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[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15889/2024
CNR: RJHC020857092024 | URN: CW / 32547U / 2024
Damanjot Singh Anand S/o Late Shri Tajendra Singh Anand Aged
about 36 years, R/o 727, Pratap Nagar, Dadabari, Kota.
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Department of
Mines & Geology, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2.
Joint
Secretary,
Department
of
Mines
&
Geology,
Government of Rajasthan.
3.
Additional Director (Mining), Department of Mines &
Geology, Kota Zone, Kota.
4.
Superintendent Engineer (Mining), Kota Zone, Kota.
5.
Mining Engineer, Ramganjmandi, Kota.
----Respondents
For Petitioner
:
Mr. S.S. Hora Advocate with Mr.
Dushyant Sharma Advocate.
For Respondents
:
Mr. Vigyan Shah Additional Advocate
General with Mr. Deepak Mittal
Advocate, Mr. Yash Joshi Advocate,
Mr. Sankalp Vijay Advocate and Ms.
Tanvisha Pant Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
Date of conclusion of arguments
::
30.07.2026
Date on which judgment was reserved ::
Whether the full judgment or only
30.07.2026
the operative part is pronounced
::
Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement
::
07.09.2026
1.
By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner has
challenged the order dated 24.09.2024 passed by the Joint
Secretary, Mines, whereby the revisional authority has set aside
the order dated 10.07.2024 passed by the appellate authority and
restored the demand of Rs.9,92,11,996.82/- raised against the
(2 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
petitioner on account of alleged illegal mining. The petitioner has
also
questioned
the
consequential
proceedings
relating
to
cancellation of Mining Lease No.68/2008.
2.
The facts, in brief, are that Mining Lease No.68/2008
was originally executed on 04.04.2011 in favour of the father of
the petitioner under the applicable mining concession rules. Upon
the death of the original lessee on 04.07.2016, a supplementary
mining lease was issued in favour of the petitioner on 01.08.2016.
The petitioner, thus, stepped into the shoes of the original lessee
and became entitled to operate the mining lease in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the lease and the statutory rules
governing the same.
3.
It is the case of the petitioner that his mining lease is
surrounded by certain adjoining mining leases, and the original
cluster plan identifies a Fixed Reference Point, namely, “Kanhaiya
Lal Ka Kua”. According to the petitioner, any proper determination
of the boundaries of his mining lease or the adjoining mining
leases was required to be undertaken by reference to the said
fixed reference point, the approved pillars and demarcation
documents.
4.
It is pleaded that an inspection of the site was
conducted by the mining authorities on 05.04.2023. During the
said inspection, an illegal mining pit was allegedly found on
adjoining khatedari land bearing Khasra No.1702. The inspection
authorities recorded that the area of development was towards
Mining Lease No.68/2008 and a mining pillar relating to the
petitioner's lease was found outside the boundary. According to
the
respondents,
the
inspection
further
revealed
that
the
(3 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
petitioner's
lease
area
was
being
[CW-15889/2024]
used
for
access
and
transportation of mineral illegally excavated from the adjoining
land.
5.
Pursuant to the inspection, a show-cause notice dated
06.04.2023 was issued to the petitioner requiring him to explain
the allegations of illegal mining. A demand of Rs.9,92,31,996.80/was thereafter raised. The petitioner approached this Court by
filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6325/2023. By order dated
09.05.2023, this Court set aside the demand order and directed
the authorities to provide an adequate opportunity of hearing to
the petitioner and thereafter pass a well-reasoned and speaking
order in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
6.
Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a representation
disputing his involvement in any illegal mining and requested that
a fresh inspection be conducted in his presence. He asserted that
the mining pillars had been correctly placed and no illegal mining
whatsoever had been undertaken by him on Khasra No.1702.
7.
In order to reconsider the matter, the Superintending
Mining Engineer constituted a committee to examine the facts and
submit its report. The petitioner was informed about the proposed
inspection and a joint inspection was thereafter conducted on
21.06.2023 in the presence of the petitioner, mining officials and
the Halka Patwari. The petitioner, however, disputed the manner in
which the inspection was conducted and the conclusions recorded
therein. According to the petitioner, no proper demarcation was
carried out with reference to the fixed reference point and no
complete field-book or proper geographical particulars were
recorded. The respondents, on the other hand, maintained that
(4 of 37)
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the inspection was undertaken by technical officers, and the
petitioner was afforded an opportunity to remain present during
the exercise.
8.
After the joint inspection, further proceedings were
initiated. The petitioner requested for a copy of the inspection
report. According to the respondents, the report and notice were
sent to the petitioner at the address furnished by him and were
duly served. According to the petitioner, however, the relevant
report was not effectively supplied to him and the demand order
dated 29.08.2023 was consequently passed without affording him
an adequate opportunity of effectively meeting the allegations.
9.
The
29.08.2023
Mining
confirming
Engineer
the
passed
demand
of
the
order
dated
Rs.9,92,11,996.82/-
against the petitioner. The petitioner preferred a statutory appeal
against
the
said
order.
In
the
meantime,
proceedings
for
cancellation of the mining lease were initiated on account of nonpayment of the demand. The petitioner also instituted a civil suit
challenging the demand and consequential action; and secured an
interim order from the civil court. Civil suit was also withdrawn
later on by the Petitioner.
10.
Subsequently,
the
competent
mining
authority
proceeded to cancel the mining lease. The petitioner challenged
the proceedings relating to cancellation before this Court by way
of filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition no. 20494/2023, while disposing of
the above writ petition vide order dated 21.12.2023, the Petitioner
was directed to pursue his statutory remedy. The appeal relating
to cancellation was thereafter transferred by ADM Kota to another
(5 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
appellate authority to avoid any possible objection arising out of
his earlier association with the proceedings leading to cancellation.
11.
The appellate authority, by order dated 10.07.2024,
allowed the appeal of the petitioner. The appellate authority found
deficiencies in the inspection and demarcation process and
expressed doubts regarding the correctness of the panchnamas
and inspection reports. The Appellate Authority observed, that
proper verification with reference to the fixed reference point and
mining pillars had not been established from the material placed
before
it.
It
also
doubted
the
methodology
adopted
for
assessment of the allegedly excavated mineral and the recovery
percentage. Consequently, the appellate authority set aside the
earlier orders and issued directions for fresh verification and
demarcation of the adjoining mining leases.
12.
Aggrieved by the appellate order, proceedings were
initiated before the revisional authority under the relevant
provisions of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017
(hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Rules of 2017’). After
considering the material available on record and hearing the
parties, the revisional authority, by the impugned order dated
24.09.2024, set aside the order dated 10.07.2024 passed by the
appellate authority and upheld the demand against the petitioner.
Hence, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner
challenging the order passed by the revisional authority.
