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AD – 5-6
Ct No.16
29.07.2026
(SSS)
RVW 141 of 2026
with
CAN 4 of 2026
D & I Taxcon Services Pvt. Ltd.
Vs.
Radhika Singh
with
FA 311 of 2014
Radhika Singh
Vs.
D & I Taxcon Services Pvt. Ltd.
with
WPLRT 205 of 2013
with
CAN 1 of 2025
with
CAN 2 of 2025
with
CAN 3 of 2026
with
CAN 4 of 2026
D & I Taxcon Services Pvt. Ltd.
Vs.
State of West Bengal & Ors.
Mr. Tapas Datta,
Mr. Mritunjoy Halder
……for the review applicant.
Mr. Abhrajit Mitra, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Suddhasatva Banerjee,
Mr. Sarvapriya Mukherjee,
Mr. Sourojit Dasgupta,
Mr. Dipendra Nath Chunder
....for the Opposite Party in RVW No.
141 of 2026, appellant in FA 311 of 2014.
Re: RVW 141 of 2026
1. Let WPLRT 205 of 2013, being somewhat
unrelated, be de-tagged from the file of RVW No.
141 of 2026.
2. RVW
No.
of
is
taken
up
for
adjudication first.
3. The
present
review
application
has
been
preferred against the judgment and decrees dated
December 9, 2025 passed in FA No. 310 of 2014
and FA No. 311 of 2014.
4. By the said judgment, the decision of the
learned Trial Court dismissing a suit for eviction
of licensee filed by the Opposite Party herein was
reversed, thereby granting eviction against the
present review applicant on the ground that the
review applicant is a licensee in respect of the
said premises.
5. Learned
counsel
for
the
review
applicant
argues, by placing reliance on the relevant orders
passed by the Trial Court in the suit from which
the appeal arose, that the learned Trial Judge
had, during pendency of the suit, repeatedly
directed the plaintiffs/present opposite parties to
issue notice of the date of peremptory hearing on
the defendant/review applicant.
6. Despite the same, there was no compliance in
that regard. However, the learned Trial Court,
instead of dismissing the suit for non-compliance
of the Court’s direction, fixed the suit for hearing
ex parte and thereafter, proceeded to decide the
same.
7. It is contended that, as such, the review
applicant, who was the defendant in the suit, did
not have any opportunity to canvass its case on
merits before the Trial Court.
8. Secondly,
learned
counsel
argues
that
in
different proceedings before the National Company
Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company
Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), it was recorded
by the said Tribunals in their judgments that
there was an admission on the part of the
liquidator, who was in control of the suit property
in the interregnum before the purchase by the
opposite party in the review application, to the
effect that the review applicant was a tenant in
respect of the suit property. That apart, there
were independent findings by the Tribunals as to
such tenancy of the review applicant. In fact, the
Tribunals also observed that “rent” was payable
by the review applicant, thereby connoting the
tenancy of the review applicant.
9. Since the said Tribunals were competent to
adjudicate
the
issues
before
them
and
in
connection with the same, such observations were
rendered, it is argued that those are binding. Even
otherwise, since the opposite party/decree holder
claims by dint of a purchase effected in the
liquidation proceedings, it is also bound by the
admissions of the liquidator, the latter having
stepped into the shoes of the original owner at the
relevant juncture.
10. Thirdly, it is argued that there are two suits
pending at present at the behest of the review
applicant, challenging the sale of the suit property
in liquidation.
11. That apart, there is a subsisting demolition
order in respect of the self-same property.
12. In the teeth of the pendency of the said
matters, it is argued that the title of the opposite
party/decree holder itself is clouded. As such, this
Court committed an error apparent on the face of
the record in granting an eviction decree in favour
of the opposite party.
13. Lastly, learned counsel argues that several
orders
were
passed
by
the
concerned
Rent
Controller at the behest of the review applicant, in
respect of granting reliefs for effecting repairs and
restoration of electricity supply in respect of the
suit premises. Thus, it is contended that the Rent
Controller acknowledged the status of the present
review applicant as tenant in respect of the suit
property. Since the judgment under review goes
against the grain of such specific findings of the
jurisdictional Rent Controller, it is argued that the
judgment
under
review
is
vitiated
by
error
apparent on the face of the record on such count
as well.
