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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 10.08.2026
Judgment pronounced on:19.08.2026
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CNR No. DLHC016046022015
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O.M.P. (COMM) 27/2015
DHAMPUR SUGAR MILLS LTD
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Prasenjit Keswani, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Upmanyu Tewari,
Adv.
versus
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD
.....Respondent
Through: Dr. Alka Dahan, Mr. Shiv
Nanda, Mr. Ankit Bharadwaj
and Ms. Pankhudi Tripathi,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
19.08.2026
%
1.
The present petition has been filed by Dhampur Sugar Mills
Ltd.1, under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19962,
seeking setting aside of the Arbitral Award dated 21.08.20153 passed
by the learned Sole Arbitrator Shri C.P. Mishra. By the impugned award
the claims made by the Petitioner against Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.4,
have been rejected and the deductions made by the Respondent under
Clause 3 of the agreements between the parties have been upheld.
“Petitioner”, hereinafter
“the Act”, hereinafter
“impugned award”, hereinafter
4 “IOCL/Respondent”, hereinafter
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2.
The present dispute arises out of agreements between the
Petitioner and the Respondent for the supply of Indigenous Anhydrous
Ethanol by the Petitioner, a manufacturer of ethanol, to the Respondent.
The parties had entered into several supply agreements over the years.
The dispute before this Court primarily concerns two issues, first, the
delay on the part of the Respondent in furnishing statutory Form-C
declarations in respect of interstate sales made by the Petitioner, and
second, the recovery of damages by the Respondent under Clause 3 of
the agreements on account of alleged short supply after the Petitioner
stopped further dispatches of ethanol.
3.
During the year of 2007, the parties entered into four agreements
for supply of ethanol to different locations of the Respondent. The
agreement for Delhi was executed on 24/29.01.2007, the agreements
for Haryana and Rajasthan were executed on 08.06.2007, and the
agreement for Punjab was executed on 12.07.2007. Thereafter, another
agreement dated 11.10.2010 was entered into for supply of ethanol to
locations in Uttarakhand. The deductions made by the Respondent
under the earlier agreements were subsequently adjusted from amounts
payable under this later arrangement, which also became part of the
dispute.
4.
Clause 3 of the agreements contained the “Take or Pay/Supply or
Pay” provision. Under this clause, the Petitioner was required to supply
and the Respondent was required to uplift the contracted quantity,
subject to a permissible variation of 10%. The parties had agreed that
the minimum performance level would be 90% of the quantity
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mentioned in the supply order for the relevant financial year. The clause
was reciprocal in nature. If the Petitioner failed to supply the minimum
quantity, consequences could follow against it, and similarly, if the
Respondent failed to uplift the required quantity, a claim could arise in
favour of the Petitioner.
5.
Clause 5 of the agreements also contained provisions relating to
payment and reimbursement of sales tax. Since the Petitioner
manufactured ethanol in Uttar Pradesh and supplied it to locations
outside the State, the transactions constituted interstate sales. The
Respondent was required to furnish Form-C declarations, which
enabled the Petitioner to claim the benefit of concessional tax rates
under the applicable law. The Petitioner contended that the Respondent
failed to provide the required declarations within time, resulting in
exposure to tax liability at a higher rate.
6.
According to the Petitioner, the delay in furnishing Form-C
declarations led to proceedings before the Uttar Pradesh tax authorities
and provisional assessment under Section 25(1) of the U.P. VAT Act.
The Petitioner claimed that it faced a possible tax liability at a higher
rate of approximately 32.5% attributable solely to the Respondent’s
failure to furnish the statutory declarations. It therefore called upon the
Respondent either to provide the pending Form-C declarations or
furnish an indemnity undertaking covering the differential tax liability,
interest and penalty. As the Respondent did not provide such indemnity,
the Petitioner informed the Respondent that further supplies of ethanol
would remain suspended.
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7.
The Respondent disputed the Petitioner’s right to suspend
supplies. Its case was that the obligation to supply ethanol was
independent of the Form-C issue and that there was no contractual
provision permitting the Petitioner to stop dispatches on that ground.
The Respondent called upon the Petitioner through letters dated
11.10.2008 and 03.11.2008 to resume supplies. However, the Petitioner
maintained that continuation of supplies without protection against the
tax exposure would cause serious financial hardship.
8.
The Petitioner relied upon subsequent correspondence, including
letters dated 17.12.2008 and 21.12.2008, as well as discussions between
the parties, to show that the Respondent was aware of the difficulties
arising from the delayed Form-C declarations. The Respondent
disputed the said correspondence and contended that the Petitioner had
committed a breach by discontinuing supply. The Respondent
accordingly invoked Clause 3 of the agreements and claimed damages
for failure to maintain the minimum agreed supply quantity.
9.
By letter dated 15.02.2010, the Respondent demanded an amount
of Rs.31,60,500/- for the years 2008-09 and 2009-10 under the “Take
or Pay” provision on account of short supply. The Respondent also
made further deductions and adjustments in relation to the different
agreements, which were subsequently challenged by the Petitioner.
10.
Before the learned Sole Arbitrator, the Petitioner raised claims
towards reimbursement of alleged differential trade tax liability,
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interest, penalty and other consequential expenses incurred by it in
relation to the proceedings initiated by the tax authorities. The
Petitioner also challenged the deductions made by the Respondent
towards alleged damages under Clause 3 of the agreements. The
Respondent contested the claims raised by the Petitioner and justified
the deductions made by it. According to the Respondent, the Petitioner
had failed to perform its primary contractual obligation of supplying the
agreed quantity of ethanol and such failure attracted the consequences
expressly contemplated under Clause 3 of the agreements.
11.
Petitioner contends that on 27.08.2008 they addressed letters to
the concerned offices of the Respondent, calling upon the Respondent
to furnish the required Form-C declarations, in the alternative, it
demanded an undertaking or indemnity from the Respondent that any
differential tax, interest or penalty arising because of delayed or nonfurnishing of Form-C would be borne by the Respondent. The Petitioner
further informed the Respondent that unless Form-C was furnished or
the required protection was given, further dispatches of ethanol would
be kept in abeyance. The Petitioner thereafter, unilaterally stopped
further supplies.
12.
The Respondent did not accept this action, its stand was that the
contractual obligation to supply ethanol could not be suspended by the
Petitioner on account of a dispute concerning Form-C. The Respondent
maintained that there was no term in the agreements giving the
Petitioner such a right, in the said regard, letters dated 11.10.2008 and
03.11.2008 were sent by the Respondent calling upon the Petitioner to
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resume supplies. The Petitioner, however, continued to maintain that
supplies could not reasonably be continued unless the Form-C issue was
resolved or the Respondent protected it against the resulting tax
exposure.