13.
While opposing the writ petition, the respondents filed
reply to the writ petition and raised a preliminary objection
regarding the limited scope of interference in exercise of writ
jurisdiction. It is contended that the petitioner is seeking a
(6 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
reappreciation of disputed facts and technical evidence, which is
beyond the permissible scope of judicial review. According to the
respondents, a writ of certiorari can be issued only where there
exists a jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity, violation of
principles of natural justice or an error apparent on the face of the
record. It is submitted that merely because another view of the
material may be possible would not justify interference with the
order passed by the statutory revisional authority.
14.
On merits, it is submitted in reply to the writ petition
that the inspection of the mining area of the petitioner, conducted
on 05.04.2023, revealed an illegal
mining pit outside the
sanctioned mining lease area on adjoining Khasra No.1702 and it
was observed that the petitioner's mining lease was being used for
access
and
transportation
of
illegally
excavated
mineral
establishing clear connection of the petitioner with the said illegal
mining. The quantity of illegally excavated mineral was assessed
by the competent technical officers as per established method. A
show-cause notice was issued and, after the earlier order of this
Court dated 09.05.2023, the matter was reconsidered after
granting further opportunity to the petitioner.
15.
The respondents submitted that the petitioner himself
sought a joint inspection and accordingly, the inspection dated
21.06.2023 was conducted in his presence. The committee
constituted by the competent authority independently examined
the site. According to the respondents, the petitioner was unable
to furnish any satisfactory explanation regarding the existence of
the illegal mining pit and the access through his mining lease. It is
(7 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
also submitted that the petitioner refused to sign the inspection
report, however, such refusal cannot invalidate the inspection.
16.
The respondents further submitted that the notices
were duly issued to the petitioner and the inspection report was
also made available to him. It is contended that the notice was
dispatched at the address furnished by the petitioner and,
therefore,
the
allegation
of
denial
of
opportunity
is
an
afterthought. The respondents reiterated that the demand order
dated 29.08.2023 was passed only after the matter had been
reconsidered pursuant to the order of this Court and after the
petitioner had been given sufficient opportunity to participate in
the proceedings.
17.
It is further submitted that the appellate authority
exceeded the permissible scope of the appeal while setting aside
not only the cancellation order but also the inspection report and
other foundational proceedings, which were not under challenge.
According to the respondents, the appellate authority entered into
a fresh factual and technical exercise beyond its scope,
and
directed demarcation on issues which did not form the foundation
of the proceedings in the manner subsequently assumed by the
appellate authority.
18.
The
respondents
contended
that
the
revisional
authority was competent under the statutory scheme to examine
the correctness, legality and propriety of the appellate order. The
revision was duly considered by the competent statutory authority
after notice and hearing of both the parties. The respondents
denied the allegation that the proceedings were vitiated because
of any opinion expressed by the earlier authority i.e. ADM, Kota. It
(8 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
is
contended
that
once
the
[CW-15889/2024]
competent
revisional
authority
exercised its independent statutory jurisdiction, the validity of its
order cannot be defeated merely because the revision proceedings
were initiated on information or at the instance of a ADM, Kota,
who might have earlier recused to hear appeal filed by the
petitioner.
19.
It was further submitted that the impugned order is
based upon relevant material and the petitioner has failed to
establish
any
jurisdictional
error,
principles of natural justice, hence,
perversity
or
violation
of
the respondents accordingly
prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
20.
Mr. S.S. Hora, learned counsel for the petitioner, while
pressing the challenge to the impugned order, submitted that the
entire action against the petitioner rests upon inspection reports
which are fundamentally unreliable. It is contended that the
alleged illegal mining took place on land comprising Khasra
No.1702, which admittedly belonged to other khatedars, and there
is no direct evidence establishing that the petitioner carried out
such illegal mining. The mere alleged existence of access through
the
petitioner's
mining
lease,
by
itself,
cannot
constitute
conclusive evidence that the petitioner was responsible for the so
called illegal excavation.
21.
Learned counsel submits that proper demarcation of
the petitioner's mining lease was never undertaken from the fixed
reference point, namely, “Kanhaiya Lal Ka Kua”. According to the
petitioner, neither the inspection dated 05.04.2023 nor the
subsequent
inspection
dated
21.06.2023
recorded
sufficient
geographical particulars or demonstrated a proper measurement
(9 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
of the boundaries of the petitioner's lease and adjoining leases,
which is apparently against the guidelines laid down by the
Allahabad High Court in Radhika Constructions through its
Proprietor Mr. Rakesh Tiwari vs. State of U.P. thru. Secy
Deptt. Of Geology and Mines Lko. & Another, 2023 SCC
OnLine All 119. It is argued that the appellate authority correctly
identified
these
deficiencies
and,
therefore,
the
revisional
authority could not have set aside its findings without specifically
demonstrating that how those findings were erroneous.
22.
It is further submitted by learned counsel for the
petitioner that the revisional authority exceeded the permissible
limits of revisional jurisdiction by reappreciating the inspection
reports and substituting its own factual conclusions for those of
the appellate authority. Reliance has been placed upon judgment
of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Limited vs Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 to
emphasise
the
distinction
between
appellate
and
revisional
jurisdiction, and it is contended that a revisional authority cannot
interfere merely because it prefers another possible view of the
evidence.
23.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted
that the proceedings for recovery and cancellation of the mining
lease were contrary to Rule 28(2)(xvii)(a) read with Schedule-IV
of the Rules of 2017. According to the petitioner, a demand arising
from an allegation of illegal mining cannot automatically be
treated as “dues” under the mining lease so as to justify
cancellation for non-payment. It is contended that the statutory
procedure governing termination of a mining lease and the
(10 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
requirement of notice and opportunity must be strictly complied
with. While placing reliance upon judgment of Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court at Principal Seat Jodhpur in the case of Takhat
Singh Vs State of Rajasthan & Others, S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 5368/ 2025 decided on 13.04.2026, it was also
argued that no proper show-cause notice proposing cancellation of
the lease was served upon the petitioner. It was emphatically
argued that the demand order and cancellation proceedings were
distinct matters and therefore, an opportunity to contest the
demand cannot be treated as an opportunity to show cause
against termination of the mining lease.
24.
Learned counsel also challenged the invocation of Rule
54 relating to illegal mining and submitted that the petitioner
never sought compounding of any offence. It is argued that the
petitioner consistently denied undertaking any illegal mining and,
therefore, the authorities could not proceed as though the alleged
violation had been admitted or compounded by the petitioner. In
order to support argument in this regard, learned Counsel for the
petitioner sought indulgence of this court on judgment dated
08.05.2018
passed
in
Khushal
Gari
&
Another
vs
The
Collector Ujjain & Others by the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, at Indore in W.P. No. 16959/2017. Learned counsel
added that it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the
case of Mangilal Vs State of M.P., (2004) 2 SCC 447, that if an
statute is silent about procedure, then it implies requirement of
compliance with principles of natural justice and fair procedure,
which as per counsel, has not been done in the present case.
