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2026:CGHC:27068
AFR
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VISHAKHA signed by
BEOHAR
VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
HIGH Court OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 6077 of 2024
Order Reserved on 08.05.2026
Order Delivered on 02.07.2026
1 - Devendra Khanna S/o Late R N Khanna Aged About 65 Years
R/o Minocha Colony, Mungeli Road, Dist - Bilaspur Chhattisgarh
2 - Smt. Neerja Khanna W/o Devendra Khanna Aged About 62
Years R/o Minocha Colony, Mungeli Road, Dist - Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh
... Petitioners
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate Presiding
Officer, Appellate, Tribunal, Bilaspur, Dist - Bilaspur Chhattisgarh
2 - The Sub Divisional Officer (R) Maintenance Tribunal, Bilaspur,
Dist
-
Bilaspur
Chhatitsgarh
3 - Smt. Santosh Khanna W/o Late R N Khanna Aged About 93
Years R/o B-7, Minocha Colony, Mungeli Road, Dist - Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
(Cause Title is taken from CIS System)
For Petitioner
: Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, Advocate
For State
: Mr. Amit Nayak, P.L.
For Respondent No. : Mr. Rupesh Shrivastava, Advocate
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
1.
By way of the present petition, the petitioners are
challenging the order dated 25/11/2024 passed by the
District Magistrate-cum-Presiding Officer, Appellate Tribunal
constituted under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents
and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, whereby the Appellate
Tribunal upheld the order dated 12/09/2024 passed by the
Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Maintenance Tribunal
constituted under the said Act of 2007.
2.
Facts of the case are that the petitioners, who are husband
and wife, are residing on the first floor of the house situated
over land bearing Khasra Nos. 1608/10 and 1608/08 at
Minocha Colony, Bilaspur, whereas respondent No. 3, who
is the mother of petitioner No. 1, is residing on the ground
floor along with the younger brother and sister-in-law of
petitioner No. 1. Respondent No. 3 instituted proceedings
under Section 5 read with Section 23 of the Maintenance
and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 before
the Maintenance Tribunal alleging, inter alia, that petitioner
No. 1 was neglecting to maintain her, that the petitioners
were harassing and abusing her, and that she apprehended
danger to her life from them; on such allegations, she
sought eviction of the petitioners from the first floor of the
house, refund of Rs. 25,00,000/-, and compensation of Rs.
5,00,000/-. The petitioners contested the proceedings by
filing an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC as well as
a detailed reply, contending that respondent No. 3 was
receiving pension and had her own source of livelihood. The
proceedings were not maintainable under the Act of 2007 as
no claim for maintenance had been made and the principal
relief sought was eviction. The petitioner No. 2 is the title
holder of land bearing Khasra No. 1608/08, having
purchased the same prior to her marriage. The Khasra No.
1608/10 does not belong to respondent No. 3 as per
revenue records and the proceedings had been initiated at
the instance of the younger brother of petitioner No. 1 with
an intention to dispossess the petitioners from the property.
The petitioners also placed on record the registered sale
deed dated 06/04/1984 pertaining to Khasra No. 1608/08
and the map of the constructed house. However, the
Maintenance Tribunal, by order dated 12/09/2024, allowed
the application of respondent No. 3 and directed eviction of
the petitioners from the house. Aggrieved thereby, the
petitioners preferred an appeal under Section 16 of the Act
of 2007, in which interim protection was granted on
30/09/2024; however, the Appellate Tribunal, by the
impugned order dated 25/11/2024, dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the order of the Maintenance Tribunal. Hence
the present petition.
3.
Following reliefs have been prayed in this petition:“10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to allow the writ petition and quashed
the impugned order dt 25/11/2024 (Annexure
P/1 & order dt 12/09/2024 (Annexure P/2), in
the interest of justice.
10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be call for
the records for its kind perusal which relates
to petitioner's matter.
10.3 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court
may deem fit and proper, may also be passed
in favour of the petitioner.”
