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SYED
ROSHAN
ZAMIR
ALI
Digitally
signed by
SYED
ROSHAN
ZAMIR ALI
CGHC010415862025
2026:CGHC:31023-DB
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ARBA No. 71 of 2025
1. Chhattisgarh Samvad Through- General Manager, Sector-19,
North Block, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.)
... Appellant
Versus
1. M/s Chhattisgarh Packagers Pvt Ltd 4/1, Nehru Nagar, Bhilai,
Bhilai, District- Durg (C.G.)
... Respondent
For Appellant
:
Mr. Ankit Singhal & Mr. Ashish Mittal, Advocates
For Respondent
:
Mr. Amit Soni & Mr. Deepak Sharma, Advocates
DB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Parth Prateem Sahu,J
& Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sachin Singh Rajput, J
Order on Board
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J
21.07.2026
1. Appellant has filed this arbitration appeal against the order
dated 08.08.2025 passed in Arb. M.J.C. No.04/2021 by the
Commercial Court (District Level) Nawa Raipur, District
Raipur.
2. Learned counsel for appellant submits that respondent is
registered as a micro small and medium enterprise having
registration No.220101201832 dated 29.07.2013 issued by
the District Trade and Industry Centre, Durg. Appellant had
placed with respondent work order of printing tin board and in
lieu of aforementioned work, respondent has submitted the
bills/invoices for a total sum of Rs.1,58,04,864/- against which
respondent has disbursed a sum of Rs.70,95,744/- only.
Aggrieved with non-payment of entire bills raised, respondent
filed an application under Section 18 (1) of the Micro, Small
and Medium Enterprise Development Act, 2006 (for short ‘the
Act of 2006’) before the Chhattisgarh Micro and Small
Enterprises Facilitation Council, Raipur (for short ‘the
Council’) on 30.3.2015. Upon service of notice issued under
Section 18 (2) of the Act of 2006, appellant appeared before
the Council on the date fixed in the notice, however, without
following due process as provided under Section 18 (2) and
(3) of the Act of 2006, the Council has passed the award on
23.12.2020.
Even the procedure as prescribed under the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act of
1996’) was not followed.
3. He contended that under Section 18 (3) of the Act of 2006 it is
specifically provided that where conciliation initiated under
sub-section (2) of Section 18 is not successful, the
proceeding under Section 18 (2) of the Act of 2006 has to be
terminated and thereafter the Council shall either itself take
up the dispute for arbitration or refer it to any institution or
center for such arbitration proceeding.
In a proceeding of
arbitration arising out of the provision under Section 18 (3) of
the Act of 2006, the provisions under the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act of 1996’) will apply.
However, in the present case, the Council has firstly not
terminated the proceeding of conciliation and further not
recorded that the Council itself is taking up the dispute for
arbitration directing the respondent to file statement of claim
and thereafter fixing the date for submission of written
statement on statement of claim. Procedure as provided
under Section 23 of the Act of 1996 is followed. Hence, the
Council has committed legal misconduct in passing the award
dated 20.2.2020.
4. Aggrieved with said award, appellant filed an application
under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before the Commercial
Court (District Judge Level) Raipur, which came to be
registered as Arb. MJC No.4/2021. Learned Commercial
Court without considering the grounds raised in the
application, has dismissed the same observing that appellant
has not fulfilled the conditions enumerated under Section 34
of the Act of 1996. It is submitted that to arrive at such a
conclusion, learned Commercial Court has taken into
consideration the pleadings made in the application under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996, in particular Paragraph No.1.
The pleading in Para-1 of application is to the effect that the
Council has made an attempt to conciliate the parties to the
proceedings under Section 18 (2) of the Act of 2006 and when
conciliation could not arrive at, the proceeding in terms of
Section 18 (3) of the Act of 2006 was commenced.