(11 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
25.
Learned
counsel
[CW-15889/2024]
submitted
that
the
revisional
proceedings themselves were not validly initiated. According to
learned counsel for the petitioner, the concerned quasi-judicial
authority (ADM) had become functus officio and could not assume
the role of an aggrieved party for the purpose of challenging the
order of the superior appellate authority. Learned Counsel for the
petitioner, while referring the observations of Hon’ble Supreme
Court
in
Mohtesham
Mohd.
Ismail
Vs
Spl.
Director,
Enforcement Direcorate & Another, (2007) 8 SCC 254,
contended that the revision could not be treated as a genuinely
suo motu proceeding when it was initiated on the basis of the
opinion or intervention of an authority connected with the earlier
proceedings.
26.
events
It was lastly submitted that the entire sequence of
discloses
apparent
bias
and
premeditation.
Learned
Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the doctrine of legal malice
as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab &
Another vs. Gurdial Singh & Others, (1980) 2 SCC 471 and
highlighted the fact that cancellation proceedings were initiated
while his appeal against the demand remained pending, and also
highlighted that an authority which had subsequently declined to
deal with the appeal on account of its earlier involvement,
surprisingly expressed an opinion to ensure filing of revision
against the subsequent appellate order. It was, therefore, prayed
that the impugned revisional order be quashed and the appellate
order dated 10.07.2024 be restored.
27.
Per
contra,
Mr.
Vigyan
Shah,
learned
Additional
Advocate General, while defending the impugned orders submitted
(12 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
that in view of the limited scope of judicial review in writ
jurisdiction the petitioner cannot be allowed to seek a complete
reappreciation of disputed facts and evidence. It was argued that
the existence and location of the mining pit, the access to the pit,
the findings of technical officers and the inferences arising from
the inspection reports are all matters of factual assessment. The
revisional authority, being statutorily empowered to examine the
correctness, legality and propriety of the appellate order, has
considered the record and restored the demand. No case of
manifest jurisdictional error or perversity in revisional order has
been established by the petitioner. While citing the judgments of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Haryana Financial
Corporation & Another vs Jagdamba Oil Mills & Another,
(2002) 3 SCC 496 and West Bengal Central School Service
Commission & Others vs Abdul Rahim & Others, (2019) 18
SCC 39, it was argued that this court while exercising writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot sit
as an appellate authority over the decision taken by the quasijudicial authority in Revision Petition.
28.
Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the
order dated 09.05.2023 passed by this Court was duly complied
with
and
accordingly,
the
petitioner
was
afforded
a
fresh
opportunity and, at his own request, a joint inspection was
conducted in his presence. The petitioner was well aware of the
allegations and actively participated in the proceedings. Therefore,
he cannot be subsequently allowed to raise a plea that he was
allegedly denied a reasonable opportunity.
(13 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
29.
[CW-15889/2024]
It was further argued by learned Additional Advocate
General that the appellate authority travelled beyond the appeal
before it and virtually conducted a fresh inquiry into matters that
did not warrant interference with the technical findings. The
revisional authority was, therefore, justified in correcting the
appellate order.
30.
Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted
that initiation of revision, if any, by a subordinate authority did not
render the revisional jurisdiction invalid. What is material is that
despite
initiation
by
a
subordinate
authority,
whether
the
competent revisional authority independently applied its mind and
exercised the statutory power vested in it, or not. The impugned
order clearly demonstrates that the revisional powers were in fact
exercised
suo-motu
consideration.
In
and
support
upon
of
altogether
aforesaid
independent
submission
learned
Additional Advocate General relied upon judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the cases of Airports Economic Regulatory
Authority of India vs. Delhi International Airport Limited &
Others, (2024) 15 SCC 345 and Indian National Congress
(I) vs Institute of Social welfare & Others, (2002) 5 SCC
685.
31.
With regard to the cancellation proceedings, learned
Additional Advocate General clarified that due procedure under the
Rule 28(2)(xvii)(a) read with Schedule-IV of the Rules of 2017
was complied with in letter and spirit, where the petitioner was
repeatedly made aware of the demand and the consequences of
non-payment by way of issuing valid notices and letters.
(14 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
32.
[CW-15889/2024]
It was further argued that the petitioner pursued
multiple proceedings before different forums against notices and
actions emanated from the same original proceedings, either by
suppressing the relevant material or by placing distorted facts
before the concerned forums,
and on remaining unsuccessful
from all the forums, now cannot be allowed contend that he
remained unaware either of the allegations or of the proposed
statutory consequences. It was submitted even before this court
the petitioner has not come out with clear hands and has
deliberately made so many misstatements, therefore, conduct of
the petitioner, in itself, disentitles him from getting any relief in
equitable writ jurisdiction in view of judgments of Hon’ble
Supreme court in the cases of K.D.Sharma vs Steel Authority
of India Limited & Others, (2008) 12 SCC 481 and State of
Orissa & Another vs Laxmi Narayan Das (dead) through
Legal Representatives & Others, (2023) 15 SCC 273.
33.
This
Court
has
considered
the
rival
submissions,
examined the pleadings and the material placed on record and
gone through the impugned order as well as the order passed by
the appellate authority.
34.
At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind the nature
of jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The writ Court does not sit as another court
of appeal over the findings recorded by statutory authorities. As
held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Cellular Vs
Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 and Jagdish Mandal vs
State of Orissa & Others, (2007) 14 SCC 517, judicial review
in writ jurisdiction is directed primarily against the decision-
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
(15 of 37)
[CW-15889/2024]
making process and not against every conclusion of fact which the
statutory authority is competent to draw from the material before
it. Interference is warranted where the decision suffers from want
or excess of jurisdiction, manifest perversity, consideration of
irrelevant material, exclusion of material which was required to be
considered, violation of statutory provisions or principles of natural
justice, or an error of law apparent on the face of the record.
35.
In the present case, the controversy principally arises
out of the allegation of carrying out illegal mining on land
comprising Khasra No.1702, which is admittedly adjoining to
petitioner’s mining area, and the consequential determination of
liability against the petitioner. It is undoubtedly true that the
petitioner at the outset disputed his involvement and contended
that the land in question belongs to other khatedars. However, the
question as to whether the circumstances recorded during
inspection were sufficient to connect the petitioner with the illegal
excavation is essentially a question of fact dependent upon an
appreciation of the technical material and the surrounding
circumstances.
36.