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the
impugned orders passed by the Maintenance Tribunal and
affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal are wholly illegal, arbitrary
and without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the petitioners have
been directed to be evicted from the disputed house despite
the fact that the property in question does not belong to
respondent No. 3 and the issue of title and possession could
have been adjudicated only by a competent civil Court in
accordance with law. It is contended that both the Tribunals
erred in treating respondent No. 3 as owner merely on the
basis of mutation entries in respect of Khasra Nos. 1608/08
and 1608/10, whereas mutation does not confer any right,
title or interest over immovable property and only enables
the State to collect land revenue. Learned counsel further
submits that the petitioners had already challenged the
mutation entries by preferring an appeal under Section 44 of
the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, which is still pending
consideration, and therefore the tribunals ought not to have
proceeded on the assumption that respondent No. 3 had
title over the property. It is further argued that the
proceedings initiated by respondent No. 3 under Sections 5
and 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and
Senior
Citizens
Act,
were
themselves
not
maintainable, as no case falling within the scope of Section
23 was made out and the application was essentially one
seeking eviction from the property rather than maintenance.
Learned counsel submits that the Act of 2007 does not
empower the Tribunal to adjudicate disputed questions of
title or to order eviction of a person from property which is
neither ancestral nor self-acquired property of the senior
citizen, particularly when petitioner No. 2 claims ownership
over Khasra No. 1608/08 on the basis of a registered sale
deed. It is also submitted that the learned Tribunal acted in
gross violation of the procedure prescribed under the Act of
2007 and the Chhattisgarh Maintenance and Welfare of
Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009, inasmuch as the
application filed by the petitioners under Order VII Rule 11
CPC was never decided, no proper enquiry as contemplated
under Sections 5(3) and 8(1) of the Act was conducted, and
the
mandatory
procedure
under
Rule
requiring
consideration of conciliation was completely ignored.
Instead, the Tribunal adopted an unknown procedure by
constituting a two-member team, recording only the
statement of respondent No. 3 and not that of the
petitioners, and then relied upon such material to pass the
order of eviction. Learned counsel further submits that the
Tribunals failed to consider that the petitioners themselves
are senior citizens and respondent No. 3 is already residing
in the same house on the ground floor and therefore no
question of denial of residence arises. It is submitted that
the petitioners had themselves lodged a prior police
complaint regarding assault and abuse by the younger son
of respondent No. 3, which probabilises the petitioners’ case
that the proceedings were initiated at the behest of the
younger son only to dispossess them from the property. It is
argued that the complaint lodged by respondent No. 3 was
merely a counterblast to the earlier complaint made by the
petitioners and that the authorities failed to appreciate the
material placed on record in its proper perspective. Learned
counsel would further submit that the impugned orders are
contrary to the object and scheme of the Act of 2007, which
is intended to secure maintenance and welfare of parents
and senior citizens and not to deprive another senior citizen
of his property or residence without due process of law. In
support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance is placed on
the decisions in M.P. Tej Babu v. State of Telangana 2017 5
RCR (Civ) 724, Mohan Lal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh &
Others WPC No.3139/2017 and Krishna Kumar v. State of
U.P. 2023 0 Supreme(All) 992, to contend that the Tribunal
has limited jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Act, that
mutation does not create title, and that eviction affecting
proprietary rights cannot be ordered in a summary manner
under the Act of 2007 without authority of law.
5.
Learned State counsel, at the outset and without entering
into the merits of the matter, submits that none of the
averments made in the writ petition shall be deemed to have
been admitted unless the same are specifically and
categorically admitted by the answering respondents in their
reply. Learned State counsel further submits that a bare
perusal of the relief clause would demonstrate that the
principal challenge in the present petition is to the order
passed by the Presiding Officer of the Appellate Tribunal
constituted under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents
and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, whereby the appellate
authority has affirmed the order dated 12/09/2024 passed by
the Maintenance Tribunal, and that the said authority is an
independent
adjudicatory
forum
represented
through
separate counsel. It is, therefore, contended that no specific
relief has been claimed against the State respondents and
no substantive allegations have been levelled against them
in the petition, and as such they are merely formal parties to
the present proceedings, as such, the same deserves to be
dismissed qua the answering respondents.
6.
Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 submits
that the present writ petition is wholly misconceived, devoid
of merit and deserves to be dismissed, as the impugned
orders passed by the learned Maintenance Tribunal and
affirmed by the learned Appellate Tribunal are legal, justified
and based on proper appreciation of the material available
on record. It is submitted that respondent No. 3 is a widow
senior citizen aged about 95 years who has been residing in
the subject residential premises for the last several decades
and had approached the Tribunal under the provisions of the
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens
Act, 2007 only after being subjected to continuous
harassment, intimidation and interference by the petitioners
in her peaceful residence and dignity. Learned counsel
submits that before the Tribunal respondent No. 3 had
produced sufficient documentary material, including revenue
records, construction-related documents, labour payment
details, electricity bills standing in her name, affidavit of the
contractor,
financial
complaint/FIR
documents,
papers,
to
demand
establish
her
drafts
long
and
settled
possession over the premises, construction of the house
from her own funds and the fact that the petitioners were
merely permissive occupants who entered the premises only
in the year 2022 and thereafter started asserting illegal
rights over the property and harassing respondent No. 3. It
is further submitted that the petitioners are attempting to
convert welfare proceedings under the Act of 2007 into a
civil title dispute by raising issues regarding ownership and
demarcation of Khasra Nos. 1608/08 and 1608/10, whereas
the proceedings before the Tribunal were not for declaration
of title but for protection of a senior citizen from abuse,
neglect and unlawful interference in her residence. Learned
counsel would contend that the power to direct eviction is
incidental and necessary for effective enforcement of the
provisions of the Act of 2007 so as to secure peaceful
residence and dignity of senior citizens, and therefore the
contention of the petitioners that the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction to pass the eviction order is wholly untenable. It
is also submitted that even if any dispute regarding title or
extent of land is alleged by the petitioners, the same cannot
defeat the welfare jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal,
particularly when both the Tribunal and the Appellate
Tribunal have concurrently recorded findings of fact
regarding the long settled possession of respondent No. 3,
the permissive occupation of the petitioners and the
harassment caused to respondent No. 3. Learned counsel
further
submits
that
merely
because
the
petitioners
themselves claim to be senior citizens, no right accrues in
their favour to continue occupying the premises of
respondent No. 3 against her wishes or to subject her to
mental harassment and intimidation. It is thus argued that
the impugned orders do not suffer from any jurisdictional
error, perversity or violation of principles of natural justice
warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, and as such the writ petition deserves to be
dismissed with costs. Reliance has been placed upon the
various judgments like Urmila Dixit vs. Sunil Sharan Dixit
and Others 2025 INSC 20, Sunny Paul vs. State NCT of
Delhi (2017) 4 AIRDelR 257, Kamalakant Mishra vs.
Additional Collector & Ors. SLP(Civil) D. No. 42786/2025 &
Neeraj
Baghel
vs.
Collector
Raipur
(2023)
AIR
(Chhattisgarh) 70.
7.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
8.
The principal challenge in the present writ petition is to the
order dated 12/09/2024 passed by the Maintenance Tribunal
and the appellate order dated 25/11/2024 affirming the
same, whereby the petitioners have been directed to vacate
the portion of the residential house occupied by them, upon
the complaint made by respondent No. 3, who is the mother
of petitioner No. 1 and a senior citizen aged about 93 years.
The core submission of the petitioners is that the learned
Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to
direct eviction, particularly when the petitioners have raised
a dispute with regard to title and ownership over the
property in question and when, according to them,
respondent No. 3 is not the true owner of the house. The
petitioners have further sought to contend that the
proceedings under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents
and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (for short, “the Act of 2007”)
were not maintainable in the absence of a claim for
maintenance and that the dispute, being essentially one
concerning immovable property, could only be decided by a
competent civil Court.
9.
Having considered the rival submissions, this Court is
unable to persuade itself to accept the contentions
advanced on behalf of the petitioners. The Act of 2007 is a
beneficial and welfare-oriented legislation enacted with the
avowed object of ensuring maintenance, protection, dignity
and security of parents and senior citizens who, in the
evening of their lives, are often exposed to neglect, abuse,
harassment and deprivation even at the hands of their own
children and relatives. The provisions of the statute,
therefore,
have
to
receive
a
purposive
and
liberal
construction so as to advance the object sought to be
achieved by the legislation rather than to frustrate it by
adopting a narrow or hyper-technical approach.
