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HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No:1009 of 2022
Between:
1.CHINNAN KRISHORE KUMAR, S/O. DEVADASU, AGED 30 YEARS.
OCCUPATIONPRIVATE
EMPLOYEE,
RIO
MACHAVARAM,
MACHILIPATNAM, KRISHNA DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
AND
1.STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF A. P, AMARAVATHI
2.CHINNAM KIRANMAYI SMILY, W/O CHINNAN KRISHORE KUMAR,
AGED 24 YEARS, R/O.D.NO.5-7-8/108, PLOT NO.18, SYNDICATE
BANK COLONY, OPP ROAD, COLLERAH HOSPITAL, CHITI NAGAR,
VIJAYAWADA.
3.CHINNAM VINEETH KUMAR, S/O CHINNAM KISHORE KUMAR,
AGED 5 YEARS, (MINOR BEING REP BY HIS MOTHER/
RESPONDENT NO.2) R/O D.NO.5-7-8/108, PLOT NO.18, SYNDICATE
BANK COLONY, OPP ROAD, COLLERAH HOSPITAL, CHITI NAGAR,
VIJAYAWADA.
...RESPONDENT(S):
****
JUDGMENT RESERVED DATE
:
07.01.2026
DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED
:
09.02.2026
DATE OF ORDER UPLOADED
:
09.02.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgment?
Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals?
Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment?
Yes/No
_________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
* THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
+ CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No: 1009 of 2022
% 09.02.2026
# Between:
1.CHINNAN KRISHORE KUMAR, S/O. DEVADASU, AGED 30 YEARS.
OCCUPATIONPRIVATE
EMPLOYEE,
RIO
MACHAVARAM,
MACHILIPATNAM, KRISHNA DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
AND
1.STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF A. P, AMARAVATHI
2.CHINNAM KIRANMAYI SMILY, W/O CHINNAN KRISHORE KUMAR,
AGED 24 YEARS, R/O.D.NO.5-7-8/108, PLOT NO.18, SYNDICATE
BANK COLONY, OPP ROAD, COLLERAH HOSPITAL, CHITI NAGAR,
VIJAYAWADA.
3.CHINNAM VINEETH KUMAR, S/O CHINNAM KISHORE KUMAR,
AGED 5 YEARS, (MINOR BEING REP BY HIS MOTHER/
RESPONDENT NO.2) R/O D.NO.5-7-8/108, PLOT NO.18, SYNDICATE
BANK COLONY, OPP ROAD, COLLERAH HOSPITAL, CHITI NAGAR,
VIJAYAWADA.
...RESPONDENT(S):
! Counsel for the Petitioners
: M.Venu Gopal
^Counsel for the Respondent : A.K.Kishore Reddy, Legal Aid Counsel
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1) (2005) 3 SCC 636
2) (2011) 1 SCC 141
3) (1988) 1 SCC 530
4) (2005) 3 SCC 636
5) (1991) 2 SCC 375
6) AIROnline 2019 SC 2208
7) AIROnline 2014 SC 224
8) 1961 SCC OnLine Punj 128
9) 1980 SCC OnLine Kar 53
10) 2007 SCC OnLine Del 561
11) (2013) 4 SCC 1
12) (1996) 5 SCC 125
13) (2015) 5 SCC 705
14) (2005) 3 SCC 313
15) AIR 1927 Mad 1187
16) ILR (1920) 43 Mad 635
17) AIR 1936 Bom 138
18) AIR 1921 Bom 380
19) (1989) 1 SCC 405
20) (2005) 4 SCC 468
21) (1978) 4 SCC 70
22) (2011) 12 SCC 189
23) (1988) 1 SCC 530
24) (1970) 1 SCWR 589
25) (1999) 6 SCC 326
26) (1999) 5 SCC 672
27) 2008 SCC OnLine Chh 9
28) AIR 1996 P&H 1757
29) 1924 SCC OnLine Mad 220
30) (1996) 4 SCC 479
31) AIR 1985 AP 207
32) (2005) 3 SCC 313
33) 1963 SCC OnLine SC 137
34) (1991) 2 SCC 375
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1009/2022
ORDER:
Criminal Revision Case has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401
of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) feeling
aggrieved by the order dated 09.03.2018 passed in F.C.O.P.No.1008/2018 on
the file of the learned IV Additional District Judge-cum-Judge, Principal Family
Court, Vijayawada.