13.
The Petitioner also relied upon subsequent correspondence,
including letters dated 17.12.2008 and 21.12.2008 and upon minutes of
discussions between the parties to show that the Respondent was aware
of the tax problem and the financial difficulty being faced by the
Petitioner. The letter dated 21.12.2008 became a matter of controversy
before the learned Arbitrator. The learned Arbitrator recorded that the
Respondent had denied the said correspondence and that no postal
receipt or acknowledgment had been produced to prove it. The
Petitioner has challenged this part of the reasoning also and submits that
the pleadings of the Respondent did not contain the denial in the manner
understood by the learned Arbitrator. The Respondent, on its part, took
the position that the Petitioner had committed breach by discontinuing
supply. Thus, the Respondent had invoked Clause 3 on the ground that
the Petitioner had failed to maintain the minimum agreed supply. The
award records, amongst other correspondence, a letter dated 15.02.2010
by which the Respondent demanded an amount of Rs.31,60,500/- for
the years 2008-09 and 2009-10 under the “Supply or Pay” provision for
failure to supply the minimum quantity. Other deductions and
adjustments concerning the different agreements also formed part of the
disputes subsequently raised by the Petitioner.
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14.
In the meantime, the tax proceedings continued. The Petitioner
maintained that the provisional assessment and the consequent financial
burden had resulted from the delay in furnishing Form-C. The
Respondent disputed this and contended that the provisional assessment
proceedings had also arisen on account of other matters concerning the
tax returns and Input Tax Credit claimed by the Petitioner. During the
arbitral proceedings, a final assessment order came to be passed by the
competent tax authority on 28.06.2012. By that time the Form-C
declarations had been furnished. The differential tax liability and
penalty apprehended by the Petitioner on account of the delayed FormC did not ultimately survive in the manner originally projected by the
Petitioner.
15.
The Petitioner nevertheless maintained that the final assessment
order could not retrospectively remove the hardship which it had
actually faced. According to it, money had been blocked and tax
proceedings had to be contested at the relevant time. It was therefore
argued that its decision to stop further exposure by suspending supply
was commercially justified. The Respondent answered that submission
by saying that commercial difficulty could not create a contractual right
which the parties had not agreed upon. It also relied upon the statutory
remedies which were available to the Petitioner before the tax
authorities.
16.
After the earlier contracts, the parties had entered into the
Uttarakhand arrangement. The Letter of Intent in relation to the later
arrangement is dated 27.09.2010 and the formal agreement is dated
11.10.2010. The Petitioner resumed supplies under the later
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arrangement. The Respondent had adjusted from amounts becoming
payable to the Petitioner certain sums which according to it were
recoverable on account of short supply under the earlier contracts. The
Respondent relied in this connection not only upon the terms of Clause
3 but also upon the Letter of Intent dated 27.09.2010 and an Affidavitcum-Undertaking dated 13.09.2011 executed by the Petitioner.
According to the Respondent these documents permitted outstanding
dues, liabilities or penalties relating to earlier contracts to be recovered
from subsequent payments. The Petitioner disputed the deductions. Its
case was that a mere claim for damages was not a debt and the
Respondent could not become a judge in its own cause, assess damages
by itself and recover them from monies payable under another
agreement.
17.
The Petitioner before the Tribunal claimed that there was
admitted delay in furnishing Form-C. It pleaded that the delay resulted
in proceedings before the tax authorities and exposed it to a higher tax
rate. It accordingly claimed that the stoppage of further supplies was
justified and that it could not be made liable under Clause 3. The
Petitioner also challenged the amounts already deducted by the
Respondent and sought their return. It made claims in respect of
differential tax, interest and penalty. It also claimed expenses stated to
have been incurred in dealing with the tax proceedings and the
connected litigation. The Petitioner further invoked the reciprocal part
of Clause 3 against the Respondent in relation to the subsequent
agreement. It claimed that the Respondent had itself failed to uplift the
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required quantity and was therefore liable under the same “Take or
Pay/Supply or Pay” provision.
18.
The Respondent denied the claims. Its main case was that
furnishing of Form-C and the obligation of the Petitioner to supply
ethanol were separate matters. According to the Respondent, there was
no clause permitting suspension of supply because Form-C had been
furnished late. The Respondent also relied upon the provisional
assessment orders themselves. It contended that those orders showed
other defaults relating to the Petitioner, including its claim of Input Tax
Credit and the manner in which its returns had been filed. It therefore
denied that the provisional assessment was solely attributable to delay
in Form-C.
19.
The Respondent further pleaded that the Petitioner could have
taken recourse to the statutory remedy of seeking further time for
production of Form-C under the applicable statutory provisions. It
relied particularly upon the proviso to Rule 12(7) of the Central Sales
Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957. As regards Clause 3, the
Respondent maintained that it was not a penalty provision. According
to the Respondent, it was an agreed liquidated damages provision and
represented the commercial assessment of the parties as to the
consequence of failure either to supply or to uplift at least 90% of the
contracted quantity.
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20.
On 29.01.2014 the learned Arbitrator framed nine issues of
which the below stated four issues are relevant for consideration in
these proceedings.
21.
Issue No.1 concerned whether there had been delay on the part
of the Respondent in furnishing Form-C in respect of supplies made
under the agreements for Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan and Punjab.
22.
Issue No.2 concerned whether the Petitioner had faced difficulty
before the trade tax authorities because of such delay and whether, for
that reason, it was justified in keeping further supplies in abeyance and,
if so, whether the Respondent could invoke the “Take or Pay/Supply or
Pay” provision.
23.
Issue No.3 concerned whether the Petitioner had itself violated
Clause 3 by keeping dispatches in abeyance.
24.
Issue No.4 directly concerned the deductions made by the
Respondent. The question framed was whether the Respondent could
unilaterally deduct the amount described as penalty under the “Take or
Pay/Supply or Pay” clause of the Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan and Punjab
agreements and whether the alleged penalty or damages were legally
deductible.
25.
The remaining issues concerned, amongst other matters, the
monetary claims of the Petitioner, the tax-related claims and expenses,
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the Petitioner’s reciprocal claim under the later agreement and the final
relief to which the parties were entitled.
26.
The parties agreed before the learned Arbitrator that oral
evidence was not required and that the disputes could be decided on the
basis of their pleadings and the documents placed on record. The
arbitral proceedings therefore remained principally documentary in
nature.
27.
The learned Arbitrator published the impugned award on
21.08.2015.
28.
