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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Extraordinary Jurisdiction)
DATED : 2nd November, 2018
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH : THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Petitioners
:
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
versus
Respondents
:
State of Sikkim and Others
Application under Article 226
of the Constitution of India
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. A. Moulik, Senior Advocate with Mrs. K. D. Bhutia, Advocate for
the Petitioners.
Mr. J. B. Pradhan, Additional Advocate General with Mr. Thinlay
Dorjee, Government Advocate, Mr. S. K. Chettri, Mrs. Pollin Rai,
Assistant Government Advocates and Mr. D. K. Siwakoti, Advocate
for Respondent No.1.
Mr. Jorgay Namka, Ms. Panila Theengh, Ms. Tashi Doma Sherpa and
Mr. Karma Sonam Lhendup, Advocates for Respondent No.2.
Mr. Bhushan Nepal, Advocate for Respondents No.3 to 5.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
The Petitioners, crying foul, are before this Court
exhorting that the Respondents No.3, 4 and 5 ought not to be
allotted stalls in the ground floor of the “Non-Veg.” building for the
purpose of selling Fish, dressed Chicken and Mutton as it would
sound the death knell for similar business being run by the
Petitioners on the first floor.
It is reasoned that the ground floor
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
being easily accessible to customers would deter them from taking
the walk up to the first floor when similar goods are available at a
convenient location at the same price. It is also the averment of the
Petitioners that the stalls now allotted to the said Respondents had
infact been earmarked for construction of toilets for use of the
vendors, workers and the customers of the said building but has
instead been allotted to the Respondents without adherence of the
tender process and turning a blind eye to the hygiene conditions in
the building.
2.
The facts leading to the instant Petition are summarised
hereinbelow.
The Petitioners are local vendors in the business of
selling dressed Chicken, Mutton and Fish from their stalls in the first
floor
of
a
building
known
as
the
“Non-Veg.”
building
“Khanchanjunga Shopping Complex” since the year 2006.
at
It is
asserted that they have been in the business since the last 60 years
viz.; when the Old Lal Market, Gangtok, was functioning from tinsheds. Subsequently the Khanchanjunga Shopping Complex was
constructed with structures known as the “Veg.” and “Non-Veg.”
buildings. Twenty-seven stalls each in the ground and first floor of
the “Non-Veg.” building are allotted for the business of selling meat,
inasmuch as live and dressed Chicken, Mutton and Fish are sold on
the first floor, known as the “Fish Market”, while Beef, Buffen and
Pork are sold on the ground floor.
The business is the means of
livelihood of the Petitioners with which they provide for their
families.
That one hundred and eighty people including the stall
owners work in the said stalls sans provision for toilets since the
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vs. State of Sikkim and Others
year 2006, resulting in unhygienic conditions including foul smell
emanating in the vicinity of the complex consequent to the outside
area being utilised by people to ease themselves.
Vacant space
available on the ground floor adjacent to the staircase leading to the
shops of the Petitioners was utilised temporarily by them for
disposing garbage. The Petitioners had requested for construction of
toilets
in
the
said
vacant
space
towards
which
a
sum
of
Rs.7,32,600/- (Rupees seven lakhs, thirty two thousand and six
hundred) only, was approved by Respondent No.1 but construction
was not initiated despite assurances by the said Respondent.
In
April 2016, the much awaited construction commenced and the
Petitioners were informed that this would be utilised as toilets while
a portion thereof would be utilised for garbage disposal.
Upon
completion in January 2017, the stalls were instead allotted to the
Respondents No.3, 4 and 5 for running meat shops by arbitrary
selection, bypassing the tender or selection process.
3.