5. He contended that whether the Council has followed the
procedure, as provided under the Act of 2006 as also the Act
of 1996 is to be considered and appreciated from the
pleadings recorded by the Council in its order sheets and not
by erroneous pleadings, if made, in subsequent proceedings
by wrong understanding of law. Said pleadings made cannot
be used as estoppel. In support of his submission, he places
reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of
Groupe Chimique Tunisien SA vs Southern Petrochemicals
Industries Corpn. Ltd., reported in (2006) 5 SCC 275.
6. He next contended that as the procedure provided under
Section 18 (2) and (3) of the Act of 2006 has not been
complied with by the Council and further the procedure as
envisaged under Chapter-V of the Act of 1996, in particular
the procedure provided under Section 23, the award passed
by the Council is not sustainable. In support of his
submission, he places reliance on the decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in case of Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam
Limited vs State of Rajasthan and others, reported in (2021)
19 SCC 206; order of this High Court dated 03.12.2024 in
WPC No.1440/2023 (Chhattisgarh Samvad vs M/s Shri Ram
Printers and Stationers) and the order dated 22.06.2026 in
WP227 No.67/2025, parties being M/s Jai Bajrang Industries
Ltd. vs Garuda Ispat Private Limited.
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent would
vehemently opposes submissions of learned counsel for
appellant that the procedure prescribed under Section 18 (2)
and (3) of the Act of 2006 has not been followed. The Council
after coming to the conclusion that settlement between the
parties is not arrived at in conciliation proceeding, has issued
notice to the appellant on 6.1.2016 mentioning that
proceeding of arbitration is started under Section 18 (3) after
terminating the proceeding under Section 18 (2) of the Act of
2006 and date of hearing in the notice is mentioned as
‘30.1.2016’.
From the contents of notice, appellant was
aware that proceeding of conciliation had been terminated
and proceeding of arbitration is initiated. He also referred to
the pleadings made in the application under Section 34 of the
Act of 1996 filed by appellant and submitted that appellant
has clearly mentioned in the application that arbitration
proceeding was started after terminating the proceeding of
conciliation under Section 18 (2) of the Act of 2006. Learned
Commercial Court has rightly taken into consideration
aforementioned fact and has passed the impugned order in
accordance with law which does not call for any interference.
In support of his submission, he referred the documents
forming part of paper book.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the documents forming part of the paper book.
9. In the paper book, proceeding of the Council is available from
Page No.284 onward.
According to proceeding dated
19.5.2015, an application submitted by respondent was
registered and notice to appellant herein was proposed. On
15.6.2015, notice to appellant herein was ordered.
In the
proceedings recorded on 10.7.2015, 2.9.2015, it is only
mentioned that the parties are present and similarly on
7.10..2015
same
proceeding
was
recorded.
In
the
proceeding, the Council has not recorded that conciliation
proceeding failed and as such proceeding initiated under
Section 18 (2) of the Act of 2006 stands terminated. Further,
in the proceeding it is recorded that notice be issued for
hearing on 30.1.2016. Further proceeding recorded would
reflects that the Council has only mentioned about issuance
of notice, appearance of parties.
In the proceeding dated
24.5.2016, it is mentioned that reply to the letter is filed and
thereafter award was passed.
10.
Before proceeding further, we find it appropriate to extract
relevant provisions of the Act of 2006 applicable to the facts
of the case. Section 18 (1) to (3) are material for the present
case, therefore, the same are reproduced herein below:“18.Reference to Micro and Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in
force, any party to a dispute may, with regard to any
amount due under section 17, make a reference to
the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council.
(2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1),
the Council shall either itself conduct conciliation in
the matter or seek the assistance of any institution
or centre providing alternate dispute resolution
services by making a reference to such an institution
or centre, for conducting conciliation and the
provisions of sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to
such a dispute as if the conciliation was initiated
under Part III of that Act.
(3) Where the conciliation initiated under subsection (2) is not successful and stands terminated
without any settlement between the parties, the
Council shall either itself take up the dispute for
arbitration or refer it to any institution or centre
providing alternate dispute resolution services for
such arbitration and the provisions of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall then
apply to the dispute as if the arbitration was in
pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in
sub-section (1) of section 7 of that Act.”
