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Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl. Petn. No. 29 of 2021
Date of Decision: 08.02.2023
Dhyan Foundation
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & 2 Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Mr. V. Shraff, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. N.D. Chullai, AAG with
Mr. S. Sengupta, Addl. PP
Mr. H. Kharmih, Addl. PP
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT
1.
This is an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and under Article
227 of the Constitution of India invoking the inherent and supervisory
powers of this Court to interfere with an order dated 16.04.2021 passed by
the learned Sessions Judge, Ri-Bhoi District, Nongpoh in Criminal Revision
No. 4 and 5 of 2021 related to Khanapara P.S. Case No. 6(02) of 2021.
2.
A brief fact of the case as could be seen from the materials on record
is that on 28.02.2021, an FIR was lodged at the Khanapara Police Station,
Ri-Bhoi District by one Smti. Kavita Jain, a member of the Gao Gyan
Foundation alleging that a number of goods vehicles were transporting cattle
from the cattle market at 9th Mile, Ri-Bhoi District for illegal smuggling to
Bangladesh and such cattle numbering about 500 or so were hoarded in a
cruel manner in clear violation of the provisions of the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals Act, 1960. Accordingly, a case was registered being Khanapara
P.S. Case No. 6(02) of 2021 under Sections 428/429 IPC read with Section
11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act.
3.
In course of investigation, about 351 cattle were seized from 11
numbers of vehicles and they were handed over to the Veterinary
Department for safe custody and were later kept inside the 9th Mile, Baridua
Cattle Market Campus, Ri-Bhoi District.
4.
The petitioner’s Organisation (Dhyan Foundation) through its
volunteer Ms. T.N. Chandrani then filed a Zimma Application No. 138 of
2021 under Section 451/457 Cr.P.C. before the learned Judicial Magistrate
First Class (JMFC) seeking custody of the seized cattle. The learned JMFC
vide order dated 10.03.2021 allowed the prayer made in the said application
and directed that the custody of the said 351 cattle be handed over in the
custody of Dhyan Foundation to be kept in the designated Gaushala and to
be looked after and taken care by the said Organisation.
5.
Being aggrieved by the said order of the learned JMFC dated
10.03.2021 the respondents No. 2 and 3 herein preferred separate criminal
revision petition before the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Ri-Bhoi
District assailing the said order aforementioned. The learned Sessions Judge
upon hearing the parties have thereafter passed a common order and
judgment dated 16.04.2021 allowing the prayer made in the said criminal
applications. It is this order dated 16.04.2021 which is assailed herein in this
present proceeding.
6.
Heard Mr. V. Shraff, learned counsel for the petitioner who has
submitted that the FIR lodged by the representative of the petitioner’s
Organisation has clearly made out a case of subjective cruelty meted out to
about 351 cattle caught in the act of being transported in a number of vehicles
with scant regard for adherence to the relevant law and rules relating to
prevention of cruelty to animals.
7.
At this juncture, the learned counsel for the petitioner has led this
Court to the provisions of Transport of Animals Rules, 1978, particularly
Rules 47 and 56 and has submitted that Rule 47 provides for a valid
certificate by a qualified veterinarian surgeon to the effect that the cattle in
question are in fit condition for travel by rail or road and that Rule 56 has
specifically laid down specifications required to be present in transport
vehicles, such as required space and special fittings etc., in such vehicle to
ensure maximum safety for transportation of such cattle which was not
present in the vehicles carrying the said cattle seized by the police in the
instant case.
8.
The learned counsel has referred to the case of Raghuram Sharma &
Anr. vs. C. Thulsi & Anr. wherein vide order dated 05.02.2020 in Criminal
Appeal No. 230 of 2020, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with a case
involving allegations of violation of the provisions of the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, wherein upon an FIR being filed alleging that
the accused therein were involved in transporting about 37 cattle in a truck
in clear contravention of Rule 56 of the Transport of Animals Rule, 1978 and
in course of the proceedings, the custody of the said cattle was given to the
said accused, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in such a case, interim
custody of the animal ought not to be given to the accused who were found
prima facie guilty of causing cruelty to the animals.