On Issue No.1 the learned Arbitrator accepted that there had been
delay in furnishing Form-C by the Respondent. The award therefore did
not proceed on the footing that IOCL was entirely free from delay in
this respect.
29.
The learned Arbitrator, however, separately examined the cause
of the provisional tax proceedings. He recorded that the provisional
assessment orders did not show that assessment under Section 25(1) of
the U.P. VAT Act had been initiated only because of delayed Form-C.
30.
The learned Arbitrator referred to matters relating to the Input
Tax Credit claimed by the Petitioner and the filing of returns under an
incorrect head. He therefore held that the tax proceedings could not in
their entirety be attributed to the Respondent.
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31.
The learned Arbitrator further held that even if Form-C was not
forthcoming in time, the Petitioner had available to it the remedy of
seeking extension for production of the declaration under the proviso to
Rule 12(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules,
1957. According to the Arbitrator, the Petitioner did not take reasonable
steps available in law to mitigate the situation.
32.
On the contractual issue the learned Arbitrator found that there
was no term in the agreements permitting the Petitioner to stop supplies
merely because Form-C had been delayed. He therefore did not accept
the Petitioner's case that an indemnity could unilaterally be made a
condition precedent for further performance.
33.
The learned Arbitrator consequently held that the Petitioner was
not justified in keeping the supply of ethanol in abeyance and that it had
committed breach of its essential supply obligation.
34.
Issue No.4 was then considered. The actual reasoning in the
award on this issue is material. The learned Arbitrator held that Clause
3 was not in the nature of a penalty. He treated the clause as one
stipulating liquidated damages and described it as a reasonable estimate
made by the parties for the loss caused due to failure to fulfil the
commitment of supply or lifting of ethanol to the extent of 90% of the
ordered quantity.
35.
The learned Arbitrator reasoned that if the provision were merely
penal in nature, the reference to the percentage of the ordered quantity
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and the tolerance built into the clause would not have been necessary.
He therefore treated the 90% minimum level and the permissible
shortfall as part of a commercially agreed measure.
36.
The learned Arbitrator then relied upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd.5. He observed that
where a contract contains an agreed provision for liquidated damages,
the stipulated amount can be recovered upon proof of breach without
requiring separate proof of the precise actual loss in every case.
37.
The award contains an observation that an aggrieved party under
such a clause would be entitled to the amount on proof of breach even
if no actual loss or injury was separately shown. The Petitioner has
placed considerable reliance on this expression in the present
proceedings.
38.
The learned Arbitrator thereafter found that the Petitioner had
wilfully and deliberately, with knowledge of the agreed terms, kept the
supply of ethanol in abeyance and thereby committed breach of an
essential term. He consequently held that the Respondent could deduct
the agreed damages.
39.
The learned Arbitrator also considered the Petitioner’s own claim
under the reciprocal part of Clause 3. The Petitioner had claimed
Rs.29,32,001/- on the allegation that the Respondent had failed to uplift
90% of the ordered quantity under the agreement dated 11.10.2010.
5 (2003) 5 SCC 705
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That claim was rejected. The learned Arbitrator recorded that the
necessary documents had not been placed on record to establish a wilful
default on the part of the Respondent. He also recorded that no evidence
had been produced in support of the claim.
40.
The learned Arbitrator further rejected the Petitioner’s claim
relating to an amount of Rs.1,36,76,301/- stated to have been withheld
in respect of supplies, observing that the necessary supporting material
was not available on record. He additionally observed that the Petitioner
had failed to establish sufferance or injury in support of the damages
claimed by it.
41.
The claims for differential trade tax, interest, penalty and
litigation or legal expenses were also rejected. The provisional
assessment orders, the reasons mentioned therein, the absence of an
application for extension and the final assessment order dated
28.06.2012 were considered in this connection.
42.
The learned Arbitrator also accepted the Respondent's case in
relation to recovery from the subsequent Uttarakhand payments. The
Letter of Intent dated 27.09.2010 and the Affidavit-cum-Undertaking
dated 13.09.2011 were relied upon for the contractual mechanism of
recovery.
43.
In this manner the claims raised by the Petitioner were rejected
and the deduction or adjustment made by the Respondent was sustained,
accordingly impugned award came to be passed on 21.08.2015.
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44.
Thus, being aggrieved, the Petitioner has preferred the present
petition challenging the impugned award principally on the ground that
it suffers from patent illegality, perversity and non-application of the
law governing damages. An additional challenge has also been made
on account of the delay in publication of the award and, at a later stage,
on the basis of Clause 16(g) of the arbitration agreement.
45.
Before this Court, the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner
first submits that the learned Arbitrator committed an error in treating
the Form-C controversy and the supply obligation as two independent
matters.
46.
It was submitted that Form-C had a direct bearing upon the
consideration received by the Petitioner for the interstate sale. Without
the declaration the Petitioner became exposed to tax at a much higher
rate. Thus, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner,
the failure of the Respondent went to the commercial root of the
transaction.
47.
Learned Senior Counsel for Petitioner submits that the Petitioner
did not stop supply without notice and in this regard repeated demands
of compliance were made. The Respondent was requested either to
furnish Form-C or to give an undertaking that it would bear the
differential tax, interest and penalty. It was submitted that the Petitioner
could not reasonably be expected to continue increasing its tax exposure
indefinitely. It was further argued that the final assessment order dated
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28.06.2012 cannot be used to judge the commercial position which
existed in August 2008. According to the Petitioner, the fact that the
threatened liability was subsequently removed cannot erase the tax
proceedings, deposits and financial hardship faced in the meantime.
48.
Learned Counsel then attacked the award under Section 74 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872. It was submitted that breach and entitlement
to damages are different things. Even if the Petitioner is assumed to
have committed breach by stopping supplies, the Respondent did not
automatically become entitled to the amount mentioned in Clause 3.
Reliance was placed upon Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass6, Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Motorola India Pvt. Ltd.7, Kailash Nath
Associates v. Delhi Development Authority8 and other decisions to
submit that Section 74 permits only reasonable compensation and not
automatic enforcement of a stipulated sum.
49.
It was argued that IOCL neither pleaded nor proved any
replacement purchase at a higher price, loss of sale, loss of blending
margin or any other quantified monetary loss. According to the
Petitioner, there is also no finding that such loss was incapable of proof.
The Petitioner particularly relies upon the language used by the learned
Arbitrator that the Respondent could recover the agreed amount even if
no actual loss or injury had been suffered. It was argued that this is
contrary to the compensatory principle contained in Sections 73 and 74
of the Contract Act. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the
AIR 1963 SC 1405
7 (2009) 2 SCC 337
8 (2015) 4 SCC 136
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learned Arbitrator adopted two different standards. While IOCL’s
deduction was sustained without separate proof of loss, the Petitioner’s
own reciprocal claim was rejected, amongst other reasons, for failure to
prove sufferance or injury. This is relied upon to allege perversity and
unequal treatment.
