Managers. – (a) A Manager may be removed from office at any
Special General Meeting of the Association, convened on the requisition of the
Board, by a vote of the majority of the apartment owners present and thereupon
a successor shall be elected within six weeks through a Special Election. The
Manager so elected shall remain in office for the residue period of the Manager
on whose removal he has been elected.
(b) Any other casual vacancy in the office of any Manager by resignation
or death shall be filled up through a Special Election for this purpose. The Board
shall take steps to hold Special Election for this purpose within six weeks from
the date of the vacancy. The election shall be held in the manner decided in
general meeting for this purpose under clause (1) or clause (6) of bye-law 8.
11. Disqualifications for being Managers. –(1) Any apartment owner, who
fails to pay in any financial year any instalment of his contribution towards the
common expenses which may have been assessed by the concerned
Association shall not be entitled–
(a) to vote at any election of the Managers of the Board concerned, and
(b) to seek election for the office of the Managers of the Board
concerned, till all his arrears are cleared.
…
13. Election of Office-Bearers, and Removal of Office-Bearers. – (1) (a) In
addition to President, there shall be the following office-bearers of an
Association – a Vice-President, a Secretary, one or more Assistant Secretaries,
a Treasurer, one or more Assistant Treasurers. All the office-bearers shall be
elected by and from the managers of the Board,
(b) The President shall after each election forward the names, address,
phone number, e-mail address of the managers of the Association with their
respective designation in form No. 3 printed on their Association letterhead to
the Competent Authority for his record.
(c) The Managers of a Board including its President, Secretary and
Treasurer may be paid honorarium for attending the meetings of the Board or
any other business in connection with the affairs of the Association at such
rates and under conditions as the Association may determine from time to time.
(2) Removal of office-bearers (a) The President, Secretary, Treasurer or
any other elected office-bearer of a Board may be removed from such office by
vote of not less than two-third of the Managers of the said Board in the meeting
that shall be specially convened for the purpose by the President of the said
Board on the requisition of at least one-third of the Managers of such Board:
Provided that the President or any other officer whose removal has been
proposed shall be given an opportunity of being heard at the meeting specially
convened for the purpose.
Provided further that in case of a meeting where the removal of the
President will be discussed, the Secretary or any other office-bearer may
convene the meeting for such purpose.
(b) Resignation of Office-Bearers–The President, Secretary or any other
elected officer may resign his office any time by a notice to the Board
addressed to the President or the Vice-President if the President resigns. On
receipt of the notice the Board shall as early as possible at a meeting consider
the matter and on the resignation being accepted shall forthwith elect another
officer from amongst the Managers of the Board in place of one who has
resigned.”
55. BL 11 provides that on failure to pay instalments of common expenses
contributions, a defaulting member is disqualified, till the arrears are
cleared, from the following :
(a) To vote at any election of the Managers of the Board; and
(b) To seek election for the office of Manager of the Board.
56. Thus, the restriction is limited to candidature and casting of vote in an
election of Managers, and does not extend to any other activity, including
removal of Managers.
57. Under BL 10(a) of the Bye-laws, a Manager may be removed from office at
any SGM convened on the requisition of the Board, by a vote of the majority
of the apartment owners present.
The election of the successor of such
removed Managers is segregated in the provision itself, which is to be done
through a Special Election, separately, within six weeks from the removal.
Thus, the process of electing a successor is not done simultaneously with
the removal but is left to be undertaken within six weeks subsequent to the
removal by a different Special Election. Hence, if BL 10 and BL 11 are read
in conjunction, there is no bar to removal of Managers even by defaulting
members.
58. The question which crops up then is whether BL 6(2) could be invoked to
requisition an SGM for the removal of Managers.
59. Under the second limb of BL 6(2), an SGM can be called on requisition of
one-third members of the association to consider “any other business” (than
those specifically reserved for an AGM) of general importance in the interest
of the Association and within the scope of the Act and the Bye-laws.