In the said circumstances, the prayers enumerated in
the Petition are as follows;
“(i)
A Rule upon the respondent nos.1 and 2 and each of
them to show-cause as to why orders/agreements/
allotment of shops in favour of respondent nos.3 to 5
and trade licence of such shops in their respective
names be not cancelled and upon hearing the parties
to make the Rule absolute;
(ii)
A writ or order or direction or declaration that the
space on the ground floor adjacent to staircase leading
to first floor which place was used by the petitioners for
dumping garbage shall not be allotted to the
respondent nos.3 to 5 or to any other persons to use it
as shop(s). In the event allotment has already been
made to respondent nos. 3 to 5 then all such
allotments including agreements if any be cancelled;
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
(iii) A writ or order or direction or declaration against the
respondent nos.1 and 2 that the newly constructed
concrete structure shall be converted into public toilet
by dismantling inner structures and toilets and garbage
room be constructed in the said newly constructed
structure for user by public and petitioners;
(iv) A writ or order or direction or declaration that the
allotment of the shops in the names of respondent
nos.3 to 5 issued by UD&HD stands cancelled and the
same space shall be converted into public toilet and
garbage room;
(v)
A writ or order or direction or declaration that the
licence issued to respondent nos.3 to 5 by Gangtok
Municipal corporation/respondent no.2 for running
meat shops in the newly constructed rooms on the
ground floor similar to those of the petitioners shall
stand cancelled and the said stalls/shops be converted
into public toilet and for garbage room;
(vi) A writ or order or direction or declaration that the
space and the construction on the ground floor
attached to the staircase leading to first floor shall not
be allotted to anyone in future and shall stand reserved
for public toilet and garbage bin;
(vii) A writ or order or direction or declaration that no
shop(s) of any item be allowed to run in the newly
constructed rooms in the ground floor of the Non-Veg.
building attached to the staircase leading to the first
floor;
(viii) Costs of the proceedings;
(ix) Any other writ/writs, order, direction as this Hon‟ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of
justice.”
4.
The
State-Respondent No.1
through the
Additional
Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Department (UD&HD),
by
filing
Counter-Affidavit
would
aver
that
the
Respondent
Department in 2016 on receipt of request for allotment of stalls in
the Non-Veg. building could identify no vacant space in the Fish
Market which already had thirty meat stalls, but found space in the
ground floor and accordingly allotted it to the Respondents No.3, 4
and 5. That, the grievances of the Petitioners are not genuine and
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
bona fide as by filing the Writ Petition they seek to restrain others
from entering into the business which they intend to monopolise. In
any event, construction of toilets and garbage disposal in the vacant
space now allotted to the Respondents No.3, 4 and 5 was discarded
in view of the hygiene conditions, as the utilities would be adjacent
to the Fish Market. Besides, the Department has constructed toilets
for the public on the ground floor of an adjacent Hotel which has
compartments for ladies and gents as also bathing space at a
distance of about 40-50 metres away from the Non-Veg. building
making it easily accessible.
A Central Garbage Collection area has
also been provided near the Non-Veg. building. The Petition being
motivated
with
the
purpose
of
discouraging
competitors,
be
dismissed.
5.
The Respondent No.2 in its Counter-Affidavit through
the Municipal Commissioner denied the allegations made by the
Petitioners
and
submitted
that
the
preamble
of
the
Sikkim
Municipalities Act, 2007, in clear terms specifies that municipal
governance is to be in conformity with the provisions of the
Constitution of India and based on the principles inter alia of
participation to improve the quality of life of the urban dwellers of
Sikkim. That, any individual or organisation that fulfils the criteria
as laid down for issuance of a Trade Licence will and must be issued
a Trade Licence.
The Petitioners having fulfilled the criteria were
issued the Trade Licence by the Respondent No.2.
6.
The Respondents No.3 to 5 filed a joint Counter-Affidavit
admitting that presently they are running a business of fish and
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
chicken in the space allotted to them below the staircase leading to
the Fish Market of the Non-Veg. building with no violation of any law
in such allotment. Pursuant to the allotment they have been issued
Trade Licences. The Writ Petition is thus liable to be dismissed on
the ground that the Petitioner has no locus standi to canvass the
legality or correctness of the action taken by the Respondent No.1 in
allotting premises to the Respondents as the Petitioners‟ case is not
that they had sought for allotment of the premises now allotted to
the Respondents. The prayer of the Petitioners is in violation of the
fundamental rights guaranteed to the Respondents under Article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. That, the grounds set out by
the Petitioners are not sustainable in the eyes of law and hence the
Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed outright.
