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NIRMALA
RAO
CGHC010405522022
2026:CGHC:27697
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 9143 of 2022
1 - Dheeraj Lohani S/o Deepchandra Brahman Aged About 30 Years R/o. Ward No.
9, Tilak Nagar Katghora, Tehsil - Katghora, District - Korba Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Secretary Home (Police) Department,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Capital Complex, Naya Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh
-
492001
2 - Director General Of Police, Chhattisgarh Police Raipur, District - Raipur
Chhattisgarh
3 - Inspector General Of Police, Bilaspur Range, District - Bilapur Chhattisgarh
-
Superintendent
Of
Police,
District
-
Korba
Chhattisgarh
5 - Nirma Toppo, Wd/o Late Shri Shivshankarsahu Aged About 29 Years R/o. E-07,
Kharmora Housing Board Colony, Balco Nagar, Police Station - Balco Nagar, District
- Korba Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner/s
: Shri Kabir Kalwani, Advocate holding
the brief of Shri Anurag Singh,
Advocate.
For Respondent/State
: Shri Abhishek Singh, P.L.
For Respondent No.5
: Shri Ravi Kumar Banjare, Advocate.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Judgment On Board
06.07.2026
1) The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following reliefs:
“1] That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue a writ/writs, direction/directions, order/orders,
quashing/set-aside
the
impugned
order
dated
05.03.2020 passed by the Respondent no. 3 i.e.
Annexure p/1, orders dated 29.11.2019 passed by
respondent no. 4 i.e. Annexure P/2.
2] That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
allow the present petition and quash the order of
punishment
being
a
writ/writs,
and
to
issue
direction/directions, order/orders to reinstate the service
of disproportionate the petitioner.
3] That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
grant any other relief(s), which is deemed fit and proper
in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case.”
2) The facts of the present case are that the petitioner was appointed
to the post of Constable (General Duty) vide order dated
15.4.2013 and was posted at Police Station Korba, District Korba.
An article of charge was issued against the petitioner on 2.9.2019
alleging that on the night of 12.7.2019, he unauthorisedly left his
place of duty alongwith his arms and ammunition, thereby
violating the provisions of Chhattisgarh Police Regulations. It was
further alleged that, on the same night, the petitioner entered into
the house of his female colleague situated at Kharmora in an
intoxicated condition.
The Disciplinary Authority appointed an
Enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer. During the departmental
enquiry, the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity of
hearing. After completion of enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted
his report to the disciplinary authority.
In the enquiry report,
allegation No.1 was not found proved whereas, the second
allegation was found proved.
The complainant, a female
Constable, herself appeared before the Enquiry Officer and made
a specific statement against the petitioner.
The disciplinary
authority concurring with the findings recorded by the Enquiry
Officer inflicted penalty of removal from service vide order dated
29.11.2019. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred an appeal
before the Appellate Authority, which came to be dismissed vide
order dated 5.3.2020. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a mercy
petition, which was also dismissed by the competent authority
vide order dated 6.9.2022. The petitioner has challenged all the
aforesaid orders by filing this petition.
3) Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the first
allegation with regard to unauthorised absence from his place of
duty alongwith arms and ammunition was not found proved by the
Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority concurred with the
said finding. He would further submit that the order of removal
from service has been passed solely on the basis of allegation
No.2, which is shockingly disproportionate looking to the nature of
the misconduct alleged against the petitioner. He would submit
that this aspect has not been considered either by the Disciplinary
Authority or by the Appellate Authority. He would pray to quash all
the three impugned orders.
4) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
would oppose the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner.
They would submit that this Court, while exercising its writ
jurisdiction, cannot re-appreciate the evidence recorded in a
departmental enquiry. They would contend that the order passed
by the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed by the Appellate
Authority, can be interfered with only if it is shown that the order
has been passed by an authority lacking competence, principles
of natural justice have been violated, or procedure prescribed
under the applicable Rules and Regulations has not been
followed. They would submit that no such grounds have been
made out in the present petition. They would submit that this
petition deserves to be dismissed.
5) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents placed on record.
6) In the present case, a show-cause notice alongwith article of
charge was served upon the petitioner on 2.9.2019, wherein the
following allegations were levelled against him:
"1. अपनेकर्तव्य स्थल से दिनांक 12.07.2019 की रात्रि में मय आर्म्स
एम्यूनेशन के गैरहाजिर होकर पुलिस रेग्युलेशन में उल्लेखित प्रावधानों के
विपरीत कार्य आचरण प्रदर्शित करना।
2. दिनांक 12.07.2019 की देररात्रि महिला सहकर्मी के खरमोरा स्थित
निवास पर शराब के नशे में प्रवेश कर गंभीर कदाचरणपूर्ण कृ त्य करना।"
7) The petitioner filed reply to the said show-cause notice and
thereafter, an Enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer were
appointed. The Enquiry Officer afforded sufficient opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner. The complainant, a female Constable,
appeared before the Enquiry Officer and made statement against
the petitioner.
Upon appreciation of the evidence, the Enquiry
Officer held allegation No.1 to be not proved whereas, allegation
No.2 was held to be proved. Thereafter, a second show-cause
notice was issued to the petitioner.
The disciplinary authority
concurred with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and
inflicted the penalty of removal from service.
The Appellate
Authority affirmed the said findings and the mercy petition
preferred by the petitioner was also dismissed. It is a well-settled
principle of law that re-appreciation of evidence in a departmental
enquiry is not permissible in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. An
order passed by the disciplinary authority can be interfered with
only it has been passed by the authority lacking jurisdiction or
competence, if the principles of natural justice have been violated,
or if the procedure prescribed under the applicable Rules has not
been followed.
8) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and
Others Versus P. Gunasekaran1 while dealing with the scope of
interference in service matters held as under :“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
. (2015) 2 SCC 610
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings,
reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry
officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative
Tribunal.
In
disciplinary
proceedings. the High Court is not and cannot act as a
second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise
of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution
of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice
in conducting the proceedings:
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case:
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced
by
irrelevant
or
extraneous
considerations
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13.Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case
the same has been conducted in accordance with
law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be:
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.
14.In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. v. S.
Sree Rama Rao. many of the above principles have
been discussed and it has been concluded thus: (AIR
pp. 1726-27, para 7)
"7.... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of
appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is
concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held
by an authority competent in that behalf, and
according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf,
and whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Where there is some evidence, which the
authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry
has accepted and which evidence may reasonably
support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High
Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to
review the evidence and to arrive at an independent
finding on the evidence. The High Court may
undoubtedly interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from reaching
a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to
the evidence and the merits of the case or by
allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the very
face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and
if there be some legal evidence on which their
findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of
that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted
to be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution."
9) Likewise, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India
and Others Versus Datta Linga Toshatwad 2 held that penalty
inflicted in a departmental inquiry can be interfered by the High
Court while exercising power under Article 226 of Constitution of
India if the order has been passed by an incompetent authority or
if procedure to inflict the penalty has not been followed or if the
penalty if disproportionate looking to the misconduct.
10) In the present case, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the
penalty was imposed by an authority not competent, or principles
of natural justice were violated, or procedure prescribed under the
applicable rules was not followed. The second allegation made
against the petitioner constitutes moral turpitude as he entered in
the house of his female colleague during the night time in an
intoxicated condition, and the said allegation has been found to be
proved in the departmental enquiry. Therefore, I do not find any
good ground to interfere with the orders impugned.
11)
Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
JUDGE
Nimmi
. (2005) 13 SCC 709
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