11.
Bare perusal of afore extracted provisions of the Act of 2006
would show that application before the Council is to be
submitted by the parties under sub-section (1) of Section 18
and conciliation proceeding has to be initiated by the Council
under sub-section (2) of Section 18, for which provision of
Section 65 to 81 of the Act of 1996 shall apply. For initiating
proceeding under sub-section (3) of Section 18, the Council
has to record that conciliation proceeding initiated under subsection (2) of Section 18 is not successful and it stands
terminated. In case at hand, the Council has not drawn such
proceeding in its order sheets but for recording appearance of
the parties and further notice was issued for appearance of
appellant herein on 30.1.2016.
12. Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act of 2006 clearly
envisages that the Council itself can take up the dispute or
refer to it any institution or centre providing alternate dispute
resolution services for arbitration and further the provision of
the Act of 1996 shall then apply to the dispute. For proceeding
under Section 18 (3) of the Act of 2006, the procedure as
envisaged under Chapter-V of the Act of 1996 shall have to be
followed, which deals with conduct of arbitral proceeding.
Section 19 of the Act of 1996 talks of determination of rules of
procedure which is extracted below for ready reference:-
“19. Determination of rules of procedure. - (1) The
arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).
(2) Subject to this Part, the parties are free to agree
on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal
in conducting its proceedings.
(3) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section
(2), the arbitral tribunal may, subject to this Part,
conduct the proceedings in the manner it considers
appropriate.
(4) The power of the arbitral tribunal under subsection (3) includes the power to determine the
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any
evidence.”
13. Section 21 of the Act of 1996 talks of commencement of arbitral
proceeding, which is also quoted herein below:“21. Commencement of arbitral proceedings.- (1)
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral
proceedings
in
respect
of
a
particular
dispute
commence on the date on which a request for that
dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the
respondent.
14. Section 23 of the Act of 1996 talks of statement of claim and
defence.
Section
provides
for
hearing
and
written
proceedings. Both the aforementioned provisions are relevant
in the facts of case, therefore, the same are extracted below:“23. Statement of claim and defence.- (1) Within the
period of time agreed upon by the parties or
determined by the arbitral tribunal, the claimant shall
state the facts supporting his claim, the points at
issue and the relief or remedy sought, and the
respondent shall state his defence in respect of these
particulars, unless the parties have otherwise agreed
as to the required elements of those statements.
(2) The parties may submit with their statements all
documents they consider to be relevant or may add a
reference to the documents or other evidence they
will submit.
(2A) The respondent, in support of his case, may also
submit a counterclaim or plead a set-off, which shall
be adjudicated upon by the arbitral tribunal, if such
counterclaim or set-off falls within the scope of the
arbitration agreement.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, either
party may amend or supplement his claim or defence
during the course of the arbitral proceedings, unless
the arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow
the amendment or supplement having regard to the
delay in making it.
(4) The statement of claim and defence under this
section shall be completed within a period of six
months from the date the arbitrator or all the
arbitrators, as the case may be, received notice, in
writing, of their appointment.”
24. Hearings and written proceedings. (1) Unless
otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal
shall decide whether to hold oral hearings for the
presentation of evidence or for oral argument, or
whether the proceedings shall be conducted on the
basis of documents and other materials:
Provided that the arbitral tribunal shall hold oral
hearings, at an appropriate stage of the proceedings,
on a request by a party, unless the parties have
agreed that no oral hearing shall be held.
Provided further that the arbitral tribunal shall, as far
as possible, hold oral hearings for the presentation of
evidence or for oral argument on day-to-day basis,
and not grant any adjournments unless sufficient
cause is made out, and may impose costs including
exemplary costs on the party seeking adjournment
without any sufficient cause.
(2)The parties shall be given sufficient advance notice
of any hearing and of any meeting of the arbitral
tribunal for the purposes of inspection of documents,
goods or other property.
(3)All statements, documents or other information
supplied to, or applications made to the arbitral
tribunal by one party shall be communicated to the
other party, and any expert report or evidentiary
document on which the arbitral tribunal may rely in
making its decision shall be communicated to the
parties.”