7.
In
Rejoinder,
the
Petitioners
would
dispute
the
contention of the Respondent No.1 that the toilets cannot be allowed
in the Non-Vegetarian Complex due to hygiene considerations as
toilets exists on each floor of the adjacent Veg. building.
The
averment that an accessible toilet has been constructed nearby is
erroneous, since it is at a distance of 300 feet away from the
building where the Petitioners‟ stalls are located.
Moreover, when
the space was allotted to the Respondents No.3, 4 and 5 exclusively
for the purpose of selling “dry items” it is not conceivable as to how
the Trade Licence was granted for selling meat.
8.
Mr. A. Moulik, Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners
while drawing the attention of this Court to the averments made in
the Petition submitted that Representations were made to the Chief
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Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
Minister in 2016 and 2017 and to the Secretary, UD&HD in 2016,
objecting to the allotment of stalls to the Respondents No.3, 4 and 5
inter alia on the grounds that allotment of such shops for the same
business on the ground floor would adversely affect the Petitioners‟
business.
The Chief Minister endorsed the representation to the
concerned Department to examine the matter in public interest and
the Department in sum and substance agreed to incorporate the
“Swachh Bharat Abhiyan” in the Non-Veg. building which however
remained unimplemented. Meanwhile, three rooms constructed on
the ground floor came to be allotted to the Respondents No.3, 4 and
5 for selling dry items, however, contrary to the terms of allotment
Trade Licence was issued for sale of meat. That, even if the Licence
is for sale of dry items the Petitioners remain aggrieved as the space
had been identified for use as toilets.
It is suggested that if the
Government
accommodate
Respondents
seek
to
the
Private
Respondents, allotment of some stalls can be made on the roof of
the building above the stalls of the Petitioners thereby causing no
negative effect on the Petitioners‟ business. That, the policy adopted
by the State-Respondents is against the principles of fair play,
justice and equity and the right to life and means of livelihood of the
Petitioners have been jeopardised at the whims and caprice of the
Respondents. Relying on the decision of Sub-Divisional Inspector of
Post, Vaikam and Others, etc.
vs. Theyyam Joseph, etc.1, Learned
Senior Counsel would submit that welfare measures are required to
be taken by the State and directive principles of the State Policy
enjoin upon the State Government duties under Part IV of the
AIR 1996 SC 1271
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
Constitution of India.
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
Hence, being a welfare State it is the
responsibility of the Respondent No.1 to provide proper facilities for
basic amenities such as toilets.
Attention of this Court was also
invited to the ratio in A. P. Pollution Control Board II vs. Prof. M. V.
Nayudu (RETD.) and Others
and it was urged that in the said matter
it was found that drinking water is of primary importance in any
country and India was a party to the Resolution of the UNO passed
during the United Nations Water conference in 1977, wherein it was
held that as drinking water is fundamental to life a duty is cast on
the State under Article 21 to provide clean drinking water to its
citizens. Similarly, in the matter at hand it is clear that hygienic and
clean surroundings are fundamental to life and the State is
responsible under Article 21 to provide such surroundings and to
ensure that there is no environmental pollution in view of the large
number of persons attending to natures call outside the Non-Veg.
building.
That, in Tamil Nadu Centre for Public Interest Litigation,
represented by K. K. Ramesh vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another
the
Supreme Court while considering the deaths of farmers in Tamil
Nadu would observe that the State stands on the position of a loco
parentis to the citizens and it was obligatory on the part of the State
to express concern and sensitivity to do the needful.
The same
attitude needs to be adopted by the State-Respondents in the
instant matter towards the Petitioners.
Further, Senior Counsel
would also rely on Danial Latifi and Another vs. Union of India4 and
contend that the concept of right to life and liberty guaranteed
(2001) 2 SCC 62
(2017) 6 SCC 734
(2001) 7 SCC 740
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India would include the right
to live with dignity which the Petitioners have been deprived of as
the absence of toilets in the Non-Veg. building causes them
immense inconvenience.