60. In view of the aspersions cast regarding the allegedly unlawful activities of
the President, Secretary, Treasurer and the BoM in general, the business
contemplated in the agenda for the SGM was undoubtedly of general
importance in the interest of the Association and otherwise within the scope
of the Act and the Bye-laws, since removal is contemplated under BL 10 of
the Bye-laws.
61. Although BL 10 is the specific provision for removal of Managers and at the
first blush may be considered to exclude the operation of BL 6(2), such
proposition cannot be held to be absolute. Conspicuously, a meeting under
BL 10(a) has to be convened on the requisition of the Board, and not onethird of the members. The question which arises thus is, what happens if
the resolution sought to be taken in the SGM is the removal of key members
of the Board, including the entire set up of President, Secretary and
Treasurer? In such a situation, it would obviously be a farce to expect the
Board to convene a meeting. In fact, in the present case, due notice was
issued to the BoM to convene the meeting on May 5, 2026. Vide reply
thereto dated May 18, 2026, the three key portfolio-holders, that is, the
President, Secretary and Treasurer, specifically refused to convene such
AGM. In such scenario, the prerogative to call the meeting shifted to the
general members of the Association, in the teeth of specific refusal of the
portfolio holders and office bearers of the BoM to do so, as per the last limb
of BL 6(2), particularly in view of the issue being of general importance in
the interest of the Association.
62. A comprehensive and conjoint reading of BL 10(a) and BL 6(2) clearly
indicates that the latter provision may be invoked if the former becomes
irrelevant in the context. BL 6(2) does not limit the scope of the agenda for
calling an SGM under the said provision; rather, it incorporates all the other
provisions of the 1972 Act and the Bye-laws and permits such SGM to be
convened within the scope of the Act and the Bye-laws, thereby taking
within its broad sweep all provisions of the Act and the Bye-laws. The
specific language of BL 6(2) is that the agenda of the SGM contemplated
therein can be “any other business of general importance in the interest of
the Association and within the scope of the Act and these Bye-laws”, thus
encompassing all the other provisions of the Bye-laws, including BL 10.
63. Another clue to the scope of convening an SGM under BL 6(2) is found in
the last limb of the said provision itself, which stipulates that if the
President does not convene a meeting within the period of 15 days from a
requisition notice calling upon him to do so, then the persons who made the
requisition shall hold the meeting within the next 15 days from the date of
expiry of convening meeting by the President, after giving
notice of such
meeting to all the members.
64. The facts of the present case fit the ambit of BL 6(2) “to the T”. On May 5,
2026, a notice of the SGM was given to the BoM, upon which the President,
Secretary and Treasurer refused to convene the same in writing on May 18,
2026. Consequent to such refusal, the notice dated May 22, 2026 was
issued to convene such SGM, after the lapse of 15 days from the first notice
dated May 5, 2026.
65. Accordingly, there was no bar to invocation of BL 6(2), particularly in the
circumstances of the present case, which would be perfectly in consonance
with the said provision, by the requisition of more than one-third members
of the Association.
66. Insofar as the authority of the 78 signatories to call the requisition meeting
by the said notice is concerned, as discussed above, the bar under BL 11 did
not operate in respect of the removal of Managers. As such, even leaving out
of consideration five of the 78 requisitionists, whose eligibility is debatable
and relating whom a limited concession has been given by the appellant,
there remained 73 requisitionists, who still formed the quorum of one-third,
in view of the total number of members of the association being 192, onethird of which comes to 64 members.
67. Another issue involved is the interplay between BL 10 and BLv 13. The
plaintiffs argue that in view of the respondent nos. 1 to 3 being elected office
bearers, the President, Secretary and Treasurer respectively, of the
Association, it is BL 13 which would apply and not BL 10.