15. Under Section 23 (1) of the Act of 1996, it is provided that
claimant shall state the facts supporting his claim, the points at
issue and the relief or remedy sought , and the respondent shall
state his defence in respect of these particulars unless the
parties have otherwise agreed as to the required elements of
those statements.
16. In case at hand, respondent had submitted an application under
Section 18 (1) of the Act of 2006 based upon which the Council
has initiated the proceeding under sub-section (2) of Section 18,
but the Council has not recorded in the proceeding that because
conciliation proceeding is unsuccessful, the proceeding of
conciliation under Section 18 (2) of the Act of 2006 is terminated
and the Council itself is taking up the matter for arbitration and
adjudicating the dispute. Failure to record such proceeding, in
the opinion of this Court, had vitiated the entire process and
passing of award dated 20.02.2020 by the Council.
17. If for the sake of arguments only, submission of learned counsel
for respondent is to be accepted that notice dated 6.1.2016, is
issued mentioning that by closing proceedings arbitration
proceeding is started under Section 18 (3) of the Act of 2006,
which is not forming part of the paper book but placed before
this Court by learned counsel for respondent for perusal, then
also, contents of said notice, if read in its entirety, would show
that such facts is mentioned, however, in the said notice it is
mentioned that the parties to the proceeding shall submit written
arguments. From bare perusal of contents of notice, which is
relied upon by learned counsel for respondent, dated 6.1.2015
fixing the date of hearing on 30.1.2016 would show that the
Council has not adopted the procedure as envisaged under
Chapter-V of the Act of 1996 but straightaway directed the
parties to submit written arguments. Even in subsequent
proceeding from 30.1.2016, as is available in the paper book,
nowhere mentioned that the Council has fixed the case for
submission of statement of claim, statement of defence etc. Nor
any application is submitted by respondent herein that his
application under Section 18 (1) of the Act of 2006 be treated as
statement of claim. No such proceeding is recorded by the
Council nor there is proceeding of the Council directing the
appellant herein to submit statement of defence.
18. In case of Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v.
Mahakali Foods Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2023) 6 SCC 401,
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus:“47.The aforesaid legal position also dispels the
arguments advanced on behalf of the counsel for the
buyers that the Facilitation Council having acted as a
Conciliator under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act,
2006 itself cannot take up the dispute for arbitration
and act as an Arbitrator. Though it is true that Section
80 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 contains a bar that the
Conciliator shall not act as an Arbitrator in any arbitral
proceedings in respect of a dispute that is subject of
conciliation
proceedings,
the
said
bar
stands
superseded by the provisions contained in Section 18
read with Section 24 of the MSMED Act, 2006. As held
earlier, the provisions contained in Chapter-V of the
MSMED Act, 2006 have an effect overriding the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The provisions
of
Arbitration
Act,
would
apply
to
the
proceedings conducted by the Facilitation Council only
after the process of conciliation initiated by the council
under Section 18(2) fails and the council either itself
takes up the dispute for arbitration or refers to it to any
institute or centre for such arbitration as contemplated
under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006.”
19. In Oil & Natural Gas Corporation vs M/s Wig Brothers
Builders and Engineers Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2010) 13 SCC
377 Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus:“…...An award is not open to challenge on the ground
that the arbitrator had reached a wrong conclusion or
had failed to appreciate some facts. But if there is an
error apparent on the face of the award or if there is
misconduct on the part of the arbitrator or legal
misconduct in conducting the proceedings or in making
the award, the court will interfere with the award.”
20. In case of Cochin Shipyard Ltd. Vs. Apeejay Shipping Ltd.
reported in (2015)15 SCC 522, Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed as under:“19. …….As far as legal misconduct is concerned, as
the authorities would demonstrate, the same must be
manifest or palpable from the proceedings before the
arbitrator. To elaborate, a person urging the ground of
legal misconduct has to satisfy the court from the
records of the arbitral proceedings that there has been
a legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator as a
consequence of which the award gets vitiated. The
question of adducing any kind of oral evidence to
substantiate the plea or stand or stance does not arise.