50.
The Petitioner also challenges the cross-contractual recovery.
Reliance has been placed upon Iron & Hardware (India) Co. v.
Shamlal & Bros.9 and Tower Vision India Pvt. Ltd. v. Procall Pvt.
Ltd10. to contend that an unadjudicated claim for damages is not an
existing debt. According to the Petitioner, the Letter of Intent dated
27.09.2010 and the Affidavit-cum-Undertaking dated 13.09.2011 could
at the highest provide a method of recovery of an amount which was
otherwise legally due. They could not themselves convert a disputed
claim for damages into a debt. It is also pointed out that the Respondent
did not file a separate counterclaim in the arbitration for recovery of
damages under the earlier agreements. According to the Petitioner, the
Respondent merely defended a unilateral deduction already made by it.
In the said regard, considerable reliance has also been placed upon the
judgment of this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v.
Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd.11, decided on 06.01.2022, and the judgment
of the Division Bench dated 18.05.2022 in the appeal arising therefrom.
It is submitted that those proceedings arose from a similar ethanol
supply arrangement involving the same Petitioner and dealt both with
Form-C and the requirement of loss under Section 74.
9 1954 SCC OnLine Bom 5
10 2012 SCC OnLine Del 4396
11 2022 SCC OnLine Del 42
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51.
The Petitioner next raises the issue of delay. It is not disputed that
arguments before the learned Arbitrator concluded on 13.03.2014 while
the award was published on 21.08.2015. Thus, there was an interval of
about seventeen months. Reliance is placed upon Harji Engineering
Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd.12, GL Litmus Events
Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority13 and the later judgment of
the Supreme Court in Lancor Holdings Limited v. Prem Kumar
Menon14. It is submitted that the long delay has to be read together with
the errors appearing in the award. In this connection the Petitioner refers
to references in the award to DSDPL and another dispute, to the
observation that certain provisional assessment orders had not initially
been filed, and to the manner in which the letters dated 17.12.2008 and
21.12.2008 were dealt with. It is contended that these are not mere
typographical mistakes and that they show that the learned Arbitrator
had lost continuity with the matter by the time the award was written.
52.
Lastly, the Petitioner has relied upon Clause 16(g) of the
arbitration agreement. The clause required the award to be made and
published within two years of the Arbitrator entering upon the reference
or within an extended period, not exceeding one further year, if the
parties agreed in writing. It is submitted that Shri C.P. Mishra entered
upon the reference on 19.08.2013 and the award was published on
21.08.2015. According to the Petitioner the award was therefore two
12 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1080
13 2025 SCC OnLine Del 5772
14 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2319
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days beyond the stipulated two-year period and no written extension
has been produced.
53.
Per contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent has opposed the
petition. It is submitted that the Petitioner is in substance asking this
Court to rehear the entire arbitration on facts and on interpretation of
the contract. According to the Respondent, the learned Arbitrator was
the chosen adjudicator of the parties. He considered the agreements,
correspondence, tax orders and the rival claims. A possible view taken
by him cannot be substituted by another view in proceedings under
Section 34.
54.
On Form-C, learned Counsel submits that there is admittedly no
clause which allowed the Petitioner to suspend supply. The Petitioner
could pursue its statutory remedies in relation to the tax declarations but
could not impose an indemnity as a new condition of further contractual
performance. The Respondent also relies upon the reasons contained in
the provisional assessment orders and submits that those proceedings
did not arise only because Form-C was delayed. It is further submitted
that the Petitioner did not even seek extension before the tax authority
under the statutory procedure. The final assessment order dated
28.06.2012 is also relied upon to show that the differential liability and
penalty did not ultimately survive.
55.
As regards Clause 3, learned Counsel submits that it is a
reciprocal and negotiated commercial provision. It operated only when
the failure went beyond the permissible 10% default. It therefore cannot
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be equated with an arbitrary penalty for every minor breach. It is
submitted that ethanol was being procured for a continuing petrolblending programme. Failure to supply the agreed quantities had
consequences for availability, planning and blending operations. Such
consequences are not necessarily capable of being proved by a single
replacement invoice. Reliance is placed upon ONGC Ltd. (supra) and
the principle that a genuine pre-estimate of damages entered into by
commercial parties can be acted upon where precise quantification of
the loss is difficult. The Respondent distinguishes the HPCL (supra)
proceedings relied upon by the Petitioner. It is submitted that the
findings and pleadings in that case were different and that the present
award has to be examined on its own contractual and evidentiary record.
56.
On the absence of a counterclaim, learned Counsel fairly accepts
that no separate counterclaim for the deducted amount was filed. It is
however submitted that the Petitioner itself sought refund of the
deduction, the Respondent defended its entitlement and Issue No.4
expressly required the learned Arbitrator to adjudicate whether the
deduction was permissible. Thus, the liability was in fact adjudicated.
The Respondent further relies upon the Letter of Intent dated
27.09.2010 and the undertaking dated 13.09.2011 as authority for
recovery of dues arising from earlier contracts from later payments.
57.
On delay, the Respondent submits that delay by itself does not
invalidate an award and that the Petitioner has failed to show that the
time taken actually affected the findings.
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58.
On Clause 16(g), it is submitted that this was not a ground taken
in the original Section 34 petition within the period prescribed by
Section 34(3). According to the Respondent a new and independent
jurisdictional ground cannot be introduced for the first time through
rejoinder or oral submissions after limitation.
59.
I have heard the learned Counsel for both the parties at length
and have gone through the impugned award, the pleadings, the relevant
agreements, the correspondence relied upon by the parties, the tax
documents and the written submissions placed on record.
60.
Certain clarifications were also sought during hearing. Learned
Senior Counsel for the Petitioner fairly accepted that there is no direct
clause in the contracts expressly permitting stoppage of supply on
account of delay in Form-C. Learned Senior Counsel also stated that no
application seeking extension for furnishing Form-C had been made
before the competent tax authority. These answers do not by themselves
decide the petition but they are relevant while examining whether the
view taken by the learned Arbitrator is an impossible view.
61.
Before examining the individual objections, the limits of the
present jurisdiction have to be kept in mind. A petition under Section
34 is not an appeal from the arbitral award. The Court does not rehear
the dispute merely because another view of the evidence or the contract
is possible. In Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority15,
the Supreme Court explained that an Arbitrator is the primary judge of
15 (2015) 3 SCC 49
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the quality and quantity of evidence and that a possible view cannot be
interfered with merely because the Court would have reached another
conclusion.