The record reveals that the first demand order was set
aside by this Court on 09.05.2023 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition
no. 6325/2023 earlier filed by the Petitioner, and the authorities
were directed to reconsider the matter after affording adequate
opportunity to the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted
his representation and himself sought a site inspection in his
presence. A technical committee was thereafter constituted and a
joint inspection was conducted on 21.06.2023 when the petitioner
(16 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
was present. Thus, the subsequent proceedings cannot be equated
with the original ex-parte inspection alone.
37.
The petitioner has seriously questioned the adequacy
and methodology of the second inspection. According to him, the
fixed reference point was not properly utilised, the mining
boundaries and coordinates were not comprehensively demarcated
and sufficient technical particulars were not incorporated in the
report. These objections were accepted to a considerable extent
by the appellate authority. However, acceptance of such objections
by the appellate authority does not, by itself, render the contrary
view
taken
by
the
revisional
authority
jurisdictionally
unsustainable.
38.
This court finds that Rule 64 of the Rules of 2017
confers upon the revisional authority an effective jurisdiction to
examine the correctness, legality and propriety of the order under
challenge. Revisional power can be exercised on application by the
aggrieved party or even on its own motion by the Revisional
Authority. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction must undoubtedly
remain within the statutory limits. However, where the appellate
authority
has
set
aside
statutory
proceedings
by
drawing
conclusions regarding the adequacy and evidentiary value of
technical material, the revisional authority is not rendered
powerless to examine whether the appellate authority has
properly exercised its jurisdiction or whether its conclusions are
legally sustainable on the record. As per Rule 64 and 65, the
Revisional Authority can confirm, modify or set aside the appellate
order.
(17 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
39.
The petitioner has placed substantial reliance upon the
decision
of
the
appellate
authority
regarding
the
alleged
deficiencies in the inspection reports. However, it is significant that
the appellate authority proceeded beyond merely setting aside the
order of cancellation and also nullified the foundational inspection
proceedings, which were not even under challenge before the
appellate
authority,
demarcation
exercise
and
simultaneously
of
all
adjoining
directed
mining
a
fresh
leases.
The
respondents were, therefore, entitled to contend before the
revisional authority that the appellate authority had travelled
beyond the controversy arising from the order under appeal and
had undertaken a wider factual exercise.
40.
This Court cannot hold, merely because the appellate
authority
had
recorded
detailed
observations
regarding
the
inspection methodology, that the revisional authority was legally
bound to accept each of those observations. The jurisdiction under
Article 226 cannot be converted into a process whereby this Court
chooses between two possible assessments of disputed technical
material. Unless the view taken by the revisional authority is
shown to be wholly unsupported by the record or manifestly
perverse,
this
Court
would
not
substitute
its
own
factual
conclusions.
41.
merely
The contention that the inspection reports are nullities,
because
the
petitioner
disputed
the
adequacy
of
geographical particulars or even pleaded lack of established
coordinates, also does not merit acceptance in the facts of the
present case. The absence or inadequacy of a particular mode of
recording measurements may constitute a relevant circumstance
(18 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
while
assessing
the
reliability
of
[CW-15889/2024]
an
inspection,
but
such
circumstance does not automatically render every inspection
legally non-existent. The evidentiary worth of the inspection has
to be considered in the context of the entire material, including
the existence of the mining pit, the circumstances noticed by the
technical officials, the location of the petitioner's lease and the
explanation, if any, furnished by the petitioner.
42.
The reliance placed by the petitioner on the fact that
the alleged illegal mining was found on land belonging to other
khatedars is also insufficient, by itself, to completely exonerate the
petitioner in writ jurisdiction. The question before the statutory
authorities was not merely one of title over the land but whether
the material collected during inspection and the circumstances
surrounding access and transportation established involvement of
the petitioner. Such inference is fundamentally a matter of factual
evaluation. The writ Court cannot undertake a fresh trial for
determining who physically excavated each portion of the mineral,
however, this court finds that under the scheme of the Rules of
2017, the Revisional Authority after examining the entire record
and available material can assess or reassess the correct factual
aspect relating to the aforesaid dispute.
43.
The allegation of denial of natural justice as pleaded by
the petitioner also does not persuade this Court to interfere with
the impugned revisional order. The petitioner was fully aware of
the allegations arising out of the inspection. After the earlier
demand
order
was
set
aside,
he
submitted
a
detailed
representation, sought a fresh inspection and participated in the
joint inspection conducted thereafter. A subsequent notice was
(19 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
issued before the demand order dated 29.08.2023 was passed.
The petitioner thereafter availed the statutory remedy of appeal
and also pursued other legal proceedings. In these circumstances,
it cannot be said that the petitioner was kept in complete
ignorance of the material or allegations forming the basis of the
proceedings.
44.
Even
assuming
that
there
existed
some
dispute
regarding the precise mode of service of the inspection report or
notice, the petitioner has not demonstrated any real prejudice of
such nature as would render the entire proceedings void. The
petitioner has consistently disputed the allegations on merits,
raised
objections
regarding
demarcation,
coordinates
and
boundaries, and carried those objections before the statutory
authorities. Thus, the petitioner had adequate knowledge of the
substance of the case which he was required to meet and had, in
fact, availed repeated opportunities to contest the same.
45.
The principle of natural justice is intended to secure
fairness and not to provide a technical weapon for invalidating
every proceeding notwithstanding the absence of any actual
prejudice. Where the person concerned has participated in the
proceedings, is aware of the allegations and has effectively raised
his objections before the competent statutory forums, an alleged
procedural irregularity is not necessarily sufficient to annul the
entire action.
46.
The contention regarding cancellation of the mining
lease and the applicability of Rule 28(2)(xvii)(a) of the Rules of
2017 also requires consideration in the light of the scheme of the
(20 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
Rules, hence, Rule 28(2)(xvii)(a) & (b) and relevant part of
Schedule-IV of the Rules of 2017 are being reproduced hereunder:
“28. Terms and Conditions of mining lease or quarry licence.-(1) Every
mining lease or quarry licence shall be subject to the following conditions:(i) xxxxx
(ii) xxxxx
(2) Every mining lease shall be subject to the following additional conditions:(i) xxxxx
(ii) xxxxxx
(xvii) (a) In case of any breach on the part of the lessee of any covenant or
condition contained in the lease, the competent authority may determine the
lease with prior approval of next higher authority and take possession of the
said premises and forfeit the security deposit or in the alternative may impose
penalty as specified in Schedule IV:
[Provided that where the competent authority to take decision on
termination of mining lease is the Director, no prior approval of next higher
authority shall be required.]