That, allotment of three stalls in the
ground floor where the toilets ought to have been constructed is in
abrogation of the fundamental rights of the Petitioners to a clean,
healthy and hygienic environment.
Invoking the doctrine of
legitimate expectation and Promissory Estoppel Learned Senior
Counsel would canvass that funds for construction of toilets had
been
sanctioned
and
the
plan
approved,
hence
after
the
construction the State-Respondent ought not to have altered the
plan of utilisation of the space as toilets.
That apart, the Private
Respondents failed to obtain any permission from the Animal
Husbandry Department before the Respondent No.2 issued Licences
to them for selling Fish and meat, therefore the Licences have been
obtained contrary to established practice. Hence, the prayers in the
Petition be granted.
9.
The contra arguments of Learned Additional Advocate
General were that the Petitioners are not entitled to make
unreasonable demands to prevent the Private Respondents from
carrying on trade for their livelihood as they are also citizens of the
country and equally entitled to the right to livelihood as manifest in
Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The
Petitioners in the garb of objecting to non-construction of the toilets
are infact urging that allotment of stalls ought not to be made to the
Private Respondents for selling meat.
This would tantamount to
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
depriving the Private Respondents of their right to livelihood when
no Statute debars them from running a business in the country.
That, Respondent No.1 is infact the allotting authority and the
Respondent No.2 is the authority who issues Licences. There is no
restriction on the powers of the Respondent No.2 to issue Licence on
assessment of the requirements of the Petitioners who are entitled
to make a living.
There is no illegality on the issuance of the
Licence and the Petition reflects the utter selfishness of the
Petitioners in depriving the Respondents No.3, 4 and 5 to earn
income, on this count Learned Additional Advocate General would
rely on Mithilesh Garg and Others vs. Union of India and Others5. That
the ratio clearly lays down that Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution
guarantees to all citizens the right to practice any profession or to
carry on any occupation, trade or business subject to reasonable
restrictions imposed by the State under Article 19(6) of the
Constitution. Hence, the Petitioners herein being private individuals
cannot seek to impose any restrictions on the issuance of Licence or
the carrying on of the business or any other restriction which the
State Legislature has opted not to as it is only the State which can
impose reasonable restrictions within the ambit of Article 19(6) of
the Constitution.
That the Petitioners have no locus standi under
Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the issuance of Licence
since no right vested on the Petitioners have been infringed.
That,
in Nataraja Agencies vs. The Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and
Natural Gas, Government of India, New Delhi and Others
(1992) 1 SCC 168
2005 (1) Current Tamil Nadu Cases (CTC) 394 : MANU/TN/1588/2004
the Division
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
Bench of the Madras High Court has categorically stated that a rival
businessman cannot file a Writ Petition challenging the setting up of
a similar unit by another businessman on the ground that
establishing a rival business close to his business place would
adversely affect business interest, even if the setting up of the new
unit is in violation of law.
That, merely because the Petitioners
apprehend a shift of allegiance of their customers to rival retail
dealers does not mean that public interest will suffer, to the
contrary it will benefit the consumers because when there is
competition, businessmen are compelled to provide better quality
products at reasonable rates. Therefore, the Petition deserves a
dismissal.
10.
Learned Counsel for the Respondents No.2 and 3, 4 and
5 would submit that they endorse the arguments made by Learned
Additional Advocate General.
Learned Counsel for Respondent No.2
would add that there are no Rules whatsoever that require the
Respondent No.2 to obtain permission from the Animal Husbandry
Department for issuance of Licence for sale of meat and fish. That
the Respondent No.2 is empowered to issue such Licences after due
assessment as per its own Rules. Besides, the Petitioner has failed
to show by way of any documentary evidence that either such Rules
exists or that has such practice been followed.
11.
The submissions put forth by Learned Counsel were
heard at length.
pleadings,
the
I have carefully perused and considered the
entire
documents
Judgments cited at the Bar.
appended,
as
well
as
the
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
12.