10.
The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior
Citizens Act, 2007 (MWPSC Act, 2007) plays a crucial role
in promoting the well-being and dignity of senior citizens in
India. It provides a legal framework for ensuring financial
security, health care access and property protection for the
elderly. By holding children and relatives accountable for the
maintenance of their elderly family members, the act
discourages neglect, abandonment and abuse of senior
citizens. The Constitution of India also recognises the need
for State intervention in taking measures to create suitable
framework for the protection of elderly persons. As per the
Article 41 under Directive Principles of State Policy:“the
State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and
development, make effective provision for securing right to
work, to education and to public assistance in case of
unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement and in
other cases of undeserved want”.
11.
The Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is based on the vision of
Article 41 of the Constitution. It was enacted by the
Parliament to protect the rights and interests of senior
citizens and enable them to lead a life with dignity and
respect. It further aims to provide a comprehensive
framework for ensuring the well-being of senior citizens in
India. The parliament enacted the Senior Citizens Act to
uphold the dignity and respect of a senior citizen at the time
of old age. State had serious concern about the challenges
faced by the people in their old age. Apart from physical
vulnerabilities, they face emotional and psychological
challenges. On account of these frailties, they are totally
dependent. The
moral
laws
formulated
through
the
legislation is necessary to rationalise the well-being of all in
the society. The moral values that prevailed in the society in
the past have been accepted as universal values. The State
in its wisdom, considering the acceptance of these values,
seeks to promote the common good through the Senior
Citizens Act. These values carried duties and obligations.
The preamble of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents
and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 underscores the need for
effective provisions to secure the maintenance and welfare
of parents and senior citizens, as guaranteed under the
Constitution. Being a beneficial piece of legislation, it is
necessary to interpret it liberally to ensure that the intent of
the legislation is fulfilled and the rights and dignity of senior
citizens are effectively protected.
12.
The
Supreme
Court
in
S.
Vanitha
v.
Deputy
Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors., (2021)
15 SCC 730, while interpreting the provisions of the Act of
2007, recognized the statute as a social welfare legislation
intended to protect the maintenance and welfare of senior
citizens and observed that the remedies under the Act must
be construed in a manner that furthers the legislative
purpose of securing dignity, maintenance and protection to
elderly parents and senior citizens.
13.
Likewise, in Arun Kumar Nayyar v. State of Haryana &
Ors., (2022) 6 SCC 629, the Supreme Court reiterated that
the purpose of the enactment is to ensure that senior
citizens are not left destitute, neglected or at the mercy of
their children or relatives, and that the provisions of the Act
must be implemented in a manner consistent with its
beneficial object.
14.
It is true that the Act of 2007 is not a substitute for a civil suit
for declaration of title and that the Maintenance Tribunal
does not function as a civil Court for adjudication of complex
questions of ownership. However, that is not the true issue
which arose for determination before the Tribunal in the
present case. A careful reading of the application preferred
by respondent No. 3 before the Maintenance Tribunal would
show that her grievance was essentially one of harassment,
neglect, intimidation and disturbance of her peaceful
possession and residence in the house in which she has
admittedly been residing for decades. The relief sought by
her was in the nature of protection of her person and
residence against the petitioners, who, according to her, had
become a source of constant threat and mental harassment.
The proceedings before the Tribunal were, therefore, not in
the nature of a title suit, but were welfare proceedings
initiated by an aged mother seeking protection against the
conduct
of
her
son
and
daughter-in-law.
In
such
proceedings, the Tribunal was required to examine whether
respondent No. 3, being a senior citizen, had established a
case warranting protection of her residence and peaceful
enjoyment of the property, and whether the continuance of
the petitioners in the premises was inconsistent with such
protection.
15.
In Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi 2022 SCC OnLine SC
1684 in para 13, the Supreme Court made an observation
as under; (SCC OnLine SC para 6)
“14. When a senior citizen parts with his or
her property by executing a gift or a release
or otherwise in favour of his or her near and
dear ones, a condition of looking after the
senior citizen is not necessarily attached to it.
On the contrary, very often, such transfers
are made out of love and affection without
any expectation in return. Therefore, when it
is alleged that the conditions mentioned in
sub-section (1) of Section 23 are attached to
a transfer, existence of such conditions must
be established before the Tribunal.”
16.
The Supreme Court of India in the recent case of Urmila
Dixit vs. Sunil Sharan Dixit (2025) 2 SCC 787 the
Supreme Court clarified that Section 23 of Senior Citizens is
not a standalone provision, as Section 23 cannot be read in
isolation as it directly reflects the statutory purpose of
safeguarding senior citizens, thus demanding a purposive
approach. The court held, if a gift deed does not explicitly
mention maintenance, it should be interpreted pragmatically
to prevent neglect of the elderly. The Hon’ble Court
interpreted Section 23(1) of the Act to hold that express
condition in the deed may not be required and nonmaintenance of a senior citizen per se would result in
invoking the implied condition for which such gift or
settlement deed has been executed by the senior citizen out
of love and affection, which is relatable to human conduct. In
the said judgment, the Supreme Court further clarified the
scope of the Senior Citizens Act in paras 23, 24 and 25,
which reads as under : (SCC p. 796, paras 23-25)
“23. The appellant has submitted before us
that such an undertaking stands grossly
unfulfilled and in her petition under Section
23, it has been averred that there is a
breakdown of peaceful relations inter se the
parties.
In
such
a
situation,
the
two
conditions mentioned in Sudesh Chhikara
case6 must be appropriately interpreted to
further the beneficial nature of the legislation
and not strictly which would render otiose the
intent of the legislature. Therefore, the Single
Judge of the High Court and the Tribunals
below had rightly held the Gift Deed to be
cancelled since the conditions for the wellbeing of the senior citizens were not
complied with. We are unable to agree with
the view taken by the Division Bench,
because it takes a strict view of a beneficial
legislation.
24. Before parting with the case at hand, we
must clarify the observations made vide the
impugned order¹ qua the competency of the
Tribunal to hand over possession of the
property. In S. Vanitha v. Commr., (2021) 15
SCC 730, this Court observed that Tribunals
under the Act may order eviction if it is
necessary and expedient to ensure the
protection of the senior citizen. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the Tribunals constituted
under the Act, while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 23, cannot order possession to
be
transferred.
This
would
defeat
the
purpose and object of the Act, which is to
provide speedy, simple and inexpensive
remedies for the elderly.
25.Another observation of the High Court that
must be clarified, is Section 23 being a
standalone provision of the Act. In our
considered view, the relief available to senior
citizens under Section 23 is intrinsically
linked with the statement of objects and
reasons of the Act, that elderly citizens of our
country, in some cases, are not being looked
after. It is directly in furtherance of the
objectives of the Act and empowers senior
citizens to secure their rights promptly when
they transfer a property subject to the
condition
of
being
maintained
by
the
transferee.”
17.
Further, in the matter of Kamalakant Mishra vs. Additional
Collector and Others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2077, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the provisions of the Act of
2007 must be construed in a manner that meaningfully
protects the life, property and dignity of senior citizens, and
upheld the authority of the Tribunal/Appellate Authority to
secure eviction of children/legal heirs whose occupation had
become
detrimental
to
the
senior
citizens’ peaceful
enjoyment of their own property. The ratio emerging from the
aforesaid decisions is that the power of the Tribunal cannot
be reduced to a sterile power to merely award money;
where the facts justify, the Tribunal can grant effective relief
to secure the senior citizen’s right to live peacefully and with
dignity. Relevant para reads as under:“7. The framework of the Act clearly notes
that the law was enacted to address the
plight of older persons, for their care and
protection. Being a welfare legislation, its
provisions must be construed liberally so as
to advance its beneficent purpose. This
Court on several occasions has observed
that the Tribunal is well within its powers to
order eviction of a child or a relative from the
property of a senior citizen, when there is a
breach of the obligation to maintain the
senior citizen.2 In the present case, despite
being financially stable, the respondent has
acted in breach of his statutory obligations in
not allowing the appellant to reside in the
properties owned by him, thereby frustrating
the very object of the Act. High Court fell in
error in allowing the writ petition on a
completely untenable ground.”