2.
Sri M.Venu Gopal, learned Counsel for the Petitioner would submit that
the impugned order of the learned Court below suffers from perversity and
material irregularity, being contrary to the evidence on record and probabilities
of the case. It is urged that the learned Family Court erred in granting
maintenance without proper appreciation of the chief affidavit filed under Order
XVIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity ‘the C.P.C.,’)
which itself constitutes a procedural violation. The Petitioner contends that
Respondent No.2 failed to substantiate her allegations with documentary proof
regarding alleged payments of cash and Adapaduchukatnam, yet the learned
Court erroneously allowed the petition. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner
would further argue that the present proceedings are a second round of
litigation, filed only after withdrawal of M.C.No.144/2017, and hence barred by
principles of judicial propriety and fairness.
3.
It is further submitted that the learned Family Court ought to have
considered the pendency of D.O.P.No.3/2016 before the learned Principal
District Judge, Machilipatnam, and G.W.O.P No.52/2017 before the learned
Family Court, Vijayawada, which clearly demonstrate that the Respondent
No.2 is attempting to harass the Petitioner by initiating multiple proceedings.
The order directing payment of Rs.7,500/- and Rs.5,000/- per month to
Respondent Nos.2 & 3 is alleged to be excessive, arbitrary, and violative of
principles of natural justice and it is urged that the impugned judgment be set
aside as being unsustainable in law.
4.
Sri A.K.Kishore Reddy, learned Legal Aid Counsel for Respondent
Nos.2 & 3 would vehemently oppose the submissions of the Petitioner,
contending that the learned Family Court has rightly exercised its jurisdiction
under Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and allied provisions to secure
maintenance for the wife and child. It is argued that the Petitioner, being
legally bound to maintain his dependents, cannot shirk his responsibility by
raising technical objections regarding procedural aspects of evidence. The
learned Counsel for Respondent Nos.2 and 3 would submit that the absence
of documentary proof does not ipso facto negate the oral testimony of PW.1,
which was found credible and sufficient by the learned Court below. The grant
of maintenance is a measure of social justice, intended to prevent destitution
and vagrancy, and therefore the order deserves to be upheld.
5.
It is further contended that the Petitioner’s reliance on pendency of other
proceedings is wholly misconceived, as the right to claim maintenance is
independent and recurring in nature. The learned Counsel for Respondent
Nos.2 & 3 would emphasize that multiplicity of proceedings was necessitated
only due to the Petitioner’s continued neglect and refusal to provide
sustenance. The quantum of maintenance awarded, Rs.7,500/- to the
Respondent No.1/wife and Rs.5,000/- to the Respondent No.3/child is
reasonable, proportionate to the Petitioner’s means, and in consonance with
settled principles of law. The learned Family Court’s order, being wellreasoned and founded on equity, justice, and good conscience, warrants no
interference by this Court.
6.
Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by
the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.
7.
Now the point for consideration is:
“Whether the order in F.C.O.P.No.1088 of 2018 dated 09.03.2022,
passed by the learned IV Additional District Judge-cum-Judge,
Principal Family Court, Vijayawada is correct, legal, and proper
with respect to its finding, or judgment, and there are any material
irregularities? And to what relief?”
8.
Under Indian law, the term ‘maintenance’ includes an entitlement to
food, clothing and shelter, being typically available to the wife, children and
parents. It is a measure of social justice and an outcome of the natural duty of
a man to maintain his wife, children and parents, when they are unable to
maintain themselves as observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Savitaben
Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat1. The object of maintenance is to
prevent immortality and destitution and ameliorate the economic condition of
women and children.
(2005) 3 SCC 636
9.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh
Kushwaha2, at paragraph Nos.38 & 39 held that even live-in relationships fall
within the ambit of “domestic relationship” under the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for brevity ‘the D.V.Act’). It recognized that
women in such relationships are entitled to the same reliefs and protections as
those in marital relationships. It further clarified that monetary relief and
compensation can also be granted under Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ in such
cases.