9.
The learned counsel has also referred to the provisions of clause (d)
of sub-Section 1 of Section 11 of the said Act to submit that any person who
convey or carries any animals in a vehicle in such a manner as to subject the
same to unnecessary pain or suffering has thus violated the provisions of the
Act. Again, under sub-Section 2 of Section 11, it is provided that an owner
shall be deemed to have committed an offence if he has failed to exercise
reasonable care and supervision with a view to the prevention of such offence
and in this case, the learned court below has failed to appreciate that the
owner although not arraigned as an accused, but who is said to be in
possession of sale purchase receipt in respect of the said cattle has failed to
take reasonable care in the transportation of the said cattle and as such, is
liable for the offence, but vide the impugned order, custody of the cattle was
given to such owner(s).
10.
The learned counsel has again submitted that it is well settled that in
a litigation involving a case of cruelty to animals, during the pendency of the
criminal trial, the custody of the animals in question cannot be given to the
owners and in terms of the provision of Rule 3(b) of the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animal (Care and Maintenance of Case Property) Rules, 2017,
the Magistrate may direct that the animals be housed at an Infirmary.
Pinjrapole, SPCA, Animal Welfare Organisation or Gaushala during the
pendency of the litigation. The petitioner’s Organisation being a duly
recognized Animal Welfare Organisation, the custody of the said cattle in
this case ought to have been entrusted to it.
11.
In support of his contention and submission, the learned counsel has
placed reliance on the following authorities:
i.
Raguramsharma & Anr. v. C. Thulsi & Anr. Order dated
05.02.2020 in Criminal Appeal No. 230 of 2020 passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court;
ii.
State of U.P. v. Mustakeem & Ors. Order dated 22.02.2002 in
Criminal Appeal No. 283-287/2002 passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court;
iii.
Dhyan Foundation v. State of Tripura & Ors. Order dated
08.10.2021 in Crl. Rev. P. No. 41 of 2021 passed by the
Hon’ble High Court of Tripura;
iv.
Dhyan Foundation v. State of Assam & Ors. Order dated
21.09.2020 in Crl. Pet. 452/2020 passed by the Hon’ble
Gauhati High Court and
v.
Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja & Ors: (2014)
7 SCC 547 para 26
12.
Per contra, Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned AAG along with Mr. S.
Sengupta, learned Addl. PP appearing for the State respondent in his
argument has submitted that on the basis of the FIR filed by the member of
the petitioner Organisation on 27.02.2021 leading to the registration of the
said Khanapara P.S. Case No. 06(02) 2021, it is a fact that about 351 cattle
which were found transported in a number of vehicles were seized and
handed over to the Veterinary Department for their safe custody and such
cattle were then kept at inside the cattle market at Baridua, Ri-Bhoi District.
13.
The learned AAG has also submitted that no prima facie evidence of
cruelty to the said cattle was found except against the drivers of vehicles
number AS-01-DD-381 and ML-05-E-2941, namely Shri. Jaharul Mia and
Shri. Bul Kyndait, respectively who were then arraigned as accused in the
said case.
14.
On completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer filed the
charge sheet and the above named accused were charge sheeted in the case
and send up for trial before the concerned court under section 428/429 IPC
read with Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.
15.
Again, it is submitted that the private respondents herein who
claimed themselves as owners of 64 and 23 cattle respectively have
challenged the order dated 10.03.2021 passed by the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Ri-Bhoi District wherein interim custody of the said
cattle was given to the petitioner’s Organisation herein in response to an
application filed by the said Organisation in that regard and such separate
applications under Sections 397/399 Cr.P.C. was filed before the learned
Sessions Judge, Ri-Bhoi District being Criminal Revision Petition No. 4 and
5 respectively.
16.
The learned Session Judge upon hearing the parties have passed a
common judgment and order dated 16.04.2021 by which order the impugned
order dated 10.03.2021 passed by the learned JMFC was set aside and
interim custody of the said cattle was then given to the respondents No. 2
and 3 herein.
17.