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
The question that arises for determination is whether
the Respondents No.3, 4 and 5 can be restrained by the Petitioners
from carrying on the business of selling meat in the allotted space in
view of the Petitioners‟ assertion that the State-Respondents are
estopped
from
allotting
stalls
and
Licence
to
the
Private
Respondents, having promised construction of toilets therein in
addition to which such allotment and sale thereof would adversely
affect their business.
13.
Article 19 of the Constitution lists a group of rights from
Clause (a) to Clause (g) which are recognised as fundamental rights.
Article 19(1)(g) extends to every citizen the right to practice any
profession or to carry on any occupation trade or business.
The
rights enumerated under Article 19 are recognised as natural rights
and although they may have different underlying philosophies, the
consistent common thread however is that the State is empowered
to impose restrictions to achieve certain objects.
In other words,
although Article 19 of the Constitution assures citizens of the rights
enumerated therein the rights cannot be absolute, uncontrolled or
wholly free from restraint, they are indeed subject to reasonable
restrictions as may be deemed necessary by the Government as
essential for safety, health, peace, decency and order of the
community.
The Constitution thus seeks to strike a balance
between individual liberty and social control.
If the restriction
imposed is greater than permitted under Clause (2) to Clause (6) of
Article 19 of the Constitution the Courts will necessarily declare the
same as unconstitutional, as imposition of restrictions limit a
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
person‟s
enjoyment
to
the
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
rights
guaranteed.
It
may
be
emphasised that violation of the fundamental rights of one individual
by another, without State support is not envisaged in the ambit of
Article 19. In this context, we may looked into the observation of
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Hans Raj Kehar and Others vs. The State
of U.P. and Others
where it was held that;
“8.
The contention that the impugned
notification is violative of the rights of the appellants
under Article 19(1)(f) or (g) of the Constitution is
equally devoid of force. There is nothing in the
notification which prevents the appellants from
acquiring, holding and disposing of their property or
prevents them from practising any profession or from
carrying on any occupation, trade or business. The fact
that some others have also been enabled to obtain
permits for running buses cannot constitute a
violation of the appellants' rights under the above two
clauses of Article 19 of the Constitution. The above
provisions are not intended to grant a kind of
monopoly to a few bus operators to the exclusion of
other eligible persons. No right is guaranteed to any
private party by Article 19 of the Constitution of
carrying on trade and business without competition
from other eligible persons. Clause (g) of Article 19(1)
gives a right to all citizens subject to Article 19(6) to
practice any profession or to carry on any occupation,
trade or business. It is an enabling provision and does
not confer a right on those already practising a
profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or
business to exclude and debar fresh eligible entrants
from practising that profession or from carrying on
that occupation, trade or business. The said provision
is not intended to make any profession, business or
trade the exclusive preserve of a few persons. We,
therefore, find no valid basis for holding that the
impugned provisions are violative of Article 19.”
[emphasis supplied]
14.
In The Nagar Rice and Flour Mills and Others vs. N.
Teekappa Gowda & Bros. and Others
the Supreme Court would
observe as follows;
“9.
……………. The right to carry on business
being a fundamental right under Art.19(1)(g) of the
Constitution, its exercise is subject only to the
restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the
general public under Article 19(6)(i).”
AIR 1975 SC 389
AIR 1971 SC 246
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
15.
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
In T. B. Ibrahim, Proprietor, Bus Stand, Tanjore vs. The
Regional Transport Authoirty, Tanjore
the Supreme Court emphasised
that reasonable restrictions can be put in place by the government
and would elucidate as hereinunder;
“13. The next contention was that the order is
repugnant to Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution,
according to which all citizens must have the right to
practise any profession or to carry on any occupation,
trade or business. It cannot be denied that the
appellant has not been prohibited from carrying on the
business of running a bus-stand. What has been
prohibited is that the bus-stand existing on the
particular site being unsuitable from the point of view
of public convenience, it cannot be used for picking up
or setting down passengers from that stand for outstations journeys. But there is certainly no prohibition
for the bus-stand being used otherwise for carrying
passengers from the stand into the town, and „‟viceversa‟. The restriction placed upon the use of the busstand for the purpose of picking up or setting down
passengers to outward journeys cannot be considered
to be an unreasonable restriction.