62.
The same discipline requires the Court to respect a plausible
interpretation of a commercial contract. At the same time, judicial
restraint does not require the Court to uphold an award which ignores a
binding provision of substantive law, travels beyond the contract or
reaches a conclusion which no reasonable tribunal could reach. The task
of this Court is therefore not to decide whether the learned Arbitrator’s
view was the best view. The question is whether the objections raised
by the Petitioner bring the award within a recognised ground for setting
aside under Section 34.
63.
Having said so, I shall first deal with the delay aspect. Arbitral
Arguments were concluded on 13.03.2014 and the award was published
on 21.08.2015. A period of about seventeen months between conclusion
of arguments and publication of an award is undoubtedly substantial.
Such delay is undesirable, particularly when arbitration is expected to
provide an efficient form of dispute resolution. However, the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Lancor Holdings Limited v. Prem
Kumar Menon (supra) makes it clear that delay by itself is not an
automatic ground for setting aside an arbitral award. The Court has to
examine whether the undue delay had an evident adverse effect upon
the decision-making process or the findings returned in the award.
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64.
The Petitioner has therefore rightly invited the Court to examine
not merely the number of months but also the mistakes which according
to it resulted from the delay.
65.
The references to DSDPL or another dispute in parts of the award
are certainly undesirable. The observation concerning the stage at
which the provisional assessment orders were produced could also have
been expressed more accurately. The treatment of some correspondence
is disputed by the Petitioner. These matters have been considered by
me. I am nevertheless unable to conclude that they establish that the
learned Arbitrator lost track of the present dispute.
66.
The award identifies the agreements between Dhampur Sugar
Mills Ltd. and IOCL. It considers the Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan and
Punjab agreements. It deals with the Form-C controversy, the
provisional tax proceedings, the suspension of ethanol supply, Clause
3, the later Uttarakhand agreement and the rival monetary claims. More
importantly, the provisional assessment orders which the Petitioner
says were incorrectly described as having been filed later were in fact
considered by the learned Arbitrator on merits. Findings were returned
upon their contents. The error as to the stage of filing therefore does not
establish that the documents themselves escaped consideration.
67.
Likewise, the dispute concerning the letters dated 17.12.2008 and
21.12.2008 does not alter the central factual finding in favour of the
Petitioner that there had in fact been delay on the part of the Respondent
in furnishing Form-C. The substance of the Petitioner’s grievance was
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therefore not overlooked because of the disputed treatment of those
letters. The arbitration was also decided on documents by agreement of
the parties and on an overall reading, this Court is unable to find the
adverse impact upon the substantive decision which would justify
setting aside merely because the award came after considerable delay.
68.
The delay deserves disapproval, but that is different from holding
that the statutory conditions for setting aside have been established. The
challenge on this ground therefore fails.
69.
Objection under Clause 16(g) requires separate consideration as
the clause contemplated publication of the award within two years after
entering upon the reference or within such extended period, not
exceeding one further year, as the parties might agree to in writing.
70.
Shri C.P. Mishra was appointed by communication dated
19.08.2013 and the award is dated 21.08.2015. Learned counsel for the
Respondent has not shown any written extension on the Court record.
A contractual time limit governing arbitral authority is not an irrelevant
matter. Decisions of the Supreme Court including NBCC Ltd. v. J.G.
Engineering Pvt. Ltd.16 and Jayesh H. Pandya v. Subhtex India Ltd.17
recognise the importance of the temporal limits agreed upon by parties.
71.
The difficulty in the present case, however, arises at an earlier
stage. The ground founded upon Clause 16(g) was not taken as a distinct
ground in the Section 34 petition filed within limitation. It was
16 (2010) 2 SCC 385
17 (2020) 17 SCC 383: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1101
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introduced later in rejoinder and in the course of arguments. This is not
merely a further argument in support of an existing ground. A complaint
that an award was delivered after an undesirable delay and a challenge
that the Arbitrator had ceased to possess contractual authority to make
the award are legally distinct objections. The latter requires
examination of the date of entering upon the reference, construction of
the contractual time provision and the existence or absence of an agreed
extension. It is therefore a separate ground having an independent
factual and legal foundation.
72.
In State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.18,
the Supreme Court recognised that amendment of a Section 34 petition
is not absolutely prohibited, but a wholly new ground having no
foundation in the original petition does not obtain an unrestricted right
of introduction after expiry of limitation. No amendment introducing
this independent ground within the permissible statutory framework has
been shown in the present case. This Court is therefore not persuaded
that the award can now be set aside upon a ground first brought in
through rejoinder and oral clarification after expiry of the period under
Section 34(3). It is however, made clear, that this conclusion is not
based upon the proposition that a delay of two days beyond a binding
contractual mandate can never have legal consequence. That question
does not require final determination here. The present conclusion rests
upon the manner and stage at which this independent ground was sought
to be introduced.
18 (2010) 4 SCC 518
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73.
Having dealt the delay aspect, this Court now comes to the
principal factual controversy concerning Form-C and the stopped
supplies. There is no dispute at this stage that Form-C was not always
furnished by the Respondent within time. The learned Arbitrator
himself accepted that there had been delay. I also find substance in the
Petitioner’s
submission
that
Form-C
was
not
commercially
meaningless. The absence of the declaration could result in assessment
of the interstate transaction at a higher rate. A supplier facing a
provisional assessment at about 32.5% would naturally be concerned
about the resulting financial burden. The Petitioner therefore had a
genuine commercial grievance. But the existence of a genuine
grievance and the existence of a contractual right to suspend
performance are two different matters.
74.
The question before the learned Arbitrator was whether the delay
in Form-C entitled the Petitioner, under these agreements, to stop
further supplies and make an indemnity from IOCL a condition for
resuming performance. The learned Arbitrator answered this question
against the Petitioner. I have not been shown any express provision of
the agreements which permitted suspension of supply on this ground.
During hearing learned Counsel for the Petitioner also fairly stated that
there was no such direct clause.
75.
The Petitioner argues that such a right must nevertheless be
inferred because the tax consequence affected the price and commercial
consideration. That is one possible manner of looking at the transaction.
But the learned Arbitrator did not accept that construction. The learned
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Arbitrator also had before him the provisional assessment orders. He
noticed that the tax proceedings referred to matters other than delayed
Form-C, including the Input Tax Credit claimed by the Petitioner and
the manner in which returns had been filed. Whether every observation
made by the learned Arbitrator regarding the tax statute was technically
necessary is not the question before this Court. What is material is that
the Arbitrator did not accept the Petitioner’s case that the entire
provisional assessment was solely the consequence of IOCL’s delay.