The learned AAG has submitted that in the first instance, the said
private respondents No. 2 and 3 herein were not arrayed as accused in the
said Khanapara P.S. Case No. 06(02) 2021 and as such, the provision of
Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act is not applicable to
their case.
18.
It is further submitted that being regarded as Owners, the learned
Sessions Judge vide the impugned Order dated 16.04.2021 has rightly
handed over the interim custody to the said respondents No. 2 and 3
respectively.
19.
Reference was also made to the Status Report filed by the
Investigating Officer who has clearly noted that there is no evidence of
cruelty to the animals meted out by either the cattle owners or the owners of
the vehicles from which the cattle were seized, except for the two
owners/drivers of the said vehicle No. AS-01-DD-1381 and ML-05-E-2941.
20.
In support of the State respondent’s case, the learned AAG has cited
the case of Dhyan Foundation v. State of Assam & Ors. in Crl. Rev.
P/146/2021 passed by the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court vide Order dated
26.10.2022 and has finally submitted that there is no legal infirmity with the
impugned order assailed and the same may be sustained.
21.
Based on the facts and circumstances as presented above and on the
basis of the submission and contention of the rival parties, this Court is made
to understand that this case involves a dispute on the alleged act of cruelty
meted out to about 351 cattle which were allegedly hoarded in a number of
vehicles by the concerned individuals with scant regard to the relevant law
and rules dealing with prevention of cruelty to animals.
22.
It should not be mistaken that all life form in our planet Earth are to
be respected and place and position alongside mankind cannot be ignored.
Though throughout history there has been a concerted effort by mankind to
subjugate other forms of life form, either for the purpose of supplementing
their diet or otherwise, on concerns being raised in this regard, laws and
regulations have been put in place to ensure that such life form are treated
with dignity, albeit, even if some or most of them are eventually killed for
human consumption purpose.
23.
In this regard, in India we have many such laws and regulations and
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (Care and Maintenance of Case Property Animals) Rules, 2017,
Transport of Animals Rules, 1978 and the like have been put in place in
pursuit of the noble purpose of treating animal life with dignity.
24.
The petitioner and his Organisation have been duly recognised by the
Animal Welfare Board of India, deemed to be actively engaged in the welfare
and rehabilitation of rescued cattle in the country and running about 30
Gaushalas are doing commendable work and mission in this regard. That this
case was initiated by lodgment of an FIR dated 28.02.2021 by this
Organisation alleging cruel treatment to a number of cattle transported in a
number of vehicles within the Ri-Bhoi District has culminated in due
registration of the said FIR and criminal proceedings initiated against the
accused person therein.
25.
However, in course of the said criminal proceedings, about 351 cattle
were seized by the police prompting the petitioner’s Organisation to file an
application under Section 451 Cr.P.C before the Court of the First Class
Judicial Magistrate at Ri-Bhoi with a prayer for to be granted interim custody
of the said cattle. The learned JMFC vide order dated 10.03.2021 has allowed
the said prayer and the custody of the said cattle was directed to be handed
over to the petitioner’s Organisation on certain conditions.
26.
The private respondents herein claiming to be the owners of some of
the cattle being aggrieved by the said order dated 10.03.2021 has approached
the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Ri-Bhoi District with separate
applications under Section 397/399 Cr.P.C. being registered as Criminal
Revision No. 4 and 5 of 2021 respectively with a prayer to set aside and
quash the impugned order and to be allowed to assume interim custody of
the said cattle.
27.
The learned Sessions Judge vide a common judgment dated
16.04.2021 after hearing all the parties concerned has deemed it fit to set
aside the impugned order dated 10.03.2021 and has instead allowed interim
custody of 64 cattle to be given to the private respondent No. 2 and another
23 cattle to private respondent No. 3 herein.
28.
Being aggrieved by the said order dated 16.04.2021 the petitioner’s
Organisation has approached this Court with this instant application with a
prayer to set aside and quash the same.
29.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has stressed on the fact that
prima facie, it has been proved that the said cattle were treated cruelly at the
time when they were seized from the vehicles numbering about 11 on the
way to be transported to Bangladesh.