68. However, we are unable to accept such contention. The aforesaid two Byelaws operate in separate and distinct fields. BL 13(2)(a) pertains to removal
of office bearers, and not ordinary Managers. Under it, the President,
Secretary, Treasurer or any other elected office bearer of a Board may be
removed from such offices, whereas under BL 10(4), a Manager may be
removed from office. The removal contemplated in BL 13(2)(a) is a removal
from the office of President, Secretary, Treasurer or otherwise and not from
the general office of Manager. In the present case, the agenda of the
proposed SGM pertained to removal of the plaintiff nos. 2 to 4 (present
respondent nos. 1 to 3) from their basic office of Manager, such removal
being not restricted merely to their removal from their offices of President,
Secretary and Treasurer. Thus, it is BL 10, as opposed to BL 13, which is
applicable. Hence, such argument of the plaintiffs/respondents also falls
flat.
69. In view of the above discussions, there cannot be any manner of doubt that
the notices dated May 5, 2026 and May 22, 2026 were valid in the eye of
law.
(iii)
Whether the impugned order was beyond the appellants’ prayers
70. The challenge in the plaint and the permanent injunction sought therein
revolves around the notices dated May 5, 2026 and May 22, 2026 and the
consequential meeting which was scheduled to be held on May 30, 2026
(ultimately held on May 31, 2026). Thus, the entire scope of the plaint
pertains to the said notices and the consequential meeting.
71. In the initial injunction application filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2
of the CPC, similar interim and ad interim reliefs have been sought as in the
plaint, challenging the May 27, 2026 order of the CA as well as the notices
of the SGM to be held on May 30, 2026. From a composite reading of the
reliefs sought in the plaint, it is evident that, contrary to the arguments of
the plaintiffs before us, the primary relief was not restricted to the challenge
to the order of the CA dated May 27, 2026 but the challenge to the notices
dated May 5, 2026 and May 22, 2026 and the consequential meeting also
forms the basis of a principal relief. Without the latter, the very premise of
the subsequent injunction applications would be rendered toothless.
72. Even from the prayers made in the second application for injunction
captioned under Section 94(e), read with Section 151 of the CPC, it is found
that the plaintiff sought a restraint order on the appellants from granting
any recognition, legitimacy or operational effect to any resolution, election or
minutes passed at the “fractured assembly” dated May 31, 2026. Thus, the
entire scope of the prayer made in the application was centered around the
May 31, 2026 meeting, which was nothing but the outcome of the two
notices assailed in the suit and the initial injunction application. However,
by the parent impugned order dated June 1, 2026, the learned Trial Judge
granted a blanket injunction restraining the private defendants/appellants
from conducting any meeting in connection with the association, which order
was extended from time to time by the subsequent impugned orders.
73. The defendants, being members of the Association, are independently
entitled to invoke several provisions of the Bye-laws, including BL 6, to
convene valid SGMs subsequently, which are beyond the scope of the
resolutions taken on May 31, 2026, which was the sole subject-matter of the
prayer made in the second injunction application. Thus, the learned Trial
Judge granted a protection/relief much beyond the prayers made by the
plaintiffs themselves in the second injunction application, on which the
impugned orders were passed. Hence, the impugned orders are vitiated on
such count as well. The blanket injunction restraining the appellants, who
are admittedly members of the concerned Association, from conducting “any
meeting” in respect of the Association is a fetter which is not only
unwarranted and beyond the scope of the prayers made by the plaintiffs
themselves, but also contrary to the Bye-laws themselves, imposing a
restriction not envisaged by the statute itself.
(iv)
Effect of refusal of ad interim injunction in connection with the
application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 on the validity of
the impugned order
74. By Order No.2 dated May 29, 2026, an ad interim prayer for injunction in
respect of the meeting to be held on the strength of the impugned notices
was refused. The meeting dated May 31, 2026 was only a fallout of the said
notices and cannot be divorced from the same. The meeting was held on
May 31, 2026 instead of May 30, 2026 only in terms of the order of the CA
dated May 27, 2026. However, fact remains that the prayer made in the
subsequent application under Section 94(e), read with Section 151, CPC,
came squarely within the purview of initial injunction application as well.