Provided further that decision of termination of lease shall be taken only
if the lessee has failed to remedy the breach, after serving of a thirty days'
notice; and
(b) The competent authority may also at any time after serving the aforesaid
notice enter upon the said premises and seize all or any of the minerals or
movable property therein and may carry away or order the sale of the
property so seized or so much of it as will suffice for the satisfaction of the
rent or royalty due and all cost and expenses occasioned by the non-payment
thereof:
Provided that non-compliance with or violation of the terms and
conditions or misbehavior by the lessee may also be punished by debarring
him for a period upto five years for any future allotment of mineral concession
or contract.”
SCHEDULE IV
PENALTIES FOR NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
OF MINING LEASE AGREEMENT
[See rule 28(2)(xvii)(a)]
S
No.
Rule
Clause
of
agreem
ent
Brief content of the
breach
Penalty
1.
28(2)(i)
28(2)(ii)
28(1)(ii)
28(1)(iii)
4(1),
4(2),
4(3),
4(4),
4(6)
Non-payment
of (i) If the breach is remedied after
royalty, dead rent notice period but within forty five days
and other charges
from the date of receipt of notice, ten
percent of security deposit or rupees
five thousand, whichever higher, shall
be forfeited.
(ii) If the breach is not remedied after
forty five days, the lease shall be
determined with forfeiture of security
deposit:
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
(21 of 37)
[CW-15889/2024]
Provided that if the breach is
remedied before the lease termination
order is issued, the lease shall not be
determined and twenty percent of the
security
deposit
or
rupees
ten
thousand, whichever higher, shall be
forfeited.
47.
Conditions No. 4(11), 4(21) and 4 (22) of the lease
deed also have material bearing to examine the impugned action
and are, therefore, also quoted as under:
“4. The Lessee/Lessees hereby covenants with the
Government as following:(1) xxxxx
(2) xxxxx
(11) Abiding by Rules-The Lessee/Lessees shall abide by
all existing Acts and Rules enforced by the Government of
India or a State Government and all such other Acts or rules
as may be enforced from time to time in respect of working
of the mine and other matters affecting safety, health and
convenience of the employees of the lessee/lessees or of the
public.
(21) Consequence of non payment of royalty or rentThe Government shall determine the lease after serving a
notice on the lessee to pay the dues within 15 days from the
date of the receipt of notice and forfeit the security amount
if the dead rent or royalty or dump removal charges are not
paid within 15 days next after the date fixed in these
presents. The Government shall have the right at any time
after serving the above notice to enter upon the said lands
and to distrain all or any of the minerals or movable
property therein and shall carry away, detain or order the
sale of property so distrained or so much of it as will suffice
for satisfaction of the rent or royalty of dump removal
charges and all costs and expenses occasioned by the nonpayment thereof. These rights shall be without prejudice to
the right of the Government to realise all its --- under the
Rajasthan Public Demand Recovery Act. 1952 (Rajasthan Act
V of 1952) or Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. 1956 (Rajasthan
Act No. 15 of 1956).
(22) Consequence, of breach of other covenants- In
case of any breach on the part of Lessee/Lessees of any
covenant or condition contained in the lease whether
contained in this clause or any other clause of this lease, the
Government may determine the lease and forfeit the
security amount and take possession of the said premises or
in the alternatively may impose payment of a penalty not
exceeding twice the amount of the annual dead rent from
the Lessee/Lessees. Such action shall not be taken unless
the Lessee/Lessees has/have failed to remedy the breach
after 15 days notice.”
48.
The petitioner contended that no independent show-
cause notice specifically proposing cancellation was issued and
(22 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
notice emanating from the demand arising from alleged illegal
mining could not be treated as sufficient notice for the purpose of
cancellation. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that
where the statute prescribes a particular procedure before
termination of a mining lease, the authority is required to
substantially comply with the statutory safeguards. Termination of
a mining lease has serious civil consequences and cannot
ordinarily be treated as an automatic or mechanical consequence
of every alleged violation.
49.
before
However, in the present case, the impugned order
this
Court
is
principally
the
revisional
order
dated
24.09.2024 whereby the demand proceedings and the appellate
order
have
been
considered.
The
petitioner
cannot
obtain
quashing of the impugned revisional order merely by raising every
objection
relating
to
the
earlier
consequential
cancellation
proceedings, particularly where the statutory authorities have
considered those proceedings separately and where the challenge
essentially involves disputed questions concerning the legal effect
of non-payment of the demand.
50.
Moreover, in the present case, the record reveals that
on request of the petitioner, joint inspection was conducted on
21.06.2023, followed by a notice dated 10.07.2023 disclosing that
as per report of joint inspection, by way of carrying out illegal
mining the petitioner has illegally dispatched 70865.712 Ton
Limestone mineral, for which penalty of ten times of royalty under
Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 in the tune of Rs. 9,9211996.80 in
addition to compounding fees of Rs. 20000/- can be levied against
the petitioner, hence he was called upon to submit his explanation
(23 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
in this regard. Petitioner alleged vide letter dated 24.07.2023 that
copy of site inspection report was not provided to him. Thereupon,
vide further letter/ notice dated 02.08.2023, required copy of the
site inspection report was sent to the petitioner again requiring
explanation
against
him
against
proposed
penalty
and
compounding fee, failing which demand was to be created and
confirmed, and necessary legal action was required to be taken
against the petitioner. Although the petitioner alleged that the said
report with fresh notice since, was sent on his old address and not
actually received by him, yet such plea raised by the petitioner is
against the admitted record where the petitioner himself has
confirmed that 12, Vallabhnagar, Kota was his valid address. Even
when the petitioner filed statutory appeal and civil suit against the
impugned proceedings, he himself wrote his address as 12,
Vallabhnagar, Kota and even the notices of impugned revision
proceedings were served upon the petitioner on the above
address, and after receiving the same, the petitioner contested
the proceedings without raising any such objection. Even there is
reference of online postal trekking report regarding service of
communication
dated 02.08.2023
in
the
proceedings
under
question. In so many subsequent notices and letters also, duly
admitted by the petitioner, letters and notices were duly received
by the petitioner at 12, Vallabhnagar, Kota. Thus, on this ground
no plea of violation of principles of natural justice or procedure
cannot be entertained by this court.
51.
Even after issuance of another notice along with copy of
site inspection report, when the petitioner did not submit any
reply/ objections, on 29.08.2023 demand of above penalty was
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
(24 of 37)
[CW-15889/2024]
crystallized and communicated to the petitioner. This order was
also sent to the petitioner on the above address 12, Vallabhnagar,
Kota. Demand order was followed by notice dated 01.09.2023
directing the petitioner to deposit the aforesaid demand failing
which necessary legal action including cancellation of lease deed
was to be taken against the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner was
admittedly
informed
through
the
communication
dated
01.09.2023 regarding the consequences of non-payment of the
amount determined against him. After receiving the above notice,
the petitioner himself wrote a letter on 29.09.2023 requesting the
authorities to extend the time to deposit the penalty from 30 days
to 90 days. He thereafter pursued an appeal and other remedies.