10.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Chanmuniya supra, further at paragraph
No.42 held that the term “wife” under Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be
given a broad and socially purposive interpretation. It emphasized that even
women in long-term live-in relationships should not be left destitute and may
claim maintenance. While earlier rulings like Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v.
Anantrao Shivram Adhav3, and Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of
Gujarat4 restricted “wife” to a legally wedded woman, cases like Vimala (K.) v.
Veeraswamy (K.)5 expanded it to include divorced women. Ultimately, the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Chanmuniya supra urged that strict proof of marriage
should not be a precondition, so as to uphold social justice and prevent
vagrancy.
(2011) 1 SCC 141
(1988) 1 SCC 530
(2005) 3 SCC 636
(1991) 2 SCC 375
11.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shome Nikhil Danani v. Tanya Banon
Danani6 reaffirmed at paragraph No.1 that, mere passing an order under
section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ does not preclude the respondent from seeking
appropriate relief under ‘the D.V.Act.’
12.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Juveria Abdul Majid Patni v. Atif Iqbal
Mansoori7, held at paragraph No.24 that monetary relief as stipulated under
Section 20 of ‘the D.V.Act’ is different from maintenance, which can be in
addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or any
other law.
13.
The High Court of Punjab-Haryana High Court in Bawa Sunder Singh
v. Manna Sunder Singh8, stressed that it could not base maintenance purely
on an arithmetic calculation, but looked that the materials on record as a
whole, and reduced the maintenance amount.
14.
The High Court of Karnataka in Haunsabai v. Balakrishna Krishna
Badiger9, at paragraph No.9 state that wife must prove that she is unable to
maintain herself in addition to the fact that her husband has the sufficient
means to maintain her whereas he has chosen to neglect to maintain even
then.
15.
The High Court of Delhi in Alok Kumar Jain v. Purnima Jain10, at
paragraph No.10 gave the following conditions when maintenance is to be
AIROnline 2019 SC 2208
AIROnline 2014 SC 224
1961 SCC OnLine Punj 128
1980 SCC OnLine Kar 53
2007 SCC OnLine Del 561
paid: Status of the parties, reasonable wants of the claimant, the income and
property of the claimant, number of persons to be maintained by the husband,
liabilities if any, of the husband, The amount required by the wife to live a
similar life style as she enjoyed in the matrimonial him keeping in view food,
clothing, shelter, educational and medical needs of the wife and the children, if
any, residing with the wife, payment capacity of the husband, etc.
16.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Voluntary Health Assn. of Punjab v. Union
of India11, at paragraph No.19 held that a woman must be regarded as an
equal partner in life and society. It emphasized that the legislation aims to
prohibit sex selection and prevent misuse of pre-natal diagnostic techniques
leading to female foeticide. The Hon’ble Apex Court further stressed that the
law’s purpose can only be fulfilled through dedicated enforcement and societal
awareness of women’s equal role.
17.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar12, had
stated at paragraph No.28 that Indian women have suffered and are suffering
discrimination in silence. At paragraph No.28 it has held that self-sacrifice and
self-denial are their nobility and fortitude and yet they have been subjected to
all inequities, indignities, inequality and discrimination.
18.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan13, at
paragraph No.14 held that under Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ a wife is entitled
to live with dignity in the same manner as in her matrimonial home. The
(2013) 4 SCC 1
(1996) 5 SCC 125
(2015) 5 SCC 705
Hon’ble Apex Court clarified that excuses like unemployment or poor business
cannot absolve a healthy, able-bodied husband of his legal obligation. Thus, a
wife’s right to maintenance under Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is absolute
unless disqualified, ensuring she is not reduced to destitution or begging.
19.
In B.P. Achala Anand v. S. Appi Reddy14, the judicial consensus
emerging from earlier authorities is that a husband's duty to maintain his wife
is a personal and status- based obligation, deriving exclusively from the
marital relationship and wholly independent of his ownership of ancestral or
self- acquired property. This principle, affirmed in Unnamalai Ammal v. F.W.
Wilson15, establishes that maintenance flows inherently from the existence of
the marital bond. P. Suriyanarayana Rao Naidu v. P. Balasubramania
Mudali16 further underscores that even an auction- purchaser cannot displace
female family members whose residence stems from such personal
obligations. Likewise, the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in Bai Appibai v.