It has to be shown from the proceedings carried on
before the arbitrator and the evidence adduced before
the arbitrator. Evidence cannot be adduced in court to
substantiate the challenge on the score of legal
misconduct. We are not entering upon any discussion
pertaining to moral misconduct as that is not the issue
in the case at hand. The decision in Fiza Developers
and Inter-Trade Private Limited (supra) has been
rendered by this Court while interpreting Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. The context being different, we are not
inclined to apply the principles enumerated therein to
the objection filed Under Sections 30 and 33 of the
1940 Act, for the simon pure reason that the authorities
are plenty to make it limpid that the issue of legal
misconduct on the part of the arbitrator should be
manifestly discernible from the record.”
21. In the case at hand also, as the proceedings conducted by the
Council were not in conformity with the mandatory provisions of
the Act of 2006, therefore, the award dated 20.02.2020 suffers
from an error which is apparent on the face of record.
22. Coming to the finding recorded by the learned Commercial Court
while dismissing application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996
filed by appellant herein, that none of the grounds raised by
applicant/appellant herein fulfill the conditions enumerated under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for which impugned award may be
interfered with.
23. Section 34 of the Act of 1996 provides for setting aside an
award. Section 34 (2) contemplates an arbitral award may be
set aside by the Court only in following circumstances:-
“(a) the party making the application establishes on the
basis of the record of arbitral tribunal that (i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the
law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing
any indication thereon, under the law for the time
being in force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not given
proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or
of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of
the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from
those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral
award which contains decisions on matters not
submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, unless such agreement
was in conflict with a provision of this Part from
which the parties cannot derogate, or failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with this Part;
or…….”
24. Reading of Section 34 (2) of the Act of 1996, as quoted above,
makes it clear that an arbitral award can be set aside on the
grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 34 and on no
other ground. Clause (iii) of sub-section (2) of Section 34
expressly provides that an arbitral award is liable to be set aside
if the party making an application under Section 34 of the Act
was not given proper notice of appointment of arbitrator or of the
arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his
case. Thus, it can be contemplated that Section 34 (2) (a) (iii) of
the Act of 1996 consists of three distinct limbs joined
disjunctively by the word “or”, which means, if any of the
conditions, as mentioned above, is established, it is sufficient to
attract the ground for setting aside arbitral award.
25. From the document of the Council dated 6.1.2016 addressed to
appellant herein, which is placed by learned counsel for
respondent for perusal of this Court, it can be seen that on the
basis of application submitted by respondent herein, conciliation
proceeding was drawn by the Council; reply on behalf of
appellant was filed and on account of non-settlement of dispute
between the parties, the Council took the dispute for arbitration
itself under Section 18 (3) of the Act of 2006 and issued notice to
appellant herein. Hence, it is clear that intimation of arbitral
proceeding under Section 18 (3) of the Act of 2006 was duly
given to appellant herein and pursuant thereto appellant
appeared before the Council. Thus, first and second limb of
Section 34 (2) (a) (iii) of the Act of 1996 are satisfied in present
case.
26. Now, the question that arise for consideration is whether
appellant herein was able to present his case before the Council
effectively, which is the third limb of Section 34(2)(a)(iii) of the
Act of 1996.
27. Section 18 (3) of the Act of 2006 empowers the Council to itself
arbitrate the dispute when the conciliation initiated under Section
18 (2) is not successful, and to pass an award. It further makes it
clear that when arbitration proceeding is initiated all the
provisions of the Act of 1996 will apply, as if arbitration was in
pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred under subsection (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 1996. Thus, if the Council
decides to conduct the arbitration proceedings, the relevant
provisions under the Act of 1996 will apply and the procedure
contemplated under the Act of 1996 is to be followed. Meaning
thereby, once the Council has assumed the role of the Arbitrator,
it requires to issue notice to applicant to file a statement of claim
in accordance with Section 23 (1) of the Act of 1996 setting out
the facts supporting the claim, issues in dispute, relief sought
and documents relied upon, and thereafter to respondent calling
for statement of defence and counter claim, if any, in support of
his case.
