The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
15. For the aforesaid reasons and applying the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions and followed by this Court, the petitioner cannot claim full salary and allowances for the period during which he had admittedly not rendered any service merely because he was subsequently acquitted in appeal.
16. Accordingly, this Court finds no illegality, arbitrariness or infirmity in the impugned order dated 19.09.2016. The petitioner has failed to make out any ground warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
17. As an upshot, the writ petition, being devoid of merits, deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. SD/(Bibhu Datta Guru) ashu
Full Judgment Text
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CGHC010426392024
2026:CGHC:31800
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 8013 of 2024
Dashrath Lal Sonwani S/o Late Shri Shakha Ram Sonwani, Aged About 54
Years Occupation Service, Presently Posted And Working As Assistant
Engineer, Rural Engineering Services, Pamgarh, District- Janjgir-Champa
(C.G.)
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through- Secretary, Department of Panchayat and
Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Nawa Raipur Atal Nagar,
District-Raipur (C.G.)
2 - Engineer In Chief, Rural Engineering Services, Vikas Bhawan Sector-19,
Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District-Raipur (C.G.)
3 - Executive Engineer, Res Division Sarguja, District-Sarguja (C.G.)
... Respondents
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Sourabh Sahu, Advocate
For State/Respondent
:
Mr. K.G. Yadav, Dy. GA
(Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru)
Order on Board
24/07/2026
1.
The petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking quashment of
the order dated 19.09.2016 whereby, after his reinstatement in service
Digitally
signed by
ASHUTOSH
ASHUTOSH MISHRA
MISHRA
Date:
2026.07.28
10:57:27
+0530
consequent upon acquittal in the criminal appeal, the respondents treated
the period from 18.04.2016 to 19.09.2016 as "No Work No Pay" and
held that the subsistence allowance already paid during the period of
suspension was sufficient, thereby declining payment of full salary and
allowances for the suspension period. The petitioner has also prayed for
a direction to the respondents to decide his representation dated
18.10.2024.
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the petitioner was
initially convicted by the trial Court and consequently removed from
service on 18.04.2016, he was subsequently acquitted by the learned
Sessions Judge by judgment dated 27.06.2016. Thereafter, he was
reinstated in service by order dated 19.09.2016. It is argued that the
acquittal was a honourable acquittal and, therefore, the petitioner cannot
be deprived of the salary and allowances for the suspension period
merely because he had remained under suspension. It is contended that
the impugned order dated 19.09.2016 is arbitrary and deserves to be
quashed. He would also submit that the petitioner preferred
representation on 18.10.2024, which is still pending.
3.
Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the petition and submits that
the petitioner was removed from service on account of his conviction by
the competent Criminal Court and not pursuant to any departmental
proceeding. After his acquittal, he was reinstated by order dated
19.09.2016, wherein the competent authority rightly directed that the
relevant period would be governed by the principle of "No Work No
Pay" and that the subsistence allowance already paid during the
suspension period was sufficient. It is submitted that subsequent
acquittal does not retrospectively wipe out the legal consequences of the
conviction nor does it automatically entitle the petitioner to back wages.
Therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
4.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record.
5.
The sole question that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner,
who was removed from service on account of his conviction by the
competent Criminal Court and was subsequently reinstated after
acquittal in criminal appeal, is entitled to full salary and allowances for
the period during which he remained out of service.
6.
It is not in dispute that the petitioner was removed from service solely
because of his conviction recorded by the competent Criminal Court and
not on account of any departmental enquiry. The respondents merely
acted upon a subsisting conviction. Consequently, during the relevant
period, the respondents were legally disabled from obtaining any service
from the petitioner.
7.
This issue in hand is also well settled and no longer res integra and it
stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court
by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v.
Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar
(Gujarat) & Another, (1996) 11 SCC 603, in which their Lordships have
considered a case where an employee was dismissed from service on
account of his conviction by a criminal court for his involvement in an
offence under Sections of Prevention of Corruption Act and
subsequently, he was acquitted and as a consequence, reinstated. Their
Lordships while considering the issue whether back-wages should be
paid to the employee for the period between the date of dismissal and the
date of reinstatement held as under: "The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has
already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is
whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of
involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for
his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon
his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that
his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by
operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the
situation. The question of back wages would be considered
only if the respondents have taken action by way of
disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be
unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented
from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct
becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its
own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had
involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted,
he had disabled himself from rendering the service on
account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under
these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to
payment of back wages."