Khimji Cooverji17reiterated that the wife’s entitlement to maintenance is
grounded solely in the status of marriage and is unaffected by the husband’s
proprietary circumstances. As clarified in Gangabai v. Jankibai18, although a
widow cannot claim residence in property alienated during the husband’s
lifetime without a prior charge, the wife’s right to maintenance during
(2005) 3 SCC 313
AIR 1927 Mad 1187
ILR (1920) 43 Mad 635
AIR 1936 Bom 138
AIR 1921 Bom 380
subsistence of marriage remains inherent, independent, and insulated from
considerations of the husband’s property holdings.
20.
In Kuldip Kaur v. Surinder Singh19, the Hon’ble Supreme Court drew
a clear distinction between the mode of enforcing recovery of maintenance
arrears and the actual satisfaction of such liability, holding that imprisonment
of the defaulter is merely a means of enforcement and not a mode of
extinguishing the liability. The Court emphasized that the arrears of monthly
allowance can be discharged only through actual payment, as the purpose of
sentencing the husband to jail is to compel obedience to the maintenance
order, not to wipe out the liability he has refused to honour. Imprisonment is
permissible only when the default is without sufficient cause, and it would be
illogical to treat incarceration as absolving a husband who, without reasonable
cause, neglects to maintain his wife or child. Maintenance, being intended to
secure the essential economic sustenance of the neglected wife or child,
cannot be substituted by sending the husband to prison, for neither the wife
nor the child can subsist without the funds required for their basic needs. Thus,
imprisonment is merely a method of recovery, not a substitute for payment,
and the liability continues until the arrears are actually paid.
21.
In Shantha v. B.G. Shivananjappa20, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that,
in the peculiar facts of the case, the bar under Section 125(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’
was inapplicable and the High Court erred in overturning the Sessions Judge’s
order, reiterating that Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is a piece of social welfare
(1989) 1 SCC 405
(2005) 4 SCC 468
legislation that must be construed liberally to advance the protection and
well- being of the wife and child. The Court emphasized that the liability to pay
maintenance under Section 125(1) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is a continuing liability, and
therefore, it is unreasonable to compel the aggrieved wife to file successive
applications for enforcement of an already subsisting obligation.
22.
In Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal21, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court underscored that Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is a measure of
social justice, specially designed to protect women and children, falling within
the constitutional mandate of Article 15(3) and reinforced by Article 39 of the
Constitution of India. The Court emphasized that statutory provisions of this
nature are not rigid textual commands but dynamic instruments intended to
fulfil important social functions, and therefore must be interpreted with the
“brooding presence of constitutional empathy” for weaker sections in mind.
Viewed thus, Courts must prefer that construction which advances the cause
of
vulnerable
dependents,
ensuring
that
the
interpretation
chosen
meaningfully furthers the objective of safeguarding women and children from
neglect and destitution.
23.
In Pyla Mutyalamma v. Pyla Suri Demudu22, the Hon’ble Apex Court
reiterated that proceedings under Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ being
preventive and summary in nature, do not require strict or conclusive proof of
marriage as demanded in prosecutions under Section 494 of ‘the I.P.C.,’
rather, consistent with Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram
(1978) 4 SCC 70
(2011) 12 SCC 189
Adhav23, the Magistrate need only ascertain whether some form of marriage
ceremony occurred, whether the parties lived together as husband and wife in
the eyes of the community, and whether children were born from the union.
Further,
as
held
in
Sethurathinam
Pillai
v.
Barabaraa
Dolly
Sethurathinam24, once there is affirmative evidence on these foundational
aspects, the Magistrate is not to delve into complex questions regarding the
validity of marriage under personal law, which fall within the exclusive domain
of the civil court; if the husband disputes the marriage, his remedy lies in
seeking a declaratory decree. Reinforcing this position, Rajathi v. C.
Ganesan25 clarified that the Magistrate must take a prima facie view in such
proceedings, since Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ proceeds on the basis of a de
facto marital relationship rather than a de jure one, and that questions
regarding the validity of marriage cannot defeat a claim for maintenance when
the other statutory requirements stand satisfied.
24.