It may be that the appellant by reason of the
shifting of the bus-stand has been deprived of the
income he used to enjoy when the bus-stand was used
for outward journeys from Tanjore, but that can be no
ground for the contention that there has been an
infringement of any fundamental right within the
meaning of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. There is
no fundamental right in a citizen to carry on business
wherever he chooses and his right must be subject to
any reasonable restriction imposed by the executive
authority in the interest of public convenience. ………..”
16.
In Harman Singh and Others vs. Regional Transport
Authority, Calcutta Region and Others
, it was observed that;
“8.
The next contention of Mr. Choudhry that
the introduction of small taxis in the streets of Calcutta
will bring about a total stoppage of the existing motor
taxi cab business of large taxi owners in a commercial
sense and would thus be an infringement of the
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution is again without force. Article 19(1)(g)
declares that all citizens have the right to practise any
profession, to carry on any occupation, trade or
business. Nobody has denied to the appellants the right
AIR 1953 SC 79
AIR 1954 SC 190
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
to carry on their own occupation and to ply their taxis.
This article does not guarantee a monopoly to a
particular individual or association to carry on any
occupation and if other persons are also allowed the
right to carry on the same occupation and an element
of competition is introduced in the business, that does
not, in the absence of any bad faith on the part of the
authorities, amount to a violation of the fundamental
right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution. Under the Motor Vehicles Act it is in the
discretion of the Regional Transport Authority to issue
permits at different rates of tariff to different classes of
vehicles plying in the streets of Calcutta and if that
power is exercised in a „bona fide‟ manner by the
Regional Transport Authority for the benefit of the
citizens of Calcutta, then the mere circumstance that
by grant of licence at different tariff rates to holders of
different taxis and different classes of vehicles some of
the existing licence holders are affected cannot bring
the case under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.”
[emphasis supplied]
17.
All the decisions of the Supreme Court extracted
hereinabove are indicative of the fact that every person is entitled to
practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or
business as provided under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and
no one can monopolise a business. Merely because one individual
apprehends loss of business on the entry of another person into the
same business does not clothe him with powers to expect the State
to intervene and impose restrictions on the new entrant. It follows
that, the exercise of a fundamental right by an individual is equal for
all thus one individual cannot infringe or deter another from
exercising his exact same right, unless and until reasonable
restriction as found essential by the State are in place.
“reasonable restrictions”
decisions
The term
has been elucidated in a plethora of
of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and connotes that the
restriction imposed on the exercise of the right must have
reasonable relation to the object which the legislature seeks to
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
achieve and ought not to be in excess thereof or arbitrary.
Laxmi Khandsari and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others
In M/s.
it was held
that the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the
underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and
urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion
of the imposition, the prevailing condition at the time should all
enter into the judicial verdict.
18.
That having been said the sweep of Article 21 of the
Constitution would necessarily have to be looked into. This Article
mandates that no person shall be deprived of his life and personal
liberty
except
according
to
procedure
established
by
law.
Enjoyment of quality life by a person is the essence of the right
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, which means not
merely survival or animal existence, but the right to live with human
dignity and thereby includes all issues of life which involve the
making of a meaningful and complete life. Obviously these facets of
the right can only be achieved by means of a proper livelihood, thus
the right to livelihood is an integral part of the right to life under
Article 21 and cannot be infringed by withholding the means of
livelihood by any process whatsoever. The action of the State is to
be based on reasonableness and cannot deprive the basic human
rights afforded under the Constitution. It also includes the right of a
citizen to carry on business wherever he chooses or at any time
subject to ofcourse to reasonable restrictions imposed by the
Executive in the interest of public convenience.