18.
In the considered opinion of this Court, once the
proceedings are viewed in the correct statutory perspective,
the principal argument of the petitioners that the Tribunal
could not have passed an order of eviction merely because
title is disputed, loses much of its force. It is now well settled
that the jurisdiction exercised by the authorities under the
Act of 2007 is not confined to directing payment of a monthly
amount by way of maintenance, but extends to passing such
incidental, ancillary and consequential directions as may be
necessary to secure the maintenance, protection, residence
and dignity of a senior citizen.
19.
In S. Vanitha (supra), the Supreme Court observed that the
Tribunal under the Act of 2007 may, where necessary and
expedient, mould relief so as to protect the senior citizen
and ensure that the statutory object is not defeated.
20.
The legal position, as narrated in the aforementioned
paragraphs, in the context of the principles laid down by the
Supreme Court of India and High Courts, makes it clear that
the conditions under Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act
need not be explicit, but might be implied. The love and
affection being the consideration, which can be traced out in
the settlement deed, would be sufficient to hold that such
love and affection is an implied condition that the senior
citizen will be taken care of by the beneficiary of the
settlement deed or gift deed. In the event of neglecting the
senior citizen, the deed of settlement or gift is liable to be
annulled.
21.
In the present case, the material placed on record shows
that respondent No. 3 is an aged widow and a senior citizen.
The Tribunal has recorded a finding, on appreciation of the
documentary material produced before it, that respondent
No. 3 has been residing in the subject premises for a
considerable length of time and that the petitioners were
occupying a portion thereof in circumstances which did not
confer upon them any independent indefeasible right to
continue against the wishes of respondent No. 3. The reply
and documents filed by respondent No. 3 before the
Tribunal, as noticed in the impugned order and reiterated
before this Court, included revenue records, electricity bills,
construction-related documents, affidavit of the contractor,
financial documents and complaints/FIR papers. The
Appellate Tribunal has independently considered the same
and affirmed the findings recorded by the Maintenance
Tribunal. Thus, what emerges is that both the statutory
authorities, upon appreciation of the material available
before them, have concurrently accepted the case of
respondent No. 3 regarding her possession, residence and
the need for protection under the Act.
22.
At this stage, it would be apposite to note that the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution,
while examining orders passed by statutory authorities
under a welfare legislation, is supervisory and not appellate.
This Court does not sit in appeal over the factual
appreciation undertaken by the Tribunal and the Appellate
Tribunal. Interference would be warranted only if the
impugned orders are shown to suffer from patent lack of
jurisdiction, perversity, violation of principles of natural
justice or manifest error apparent on the face of the record.
Merely because another view may also be possible on facts,
this Court would not substitute its own appreciation for that
of the statutory authorities, particularly where the authorities
have concurrently recorded findings on the basis of material
placed before them. In the present case, the petitioners
have not been able to demonstrate that the findings
recorded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the Appellate
Tribunal are perverse or based on no evidence.
23.
Much emphasis was laid by learned counsel for the
petitioners on the plea that respondent No. 3 is not the
owner of the property and that the authorities have
proceeded only on the basis of mutation entries in her
favour. In this regard, there can be no quarrel with the
proposition that mutation by itself does not confer title over
immovable property and is primarily meant for fiscal
purposes. Equally, there can be no dispute that questions of
title, if seriously and substantially raised, are to be finally
adjudicated by a competent civil Court. However, in the facts
of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that
the issue of title sought to be projected by the petitioners
does not render the proceedings before the Tribunal nonmaintainable for more than one reason. First, the relief
granted by the Tribunal was not a declaration of ownership
in favour of respondent No. 3, but a protective direction
under the Act of 2007 to secure her peaceful residence and
dignity. Secondly, even according to the petitioners, the
house in question is a common residential structure
standing over Khasra Nos. 1608/08 and 1608/10 and
respondent No. 3 is admittedly residing therein. Thirdly, the
mere pendency of mutation appeal under Section 44 of the
Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, or the assertion of title
by petitioner No. 2 on the basis of a sale deed, would not
denude the Tribunal of its welfare jurisdiction to protect a
senior citizen from harassment and to secure her residence.