76.
The learned Arbitrator further considered the statutory remedy of
seeking extension of time for production of Form-C under Rule 12(7).
During hearing before this Court, the Petitioner did not dispute that no
such application for extension had been made. The final assessment
order dated 28.06.2012 was also before the learned Arbitrator.
Ultimately the apprehended differential tax and penalty on account of
the delayed Form-C did not survive in the form in which they had
initially been projected.
77.
The Petitioner is correct that a later final assessment does not
mean that it faced no difficulty at the earlier stage. A temporary cash
flow burden or exposure may be very real at the time when provisional
proceedings are pending. But the question in arbitration was not only
whether the Petitioner faced difficulty. It was whether that difficulty
authorised it under the contract to stop performance altogether. The
learned Arbitrator found that it did not and this Court is unable to say
that this construction of the agreements is one which no reasonable
Arbitrator could adopt. There was no express suspension clause and an
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additional indemnity was demanded by the Petitioner as a condition for
further supply although statutory remedies were available. The tax
proceedings had more than one aspect and the final differential demand
did not ultimately survive. In these circumstances the finding that the
Petitioner should have pursued its remedies without unilaterally
stopping contractual supply is at least a plausible view of the agreement
and the material before the tribunal. Section 34 does not permit this
Court to replace that view merely because the Petitioner’s decision can
also be understood from a commercial point of view.
78.
In the said regard, the Petitioner has placed considerable reliance
upon Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra). The reliance
cannot simply be brushed aside because the supplier in that case was
the present Petitioner and the controversy also concerned ethanol
supplies and Form-C. In the said judgment dated 06.01.2022, this Court
examined the commercial effect of non-furnishing of Form-C and also
considered whether damages claimed by the oil company satisfied the
requirements of Section 74. The Division Bench thereafter considered
the matter in the appeal decided on 18.05.2022 and affirmed the result.
Those judgments lay down principles which have to be respected. They
do not, however, mean that every arbitral award arising from every
ethanol agreement involving this Petitioner must necessarily have the
same result.
79.
An award under Section 34 has to be examined with reference to
the contractual findings and evidentiary record upon which that
particular Tribunal acted. In the present case, the learned Arbitrator
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squarely framed the question whether the Petitioner was entitled to keep
supplies in abeyance. He accepted the delay in Form-C but gave
separate reasons for holding that the delay did not create a contractual
right of suspension. Those reasons include the absence of such a
contractual term, the nature of the provisional assessment proceedings,
the statutory course which was not availed and the final assessment
order. The present award therefore cannot be set aside merely by
importing a factual conclusion reached on another arbitral record.
80.
Further, the HPCL (supra) judgments also have to be kept in
view while examining Clause 3 and Section 74 and is being dealt
herewith separately.
81.
The most substantial legal challenge is to the finding under Issue
No.4. The Petitioner is correct in submitting that every sum mentioned
in a contract does not become automatically recoverable merely
because breach has occurred. Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act
allows reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount stipulated in
the contract, which is therefore the upper limit and the provision
remains compensatory in nature. It is imperative to mention here the
judgment in Fateh Chand (supra) which established the compensatory
character of Section 74. Furthermore, the judgment in ONGC Ltd. v.
Saw Pipes Ltd. recognised that where commercial parties have made a
genuine pre-estimate and the actual consequence of breach is difficult
to quantify, exact proof of the monetary loss need not invariably be
insisted upon. Kailash Nath Associates (supra), reiterates that loss or
legal injury cannot altogether disappear from the enquiry and that where
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actual loss is capable of proof, Section 74 does not simply dispense with
it. The judgment in Construction & Design Services v. Delhi
Development Authority19, also recognises that in an appropriate case
the nature of the transaction may permit reasonable compensation to be
determined without exact proof of each component of loss. Thus, the
propositions are not really inconsistent as being held by the Courts from
time to time. The amount stated in a contract is not payable as a
punishment for breach, at the same time, the law does not insist upon
impossible evidence where loss naturally follows from the breach but
its exact monetary measurement is difficult and the parties have made
a genuine and reasonable pre-estimate.
82.
The Petitioner has strongly relied upon one sentence in the
present award. The learned Arbitrator stated, while referring to Saw
Pipes (supra), that the aggrieved party “is entitled to the said amount
on proof of breach, even if no actual loss or injury was suffered by it”.
If this sentence is read entirely by itself, the expression is undoubtedly
wider than the principle of reasonable compensation under Section 74.
A mere breach cannot be converted into a source of profit where the
evidence affirmatively shows that no loss or legal injury at all could
have followed. An arbitral award, however, has to be read as a whole
and a Section 34 Court should not isolate one expression from the
findings which immediately precede and follow it if the reasoning as a
whole conveys a legally sustainable view.
19 (2015) 14 SCC 263
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83.
Immediately before the said expression, the learned Arbitrator
expressly considered the nature of Clause 3 and held that it was not a
penalty describing it as liquidated damages and, more importantly, “as
reasonable estimate by parties for loss being caused due to failure to
fulfil commitments of supply and lifting of ethanol to the extent of 90%
of the ordered quantity”. Thus, this is not a case where the Arbitrator
merely noticed a figure in the contract and ordered it to be paid without
considering its character. There is an express finding that the clause
constituted a reasonable estimate of the loss attached by the parties to
failure of minimum performance. The structure of Clause 3 also
supports the possibility of such a view, being reciprocal and did not
operate upon every insignificant shortfall. The parties permitted a
deviation of 10% and the commercial consequence arose only when
performance fell below the stipulated minimum of 90%. This feature is
relevant, a provision which leaves a tolerance and fixes the consequence
only beyond that tolerance can reasonably be understood by a
commercial tribunal as an agreed allocation of the risk of material short
supply or short uplift rather than a punishment imposed for the very first
default.
84.
The subject matter also cannot be ignored. The contracts were for
continuing supply of ethanol for petrol blending at the Respondent’s
locations. The object was not a single isolated sale of a readily
replaceable item under one invoice, the parties themselves considered
minimum annual supply and uplift sufficiently important to provide a
reciprocal contractual mechanism. A deliberate cessation of supply
beyond the agreed tolerance was therefore capable of affecting the
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Respondent’s procurement and blending programme even though the
exact monetary consequence might not be reflected in one replacement
purchase document.
85.