In Shahada Khatoon v. Amjad Ali26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that the scope of the Magistrate’s power under Section 125(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’
is strictly limited to imposing imprisonment for a term not exceeding one
month, or until earlier payment, and this power cannot be expanded to
authorize continued detention until the arrears are fully cleared. The Court
rejected the contention that the continuing nature of the liability permits
(1988) 1 SCC 530
(1970) 1 SCWR 589
(1999) 6 SCC 326
(1999) 5 SCC 672
indefinite custody, clarifying that upon each breach, the wife must seek fresh
recourse before the Magistrate. Since Section 125(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ clearly
circumscribes the Magistrate’s authority, the High Court rightly upheld this
limitation, and the appeal was consequently dismissed.
25.
In Shashikala Pandey v. Ramesh Prasad Pandey27, the High Court of
Chhattisgarh observed that the respondent had deliberately disobeyed the
earlier maintenance order, and relying on the principle affirmed in Bani v.
Parkash Singh28, held that when a husband willfully defaults in payment of
maintenance and litigation expenses, the law does not compel the wife to
undergo protracted execution proceedings, as such failure amounts to
contumacy. It was reiterated that under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
the matrimonial court possesses ample power to ensure compliance by
striking off the husband’s defence where he neglects to honour court- ordered
maintenance, a view consistently upheld in several decisions of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court.
26.
In Raja Bommadevara Raja Lakshmi Devi Amma v. Raja B.
Naganna Naidu Bahadur Zamindar29, the Hon’ble High Court of Madras held
that the right of a wife to maintenance arises purely from the marital status
and not from any contractual arrangement, the obligation being a personal
liability imposed by Hindu law on the husband. The Court observed that,
among Hindus, a suit for maintenance is not one founded on contract but one
2008 SCC OnLine Chh 9
AIR 1996 P&H 1757
1924 SCC OnLine Mad 220
rooted in the jural relationship of marriage, a civil obligation recognized
independently of any agreement between the parties, and specifically
contemplated under Article 128 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
27.
In Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat30, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court reaffirmed that the obligation of a husband to maintain his wife is a
personal, legal and absolute duty arising from the jural relationship of
marriage, and not from any express or implied contract, and this duty subsists
irrespective of his possession of property. The Court emphasized that a
husband cannot plead financial constraints so long as he is capable of earning,
and similarly, under modern Hindu law, both sons and daughters are
personally obligated to maintain their aged or infirm parents, including a
childless stepmother who cannot maintain herself. Referring to Sections 18
and 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, the Court
reiterated that a Hindu is legally bound to maintain his wife, minor sons,
unmarried daughters, and dependent parents, such obligation flowing from the
very existence of the familial relationship. The Court then addressed the
central issue, whether a stepmother falls within the ambit of Section 125 of
‘the Cr.P.C.,’ framing the question as whether she qualifies as a person
entitled to claim maintenance from her stepson under the provision.
(1996) 4 SCC 479
28.
In Bharat Heavy Plates and Vessels Ltd., Re31, cited in B.P. Achala
Anand v. S. Appi Reddy32, a learned Judge of this Court held that where a
husband, an employee allotted company quarters constituting the matrimonial
home, abandoned the premises after estrangement while his wife and minor
children continued to reside there, the company could not evict them merely
because the husband terminated the lease. Recognizing the husband's
obligation to provide shelter and the parties’ own acknowledgment of the
quarters as the matrimonial home, the Court restrained eviction and directed
that the rent be deducted from the husband’s salary, thus upholding the wife's
right to residence as flowing from the marital relationship.
29.
In Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh33, the Hon’ble Apex Court summarized
that Chapter XXXVI of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ governing maintenance of wives and
children, is intended to serve a social purpose, ensuring prompt relief to
deserted wives and helpless children. It was clarified that Section 488 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ provides multiple forums for initiating proceedings, permitting the wife
or child to proceed against the husband or father not only where he
permanently or temporarily resides, but also where he last resided or where
he is found at the time of initiation of the proceedings.
30.