Therefore, the question cannot be examined in complete isolation
from the entire sequence of proceedings. The petitioner was aware
that non-compliance with the demand would entail further
statutory consequences. Thereafter, one letter dated 11.10.2023
was written by the Mining Engineer, Ramganzmandi to the
Superintending Mining Exngineer, Kota informing therein that the
petitioner has not remedied the breach by depositing the penalty
amount, hence, proposal was sent to cancel the lease deed in the
light of Rule 28(2)(xvii) (a) and (b) of the Rules of 2017 and
conditions number 4(21) and (22) of the Lease deed. Copy of
letter dated 11.10.2023 was also sent to the petitioner. The
aforesaid letter was followed was similar letter dated 10.11.2023
written by the SME, Kota to ADM, Kota reiterating that the
petitioner despite notices has not deposited the penalty, therefore
permission was sought to cancel the lease deed in accordance with
the Rules. Copy of letter dated 10.11.2023 was also undisputedly
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
(25 of 37)
[CW-15889/2024]
served upon the petitioner. In response to aforesaid letter dated
10.11.2023, on account of non-compliance of the earlier notices,
the ADM Kota vide letter dated 16.11.2023 conveyed its approval
to cancel the lease deed and directed to proceed further and to
take possession of the lease, as well as to send proposal for
auction of the lease deed. Undeniably copy of the letter dated
16.11.2023 was also served upon the petitioner. Subsequently, in
furtherance of aforesaid proceedings vide office order dated
15.12.2023, lease deed of the petitioner was cancelled by the
Superintending Mining Engineer, Kota. Thus, in the present case,
in view of number of notices and letters mentioned here-in-above,
violation of provisions of Rule 28(2)(xvii) read with Schedule IV of
the Rules of 2017 cannot be alleged by the petitioner.
52.
The judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the
case of Takhat Singh (supra) relied upon by the petitioner in
support of strict compliance with the procedure for cancellation
cannot be applied mechanically without examining the statutory
context and factual foundation of the particular case. A precedent
dealing with termination on the basis of a different factual and
statutory setting cannot automatically invalidate the revisional
order.
53.
In Takhat Singh (supra), the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court, while considering the validity of cancellation of a
mining lease under Rule 28(2)(xvii)(a) of the Rules of 2017, held
that termination of a mining lease is a serious and drastic
consequence and the authority is required to strictly adhere to the
procedure prescribed under the Rules. The mere fact that an
earlier notice contained a general stipulation regarding possible
(26 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
termination could not dispense with the requirement of a specific
30-days' notice contemplated by the second proviso to Rule 28(2)
(xvii)(a) before taking the final decision to terminate the lease.
The Court further held that the authority was required to consider
the explanation submitted by the lessee and to examine whether
the lesser consequence of imposition of penalty, instead of
termination, would meet the ends of justice. The court further
took note of the significant fact that in that case, the petitioner
Takhat
Singh
admittedly
remedied
the
alleged
breach
by
depositing the entire penalty. Accordingly, the orders determining
the liability and terminating the mining lease were quashed and
the respondents were directed to restore the mining lease, subject
to compliance with the applicable statutory conditions and
payment of lawful dues. Facts of the present case are altogether
different. In the present case, it is undisputed that unlike the case
of Takhat Singh (supra), breach has not been remedied by the
present petitioner by depositing the penalty amount, and further,
as referred here-in-above, not only one but several notices/ letters
were regularly and consistently served upon the petitioner, which
is sufficient compliance of the Rule 28(2)(xvii) read with ScheduleIV of Rules of 2017.
54.
In considered opinion of this Court,
the judgment in
Takhat Singh (supra) should not be understood as laying down
that a mining lease must be restored even where the lessee has
never remedied the breach or deposited the penalty/dues. A
proper reading of Rule 28(2)(xvii)(a) read with Schedule IV of the
Rules of 2017 shows that the remedying of the breach remains an
important condition. Schedule IV provides a graded consequence:
(27 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
if the breach is remedied within the notice period, no adverse
consequence follows; if it is remedied after the notice period but
within 45 days, the prescribed penalty is attracted; and if the
breach continues beyond 45 days, determination of the lease
becomes permissible. Significantly, clause (ii) of Schedule IV
provides that if the breach is remedied before the order of
termination is actually passed, the lease shall not be determined,
subject to the prescribed forfeiture. Takhat Singh’s judgment
emphasises this aspect and holds that the 45-day period is not an
absolute cut-off beyond which the lessee loses the opportunity to
cure the breach. However, this does not mean that a lessee who
has allowed the breach to continue and has neither deposited the
amount nor otherwise remedied the breach acquires an absolute
right to restoration after termination. While examining the manner
in which termination was effected and absence of the mandatory
specific
30-days'
additionally
found
notice
preceding
that
the
termination,
petitioner
in
that
the
Court
case
had
subsequently paid the revised dues under the Amnesty Scheme
and also considered that similarly situated lessees had been
restored after such payment. These circumstances materially
influenced the direction for restoration. In absence of similar
circumstances, the aforesaid judgment of Takhat Singh does not
advance case of the petitioner. The judgment itself records that
the petitioner Takhat Singh had deposited the entire revised
penalty under the Amnesty Scheme and obtained a No Dues
Certificate, and the Court also found discriminatory treatment
because similarly situated lessees had been restored. Thus, the
(28 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
restoration
direction
cannot
[CW-15889/2024]
safely
be
divorced
from
those
additional facts.
55.
Another contention of the petitioner that proceedings
under Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 could not have been
undertaken because the petitioner never sought compounding also
does not justify interference in the present writ petition. The
controversy requires consideration of the scope and ambit of Rule
of
the
Rules,
which
deals
with
illegal
mining,
transportation and storage of minerals. Rule 54 of the Rules of
2017 lays down as under:
“54. Illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals.- (1) No
person shall undertake any prospecting or mining operations in any area
without holding any mineral concession, permit or any other permission
granted or permitted under these rules, as the case may be and shall not
dispatch mineral from the mines, except from the quarry licenced area or
bricks, without valid rawanna or transit pass.
(2) No person shall transport or store or cause to be transported or stored any
mineral otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of these rules.
(3) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-rule (1) and (2) shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or with
fine which may extend to five lacs rupees, or with both:
Provided that the Additional Director Mines, Superintending Mining
Engineer, Superintending Mining Engineer(vigilance), Mining Engineer, Mining
Engineer (vigilance), Assistant Mining Engineer, Assistant Mining Engineer
(vigilance), Mines Foreman, Surveyor or any other officer or official authorised
by the Government, Director or Additional Director Mines may either before or
after the institution of the prosecution, compound the offence committed in
contravention of the sub-rule (1) and (2) on payment of cost of mineral and
compound fee as mentioned below:S.No.