14.
In
support
of
the
last-abovementioned
contention, learned counsel cites Om Prakash
Gupta vs. Dr. Rattan Singh and Anr. reported at
1962 SCC OnLine SC 111 where the Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
observed
Tribunals
under
the
Rent
inter
that
alia
Control
Act
the
being
considered therein, being creatures of statute,
have limited jurisdiction and have to function
within the four-corners of the statute creating
them. But within the provisions of the Act, it was
held, they are Tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction
and their orders are final and not liable to be
questioned
in
separate
suit
collateral
or
proceedings
application
in
like
a
execution
proceedings.
15. The aforesaid contentions are controverted by
learned senior counsel appearing for the opposite
party.
16. Upon consideration of the arguments of the
parties, we are unable to find merits in the
contentions
of
the
review
applicant
for
the
following reasons:
17.
Insofar as the first ground of review is
concerned, which is that despite the eviction suit
having been fixed for ex parte hearing, in the teeth
of non-compliance of the Trial Court’s direction
for issuing notice to the defendant regarding
peremptory hearing the suit should have been
dismissed, we are of the view that there was no
statutory
mandate
of
giving
such
notice
of
peremptory hearing to the defendant.
18. Thus, the purported non-compliance of the
Trial Court’s orders by the plaintiff in not giving
any
notice
satisfactorily
to
the
defendant
in
respect of the date of peremptory hearing did not
vitiate the suit itself or go to the root of the
matter.
19. As such, it cannot be urged, that too, at this
belated stage of a review application, that such
non-compliance on a minor aspect by the plaintiff
disentitled the plaintiff to the judgment which was
passed by this Court.
20. Since the defendant/review applicant chose
not to appear in the suit at the hearing stage,
there was no option left to the Trial Court but to
fix the suit for ex parte hearing. Non-service of
any separate notice of the date of peremptory
hearing on the defendant/review applicant did not
change such normal course of law in any manner.
21.
More
importantly,
despite
such
non-
compliance being allegedly glossed over by the
Trial Court by continuing with the suit, the suit
was
ultimately
dismissed.
Thus,
the
defendant/present review applicant did not have
any right of appeal against the same. In the
absence of any such right, the defendant could
not have raised this objection before any superior
forum. What could not be argued in the appeal
itself cannot now be permitted to be argued by the
review applicant at the review stage.
22. Regarding the second contention, we find on
an elaborate scrutiny of the relevant observations
of the Tribunals that the admissions purportedly
referred to therein were made by the review
applicant itself and were not attributable to the
liquidator.
23. For example, the NCLT, in its order dated June
25, 2019, had observed in paragraph no. 50 of the
said order that “the applicant is admittedly a
tenant”. In the immediately preceding sentence, it
was recorded that learned senior counsel for the
liquidator had attempted to bring to the attention
of the Tribunal a letter addressed to the liquidator
by the applicant therein. It was on the basis of
such letter that the said observation was recorded
by the Tribunal, evidently implying that it was the
letter of the applicant (present review applicant)
where it was “admitted” that the applicant was a
tenant. Thus, the Tribunal clearly referred to the
so-called admission of the review applicant itself
and not the liquidator while so observing.
24. In the same judgment, the liquidator had also
observed that the direction given thereinabove
was not a bar in collecting “rent” for the “tenants”
who had challenged the sale of the building.
25.
The liquidator, in another portion of the
judgment, also referred to the present review
applicant as a “tenant” in respect of the office
space.
26. Again, the NCLAT, in its judgment dated
March 3, 2020 passed in Company Appeal (AT)
(Insolvency) No. 1347 of 2019 had recorded in
paragraph
that
the
appellant
therein
was
“admittedly” a tenant occupying the tenanted
portion.
27. In paragraph 7, a similar observation was
recorded
appellant
to
the
effect
(present
that
review
“admittedly”
the
applicant)
was
occupying a portion of the Nicco House as a
tenant. The self-same observation was repeated
thereafter by recording that the liquidation estate
comprising of Nicco House “admittedly does not
belong to the appellant and in its capacity as
tenant, the appellant having no right, title or
interest in Nicco House other than the right of
occupation in accordance with the terms of lease
agreement,
did
not
fall
within
the
ambit
of
operational creditor”.