At the highest, such disputes may remain open for
adjudication before the competent civil/revenue forum, but
they cannot be permitted to obstruct the statutory protection
available to respondent No. 3 under the Act of 2007.
24.
The argument that since respondent No. 3 is receiving
pension and had not sought monthly maintenance, the very
proceedings under the Act of 2007 were not maintainable,
also
does
not
merit
acceptance.
The
concept
of
“maintenance” under the Act is not to be understood in a
narrow monetary sense alone. The statute is designed to
secure not merely financial support but also the broader
welfare of parents and senior citizens, which includes food,
residence, protection and the ability to live in peace and
dignity. A senior citizen who is financially secure may yet be
subjected to harassment, coercion, abuse or unlawful
interference in her residence by her children or relatives,
and it would be wholly contrary to the object of the Act to
hold that in such a situation she is remediless merely
because she does not seek a quantified amount of monthly
maintenance. The legislative concern is with maintenance
and welfare in a holistic sense. If the continuance of the
petitioners in the premises is found by the Tribunal to be
destructive of the senior citizen’s peace, safety and dignity,
the Tribunal cannot be rendered powerless merely because
the senior citizen is in receipt of pension.
25.
The further submission of the petitioners that petitioner Nos.
1 and 2 are themselves senior citizens and therefore could
not have been directed to vacate, is equally misconceived.
The Act of 2007 protects senior citizens from neglect and
abuse. It does not create a superior or overriding right in
favour of one senior citizen to occupy the residential
premises of another senior citizen against the latter’s
wishes. The status of the petitioners as senior citizens may
be a relevant circumstance in assessing equities, but it does
not confer upon them an indefeasible right to remain in
occupation of premises if their occupation is found to be
inconsistent with the right of respondent No. 3 to live
peacefully and securely. The Tribunal and the Appellate
Tribunal have proceeded on the factual premise that
respondent No. 3, an aged widow, had approached the
statutory forum because of persistent harassment and
interference caused by the petitioners. Once that factual
foundation is accepted, the mere age of the petitioners
cannot by itself operate as a bar to the relief granted.
26.
Learned counsel for the petitioners also assailed the
impugned orders on the ground of procedural irregularity,
contending that the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC
filed by the petitioners was not separately decided, that the
procedure contemplated under Rule 10 of the Chhattisgarh
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens
Rules, 2009 regarding conciliation was not followed, and
that no proper enquiry as contemplated under Sections 5(3)
and 8(1) of the Act was held. Having gone through the
orders impugned and the pleadings placed on record, this
Court is unable to hold that any such infraction has
occasioned failure of justice so as to warrant interference
under Article 226. Proceedings before the Tribunal under the
Act of 2007 are summary in nature and are not required to
conform to the technicalities of a civil suit. The non-disposal
of an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, by itself,
would not vitiate the final order if the objections raised
therein
have,
in
substance,
been
considered
while
adjudicating the main case. In the present case, the
principal objections raised by the petitioners namely, want of
title of respondent No. 3, maintainability of the application,
and absence of jurisdiction to order eviction have all been
dealt with by the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal while
rendering the final decision. As regards conciliation, though
Rule 10 contemplates an attempt at settlement, such
provision is directory and intended to facilitate amicable
resolution where feasible; its non-invocation in a given case
would not ipso facto render the proceedings void,
particularly when the parties were heard, replies were filed,
documents were produced and the matter was decided on
merits. No material prejudice is shown to have been caused
to the petitioners on account of the alleged non-compliance.
27.