1.
2.
3.
Vehicle/Equipment
Compound fee (in Rs.)
per unit
Tractor Trolley
Twenty five thousand
[Truck/Dumper/any other vehicles having Fifty thousand
gross vehicle weight upto sixteen tonnes (as
per registration certificate of the vehicle)]
[Truck/Dumper/any other vehicles having One lacs
gross vehicle weight more than sixteen
tonnes (as per registration certificate of the
vehicle) and] Wire saw, crane, excavator,
loader, power hammer, compressor, drilling
machine etc.
Note: Cost of the mineral shall be taken as ten times of royalty in lieu of rent,
royalty, compensation for environmental degradation and tax chargeable on
the land occupied without lawful authority, etc..
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
(29 of 37)
[CW-15889/2024]
Provided that the amount of compound fee in cases other than specified
as above shall not be less than rupees twenty thousand and shall be in
addition to the cost of mineral.
(4) Where any person trespasses on any land in contravention of the
provisions of sub-rule (1), such trespasser may be served with an order of
eviction by the Additional Director Mines, Superintending Mining Engineer,
Superintending Mining Engineer (vigilance), Mining Engineer, Mining Engineer
(vigilance), Assistant Mining Engineer, Assistant Mining Engineer (vigilance),
District Collector, Sub-Divisional Officer, Tehsildar, Deputy Conservator of
Forest (in forest land), Assistant Conservator of Forest (in forest land),
Regional Forest Officer (in forest land), Revenue Intelligence Officer of State
Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (SDRI), Mines Foreman, Surveyor or any
other officer or official authorised by the Government, Director or Additional
Director Mines in this behalf.
(5) Whenever any person, without a lawful authority, raises any mineral from
any land other than under any mineral concession or any other permission
and for that purpose bring on the land any tool, equipment, vehicle or other
thing, such tool, equipment, vehicle etc. along with mineral, if any, may be
seized by the authorities mentioned in sub-rule (4) who shall give a receipt to
the person from whose possession the property or mineral is seized:
Provided that every officer seizing any property or mineral under this
rule may handover the property or mineral so seized to the nearest police
station or police chauki.
Provided further that the seized vehicle, equipment or mineral may be
released after deposition of cost of mineral along with the compound fees as
specified in sub-rule (3).
Provided also that where mineral so raised has already been dispatched
or consumed, the authorities mentioned in sub-rule (3) shall recover cost of
mineral along with the compound fees as specified in sub-rule (3).
Provided also that where vehicle, equipment or mineral so seized is not
released, the officer seizing the property or mineral shall make a report of
such seizure within seventy two hours to his superior officer and to the
Magistrate having jurisdiction.
[(5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (5), no seized vehicle
shall be released without registration with the department as per the
provisions of sub-rule (2) of the rule 73A, if not registered.]
(6) All property seized under this rule shall be liable to be confiscated by an
order of Magistrate if the amount equal to ten times of royalty in lieu of cost of
mineral, rent, royalty, compensation for environmental degradation and tax
chargeable on the land occupied without lawful authority, etc. is not paid by
the trespasser within a period of three months from the date of commission of
such offence or when the recoveries are not affected by that time:
Provided that on payment of these dues within the said period of three
months, all properties seized shall be ordered to be released and shall be
handed over to the trespasser or the owner of the property.
(7) Where the person committing an offence under these rules is a company
registered under Companies Act, every person who at the time when the
offence was committed, was incharge and was responsible to the company for
conduct of the business of the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the
offence and shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished accordingly:
(30 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
(8) The mines, revenue, police and transport department shall made coordinated efforts to vigil illegal mining or transportation of the mineral.”
56.
Meticulous examination and analysis of the aforesaid
Rule would make it evidently clear that sub-rule (1) prohibits any
person from undertaking prospecting or mining operations without
a valid mineral concession, permit or other permission and further
prohibits dispatch of mineral except from the licensed quarry area
and without a valid rawanna or transit pass. Sub-rule (2) similarly
prohibits transportation or storage of mineral otherwise than in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules. Thus, Rule 54 is
intended to regulate not only the activity of extraction of mineral,
but also its subsequent transportation and storage. Sub-rule (3)
provides the penal consequence for contravention of sub-rules (1)
and (2), namely, imprisonment which may extend to five years or
fine which may extend to five lakh rupees, or both. The proviso
thereto confers power upon the specified mining authorities to
compound the offence, either before or after institution of
prosecution, upon payment of the cost of mineral and the
prescribed compound fee. The use of the expression “may” in this
provision makes it clear that compounding is a statutory mode of
dealing with the offence and is not an automatic consequence of
every
case
of
alleged
illegal
mining.
Ordinarily,
therefore,
compounding involves an act of settlement of the offence in
accordance
with
the
statutory
power
conferred
upon
the
competent authority.
57.
However, Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 is not confined
to the mechanism of compounding. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 of the
Rules of 2017 constitutes an independent and comprehensive
provision dealing with seizure and recovery. Where any person,
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
(31 of 37)
[CW-15889/2024]
without lawful authority, raises any mineral from any land
otherwise than under a valid mineral concession or other
permission and brings upon such land any tool, equipment, vehicle
or other thing for that purpose, the mineral as well as such
vehicle, equipment or other property may be seized by the
competent authority. The Rule further provides that the seized
vehicle, equipment or mineral may be released upon deposit of
the cost of mineral together with the compound fee specified in
sub-rule (3).
58.
A separate situation is contemplated by the third
proviso to sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017, namely,
where the mineral so excavated has already been dispatched or
consumed. In such a situation, physical recovery of the mineral is
no longer possible. The Rule, therefore, expressly provides that
the competent authority shall recover the cost of mineral along
with the compound fee specified in sub-rule (3). The use of the
expression “shall recover”, as contrasted with the expression “may
compound” occurring in sub-rule (3), is significant and indicates
that the recovery contemplated by the third proviso is a statutory
consequence of the unauthorised raising of mineral and its
subsequent dispatch or consumption.
59.
The expression “compound fee” occurring in the third
proviso to sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 cannot,
therefore, necessarily be construed to mean that the offence has
in every case been voluntarily compounded by the person
proceeded against. Compounding of an offence under sub-rule (3)
of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 and recovery of the amount
contemplated by sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
(32 of 37)
[CW-15889/2024]
operate in different fields. Compounding is a statutory mode by
which the offence may be settled upon payment of the prescribed
amount, whereas the third proviso to sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 of
the Rules of 2017 provides for recovery of the prescribed
monetary liability in a situation where the mineral has already
been dispatched or consumed. To construe the latter provision as
dependent upon the voluntary consent or option of the offender to
compound the offence would render the expression “shall recover”
substantially ineffective and would enable the person proceeded
against to defeat the statutory recovery merely by declining to
compound the offence.