The subsequent prayer, being only in furtherance of the previous prayer of
injunction,
cannot
be
segregated
from
the
previous
prayer
and
compartmentalised on the premise of any distinct cause of action. Thus, the
principle of res judicata operated squarely in respect of the subsequent
prayer at the same (ad interim) stage by dint of refusal of ad interim order in
connection with the earlier injunction application on May 29, 2026.
75. The argument of the plaintiffs that the earlier refusal was premised only on
violation of Section 80 of the CPC is fallacious, since the learned Trial Judge
had also considered the merits of the prayer and came to the prima facie
view that the CA, while passing the order dated May 27, 2026, might have
considered the contentions of both parties. Thus, the principle of res
judicata operated at the same stage. Although the meeting dated May 31,
2026 took place subsequent to the earlier refusal of ad interim injunction,
the same came within the scope of the initial refusal of ad interim injunction
and was merely an outcome of the impugned notices, which were assailed in
the earlier injunction prayer as well. If the ad interim injunction as sought
in the initial application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 was to be
granted, the same would have precluded the meeting dated May 31, 2026
from being held, thus rendering the subsequent prayer redundant. The
meeting in respect of which the second injunction application was filed was
merely a result of, and in furtherance of, the notices which were the subjectmatter of the earlier injunction application, the ad interim prayer made in
which was refused.
76. Thus, the artificial captioning of the second injunction application under
Section 94(e) of the CPC was a mere misnomer and a feeble endeavour to
dissociate the scopes of the two injunction applications.
77. We must consider the fact that Section 94(e), CPC is merely the substantive
provision for grant of injunction, in turn derived from Sections 37 and 38 of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963, whereas Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 deal with
the procedural part of the same. The two sets of provisions are not
independent of each other but supplemental inter se.
78. It is further to be noted that the filing of the earlier injunction application by
the plaintiffs themselves under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, CPC for reliefs
of a similar nature as the second one invalidates the contention of the
plaintiffs that the second injunction application operated in a sphere not
covered by Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2. If such argument is to be accepted,
the earlier injunction application would also be denuded of validity, since
the scope of prayers made in both the injunction applications are
qualitatively the same.
79. Hence, the reliance of the plaintiffs/respondent nos.1 to 4 on Manohar Lal
Chopra (supra)1 and Vareed Jacob (supra)2 is misplaced, as the present case
is not one left uncovered by the paradigm of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of
the CPC, furnishing scope to the court to grant injunction ex debito justitiae
under its inherent powers.
80. The captioning of the second application under Section 94(e), read with
Section
151,
CPC
was
merely
an
attempt
on
the
part
of
the
plaintiffs/respondent nos.1 to 4 to mislead the Court and to seek an
injunction which they could very well seek in connection with the earlier
injunction application. Not only that, the refusal of the earlier ad interim
prayer of injunction directly affects the outcome of the second application
since, if granted, the earlier ad interim injunction would preclude the cause
of action of the second injunction application from arising at all.
Manohar Lal Chopra vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, reported at AIR 1962
SC 527
Vareed Jacob vs. Sosamma Geevarghese and Others, reported at (2004) 6 SCC 378
81. Thus, the plaintiffs/respondents are squarely barred by the principle of res
judicata from seeking the ad interim relief sought in the second injunction
application at the self-same (ad interim) stage of the proceedings (although
such bar would not operate at the subsequent stage of final disposal of the
injunction applications) in view of the refusal of their earlier ad interim
prayer for injunction.
(v)
Non-joinder of all signatories
82. Since there were 78 signatories to the requisition notices dated May 5, 2026
and May 22, 2026, which have been assailed as one of the principal reliefs
in the suit and the injunction applications, all the said signatories would be
directly affected by the outcome of the suit as well as the injunction prayers
and, hence, are necessary parties.