This Court also does not find any substance in the plea that
since respondent No. 3 is residing on the ground floor and
the petitioners on the first floor, no issue of denial of
residence or welfare could arise. The right protected by the
Act of 2007 is not merely a right to a roof over one’s head in
the abstract; it is a right to live in peace, security and dignity,
free
from
intimidation,
harassment
and
coercive
interference. A senior citizen may well be physically residing
in a portion of the house and yet be exposed to a hostile and
oppressive atmosphere created by children or relatives
occupying another portion of the same house. Whether such
a situation exists in a given case is essentially a matter of
factual assessment. The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal,
after considering the pleadings, complaints and material
placed on record, have accepted the version of respondent
No. 3 that the continuance of the petitioners in the premises
was inimical to her peaceful living. This Court does not find
any perversity in such conclusion.
28.
The reliance placed by the petitioners upon their own police
complaint against the younger son of respondent No. 3, and
the allegation that the proceedings have been initiated at his
behest to dispossess the petitioners, also does not advance
the petitioners’ case. At best, the said material discloses that
there are inter se disputes within the family. Such disputes,
however, do not eclipse the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to
examine the complaint of respondent No. 3 on its own
merits. The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal were
conscious
of
the
competing
allegations
and,
upon
appreciation of the material, have chosen to accept the case
of respondent No. 3. This Court cannot re-appreciate such
disputed factual issues in exercise of writ jurisdiction as
though sitting in appeal over the findings of the authorities.
29.
Another aspect which deserves emphasis is that the
petitioners have attempted to read Section 23 of the Act in
an unduly restrictive manner. While it is true that Section 23
specifically deals with transfer of property by a senior citizen
subject to the condition of providing basic amenities and
physical needs, the present case cannot be decided by
isolating Section 23 from the broader scheme of the Act.
The Tribunal in a given case may exercise jurisdiction to
secure maintenance and protection of a senior citizen even
where the matter is not confined to cancellation of a transfer
under Section 23, provided the relief granted bears nexus to
the statutory object of maintenance, welfare and protection.
The Supreme Court decisions referred to above clearly
underscore that the Act of 2007 is not to be reduced to a
mere debt-recovery mechanism for monthly allowance; it is
a welfare statute intended to secure meaningful protection to
elderly persons. Once the factual foundation of neglect,
harassment and threat to peaceful residence is established,
the Tribunal is not powerless to grant effective relief.
30.
Insofar as the petitioners have sought to invoke Article 300A
of the Constitution and contend that they are being deprived
of property without authority of law, this Court is unable to
accept the submission in the facts of the present case. The
impugned orders have not been passed dehors law; they
have been passed by statutory authorities constituted under
the Act of 2007 in exercise of jurisdiction vested in them by a
welfare legislation. The petitioners have been heard in the
proceedings; they filed reply, documents and appeal; and
the matter has been adjudicated by two forums. If the
petitioners claim an independent title over any part of the
property, it is always open to them to avail appropriate
remedies before the competent civil forum in accordance
with law. But so long as the impugned orders are traceable
to statutory power exercised for protection of a senior citizen
and do not suffer from perversity or jurisdictional error, the
challenge on the basis of Article 300A cannot be accepted.
31.
On an overall consideration of the matter, this Court is of the
view that the controversy sought to be projected by the
petitioners as a pure title dispute is, in substance, an
attempt to dislodge the concurrent findings recorded by the
Tribunal
and
the Appellate
Tribunal
in
proceedings
undertaken for the welfare and protection of an aged mother
under the Act of 2007. The material on record demonstrates
that respondent No. 3 is a senior citizen who approached
the statutory forum alleging harassment and interference in
her peaceful residence. The Tribunal, after considering the
rival material, granted relief in her favour and the Appellate
Tribunal, upon independent consideration, affirmed the
same. The petitioners have failed to make out any case of
jurisdictional error, perversity, violation of natural justice or
manifest illegality so as to warrant interference by this Court
in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
32.
Consequently, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition.
The same deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. The
order dated 12/09/2024 passed by the learned Maintenance
Tribunal, Bilaspur, as affirmed by the appellate order dated
25/11/2024 passed by the District Magistrate-cum-Presiding
Officer, Appellate Tribunal, Bilaspur, does not call for
interference.
33.
No order as to costs.
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Vishakha
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