28. In a subsequent portion of the judgment,
coming
under
paragraph
thereof,
it
was
observed that once it is found that the appellant
is not an operational creditor as claimed by it on
the strength of ‘leasehold rights’ in Nicco House, it
cannot
seek
declaration
to
adjudge
a
sale
transaction affected by the liquidator as void. It
was further observed that ‘claim of compensation’
in its capacity as “tenant” is incompatible with the
lately projected claim of being an operational
creditor. The NCLAT went on to observe further
that re-agitating the same matter time and again
in
different
grounds
and
lately
under
“self-
assumed status” of being an operational creditor
was
clearly
at
variance
with
the
appellant’s
“admitted status” as tenant.
29. On a comprehensive reading of the aforesaid
observations, there cannot be any manner of
doubt that the “admissions” being referred to
therein were clearly on the part of the review
applicant itself and not by the liquidator or
anyone else. Moreover, the said admissions were
construed against the review applicant vis-a-vis
its claim that it was an operational creditor. Thus,
not only was the context of the said observations
different from the present lis, but the admissions
were attributed to none else than the review
applicant itself and cannot bind the present
opposite party/decree holder and/or debar the
opposite party from obtaining a decree of eviction
of the review applicant as a licensee as owner of
the property, having stepped into the shoes of the
erstwhile owner by dint of purchase.
30. We further observe that in some of the places
of their judgments, both the NCLT and NCLAT
independently made cursory observations that the
review applicant was apparently a tenant and was
paying rent. However, the said observations were
also made in the context of the claim made by the
review
applicant
independent
itself
adjudication
and
not
by
way
of
of
the
issue
as
to
whether the review applicant was a tenant or a
licensee.
31. Moreover, the NCLT or the NCLAT does not
have the jurisdiction in law to adjudicate tenancy
rights of an entity. It is exclusively within the
domain of the Civil Court that a declaration in
that regard lies.
32. Under certain circumstances, Courts have
held that if observations as to the status of the
defendant as a tenant are made even in an
eviction proceeding, the same are binding in
collateral proceedings and are to be treated as
conclusively decided.
33. It was precisely such context in which the
proposition laid down in Om Prakash Gupta was
laid down.
34. The
said
proceeding
case
which
arose
was
from
an
initiated
eviction
before
the
Additional Rent Controller and went up in appeal
before the Rent Control Tribunal and thereafter to
the High Court, from where the challenge before
the Supreme Court was preferred. It is evident
from
a
comprehensive
reading
of
the
said
judgment that under the Rent Control Act being
considered therein, it was the Rent Controller,
and not the Civil Court, who had the exclusive
jurisdiction in law to decide an eviction suit.
Thus, the authority being exercised by the Rent
Controller, while coming to the relevant findings
in the said matter, was akin to and co-extensive
with that of a Civil Court to grant a decree of
eviction either of a tenant or of a licensee. Hence,
the ratio laid down therein has to be read in the
facts of the case and not taken out of context.
Under
the
provisions
aforesaid
of
the
circumstances
said
statute,
and
the
the
Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that although Tribunals have
limited jurisdiction and have to function within
the four-corners of the statute creating them,
within the provisions of the said Act, they are
Tribunals
of
exclusive
jurisdiction
and
their
orders are final and not liable to be questioned in
collateral proceedings like a separate suit or
application in execution proceedings.
35. Thus, such observations were rendered in
respect
of
a
Tribunal
which
had
statutory
authority to decide eviction suits against tenants.
36. Hence, the said judgment does not come to
the aid of the review applicant in the present
context.
37. The Rent Controller orders relied on by the
review
applicants
were
passed
under
the
provisions of Sections 27 and 36 of the West
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, which limits
the jurisdiction of the Controller only to prima
facie consider the entitlement of a tenant to get an
order of repair/restoration of essential amenities.
An order passed under the said provisions is by
no
stretch
of
imagination
a
conclusive
determination on the issue as to whether the
applicant is a tenant or not.