As discussed above, since the bar
against defaulting members under BL 11 operates only in respect of voting
and candidature in elections to the post of Manager and not to removal of
Managers from their office, at least 73 of the 78 signatories were legally
entitled to issue such notices for a requisition SGM, as held above. Hence,
the injunction applications and the suit in respect of only 4 out of the total
78 signatories are not maintainable in view of non-joinder of necessary
parties.
83. As held in Dr. Vimal Sukumar (supra)3, such bar is curable and not absolute
and does not debar the Court from granting interim reliefs. However, in the
said report, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that an order passed
Dr. Vimal Sukumar v. D. Lawrence, reported at 2025 INSC 622
without leave being granted under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC is not binding
on non-parties.
84. Taking the said ratio to its logical conclusion, only the four defendants,
including the present appellants, would be bound by the injunction and not
the rest of the signatories to the impugned notices. In such situation, the
grant of injunction would cause a confusion of legal principles and anarchy
of reliefs, since the impugned notices were conjointly issued by all the
requisitionists. The chaos which would ensue would be that theoretically,
all the other signatories apart from the defendants would be able to pursue
the said notice and consequentially, the meeting held in furtherance thereof
on May 31, 2026 would also hold valid for the other signatories. If such be
the situation, the injunction granted by the learned Trial Judge would be
rendered toothless, as the notices and the consequential meeting would
stand valid for all practical purposes. Also, it cannot be that a joint cause of
action of all the signatories would be segregated and the outcome thereof,
that is, the meeting dated May 31, 2026 can be partially said to be valid and
partially invalid, which would be an absurd proposition.
Just as there
cannot be a partial rejection of a plaint, there cannot be a partial
segregation of a joint cause of action. Hence, the ratio of Dr. Vimal Sukumar
(supra)4 cannot come to the aid of the plaintiffs in the present case, as the
challenge to the impugned notices and the consequential meeting and
resolutions taken therein would hold good in respect of all the other
signatories whose cause of action is joined with the present defendants.
Dr. Vimal Sukumar v. D. Lawrence, reported at 2025 INSC 622
85. We cannot overlook another aspect of the matter. Contrary to the impression
sought to be given by the plaintiffs/respondent nos.1 to 4, a closer look at
the first relief claimed in the plaint would clearly betray the fact that the
leave sought under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC did not pertain to
maintainability of the suit against the other signatories of the notice. The
expression used in Prayer A of the plaint is “to sue under representative
capacity” and no further, in a studied non-disclosure of further details.
86. From Paragraph Nos.1 and 2 of the plaint, it would be revealed that the
plaintiff no.1 claims, as the existing Secretary, to be fully authorised and
duly empowered and legally competent to “represent and act for and on
behalf of the Association”. Also, the pleadings indicate that allegedly that
BoM of the Association, comprised of the President, Secretary, Treasurer
and the other duly designated executive members, “are the lawfully and
officially elected representatives of the Association, whose authority is
binding upon all apartment owners and stakeholders”.
87. In the last sentence of Paragraph No.2 of the plaint, it is categorically
pleaded that the BoM is “collectively as well as individually clothed with the
full-fledged legal capacity, locus standi and authority to sue, be sued and
initiate appropriate civil and criminal proceedings before the Trial Court for
the effective preservation and enforcement of the rights, interests and
entitlements of the Association and its constituent apartment owners”.
Thus, from the plaint pleadings, it would be evident that the leave to sue
under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC sought in Relief A of the plaint was not for
the purpose of suing against the other signatories to the impugned notices
but for the plaintiffs themselves to sue in representative capacity for all the
apartment owners and the members of the Association.
88. Rather, in Paragraph No.4 of the plaint, it is categorically stated that the
defendant no.2 and his associates are acting “strictly in their individual
capacities”, possessing zero executive power and “carrying no statutory
mandate to represent the collective body of apartment owners and hold no
legal authority to execute instruments or make representations on behalf of
the Association”.