60.
Thus, where the competent authority establishes that
mineral was raised without lawful authority and such mineral has
already been dispatched or consumed, the fact that the person
proceeded against has not opted for compounding, or has
expressly declined to compound the offence, by itself does not
take away the statutory power and obligation to recover the cost
of mineral along with the prescribed compound fee under the third
proviso to Rule 54(5). Such recovery, however, cannot be equated
with a finding of criminal guilt or with an order of compounding of
the criminal offence. If prosecution has been instituted and the
offence has not been compounded, the question of criminal
liability remains subject to adjudication by the competent criminal
court in accordance with law.
61.
The distinction between the two provisions may thus be
stated simply in the manner that sub-rule (3) of Rule 54 of the
Rules of 2017 deals with the power to compound the offence,
whereas sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017, particularly
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
(33 of 37)
[CW-15889/2024]
its third proviso, deals with the statutory consequences of
unauthorised extraction where the mineral is no longer available
for seizure because it has already been dispatched or consumed.
Consequently, payment or recovery of the amount prescribed
under Rule 54(5) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 does not, by
itself, amount to compounding of the criminal offence. In the
present case also, it is evident from material available on record
that the illegally excavated mineral was already dispatched by the
petitioner, hence, recovery under Rule 54 was rightly created and
enforced by the authorities.
62.
The submission that the revisional proceedings were
invalid because the concerned authority (ADM Kota) was functus
officio and could not be treated as an aggrieved person also does
not carry the case of the petitioner any further. The relevant
question is not merely who initiated or suggested the initiation of
proceedings, but whether the competent revisional authority
possessed statutory jurisdiction and independently exercised that
jurisdiction.
63.
A statutory power of revision, where exercisable suo-
motu, is not extinguished merely because information regarding
the possible illegality or impropriety of an order is brought to the
notice of the competent authority by an officer or authority
connected with the earlier proceedings. The source from which the
information reaches the revisional authority and the independent
statutory exercise of revisional jurisdiction are distinct matters.
64.
In the present case, the petitioner was issued notice
and was afforded an opportunity of hearing before the revisional
authority. The impugned order is not shown to have been
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
(34 of 37)
[CW-15889/2024]
mechanically passed at the dictation of any other authority.
Therefore, the mere fact that an earlier authority expressed an
opinion regarding the availability of revisional remedy cannot, by
itself, render the exercise of statutory revisional jurisdiction
without authority of law.
65.
The allegation of bias and legal malice is equally
unsupported by sufficient material. Bias cannot be inferred merely
because an authority takes a view adverse to a party or because
the authority had earlier dealt with another stage of the same
proceedings. A clear factual foundation giving rise to a reasonable
apprehension that the competent decision-maker acted under
prejudice, personal animosity or for an extraneous purpose is
required.
66.
The fact that the appeal against cancellation was
transferred to another authority itself demonstrates that the
statutory system took care to avoid any possible objection
concerning the participation of an authority previously associated
with the matter. The subsequent expression of an opinion
regarding the availability of revision does not establish that the
competent revisional authority acted with bias or surrendered its
independent judgment.
67.
The petitioner has also questioned the correctness of
the revisional order on the ground that it did not specifically deal
with every finding recorded by the appellate authority. It is settled
that an authority is required to give reasons which disclose
application of mind to the material issues. However, an order
cannot be invalidated merely because it does not reproduce and
answer each and every sentence or observation appearing in the
(35 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
order under challenge. On a consideration of the impugned order
as a whole, this Court finds that the revisional authority has
addressed the core controversy relating to the inspection, the
material connecting the petitioner with the alleged illegal mining,
the conclusions drawn by the appellate authority and the
consequences arising from the findings of the mining authorities.
The petitioner may disagree with the conclusions reached, but
disagreement with the merits of the decision is not equivalent to
absence of jurisdiction or perversity.
68.
It is
also
relevant that the controversy involves
technical matters concerning mining operations, measurement of
excavation, boundaries and assessment of mineral. The statutory
authorities constituted under the mining law possess specialised
competence to examine such matters. Unless their conclusions are
shown to be unsupported by any material or contrary to a
mandatory statutory provision, the writ Court would exercise
restraint in substituting its own assessment for that of the
competent technical and statutory authorities.
69.
The appellate authority and the revisional authority
have taken different views of the material. However, that
circumstance, by itself, does not justify interference by this Court.
The writ jurisdiction is not intended to provide a third tier of
factual adjudication. Once the competent revisional authority has
examined the legality and propriety of the appellate order and has
recorded reasons for interfering with it, this Court would not
reappreciate the entire evidence for the purpose of determining
which of the two statutory authorities had taken the preferable
factual view.
(36 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
70.
[CW-15889/2024]
The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the
petitioner regarding the requirement of a proper show-cause
notice, fair opportunity, limits of revisional jurisdiction and the
necessity of an identifiable basis for imposing liability are founded
upon well-established principles. However, those principles do not
advance the petitioner's case in the absence of a demonstrated
jurisdictional error in the impugned order. The applicability of a
precedent necessarily depends upon the statutory scheme and
factual circumstances of the case in which it is invoked.
71.
Similarly, the principle that a quasi-judicial authority
cannot ordinarily become a litigating party to defend its own order
does not mean that a statutory revisional authority is prevented
from
exercising
suo-motu
jurisdiction
as
per
Rule,
when
information regarding the legality or propriety of an order is
brought to its notice by a departmental officer. The ultimate
question remains whether the competent revisional authority
independently exercised a power vested in it by statute. In the
present case, this Court does not find that the impugned order
was
passed
without
jurisdiction
merely
because
of
the
circumstances in which the revisional proceedings came to be
initiated.
72.
Upon an overall consideration of the matter, this Court
is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to
establish that the impugned order dated 24.09.2024 suffers from
lack of jurisdiction, patent illegality, manifest perversity or
violation of the principles of natural justice. The grounds raised by
the petitioner substantially require a fresh appreciation of disputed
(37 of 37)
[2026:RJ-JP:35841]
[CW-15889/2024]
factual and technical issues, which this Court cannot undertake in
exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction.
73.
This Court also finds that the petitioner had multiple
opportunities to contest the allegations and did, in fact, avail the
statutory and legal remedies available to him. The mere existence
of another possible interpretation of the inspection material or a
disagreement with the conclusions of the revisional authority
cannot furnish a ground for exercise of certiorari jurisdiction.
Consequently,
no
case
for
interference
with
the
impugned
revisional order dated 24.09.2024 is made out.
74.
Accordingly,
the
writ
petition
is
dismissed.
The
impugned order dated 24.09.2024 does not warrant interference
by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
75.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI
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