28. A perusal of the order sheets recorded by the Council as also
the award passed by the Council dated 23.12.2020 reveals that
upon making application for conciliation by respondent herein,
attempt was made by the Council to conciliate between parties,
however, there was no favourable outcome and therefore, the
Council itself has taken up the dispute for arbitration under
Section 18 (3) of the Act of 2006, directed both the parties to
submit their written arguments and fixed the matter on 30.1.2016
directing the parties to appear for hearing along with necessary
documents.
On
30.1.2016,
applicant/respondent
herein
submitted letter dated 24.11.2015, a copy whereof was supplied
to non-applicant/ appellant herein for filing its reply as also
written arguments within 21 days. Appellant herein filed reply on
04.05.2016 to letter dated 24.11.2015. Thereafter, the matter
was taken up by the Council on various dates and only presence
of the parties was recorded.
On 20.02.2020 the matter was
finally heard by the Council and the award was passed on
23.12.2020. In the entire proceeding of the Council, there is
nothing
to
show
filing
of
a
statement
of
claim
by
claimant/respondent herein, submission of statement of defence
by
non-applicant/appellant
herein,
framing
of
points
for
determination, production of evidence etc. as contemplated
under the Act of 1996.
29. When the Council had invoked the proceedings under Section
18 (3) of the Act of 2006 and acted as an Arbitrator, it ought to
have taken up the dispute as an Arbitrator and should have
followed the procedure enumerated under the Act of 1996. The
Council proceeded to adjudicate the dispute without directing
claimant/respondent herein to file a Statement of Claim in
arbitral proceedings and without granting
opportunity to
appellant herein to file statement of defence, as contemplated
under Section 23 of the Act of 1996.
The Council did not even
conduct any proceeding such as recording evidences, marking
of documents, opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of
claimant etc.
30. Application filed under Section 18 (1) of the Act of 2006 for
initiating conciliation could not, by itself, be treated as statement
of claim in arbitral proceedings. Proceedings for conciliation and
arbitration cannot be clubbed as there is a fundamental
difference between conciliation and arbitration. During the
conciliation proceedings, the Council was under obligation to
assists the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, in an
impartial and independent manner. Whereas, in arbitration, the
arbitral tribunal / arbitrator adjudicates the disputes between the
parties based on the pleadings in statement of claim, statement
of defence and evidence in support thereof adduced by
respective parties.
necessitated
Transition from conciliation to arbitration
compliance
with
the
mandatory
procedure
prescribed under the Act of 1996. The claimant must present a
clear statement of claim, setting out facts, reliefs, and supporting
documents. Respondent must then be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to submit a statement of defence. Only through such
exchange does the Council obtain a crystallized understanding
of disputes. If this statutory stage is bypassed, very identification
of issues remains absent. Adjudication without pleadings is akin
to deciding in a vacuum, depriving parties of opportunity to
contest. By surpassing the mandatory provision of the Act of
1996, the Council deprived the appellant herein of its statutory
right to effectively present its case, which also amounts to
violation of the principles of natural justice.
31. In case of
Associate Builders vs Delhi Development
Authority, reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49, Hon’ble Supreme Court
has observed thus:“30...The Audi Alteram Partem principle which
undoubtedly is a fundamental juristic principle in Indian
law is also contained in Sections 18 and 34 (2) (a) (iii)
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. These Sections
read as follows:
"18. Equal treatment of parties.- The parties shall
be treated with equality and each party shall be
given a full opportunity to present his case.
34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court
only if- (a) the party making the application
furnishes proof that(iii) the party making the application was not given
proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or
of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable
to present his case; "
32. In Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. vs.
National Highways Authority of India Ltd. 2019 SCC OnLine
SC 677, the Supreme Court has held as under:-
"35. …..However, insofar as principles of natural
justice are concerned, as contained in Sections 18
and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 1996 Act, these continue to be
grounds of challenge of an award, as is contained in
paragraph 30 of Associate Builders (supra).”