38. Insofar as the pendency of other civil suits
and/or demolition order in respect of the suit
building are concerned, those cannot be a relevant
consideration in respect of a decree of eviction
passed against the licensee.
39. By the judgment under review, this Court took
into consideration all the arguments made by the
respective parties and thereafter, came to the
conclusion
that
the
review
applicant
was
a
licensee and accordingly proceeded to reverse the
decision of the Trial Court and passed a decree of
eviction of licensee.
40. Mere pendency of other civil suits and/or any
demolition order does not have any germane
bearing at all on the said adjudication and as
such, cannot furnish grounds of the present
review as well.
41. Moreover, the questions raised in the review
application were available to the review applicant
at the time of hearing of the appeals, but not so
raised. Hence, a re-hearing of the first appeals in
the garb of review is also not permissible in law.
42. In view of the above findings, we are of the
opinion that the review application is devoid of
substance.
43. Accordingly, RVW 141 of 2026 is dismissed on
contest without any order as to costs, thereby
upholding
the
judgment
and
decrees
dated
December 9, 2025 passed in FA 310 of 2014 and
FA 311 of 2014.
44. CAN 4 of 2026 is consequentially disposed of
as well.
45. No order as to costs.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)
In Re: WPLRT 205 of 2013
with
CAN 1 of 2025,
CAN 2 of 2025,
CAN 3 of 2026,
CAN 4 of 2026
46. CAN 3 of 2026 is an application for addition of
the subsequent purchaser of the subject property
to the writ petition.
47. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties,
CAN 3 of 2026 is allowed on consent, thereby
impleading the proposed added respondent as the
respondent in the present proceeding.
48. The learned Advocate-on-record for the writ
petitioner
shall
carry
out
the
necessary
consequential amendments to the cause title of
the writ petition during the course of the day.
49. The present writ petition arises from an order
passed by the Rent Controller under the West
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (hereinafter
referred to as “the 1997 Act”) granting reliefs to
the petitioner, claiming to be a tenant, under
Section 27 of the 1997 Act.
50. The learned Tribunal, sitting in a challenge
against the said order of the Rent Controller,
reversed the same on the finding that in view of
the pendency of a civil suit for eviction of the
petitioner on the ground that the petitioner is a
licensee, the matter ought to be relegated to the
Civil Court.
51. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
seeks to rely on Kartick Chandra Bhandari vs.
Ashim Kumar Samanta reported at AIR 2008 Cal
279 where it was held by a learned Single Judge
of this court that when there is a pending suit,
the tenant has option under the 1997 Act to either
initiate
independent
proceedings
before
the
Controller for appropriate orders for repair and/or
for essential supplies or to make an interim
application in the pending suit for grant of such
relief.
52. It is contended that learned Tribunal relied on
Somnath
Mukherjee
vs.
Mamata
Rani
Saha
reported at 2006 (3) CHN 213, where a contrary
proposition was laid down, without taking into
consideration
the
ratio
of
Kartick
Chandra
Bhandari (supra).
53. During arguments, it is pointed out by learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner
as
well
as
the
respondent that by a previous order passed today
itself,
this
court
has
dismissed
a
review
application against a judgment passed in two first
appeals, granting eviction decrees against the
present writ petitioner on the ground that the writ
petitioner is a licensee.
54. We take note of the said fact.
55. The entire gamut of the disputes involved in
the
present
writ
petition
has
been
rendered
infructuous in view of the aforesaid adjudication.
56. Since the First Appellate Court has already
passed a decree of eviction against the petitioner
on the premise that the petitioner is a licensee, as
opposed to a tenant, and the application for
review of such judgment has been dismissed, no
scope remains for any relief to be granted to the
petitioner on the premise that the petitioner is a
tenant within the contemplation of the 1997 Act.
57. Thus, the issues of law raised in the present
writ petition are rendered academic and need not
be adjudicated on merits at all.
58. In view of the above observations, WPLRT 205
of 2013 is dismissed as infructuous without any
order as to costs.
59. CAN 1 of 2025, CAN 2 of 2025 and CAN 4 of
2026 are also disposed of consequentially.
60. There will be no order as to costs.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)
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