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2026:CGHC:16319
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
AVINASH
SHARMA
Digitally signed
by AVINASH
SHARMA
Date: 2026.04.16
10:38:57 +0530
CR No. 288 of 2025
Cholamandalam Ms General Insurance Company Limited, Through Branch
Manager, Branch Office At- Ward No. 25 (Guru Govind Singh Ward), Second
Floor, Simran Towers, Pandri Road, In Front Of L.I.C. Office, Raipur, DistrictRaipur (C.G.)
... Applicant.
versus
1 - Dinesh Kumar Nishad S/o Shri Maniram Nishad Aged About 39 Years
Residence And Post- Konargarh, Police Station- Mulmula, District- JanjgirChampa (C.G.) (Claimant)
2 - Rajesh Kumar Soni S/o Kashi Prasad Soni Aged About 33 Years Residence
And Post- Devrikhurd (Atal Awas Colony), Torwa, Police Station, Torwa, Tehsil
And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) (Driver)
3 - Ashish Kumar Pahunchal S/o Durgesh Pahunchal Residence- Shiv Mandir
Gali, Old Power House, Devridih Torwa, Police Station- Torwa, Tehsil And District
Bilaspur (C.G.) (Owner)
... Respondent(s)
For Applicant
: Ms. Aditi Diwan, Advocate.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Order on Board
09/04/2026
1.
The applicant being Insurance Company has called in question the legality,
propriety and correctness of the proceedings initiated and order dated
10.09.2025 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals, Bilaspur C.G.
in relation to MACT No.1923 of 2023 preferred under Section 166 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘M.V. Act’) by the Respondent No.1
whereby, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act preferred by the
Respondent No.1 has been allowed and delay in filing the claim petition
has been condoned. Whereas, application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC filed
by the applicant Insurance Company has been rejected.
2.
The core issue involved in the present case to the maintainability of claim
petition filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal to condone such delay.
3.
The facts, in brief are that the claimants/Respondent No.1 instituted
applications under Section 166 of the M.V. Act seeking compensation on
account of injuries sustained in motor accidents. However, the said claim
petition was filed beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section
166(3) of the M.V. Act. Upon such filing, the present applicant/revisionist
i.e., the Insurance Companies and the vehicle owners, raised objections
before the concerned Tribunals and preferred applications seeking rejection
of the claim petitions on the ground that the same were barred by limitation
and thus not maintainable.
4.
The Tribunals, however, declined to accept the objections raised by the
revisionists and proceeded to entertain the claim petition by condoning the
delay in filing the same. While doing so, the Tribunals, in substance,
invoked principles analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for
short, ‘Limitation Act’), and held that sufficient cause had been shown for
condonation of delay.
5.
Consequently, the application preferred by the present revisionist under
Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC seeking rejection of the claim petition came to
be dismissed, giving rise to the present civil revision.
6.
The applicant has assailed the impugned order primarily on the ground that
the learned Tribunal has acted with material irregularity and illegality in
assuming jurisdiction not vested in them by law. It is contended that the
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, being a statutory forum constituted under
the M.V. Act, is bound by the provisions of the said Act and cannot travel
beyond the same. According to the applicants, there is no provision under
the Act, particularly after the amendments brought into force, which
empowers the Tribunal to condone delay in filing claim petitions under
Section 166 of the M.V. Act, and therefore, the invocation of principles akin
to Section 5 of the Limitation Act is wholly misconceived and impermissible.
7.
It is further contended that the claim petition, having been instituted beyond
the statutorily prescribed period, could not have been entertained at all, and
the failure on the part of the learned Tribunals to reject such petition at the
threshold amounts to a jurisdictional error. It has also been urged that, in
several instances, the delay has been condoned without affording
adequate and effective opportunity of hearing to the present revisionist, i.e.,
the Insurance Company thereby resulting in violation of the principles of
natural justice. According to the applicant, the impugned order thus suffer
from non-application of mind, patent illegality and jurisdictional infirmity,
warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
8. It is further submitted that the issue relating to the scope, applicability and
condonability of delay under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act has been
engaging consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a batch of
proceedings, wherein interim protection has also been granted. In the said
proceedings, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, inter alia, directed that claim
petitions ought not to be dismissed at this stage solely on the ground of
limitation, thereby indicating that the issue is yet to attain finality and is
under active consideration before the Apex Court.