33. In case of Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. (supra), Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed thus:“14. From a reading of Section 18(2) and 18(3) of the
MSMED Act it is clear that the Council is obliged to
conduct conciliation for which the provisions of
Sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 would apply, as if the conciliation was
initiated under Part III of the said Act. Under Section
18(3), when conciliation fails and stands terminated,
the dispute between the parties can be resolved by
arbitration. The Council is empowered either to take
up arbitration on its own or to refer the arbitration
proceedings to any institution as specified in the said
Section. It is open to the Council to arbitrate and pass
an award, after following the procedure under the
relevant provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, particularly Sections 20, 23, 24, 25.”
34. As discussed above, as the Council did not initiate arbitration
proceedings in accordance with mandatory provisions envisaged
under the Act of 1996, as a result of which appellant was unable
to present his case before the Council effectively, which also
amounts to violation of principles of natural justice, and
therefore, the award passed by the Council is vitiated under
Section 34 (2) (a) (iii) of the Act of 1996. Thus, finding of learned
Commercial Court that appellant has not been able to fulfill any
of the conditions enumerated under Section 34 of the Act of
1996 is erroneous and not sustainable.
35. Coming to the argument raised by learned counsel for
respondent based on the observation made by the learned
Commercial Court on Para-1 of the pleadings made in
application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 that when
settlement is not arrived in proceeding under Section 18 (2) of
the Act of 2006, arbitration proceeding is started under Section
18 (3) is concerned, the Court is conscious of the fact that
pleadings being the handwork of lawyer, may be imperfect or
suffer from defects or omission. Nevertheless, the proceedings
conducted before the authority concerned are the best evidence
of what actually transpired and must prevail over any deficiency
in the pleadings. The pleadings made by wrong understanding of
law, would not estop the party to take other correct stand in
subsequent proceedings as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
case of Group Chimique Tunisien SA (supra). Relevant portion
of said decision is reproduced herein below:“9.It is true that the petitioner had contended before
the Jordanian Court that there was no arbitration
agreement
between
the
parties.
But
the
said
contention was not accepted and the suit filed by the
petitioner has been dismissed on the ground of want
of jurisdiction. Thereafter, on reconsidering the matter
and taking legal advice, with reference to the
contentions of the respondent, the petitioner has now
proceeded on the basis that an arbitration agreement
exists between the parties. If, on account of mistake or
wrong understanding of law, a party takes a particular
stand (that is, there is no arbitration agreement), he is
not barred from changing his stand subsequently or
estopped from seeking arbitration. (See U.P. Rajkiya
Nirman Nigam Ltd. v. Indore (P) Ltd., [1996] 2 SCC
667, where the contention based on estoppel was
negatived while considering a reserve (sic reverse)
situation.”
36. In above facts of the case and decision of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Group Chimique Tunisien SA (supra), submission made
by learned counsel for respondent and finding recorded by
learned Commercial Court in impugned order under Section 34
of the Act of 1996 is not sustainable.
37. In view of aforesaid discussion and taking into consideration
above decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is apparent that
appellant was not granted proper opportunity to present his
case.
Accordingly, the impugned order dated 08.08.2025
passed by the Commercial Court (District Level) Raipur in Arb.
MJC No.4/2021 is set aside. Application under Section 34 of the
Act of 1996 filed by appellant herein is allowed and the award
dated 20.02.2020 passed by the Council is set aside. The matter
is remanded back to the Council for reconsideration from the
stage contemplated under Section 18 (2) of the Act of 2006 and
for proceeding thereafter strictly in accordance with law.
38. Copy of document of the Council dated 06.01.2016, which is
placed by learned counsel for appellant, be treated as part and
parcel of the paper book.
Sd/(Parth Prateem Sahu)
Judge
roshan/-
Sd/(Sachin Singh Rajput)
Judge
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