The learned Arbitrator found that the Petitioner had wilfully and
deliberately kept supplies in abeyance. Having first found breach of an
essential supply obligation, he treated the stipulated measure as the
reasonable estimate already agreed by the parties. In my view, the
sentence in the award referring to absence of actual loss or injury has
to be understood in this setting as dispensing with separate proof of the
exact quantified monetary loss after the Arbitrator had accepted the
clause itself as a reasonable pre-estimate. It cannot fairly be read as a
factual finding by the Tribunal that the Respondent suffered no legal
consequence whatsoever and was nevertheless being given a windfall.
86.
The distinction is important. If the learned Arbitrator had found
that no loss or injury could possibly have resulted and had still granted
the amount merely to punish breach, the position under Section 74
would have been different. That is not the finding which emerges when
the award is read as a whole. In Kailash Nath (supra), the surrounding
facts were material because the evidence itself showed the position
concerning the property and the absence of the claimed loss. The
principle that compensation remains compensatory is binding, but its
application necessarily depends upon the facts and nature of the
particular transaction. Likewise, the HPCL judgments relied upon by
the Petitioner cannot be read as laying down that no “Take or
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Pay/Supply or Pay” clause in an ethanol contract can ever represent a
reasonable pre-estimate.
87.
In those proceedings the Court examined the particular pleadings
and findings before it and found serious deficiencies in the claim for
damages, including the foundation concerning loss and the manner in
which the claim had been put forward. The Division Bench emphasised
the need for breach, legal injury flowing from breach and the resulting
basis for compensation. Those legal requirements apply here also. The
difference is that the learned Arbitrator in the present case expressly
treated Clause 3 itself as a reasonable estimate for the loss arising from
failure to meet the 90% commitment and also separately found a
deliberate breach of the essential supply obligation.
88.
Whether this Court, acting as the original adjudicator, might have
required more evidence from IOCL is not the test under Section 34. The
question is whether the view taken by the learned Arbitrator is an
impossible application of Section 74 or a view which the contract and
the law could reasonably bear. The Petitioner has not shown that the
contractual measure was extravagant, unconscionable or wholly
unrelated to the commercial consequence which the parties sought to
address. The clause applied equally to both sides, which the Petitioner
itself invoked its reciprocal operation when making its own claim
against IOCL. The fact that the Petitioner invoked the clause does not
prevent it from raising a valid objection under Section 74. It does,
however, show that the provision formed part of the commercial
allocation accepted by both parties and was not a unilateral clause
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imposed only upon the supplier. This Court, therefore, does not find
that the learned Arbitrator’s treatment of Clause 3 crosses the threshold
for interference under Section 34. At the highest, the Petitioner has
demonstrated that a different or stricter view of the evidence relating to
loss was possible. That is insufficient to set aside an arbitral award.
89.
The Petitioner has next argued that there is an internal
inconsistency because IOCL’s deduction was upheld without separate
proof of actual loss whereas the Petitioner’s claim under the reciprocal
clause was rejected, amongst other grounds, for want of proof of
sufferance or injury. I have considered this part of the award carefully.
If the Petitioner’s reciprocal claim had been rejected only on the
proposition that actual quantified loss must invariably be proved, while
IOCL had been expressly exempted from the same legal requirement,
the argument would have required closer consideration. The award,
however, gives additional and independent reasons for rejecting the
Petitioner’s claim. The learned Arbitrator recorded that necessary
documents had not been placed on record to establish wilful default by
the Respondent in uplifting the contracted quantity. He further recorded
that no evidence had been produced to support the claim of
Rs.29,32,001/-. The claim concerning Rs.1,36,76,301/- was also
rejected for want of material establishing the alleged withholding in the
manner asserted. Thus, the Petitioner’s reciprocal claim failed at the
factual foundation itself, including proof of the Respondent’s default
and the quantities or amounts on which the claim depended. It was not
rejected only because exact monetary loss had not been proved.
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90.
The reasoning could no doubt have been expressed with greater
symmetry, which is not enough to infer that two different laws were
deliberately applied to the two parties nor does it establish bias. An
allegation of bias cannot be founded merely on the fact that one party
succeeded on an issue and the other party failed on another issue, there
must be material showing lack of impartial adjudication and no such
material has been established here.
91.
The next submission is that IOCL could not determine its own
damages and recover them by deduction. As a general proposition, the
Petitioner is correct that a mere assertion of unliquidated damages is not
the same as an admitted and presently payable debt. A commercial party
cannot pass a binding decree in its own favour merely by describing its
claim as damages; however, that is not where the matter ended in the
present case, the Respondent made deductions which the Petitioner
disputed and invoked arbitration. The Petitioner sought return of the
deducted amount, the Respondent defended its entitlement. Thus, Issue
No.4 was then specifically framed to decide whether the Respondent
could deduct the amount under the “Take or Pay/Supply or Pay” clause
and whether such deduction was legally permissible.
92.
The very liability underlying the deduction therefore became a
matter for adjudication before the chosen arbitral forum. The learned
Arbitrator considered the breach, the character of Clause 3 and the
Respondent’s entitlement and gave a decision upon them. The claim did
not remain an unadjudicated internal calculation of IOCL after the
arbitral award. The absence of a separately titled counterclaim is not, in
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these circumstances, decisive. The Petitioner itself put the refund and
legality of the deduction directly in issue and the parties proceeded
before the Arbitrator on an express issue concerning IOCL’s
entitlement. No case has been made out that the Petitioner lacked notice
of the case it had to meet or that Issue No.4 travelled beyond the
pleadings and reference. On the contrary, Issue No.4 was one of the
principal questions argued before the learned Arbitrator.
93.
The distinction recognised in Iron & Hardware and Tower
Vision (supra) between a mere claim for damages and a crystallised
liability does not require the Court to ignore the fact that the disputed
liability was thereafter adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal. Section 74
does not require that a separate civil decree must first be obtained before
a contractual deduction can be defended when the legality of that very
deduction is placed for decision before the Arbitrator.
94.
The Petitioner is also correct in submitting that a general
recovery clause cannot by itself create an underlying liability which
otherwise does not exist. The Letter of Intent dated 27.09.2010 and the
Affidavit-cum-Undertaking dated 13.09.2011 therefore cannot be
treated as an independent adjudication that the earlier damages were
legally due. The learned Arbitrator’s conclusion, however, need not be
understood in that manner. He first determined the underlying question
of breach and the entitlement under Clause 3, thereafter, the Letter of
Intent and undertaking became relevant to the manner in which the
liability could be adjusted against later payments. Once the underlying
liability was upheld by the Arbitrator, his interpretation of those
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documents as providing a contractual mechanism for recovery from
subsequent payments was a possible construction of the documents.