AIR 1981 SC 873
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
19.
and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
In Olga Tellis and Others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation
the Supreme Court while discussing the right to life
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and consequently the
right to livelihood held as follows;
“32. As we have stated while summing up the
petitioners' case, the main plank of their argument is
that the right to life which is guaranteed by Article 21
includes the right to livelihood and since, they will be
deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from
their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is
tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence
unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will
assume the factual correctness of the premise that if
the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they
will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that
assumption, the question which we have to consider is
whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood.
We see only one answer to that question, namely, that
it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by
Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean
merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away
as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the
death sentence, except according to procedure
established by law. That is but one aspect of the right
to life. An equally important facet of that right is the
right to livelihood because, no person can live without
the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If
the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the
constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving
a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of
his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such
deprivation would not only denude the life of its
effective content and meaningfulness but it would
make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation
would not have to be in accordance with the procedure
established by law, if the right to livelihood is not
regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone
makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life
livable, must be deemed to be an integral component
of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to
livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life.
…………………… So unimpeachable is the evidence of the
nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They
have to eat to live: Only a handful can afford the
luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat,
only if they have the means of livelihood. That is the
context in which it was said by Douglas, J.
in Baksey [347 US 442, 472 : 98 L Ed 829 (1954)] that the
right to work is the most precious liberty that man
possesses. It is the most precious liberty because, it
(1985) 3 SCC 545
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life
is a precious freedom. “Life”, as observed by Field, J.
in Munn v. Illinois [(1877) 94 US 113] means something
more than mere animal existence and the inhibition
against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits
and faculties by which life is enjoyed. This observation
was quoted with approval by this Court in Kharak
Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332
: (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329].
33. ………………….. But, any person, who is
deprived of his right to livelihood except according to
just and fair procedure established by law, can
challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life
conferred by Article 21.”
[emphasis supplied]
20.
The fulcrum of the Petitioners‟ prayer is to ensure that
the Private Respondents are not allotted stalls in the Non-Veg.
building as also Licence to sell meat therefrom, inter alia on grounds
that it would affect the Petitioners‟ business. Ofcourse a tangential
argument has also been incorporated that the area which was to
have been converted into toilet was allotted to the Private
Respondents causing inconvenience to the Petitioners herein. It is
not the case of the Petitioners that they have been restricted in any
manner by the State-Respondents from carrying out their business
and occupation. It is also not the case of the Petitioners that the
State- Respondents have not made efforts to provide basic facilities
and convenience to the Petitioners by constructing accessible toilets
for their use be it at a distance of 40–50 metres not necessarily at
their doorstep as envisaged.
It has been specifically averred and
argued by learned Counsel for the State-Respondents that the
facilities are for men and women replete with bathing compartments
and nothing contrary thereto emerges.
21.
The doctrine of legitimate expectation is invoked when a
person may have been treated in a certain way by an administrative
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
authority although he has no legal right in private law to receive
such treatment.
In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax
Officer and Others
observed
that
the
while explaining this concept the Supreme
expectation
may
arise
either
from
a
representation or promise made by the authority, including an
implied representation or from consistent past practice. Legitimate
expectation can provide sufficient interest to enable one who cannot
point to the existence of a substantive right to obtain the leave of
the Court to apply for judicial review.
It is generally agreed that
“legitimate expectation” gives the applicant sufficient locus standi
for judicial review. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief
straightway from the administrative authorities as no crystallized
right as such is involved.
The protection of such legitimate
expectation does not require the fulfillment of the expectation where
an overriding public interest requires otherwise.
In other words,
where a person‟s legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking of a
particular decision, then the decision-maker is to justify the denial of
such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. In the
same line, we may also look at the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel
which is a rule of equity flowing out of fairness, striking on behavior
deficient in good faith. While applying this concept, the Court ought
to be concerned with the conduct of a party for determination as to
whether he can be permitted to take a different stand in a
subsequent proceeding. The doctrine is thus premised on conduct
of a party making a representation to the other so as to enable him
(2005) 1 SCC 625
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
to arrange his affairs in such a manner as if the said representation
would be acted upon.
22.