9.
In this context, reference is made to the order passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited
v. Ayiti Navaneetha and others (Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.
8412–8413/2023 and connected matters), wherein, vide order dated
04.11.2025, it has been specifically observed that the Tribunals and the
High Courts shall not dismiss claim petitions on the ground that such
petitions are barred by limitation under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act.
Taking note of the aforesaid interim directions, this Court had earlier
directed the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunals to proceed with
the claim cases, however, no final award shall be passed.
10. Further, in continuation thereof and in view of the subsequent order passed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Dash v. Union of India and
another (Writ Petition (Civil) No.166/2024) vide order dated 19.03.2026,
whereby the matter has been directed to be listed for further hearing, this
Court is of the considered opinion that a balanced approach is required to
be adopted. Accordingly, while the concerned Tribunals shall be at liberty to
proceed with the adjudication of the claim petitions in accordance with law,
it is directed that no final order shall be passed until the issue is finally
settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11. It is further clarified that in the event any order is passed which operates in
favour of the Insurance Companies or the vehicle owners, it shall be open
to them to bring such development to the notice of the concerned Tribunal,
and upon such intimation, the Tribunal shall be at liberty to pass
appropriate orders, strictly in accordance with law and subject to the final
outcome of the proceedings pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12.In view of the factual matrix as delineated hereinabove, particularly the
interim directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in relation to the
issue of limitation under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court
finds that the principal grievance raised by the applicants i.e. Insurance
Companies as well as vehicle owners, seeking outright rejection of the
claim petitions on the ground of delay, cannot be countenanced at this
stage. The directions of the Apex Court clearly mandate that such claim
petitions ought not to be dismissed solely on the ground of limitation
pending final adjudication of the issue.
13. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the submission of the applicant
and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the challenge laid by the applicant does not warrant
interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction at this stage. The orders
passed by the learned Tribunals, in so far as they proceed to entertain the
claim petitions instead of rejecting them at the threshold, cannot be said to
suffer from such jurisdictional error or material irregularity as would call for
interference, particularly in light of the binding interim directions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
14.At the same time, considering the contention of the applicant with regard to
lack of jurisdiction and the alleged improper exercise of discretion in
condoning delay, it is deemed appropriate to balance the competing
interests of the parties. While the claimants cannot be non-suited at the
threshold on technical grounds of limitation, the rights and objections of the
Insurance Companies and vehicle owners also deserve to be adequately
safeguarded.
15. Accordingly, it
is directed that the concerned Motor Accident Claims
Tribunals shall proceed with the adjudication of the claim petitions in
accordance with law. However, no final award shall be passed by the
Tribunals until the issue relating to the applicability and condonation of
delay under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act is conclusively decided by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is further observed that all contentions of the
parties, including those relating to limitation, jurisdiction, and the
applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, are kept open to be
urged at the appropriate stage, and the Tribunals shall consider the same
independently, uninfluenced by any prima facie observations made in the
present proceedings.
16.Needless to say, in the event there is any subsequent development or
authoritative pronouncement by the Hon’ble Supreme Court governing the
field, it shall be open to either party to bring the same to the notice of the
concerned Tribunal, which shall thereafter proceed to pass appropriate
orders strictly in accordance with law and in consonance with such
pronouncement.
17. In view of the aforesaid,
the present civil revision stand disposed of. Any
interim orders operating in these matters shall stand vacated forthwith,
subject, however, to the directions issued hereinabove.
18.Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Avinash
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