30.
Citing the relevant provision of law regarding the mode and manner
on how transport of animals should be affected, the provision of Rule 56 of
the Transport of Animals Rule, 1978 was cited which rule has specifically
provided the manner on how cattle are to be transported by goods vehicles
and what necessary precaution are to be taken.
31.
The learned counsel has however submitted that under sub-Section 2
of Section 11 of the said Prevention Act, the law provides that an owner shall
be deemed to have committed an offence if he has failed to exercise
reasonable care and supervision with a view to the prevention of such offence
and in this case considering the fact that the said cattle have been treated
cruelly during their transportation, the owner of such cattle even the alleged
owners, that is, the respondents No. 2 and 3 herein are to be treated as
accused persons in the case.
32.
Again, referring to Rule 3 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(Care and Maintenance of Case Property Animals) Rules, 2017 wherein Rule
3(b) has empowered the Magistrate to direct the animal to be housed at an
infirmary, Pinjrapole, SPCA, Animal Welfare Organisation or Gaushala
during the pendency of the litigation, the learned counsel for the petitioner
has submitted that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have taken note of
this provision while passing the impugned order and accordingly the said
impugned order has been passed without jurisdiction and the same is liable
to be set aside and quashed.
33.
As to the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner,
in the case of Raguramsharma (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing
with a case of similar nature as the present one where the issue of interim
custody of the seized cattle was deliberated, the court coming to the
conclusion that the accused therein were prima facie guilty of causing cruelty
to the animals has held that interim custody of the animals ought not to be
handed over to the accused. This common trend has been followed in the
cases cited by the petitioner as indicated at para 11 above.
34.
However, as submitted by the learned AAG the facts and
circumstances of the case between the parties is that on being seized, the said
cattle were examined by a Veterinary Officer and on being certified that no
cruelty has been inflicted upon the said cattle, they have been directed to be
kept at the 9th Mile Baridua Cattle Market Campus, Ri-Bhoi District.
Therefore, prima facie no case of cruelty against the said cattle has been
made out, albeit subject to evidence during the trial.
35.
The further contention of the learned AAG is that the private
respondents herein though are owners of some of the cattle, they have not
been arraigned as accused persons in the case and therefore, the observation
and findings made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases cited above
will not be applicable as the observation made therein relates to the accused
person which is not the case here. In this regard, the case of Manager,
Pinjrapole Deudar & Anr. v. Chakram Moraji Nat & Ors.: (1998) 6 SCC
520 paras 8, 9, 10 & 11 are relevant in the context of this case, the said
paragraphs are reproduced below as:“8. From a plain reading of the provisions above noted, it its evident
that sub-section (1) of Section 35 enables the State Government to
appoint infirmaries for the treatment and care of animals in respect
of which any of the offences under the Act has been committed and
to authorise the detention of such animals pending their production
before a Magistrate. Under sub-section (2), the Magistrate may
order that:
(a) the animal shall be treated and cared for in an infirmary
till such time it is fit to perform its usual work or is
otherwise fit for discharge;
(b) the animal shall be sent to a Pinjrapole; or
(c) the animals shall be destroyed if it is certified by a
Veterinary Officer, authorised under the Rules, to be
incurable or if it is found that it cannot be removed without
cruelty.
The mandate of sub-section (3) is that no animal shall be
released from an infirmary unless it is directed to be sent to a
Pinjrapole or be destroyed or certified by the Veterinary Officer
concerned to be fit for discharge. Sub-section (4) imposes liability for
payment of the cost of transporting the animal to an infirmary or
Pinjrapole and its maintenance and treatment in an infirmary, in
accordance with the prescribed rates, which, however, can be
dispensed with if the Magistrate is satisfied that on account of the
poverty of the owner, he is unable to bear the same, otherwise it may
be recovered as arrears of land revenue, as envisaged in sub-section
(5). Sub-section (6) says that if the owner refuses or neglects to
remove the animal within the time specified by the Magistrate then he
can order the sale of the animal and appropriation of the sale
proceeds for the cost thereof and in the event of there being surplus
proceeds of such sale, payment of the same to the owner on his
application within two months of the sale. This is postulated by subsection (7).