In M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others
the Supreme Court while considering this
concept also discussed the origins of the doctrine as follows;
“7. That takes us to the question whether the
assurance given by Respondent 4 on behalf of the
State Government that the appellant would be exempt
from Sales Tax for a period of three years from the
date of commencement of production could be
enforced against the State Government by invoking the
doctrine of promissory estoppel. Though the origins of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be found
in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. [(1877) 2 AC 439 :
LT
932]
and Birmingham and District Land
Co. v. London and North-Western Rail Co. [(1888) 40 Ch
D 268, 286 : 60 LT 527], authorities of old standing
decided about a century ago by the House of Lords, it
was only recently in 1947 that it was rediscovered by
Mr Justice Denning, as he then was, in his celebrated
judgment
in Central
London
Property
Trust
Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. [(1956) 1 All ER 256 : 1947
KB 130] This doctrine has been variously called
“promissory estoppel”, “equitable estoppel”, “quasi
estoppel” and “new estoppel”. It is a principle evolved
by equity to avoid injustice and though commonly
named “promissory estoppel”, it is, as we shall
presently point out, neither in the realm of contract nor
in the realm of estoppel. It is interesting to trace the
evolution of this doctrine in England and to refer to
some of the English decisions in order to appreciate the
true scope and ambit of the doctrine particularly
because it has been the subject of considerable recent
development and is steadily expanding. The basis of
this doctrine is the inter-position of equity. Equity has
always, true to form, stepped in to mitigate the rigours
of strict law. The early cases did not speak of this
doctrine as estoppel. They spoke of it as “raising an
equity”. ……………..”
[emphasis supplied]
Hence,
the
doctrine
of
Promissory
Estoppel
would
be
applicable in a case where the appellant would suffer a detriment by
acting on a representation made by the Government.
(1979) 2 SCC 409
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
23.
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
The documents on record do not indicate any assurance
from the Government to the Petitioners for construction of toilet. It
is the Petitioners who have submitted the representations, the
prayers of which did not materialize. Legitimate expectation would
have arisen if assurances had been made to the Petitioners by the
Respondents No.1 and 2, nothing emanates in this context.
The
Petitioners already being in the trade have not acted to their own
detriment in any manner whatsoever.
Moreover, as pointed out in
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. (supra) the legitimate expectation is not
required to be fulfilled where overriding public interest is to be given
priority as in the instant case where the Respondents‟ right to life
and as a corollary right to livelihood are involved. Hence, neither of
the doctrines are applicable to the Petitioners in the present case.
24.
Therefore, in the light of the matter at hand in my view
it is evident that the Petitioners cannot seek to restrain the private
Respondents from also carrying on business for their livelihood and
achieving their economic requirements. It is the aim and goal of the
Government to enable the society to be an egalitarian one. The
Petitioners
cannot
Respondents
in
put
the
hurdles
garb
of
in
the
path
inconvenience
of
the
caused
private
by
non-
construction of toilets. The documents on record also indicate that
infact an estimate of Rs.7,32,600/- (Rupees seven lakhs, thirty two
thousand and six hundred) only, had been placed for approval of the
authorities by the Engineers concerned but was at no point of time
either approved or sanctioned. Contrary to the submissions of the
Petitioners that they had made several representations to the
WP(C) No.05 of 2017
Dawa Phuti Bhutia and Others
vs. State of Sikkim and Others
authorities the records stand sentinel to the fact that only two
representations were made in the year 2016, i.e., on 08-04-2016
and 12-04-2016 and one in the year 2017, i.e., on 03-02-2017. The
argument that the Respondent No. 2 ought not to have issued
Licenses for selling of meat apart from seeking non-allotment of
stalls is in itself an incongruous argument since the statute clothes
the State Respondents with powers to make assessments and issue
Licences if the requisite criteria thereof stand fulfilled.
The
Petitioners cannot seek to trample on the fundamental rights of the
Private Respondents by way of prayers that are indeed absurd.
25.
In
conclusion,
in
view
of
the
entire
foregoing
discussions, the Writ Petition deserves no consideration and is
accordingly dismissed.
26.
No order as to costs.
Sd/-
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
02-11-2018
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