In Vimala (K.) v. Veeraswamy (K.)34, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reaffirmed that Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is a social- justice measure
AIR 1985 AP 207
(2005) 3 SCC 313
1963 SCC OnLine SC 137
(1991) 2 SCC 375
intended to prevent vagrancy and destitution by providing a speedy remedy
for food, clothing, and shelter to a deserted wife. The Court held that when a
husband attempts to defeat a wife’s claim by portraying her as a kept mistress
on the plea of a prior subsisting marriage, he must furnish strict proof of such
earlier marriage. It clarified that the term “wife” in Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’
includes a divorced woman who has not remarried, consistent with the
provision’s protective purpose; however, a second wife in a void marriage is
excluded from entitlement only if the husband satisfactorily proves the valid
subsistence of the first marriage. Finding that the respondent had failed to
discharge this heavy burden and that the High Court had ignored the required
standard of proof, the Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to
maintenance.
31.
Maintenance, in the contemplation of Indian jurisprudence, is a
socio‑legal obligation flowing inexorably from the status of marriage and the
familial bond. It is not a mere contractual arrangement, but a personal liability
imposed upon the husband, and in certain circumstances upon children, by
virtue of the jural relationship itself. The statutory recognition of this duty under
Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ as well as under the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act, 1956 (for brevity ‘the H.A.M Act’), underscores its character
as a measure of social justice designed to prevent destitution and vagrancy.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that maintenance
encompasses the basic requisites of life, food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
and education, ensuring that dependents are not reduced to penury or forced
into indignity.
32.
The jurisprudential foundation of maintenance rests upon the principle
that a wife, minor children, and dependent parents are entitled to sustenance
commensurate with the status and means of the person legally bound to
maintain them. Courts have emphasized that the obligation is absolute and
cannot be evaded on the pretext of unemployment, financial constraints, or
pendency of other proceedings. In Shamima Farooqui supra, the Hon’ble
Apex Court clarified that excuses such as poor business or lack of income
cannot absolve a healthy, able‑bodied husband of his duty. Maintenance is
thus a continuing liability, enforceable through coercive processes, if
necessary, but never extinguished except by actual payment.
33.
The rules governing maintenance are informed by both statutory
provisions and judicial pronouncements. Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ provides
a summary remedy, preventive in nature, where strict proof of marriage is not
insisted upon, rather, the learned Magistrate may take a prima facie view of
the relationship to secure immediate relief. The quantum of maintenance is
determined by multifactorial considerations: the status of the parties,
reasonable wants of the claimant, income and property of the person liable,
number of dependents, and the standard of living enjoyed in the matrimonial
home. Courts have repeatedly stressed that maintenance is not to be
calculated arithmetically but must be proportionate, equitable, and reflective of
the claimant’s dignity.
34.
Judicial interpretation has also expanded the ambit of “wife” under
Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ to include divorced women who have not
remarried, and in certain contexts, women in long‑term live‑in relationships,
thereby ensuring that the protective purpose of the provision is not defeated
by rigid textualism. In Chanmuniya supra, the Supreme Court urged a socially
purposive interpretation of “wife,” recognizing that strict proof of marriage
should not be a precondition to relief, lest vulnerable women be left destitute.
Similarly, the Court has clarified that maintenance under Section 125 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ is distinct from monetary relief under ‘the D.V.Act’, and both may
coexist, thereby broadening the remedial framework available to women and
children.
35.
Ultimately, maintenance is conceived as a dynamic instrument of
constitutional empathy, falling within the protective ambit of Articles 15(3) and
39 of the Constitution of India. It is a manifestation of the State’s commitment
to safeguard weaker sections of society, particularly women and children, from
neglect and economic deprivation. The liability to maintain is continuous,
enforceable, and insulated from considerations of proprietary holdings, flowing
solely from the existence of the marital or familial relationship. Courts have
consistently reiterated that maintenance is not charity but a right, and its
enforcement is essential to uphold equity, justice, and good conscience. Thus,
maintenance jurisprudence in India stands as a testament to the judiciary’s
resolve to ensure that no wife, child, or dependent parent is left to languish in
penury due to the neglect of those legally bound to sustain them.
36.
Upon consideration of the factual matrix and evidentiary record in the
present matter, the Petitioners examined P.Ws.1 to 3, whereas the
Respondent adduced the testimony of R.W.1. The Petitioners produced and
marked Exhibits A.1 to A.5, while the Respondent brought on record Exhibits
B.1 and B.2 before the learned Trial Court.
37.