8.
Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 SCC
121, the principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore
(supra) has been followed with approval.
9.
In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v.
Bhopal Singh Panchal (AIR 1994 SC 552), the Supreme Court has
considered a provision in the service regulation which provided that an
employee, who is absent from duty without any authority, shall not be
entitled to any pay and allowance during the period of such absence
(similar to F.R. 17) and held as under: “15. … It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame
and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty
during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled
to full pay and allowances for the said period. In other words,
the Regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat
the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or
otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly
challenged. During this period, the employee renders no
work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the
misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping
him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be
saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances
for the period. That will be against the principle of ‘no work,
no pay’ and positively inequitable to those who have to work
and earn their pay. …”
10.
In the matter of State Bank of India and another v. Mohammed Abdul
Rahim (2013) 11 SCC 67, the Supreme Court considering the earlier
decisions in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh’s case
(supra) and Baldev Singh v. Union of India (2005) 8 SCC 747, held that
subsequent acquittal of Government servant though obliterates his
conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal
consequences of the conviction under the Act, and observed as under: “11. … During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a
prohibition in law on the appellant Bank from employing him.
If the respondent could not have remained employed with the
appellant Bank during the said period on account of the
provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he
would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His
subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does
not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences
of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the
respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid
basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following
his acquittal and the same has been granted by the appellant
Bank.”
11.
In the case in hand, the petitioner’s termination was not on account of
disciplinary action, and the claim is not consequent upon exoneration in
a departmental appeal. The petitioner was out of employment and was
terminated during the period of conviction in a criminal case. Now he is
claiming back-wages owing to his acquittal in the criminal appeal.
12. It is noteworthy to mention here that it was his own conduct of involving
himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in
service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he may be
entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on
the basis of the conviction by operation of the proviso to the statutory
rules applicable to the situation. However, the question of back-wages
would have arisen only if the respondents had taken action by way of
disciplinary proceedings and the said action was found to be
unsustainable in law, and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging
his duties. The conduct of the petitioner becomes relevant for
consideration of his entitlement to back-wages. In the present case, since
the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later
acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering service on account of
conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the
petitioner is not entitled to payment of back-wages.
13. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was dismissed from service on
account of his conviction by the competent criminal Court and not
pursuant to any departmental proceedings. His subsequent acquittal does
not automatically entitle him to back-wages. In Ranchhodji Chaturji
Thakore (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly held that acquittal in a
criminal case does not ipso facto confer a right to claim back-wages for
the period during which the employee remained out of service on
account of conviction. The principle laid down therein is that where the
employer had acted on the basis of a subsisting conviction, the action
cannot be termed illegal merely because the conviction was later set
aside.
14.
This Court in Ram Prasad Nayak v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others,
WPS No.1473 of 2021, decided on 15.04.2025, after considering the
aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, categorically held
that where an employee was removed from service on account of
conviction in a criminal case and was subsequently acquitted would not
be entitled to back wages, as the employer could not avail his services
during the relevant period. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed.
Subsequently, the said petitioner’s review petition was also dismissed by
order dated 26.2.2026 passed in Review Petition No.191 of 2025.
15.
For the aforesaid reasons and applying the law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions and followed by this Court, the
petitioner cannot claim full salary and allowances for the period during
which he had admittedly not rendered any service merely because he
was subsequently acquitted in appeal.
16.
Accordingly, this Court finds no illegality, arbitrariness or infirmity in
the impugned order dated 19.09.2016. The petitioner has failed to make
out any ground warranting interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
17.
As an upshot, the writ petition, being devoid of merits, deserves to be
and is accordingly dismissed.
SD/(Bibhu Datta Guru)
JUDGE
ashu
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