Section 34 does not permit this Court to substitute another contractual
construction merely because the Petitioner says that a narrower
construction should have been adopted.
95.
What remains to be analysed is the Petitioner’s tax claims, which
also do not call for interference. The learned Arbitrator did not deny
that there had been delay in Form-C but, nevertheless examined
whether the claimed monetary liability was wholly and directly
attributable to the Respondent. The provisional assessment orders
contained matters relating to the Petitioner’s own tax treatment in
addition to the Form-C question and the Arbitrator also noticed that an
application for extension was not made. These were relevant pieces of
material before the Tribunal. More importantly, the final assessment
order dated 28.06.2012 did not leave the Petitioner with the differential
tax and penalty liability on account of delayed Form-C in the manner
originally apprehended.
96.
The Petitioner may have faced temporary hardship, that fact by
itself does not establish a contractual entitlement to recover every
amount or expense incurred during the tax proceedings from IOCL. The
causal connection, the contractual basis and proof of the amount were
matters for the learned Arbitrator. He considered the documentary
record and rejected the claim. This Court cannot reopen those findings
as an appellate authority merely because it might assess the causal
connection differently.
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97.
Furthermore, the claim towards legal expenses was also rejected
for want of the necessary proof and nexus. This again falls within
appreciation of the evidence and does not disclose patent illegality.
98.
I have also considered collectively the errors pointed out by the
Petitioner. An arbitral award is expected to accurately state the names
of the parties and the documents before it, references to another concern
or another matter are not desirable. Equally, an observation about
whether a document was filed at one stage or another should be
factually correct. But Section 34 does not permit setting aside for every
clerical, descriptive or factual inaccuracy. The error must have a
bearing upon the decision or show that vital evidence was ignored or
that the tribunal proceeded upon a basis having no connection with the
record. That threshold is not met here.
99.
The provisional assessment orders were considered, the delay in
Form-C was accepted, stoppage of supply was considered, Clause 3 was
reproduced and interpreted, the parties’ respective monetary claims
were examined, and the subsequent Uttarakhand arrangement and
recovery documents were also dealt with. Thus, the main controversies
were before the Arbitrator and were adjudicated. The inaccuracies
relied upon by the Petitioner do not displace the substantive chain of
reasoning which led to the award.
100. The fact that the original arbitral record was subsequently stated
to be unavailable is certainly unfortunate. It cannot, however, result in
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a presumption that every disputed observation in the award is incorrect
or that the award must for that reason be set aside.
101. On a consideration of the entire matter, this Court is unable to
accept that the Petitioner has established a ground for setting aside the
award under Section 34 of the Act.
102. The Petitioner’s grievance concerning delayed Form-C was
genuine and the learned Arbitrator himself accepted that there had been
delay. The Arbitrator nevertheless held that the agreements did not
permit the Petitioner to suspend ethanol supplies on that ground. In the
absence of an express suspension clause and having regard to the other
circumstances noticed in the award, that conclusion is a possible
interpretation of the contractual relationship. The Court cannot convert
the Petitioner’s commercial justification into a contractual right which
the learned Arbitrator, upon interpretation of the agreements, found did
not exist.
103. The final tax assessment order dated 28.06.2012 and the reasons
contained in the provisional assessment proceedings also furnished
material upon which the learned Arbitrator could reject the Petitioner’s
monetary claims towards differential tax, penalty and related expenses.
104. As regards Clause 3, the law under Section 74 does not permit
automatic penal recovery merely upon proof of breach. However, the
present award cannot fairly be read as enforcing an arbitrary penalty.
The learned Arbitrator expressly held the reciprocal Clause 3 to be a
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liquidated damages provision and a reasonable estimate made by the
parties for the loss arising from failure to meet the minimum 90%
supply or uplift commitment, contained a 10% tolerance and dealt with
the commercial consequence of material non-performance.
105. The observation in the award concerning absence of actual loss,
when read in the context of the entire reasoning, amounts to dispensing
with separate proof of the exact quantified loss after accepting the
contractual pre-estimate. It does not amount to a finding that no legal
injury or commercial consequence whatsoever could arise and yet a
penalty should be imposed. The view taken by the learned Arbitrator is
therefore capable of being sustained within the principles explained in
Saw Pipes (supra) and the later law governing reasonable
compensation. The decisions in Fateh Chand, Kailash Nath and the
HPCL (supra) proceedings do not justify treating the present Section
34 petition as an appeal and undertaking a fresh assessment of the
damages evidence.
106. The challenge to the cross-contractual adjustment also fails as a
disputed damages claim is not made a debt merely by unilateral
assertion. But in the present case, the Petitioner challenged the
deduction in arbitration and Issue No.4 specifically required
adjudication of IOCL’s entitlement, the liability was thereafter
adjudicated by the learned Arbitrator. Once that liability was upheld,
the Letter of Intent dated 27.09.2010 and the Affidavit-cumUndertaking dated 13.09.2011 could reasonably be treated as providing
the mechanism for recovery from subsequent payments.
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107. The alleged inconsistency in treatment of the reciprocal claims
also does not establish bias or perversity because the Petitioner’s claim
was independently found deficient in proof of the Respondent’s default,
the supporting quantities, documents and the amounts claimed.
108. The delay of about seventeen months in publication of the award
was substantial and undesirable. The Petitioner has, however, not
established that the delay had such an adverse effect upon the findings
as would warrant setting aside the award. The separate challenge based
upon Clause 16(g) was not raised as an independent ground in the
Section 34 petition within the statutory period and cannot, in the facts
of this case, be introduced through rejoinder and oral submissions as a
new basis for setting aside the award.
109. The Court may have expressed some parts of the reasoning
differently had it been deciding the disputes as the original adjudicator,
however, that is not the jurisdiction which the Court exercises under
Section 34. The learned Arbitrator was the adjudicator selected under
the contractual mechanism and his conclusions on the material issues
are supported by reasons and by material which was before him, thus
the conclusions cannot be described as findings which no reasonable
arbitral tribunal could reach.
110. No ground has therefore been made out to hold that the impugned
award is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law or patently
illegal in a manner going to the root of the matter, perverse, or otherwise
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liable to be set aside within the limited jurisdiction under Section 34 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
111. In view of the aforesaid, the petition filed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 challenging the Arbitral Award
dated 21.08.2015 passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator is hereby
dismissed and the Impugned Arbitral Award dated 21.08.2015 shall
remain undisturbed and is upheld in its entirety.
112. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
AUGUST 19, 2026/gunn/at
O.M.P. (COMM) 27/2015
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
17:01:03
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