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2026:CGHC:1110
Digitally
signed by
JYOTI
SHARMA
JYOTI
SHARMA Date:
NAFR
2026.01.09
16:25:00
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MA No. 5 of 2026
Devkumar Sahu S/o Shri Kanhaiya Sahu Aged About 40 Years R/o
Ramnagar Kawardha, Thana And Tahsil- Kawardha, District- Kabirdham
(C.G.)
... Appellant(s)
versus
1. Shri Khelawan Yadav S/o Late Roopnath Yadav Aged About 75 Years
R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil - Kawardha, DistrictKabirdham (C.G.)
2. Shri Silau Yadav S/o Late Roopnath Yadav Aged About 70 Years R/o
Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil - Kawardha, District- Kabirdham
(C.G.)
3. Shri Jethram Yadav S/o Late Roopnath Yadav Aged About 70 Years
R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil - Kawardha, DistrictKabirdham (C.G.)
4. Shri Baisakhu Yadav S/o Late Roopnath Yadav Aged About 70 Years
R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil - Kawardha, DistrictKabirdham (C.G.)
5. Shri Rajaram Yadav S/o Late Roopnath Yadav Aged About 70 Years
R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil - Kawardha, DistrictKabirdham (C.G.)
6. Shri Laxman Yadav S/o Late Roopnath Yadav Aged About 70 Years
R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil - Kawardha, DistrictKabirdham
(C.G.)
7. Smt. Bhukhin Bai Yadav (Died) D/o Late Rupnath Yadav Nil
7.A Bhagwan Singh S/o Shivprayash Yadav Aged About 72 Years R/o
Village- Jungle Khamhi, Thana And Tahsil- Pandariya, DistrictKabirdham (C.G.)
7.B Siyaram S/o Shivprasad Yadav Aged About 50 Years R/o VillageJungle Khamhi, Thana And Tahsil- Pandariya, District- Kabirdham
(C.G.)
7.C Santram S/o Shivprasad Yadav Aged About 49 Years R/o VillageJungle Khamhi, Thana And Tahsil- Pandariya, District- Kabirdham
(C.G.)
7.D Maniram S/o Shivprasad Yadav Aged About 47 Years R/o VillageJungle Khamhi, Thana And Tahsil- Pandariya, District- Kabirdham
(C.G.)
7.E Dhaniram S/o Shivprasad Yadav Aged About 45 Years R/o VillageJungle Khamhi, Thana And Tahsil- Pandariya, District- Kabirdham
(C.G.)
8. Baisakhin Bai D/o Late Rupnath Yadav Aged About 65 Years R/o
Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil- Kawardha, District- Kabirdham
(C.G.)
9. Rajni Bai D/o Late Rupnath Yadav Aged About 60 Years R/o VillageBhagutola, Thana And Tehsil- Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.)
10. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector Kawardha, DistrictKabirdham (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant (s)
:
Mr. Alok Kumar Dewangan, Advocate
For State/
:
Mr. Ritesh Giri, P.L.
Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Order on Board
08/01/2026
Heard.
1. I.A.No.1 of 2025
2. This is an application for condonation of delay of 60 days in filing
the appeal.
3. By the present appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the CPC the
appellant is challenging the order dated 09.07.2025 passed by the
Learned District Judge, Kabirdham C.G. in Civil Suit No.
01-A/2024 whereby and where-under the learned Trial Court
rejected the application filed by the plaintiff/ appellant under Order
39 Rule 1 & 2 read with Section 151 of the CPC.
4. The appellant/plaintiff filed the present suit alleging that the
respondents/defendants are joint owners of agricultural land
bearing Khasra Nos. 383/2 and 383/4, admeasuring 1.08 acres,
situated at Kawardha. According to the appellant, owing to urgent
family needs, the respondents agreed to sell 0.27 acres of land
out of the said holding. After negotiations in the presence of
witnesses, a sale agreement was entered into on 02.04.2023, and
the land agreed to be sold was described in Schedule ‘A’ of the
plaint. Pursuant to the agreement, the respondents received a
total sum of ₹20,00,000/- as earnest money, ₹12,00,000/- through
cheques on 02.04.2023 and ₹8,00,000/- in cash on 08.04.2023.
The agreement was executed before a Notary at Kawardha, and
possession of the disputed land was allegedly handed over to the
appellant,
who
thereafter
raised
fencing
and
boundary
demarcation. As per the terms of the agreement, the registered
sale deed was to be executed on or before 08.02.2024. The
appellant asserted that despite repeated requests and issuance of
a legal notice, the respondents avoided execution of the sale deed
and threatened to alienate the land to third parties. The appellant
claimed readiness and willingness to perform his part of the
contract and alleged that he remained present before the SubRegistrar on the scheduled date with the balance consideration,
but the respondents failed to appear.