The impugned order passed by the learned Family Court in granting
maintenance to the Respondent No.2/wife and Respondent No.3/minor child
under Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ exemplifies a judicious exercise of
discretion, firmly anchored in the sacrosanct principles of social justice. The
cornerstone of the instant controversy resides in Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’
a benevolent provision engrafted into the statute book to ameliorate the plight
of wives, children, and indigent parents forsaken by those legally bound to
sustain them. The right to maintenance thereunder is not a one-time bounty
but an ambulatory, recurring entitlement, crystallizing afresh upon each
breach of obligation, untrammelled by the pendency or outcome of collateral
matrimonial proceedings. Thus, the Respondent No.2/wife's fresh invocation
post-withdrawal of M.C.No.144/2017 stands impregnably fortified, rebutting
the Petitioner's narrative of vexatious litigation.
38.
This Court, upon meticulous scrutiny of the record, finds no scintilla of
perversity or material irregularity warranting interference in revision. The
Petitioner's cavil regarding the purported procedural infraction under Order
XVIII Rule 4 of ‘the C.P.C.,’ vis-à-vis the chief affidavit is untenable, for
proceedings under Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ are summary in nature,
designed to dispense expeditious relief sans the rigours of plenary civil
adjudication. The oral testimony of PW1, replete with cogent details on the
Petitioner's neglect and the Respondent's indigence, stands unassailed and
suffices to discharge the evidentiary threshold, rendering the absence of
corroborative documents inconsequential.
39.
In assaying the quantum awarded Rs.7,500/- to Respondent No.2/wife
and Rs.5,000/- to Respondent No.3/child, the Court is guided by the trite
principle that maintenance must be just and adequate, commensurate with the
husband's pecuniary resources, the dependents' reasonable needs, and
prevailing living standards, eschewing both niggardliness and extravagance.
Oral testimony of PW1, untainted by embellishment and corroborated by life's
stark probabilities, supplants the Petitioner's quibble over absent documents,
for Section 125 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ proceedings privilege substantive justice over
evidentiary formalism. This adjudication, steeped in equity and good
conscience, vindicates the constitutional ethos of Article 39, enshrining the
Directive to secure uniform civil justice for the vulnerable.
40.
The Petitioner's asseveration that the instant petition constitutes a
"second round of litigation" post-withdrawal of M.C.No.144/2017 crumbles
under the weight of judicial precedent, which unequivocally countenances the
independent and recurring character of maintenance claims. Res judicata or
constructive res judicata finds no foothold herein, as the right to sustenance is
not extinguished by prior proceedings but accrues afresh with each instance
of default. The learned Family Court astutely discerned that multiplicity of
proceedings, far from bespeaking harassment, stems inexorably from the
Petitioner's obdurate refusal to fulfil his statutory and moral imperative under
Section 125(1) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ to maintain his wife and progeny, thereby
precipitating recurrent applications for redress.
41.
Equally meritless is the Petitioner's grievance anent the pendency of
D.O.P.No.3/2016 before the learned Principal District Judge, Machilipatnam,
and G.W.O.P No.52/2017 before the learned Family Court, Vijayawada. The
doctrine of lis pendens or forum shopping does not vitiate the Respondent's
invocation of concurrent remedies, each tailored to discrete facets of
matrimonial discord. This Court reiterates the hallowed principle that
maintenance entitlements are not mutually exclusive but operate in tandem to
effectuate equity, precluding the Petitioner from leveraging parallel litigations
as a shield against his inescapable liabilities.
42.
The Respondent No.3 is aged about 8 years. He is with his mother
Respondent No.2. He is being imparted with necessary education,
nourishment and the quantum of maintenance, Rs.7,500/- per mensem to
Respondent No.2/wife and Rs.5,000/- to Respondent No.3/child, bears the
imprimatur of reasonableness, calibrated to the Petitioner's earning capacity,
the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 exigencies, and prevailing socio-economic
parameters and subsequent expositions. No arbitrariness or violation of
natural justice taints the adjudication, which evinces a balanced appraisal of
competing equities. In the absence of demonstrable error, palpable infirmity,
or jurisdictional overreach, the impugned order merits undisturbed affirmation.
43.
Finding no illegality let alone patent illegality or miscarriage of justice,
the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed sans costs.
As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand
closed.
_________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
Dt: 09.02.2026
Note: LR copy to be marked.
B/o
VTS
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