89. The crux of the above discussion is that, as per the plaint case itself, the
leave to sue sought under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC sought by the plaintiffs
was only in respect of the plaintiffs, in representative capacity of the
Association and all the apartment owners, and not for suing the defendants
in representative capacity of the other signatories.
90. Hence, in the absence of any prayer or averment in the plaint that the other
signatories were also sought to be brought within the purview of
representative capacity of the defendants impleaded, there was no scope of
even seeking any leave under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC. Thus, the suit is
also bad in its present form, at least on a prima facie footing at this stage, in
view of the non-joinder of other signatories as parties to the suit.
91. Indeed, following the principle laid down in Dr.Vimal Sukumar (supra)5, it
could have contemplated that the defect is a curable one if there was any
iota of averment or prayer in the plaint itself, beyond which the plaintiffs
cannot traverse, as to an attempt to seek such leave or at least recognising
Dr. Vimal Sukumar v. D. Lawrence, reported at 2025 INSC 622
the need to ask for such leave under Order I Rule 8, CPC. In the absence of
the same, however, the defect attains an absolute character and cannot be
curable, even as per the plaint pleadings. Thus at least till date, the defect
remains palpable and vitiates the grant of injunction altogether.
CONCLUSION
92. In view of the above findings, there cannot any manner of doubt that the
impugned order was passed not only de hors the prayers made by the
plaintiffs/respondent nos.1 to 4 but also de hors the law and vitiated on
such count. The contention of the plaintiffs that the prayer for injunction
could be moulded by the Trial Court is also fallacious, since the concept of
moulding reliefs applies only when the relief granted is lesser than that
prayed for, and cannot be invoked for granting injunction wider than and
beyond the prayers made in the plaint or the injunction application. The
omnibus prayer in the injunction application for “any other or further
reliefs” is too wide and vague to be a basis of consideration since, if so
construed, it would include every relief under the Sun and would entitle the
Court to traverse beyond the pleadings and reliefs sought in the plaint and
injunction application.
93. Furthermore, we find that the sole premise of the impugned order was the
removal of Mr. Shreekant Gupta, allegedly the senior-most member of the
Association, from the meeting in violation of the direction of the Competent
Authority dated May 27, 2026, which we have already held above to be
without jurisdiction, in particular being in contravention of Bye-Law 6(4) of
the West Bengal Apartment Ownership Bye-Laws, 2022.
94. Apart from that, the impugned order dated June 1, 2026 is absolutely
devoid of any reason whatsoever. Thus, the said order cannot be sustained
on such count as well.
95. Since we hold that the parent ex parte order dated June 1, 2026 is not
sustainable in law, the subsequent mechanical extensions of the same at
the same stage (ad interim) of the proceeding, without final adjudication of
the injunction application, also cannot be sustained consequentially.
96. Accordingly, allthe appeals stand allowed, setting aside the orders impugned
therein.
97. Thus, F.M.A. No.816 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby setting aside the
impugned order dated June 1, 2026, passed by the learned Judge, Fifth
Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No.1123 of 2026.
98. Consequentially, F.M.A. No.951 of 2026 is also allowed on contest, thereby
setting aside the impugned order dated June 29, 2026, passed by the
learned Judge, Fifth Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit
No.1123 of 2026; F.M.A. No.952 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby
setting aside the impugned order dated July 17, 2026, passed by the
learned Judge, Fifth Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit
No.1123 of 2026; and F.M.A. No.1186 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby
setting aside the impugned order dated September 7, 2026, passed by the
learned Judge, Fifth Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit
No.1123 of 2026.
99. Accordingly, the application made in connection with F.M.A. No.816 of
2026, being CAN 1 of 2026, stands dismissed as well.
100. There will be no order as to costs.
101. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied
to the parties upon compliance of all formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Sandip Kumar De, J.)
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