5. Consequently, the appellant instituted the suit seeking appropriate
reliefs and also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2
CPC for grant of temporary injunction.
6. Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 and 9, in their reply, denied the
averments made in the application and contended that the suit
land bearing Khasra Nos. 383/2 and 383/4 at Village Bhagutola is
recorded in their names and in the names of the legal heirs of
deceased defendant No. 7. It was asserted that they own only
0.54 acres of land and not 1.08 acres as alleged, and that no
agreement was ever executed for sale of 0.27 acres of the said
land. The respondents further denied receipt of ₹20,00,000/- as
earnest money and alleged that the purported agreement dated
08.04.2023 does not bear the signatures or thumb impressions of
all recorded land owners, that the respondents are illiterate
persons, and that the document has been tampered with and
forged. It was contended that the contractual terms were violated
and that restraining transfer of the land on the basis of such a
document would amount to infringement of their rights, and
accordingly dismissal of the application with costs was prayed for.
7. The learned Trial Court after hearing the parties and on due
consideration of the material available on record, by order dated
09.07.2025, rejected the application for temporary injunction.
Aggrieved by rejection of the injunction application, the appellant
has preferred the present appeal.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Trial
court erred in rejecting the application for temporary injunction,
having failed to consider the strong prima facie case, balance of
convenience, and irreparable loss in favour of the appellant. It was
contended that the impugned order was passed mechanically,
without proper judicial reasoning, contrary to settled principles
under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, and is arbitrary, perverse,
and liable to be set aside.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the the parties and perused the
documents.
10. After considering the matter in its entirety and upon appreciation
of the material on record, the learned Trial Court rejected the
application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section
151 CPC by the impugned order. The Court observed that even
assuming the agreement dated 08.04.2023 to be valid, the plaintiff
still owes the defendants a sum of ₹5,20,00,000/- out of the total
consideration of approximately ₹5,40,00,000/- for the disputed
land. The defendants are agriculturists, and agriculture constitutes
their sole source of livelihood. Granting a temporary injunction in
such circumstances would prevent the defendants, who are rural,
uneducated, and economically weaker, from using and enjoying
their own land and deprive them of the sale proceeds. This would
cause them economic and mental hardship, which cannot be
adequately compensated financially. In view of the above, the
learned Trial Court rightly concluded that the balance of
convenience and the element of irreparable harm are not in favour
of the plaintiff, and the impugned order is therefore justified.
11. Even otherwise the present appeal is barred by time. The
appellant filled the application for condonation of delay by
assigning the reason that due to medical emergency in family the
appellant could not file the appeal in time.
The said reason
assigned by the appellant orally that too without any supporting
document.
12. In the absence of any sufficient cause, the application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be entertained as a matter of
routine, particularly, when the delay in filing of the instant appeal is
for a period of 60 days.
13. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and anothers.
The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 2013 (14) SCC
81, has, in very categorical terms, after considering a series of
judgements of Supreme Court on Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
the Supreme Court held that where a case has been presented in
the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court
as to what was the "sufficient cause which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within
limitation. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts
to showing utter disregard to the legislature. It further held that
‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in
view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained
inactive". The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was
prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and
unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not
allow the application of condonation of delav. Para’s 12 & 15 of the
said decision read as under :12. It is a settled legal position that law of limitation
may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be
show period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A
result prescribes. The Court has no power to extend
the Court has no power to ignore the provision to
relieve flowing from a statutory provision is never an
evil. A what is considers a distress resulting from it
operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship
or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has
no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the
law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a
situation.
It
has
consistently
been
held
that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
15. …..In case a party is found to be negligent, or for
want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be justified
ground to condone the delay….."
14. The Supreme Court in the matter of Pathpati Subba Reddy
(Died) by LRs. And Ors Vs. Special Deputy Collector {2024
SCC OnLine SC 513} had held as under:26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of
the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this
Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that
there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the
right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or
availed of for a long time must come to an end or
cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though
liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same
cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in
nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient
cause is established for various factors such as, where
there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to
the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the
cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vi) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided
on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay
and condoning the delay for the reason that the
conditions
have
been
imposed,
tantamounts
to
disregarding the statutory provision.
15. In view of the above, since sufficient cause has not been
explained by the appellant/ plaintiff, under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning the delay in filing of the instant
appeal and further as there is no illegality in the order of the
learned trial court, the instant appeal is liable to be and is hereby
dismissed at the motion stage itself on the ground of delay and
laches as also on merits.
Sd/(Bibhu Datta Guru)
JUDGE
Jyoti
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