The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
9. Applying the well settled principles of law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and further considering the fact that the identical issue has already been considered and decided by this Court in Sumitra Bai (supra); and for the reasons mentioned in the application, I.A. No.2, for condonation of delay of 218 days in filing the appeal is hereby rejected.
10. Consequently, the instant arbitration appeal is also dismissed on this score alone. Sd/(Bibhu Datta Guru) $. Bhilwar
Full Judgment Text
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The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:CGHC:9347
SOURABH
BHILWAR
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SOURABH
BHILWAR
Date: 2026.02.23
18:08:49 +0530
ARBA No. 75 of 2025
Chief Engineer Public Works Department, National Highway Zone, NH
Campus Pension Bada, Raipur (C.G.), Through Executive Engineer,
Public Works Department, National Highway Division, Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Appellant
versus
1 - Rohit Sidar S/o Late Shri Balakram Aged About 61 Years R/o
Masaniyakala, Tehsil Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh (NonApplicant No. 1)
2 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue)-Cum-Competent Authority Under
Land Acquisition, Champa, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
(The cause title is as per the Memo of Appeal)
For Appellant(s)
:
For Respondent No. 1
:
Mr. R.K. Mishra, DSGI alongwith Mr. Rishabh
Dev Singh, CGC
Mr. Ramakant Patel, Advocate alongwith Mr.
:
Shubham Patel, Advocate
Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy. Govt. Advocate
For Respondent/ State
Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Order on Board
23/02/2026
1.
Heard on I.A. No. 2 of 2025, application for condonation of delay
of 218 days in filing this arbitration appeal filed under Section 37
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
2.
The present appeal arises out of land acquisition proceedings
initiated under the National Highways Act, 1956 for widening of
National Highway No. 200 (New 49), wherein land of the private
respondent was acquired and an award dated 16.04.2018 was
passed by the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA)
determining
compensation.
Being
dissatisfied,
the
private
respondent preferred an application under Section 3G(5) of the
Act
seeking
enhancement
of
compensation. The
learned
Arbitrator, instead of re-determining the compensation, remanded
the matter to the CALA for passing a revised/modified award vide
arbitral award dated 21.02.2023. The appellant challenged the
said award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996; however, the learned District Court, vide order dated
27.09.2024, dismissed the application while observing that the
Arbitrator had acted beyond the scope of Section 3G(5).
Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present
appeal.
3.
Learned DSGI appearing for the appellant submits that the
present appeal has been filed along with an application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of
218 days in filing the appeal. He further submits that the appeal
was filed on 17.04.2025. It is further submitted that after the
impugned order dated 27.09.2024 was passed and the certified
copy was obtained, the appellant sought legal opinion from its
counsel, who advised filing an appeal under Section 37 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The matter was thereafter
placed before the superior authority for approval and, upon
approval, entrusted to counsel for drafting. During this period, the
then Executive Engineer (officer-in-charge) superannuated and
the post remained vacant for some time. Subsequently, after the
new officer assumed charge and the winter vacation intervened,
the draft was approved and the appeal was filed. He also submits
that the delay occurred due to these administrative and procedural
circumstances, and not deliberately or with malafide intention. It is
therefore prayed that the delay may be condoned considering the
plausible explanation offered by the appellant..
4.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondents submit that
the issue involved in the present arbitration appeal, regarding
delay, has already been considered and decided by this Court
vide judgment dated 02.02.2026 passed in ARBA No.62 of 2025
(Sumitra Bai vs. Executive Engineer, PWD & Ors.) placing
reliance upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the
matter of Government of Maharasthra (Water Resources
Department) vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors
Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460. Learned counsel further
submits that the delay of 218 days has not been satisfactorily
explained and the grounds urged are vague and general in nature,
which do not constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is contended that the appellant
has been grossly negligent in prosecuting the matter and the
application has been filed only to overcome the statutory bar of
limitation.
5.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
6.
In the case at hand, after going through the papers placed before
this Court, it is evident that the order impugned was passed on
27/09/2024; applied and received the certified copy of the same
on 04/12/2024 and thereafter the appellant preferred the instant
appeal before this Court on 02/08/2025. The Registry on due
computation, found that the appeal is barred by delay of 218 days.
The period of limitation to file the appeal is 90 days. The appellant
has failed to demonstrate any sufficient cause for not filing the
appeal within the stipulated period prescribed under the provisions
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, except citing certain
administrative and procedural circumstances, which themselves
do not constitute a satisfactory explanation for condonation of
delay. In fact, there was a long delay of 218 days beyond the
prescribed period. The explanation feel woefully short of making
out any sufficient cause. It is also noteworthy to mention here that
merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of
a given case, there is no vested right in the appellant to have
delay condoned.
7.
The Supreme Court in the matter of Borse Brothers Engineers
and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held thus at para 62, 63 & 68 :
“62. Also, it must be remembered that merely because
sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given
case, there is no right in the appellant to have delay
condoned. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa
Coalfields Ltd. as follows: (SCR p. 771: AIR p. 365, para
12)-"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even
after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not
entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a
matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a
condition
precedent
for
the
exercise
of
the
discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section
5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has
to be done; the application for condoning delay has to
be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause
is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its
discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of
the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all
relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of
the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration;
but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the
discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown
would naturally be limited only to such facts as the
Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an
enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all
the time available to it. In this connection we may point
out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence
are always material and relevant when the Court is
dealing with applications made under Section 14 of
the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the
Court is called upon to consider the effect of the
combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore,
in our opinion, considerations which have been
expressly
made
material
and
relevant
by
the
provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent
and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with
applications which fall to be decided only under
Section 5 without reference to Section 14."
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal
sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and
the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section
37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116
and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of
the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30
days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a
party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent
manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the
discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in
mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite
party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what
may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or
laches.
68. This explanation falls woefully short of making out any
sufficient cause. This appeal is therefore allowed and the
condonation of delay is set aside on this score also.”
8.
In the absence of any sufficient cause and explanations, the
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be
entertained as a matter of routine, particularly, when the delay in
filing of the instant appeal is for a period of 218 days.
9.
Applying the well settled principles of law laid down by the Apex
Court in the matter of Borse Brothers Engineers and
Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and further considering the fact
that the identical issue has already been considered and decided
by this Court in Sumitra Bai (supra); and for the reasons
mentioned in the application, I.A. No.2, for condonation of delay of
218 days in filing the appeal is hereby rejected.
10.
Consequently, the instant arbitration appeal is also dismissed on
this score alone.
Sd/(Bibhu Datta Guru)
JUDGE
$. Bhilwar
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