9. In view of the above discussion and provisions of Section 451
CrPC, it appears to us that unless the owner of the animal in respect
of which he is facing prosecution, is deprived of the custody (which
can be done only on his conviction under the Act for the second time),
no bar can be inferred against him to claim interim custody of the
animal.
10. Now adverting to the contention that under Section 35(2), in the
event of the animal not being sent to infirmary, the Magistrate is
bound to give the interim custody to a Pinjrapole, we find it difficult
to accede to it. We have noted above the options available to the
Magistrate under Section 35(2). That sub-section vests in the
Magistrate the discretion to give interim custody of the animal to a
Pinjrapole. The material part of the sub-section (shorn of other
details) will read, the Magistrate may direct that the animal
concerned shall be sent to a Pinjrapole. Sub-section (2) does not say
that the Magistrate shall send the animals to a Pinjrapole. It is thus
evident that the expression "shall be sent" is a part of the direction to
be given by the Magistrate if in his discretion he decides to give
interim custody to a Pinjrapole. It follows that under Section 35(2) of
the Act, the Magistrate has discretion to hand over interim custody of
the animal to a Pinjrapole but he is not bound to hand over custody
of the animal to a Pinjrapole in the event of not sending it to an
infirmary. In a case where the owner is claiming the custody of the
animal, the Pinjrapole has no preferential right. In deciding whether
the interim custody of the animal be given to the owner who is facing
prosecution, or to the Pinjrapole, the following factors will be
relevant:
(1) the nature and gravity of the offence alleged against
the owner;
(2) whether it is the first offence alleged or he has been
found guilty of offences under the Act earlier;
(3) if the owner is facing the first prosecution under the
Act, the animal is not liable to be seized, so the owner
will have a better claim for the custody of the animal
during the prosecution;
(4) the condition in which the animal was found at the
time of inspection and seizure;
(5) the possibility of the animal being again subjected to
cruelty. There cannot be any doubt that establishment
of the Pinjrapole is with the laudable object of
preventing unnecessary pain or suffering to animals
and providing protection to them and birds. But it
should also be seen:
(a) whether the Pinjrapole is functioning as an
independent organization or under the scheme of the
Board and is answerable to the Board; and
(b) whether the Pinjrapole has a good record of taking
care of the animals given under its custody. A perusal
of the order of the High Court shows that the High
Court has taken relevant factors into consideration in
coming to the conclusion that it is not a fit case to
interfere in the order of the learned Additional
Sessions Judge directing the State to hand over the
custody of the animals to the owner.
11. Dr. Singhvi represents that the Pinjrapole is prepared to keep
the animals in custody without charging any money for their
maintenance. In our view, that cannot be a correct criterion for
giving custody of the animals to the Pinjrapole particularly when
the Court has to decide the competing claims of the owner and the
Pinjrapole for their custody.”
36.
The case of Manager, Pinjrapole Deudar (supra) was also referred to
by the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in the case of Dhyan Foundation v. State
of Assam & Ors. in Crl. Rev. P/ 146/2021 (supra) cited by the learned AAG.
37.
On an overall analysis, this Court is firstly convinced that prima facie
no cruelty has been inflicted on the cattle at the time of seizure as certified
by the said Veterinary Officer and that the private respondents herein being
the owners of the 64 and 23 cattle respectively cannot be deprived of interim
custody of their cattle in view of the proposition laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Manager, Pinjrapole Deudar (supra).
38.
To this extent, the impugned order dated 10.03.2021 passed by the
learned Judicial Magistrate First Class as well as the order dated 16.04.2021
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Ri-Bhoi District is modified, inasmuch
as, the interim custody of the said 64 and 23 cattle are to be retained with the
private respondents No. 2 and 3 herein respectively while the remaining 264
cattle are to be handed over to the petitioner’s Organisation in the light of the
order dated 10.03.2021.
39.
In view of the above, this petition is hereby disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
08.02.2023
“Tiprilynti–PS”
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