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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.54 of 2026
Date of Decision: 15.06.2026
_________________________________________________________________________
Chanjeet Singh
State Bank of Patiala & Anr.
Versus
……...Petitioner
…....Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Goldy Kumar, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. Arvind Sharma, Advocate, for respondent No.1.
Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional
Advocates General with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr.
Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for
respondent No.2-State.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 read
with Section 442 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, lays challenge to
judgment dated 10.06.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, in
Criminal Appeal No.67D/X/21/2017, affirming the judgment of conviction
dated 13.10.2017 and order of sentence dated 17.10.2017, passed by the
learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.I, Dharamshala, District
Kangra, H.P. in Criminal complaint No.17-II/2015, whereby the learned
Court below, while holding the petitioner-accused (in short the "accused")
guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the "Act”), convicted and sentenced
him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and pay
compensation to the tune of Rs.3,00,000/- to respondent No.1-complainant
(in short the "complainant").
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as
well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties are that
complainant instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Act in the
competent Court of law, alleging therein that on 17.05.2013, at the request
of the accused, it advanced a term loan amounting to Rs. 10,00,000/- for
the purchase of truck, on the prevailing terms and conditions of the bank,
including interest. As per the agreed terms, the accused was required to
repay the loan amount along with interest in 81 regular monthly
installments of Rs. 19,481/- each. However, fact remains that accused
failed to repay the installments, as a result thereof, loan account became
irregular and with a view to discharge his aforesaid liability, accused issued
cheque bearing No.298129 dated 31.12.2013 amounting to Rs.1,50,000/in favour of the complainant, but aforesaid cheque on its presentation was
dishonoured with the remarks “Funds insufficient”. Since accused failed to
make the payment good within the stipulated period despite his having
received legal notice, complainant had no option, but to initiate proceedings
under Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of law.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
3.
by
the
respective
parties,
vide
judgment/order
dated
13.10.2017/17.10.2017, held the accused guilty of his having committed
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted
and sentenced him as per the description given herein above.
4.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of
conviction recorded by the learned Court below, accused preferred an
appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra at
Dharamshala, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, but same was dismissed
vide judgment dated 10.06.2025.
In the aforesaid background, accused
has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for
his acquittal after setting-aside the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence recorded by the learned Court below.
5.
Vide order dated 09.01.2026, this Court stayed the substantive
sentence imposed by the learned Court below subject to the accused
depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing personal bond
in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like amount within a
period of four weeks. Though aforesaid order was complied with, but
thereafter matter was repeatedly adjourned, enabling the accused either to
settle the matter with the complainant-bank or to deposit the remaining
amount, but in vain. On 07.05.2026, it came to be stated at the behest of
the petitioner that he is ready and willing to settle the matter with the
complainant-bank, as such, this Court adjourned the matter for today’s
date, but since today neither accused has come present nor has deposited
the balance amount, this Court has no option, but to decide the petition on
its own merits.
6.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra at
Dharamshala, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, whereby judgment of
conviction and order of sentence recorded by the learned trial Court came
to be upheld, this Court is not persuaded to agree with Mr. Goldy Kumar,
learned counsel for the accused, that learned Courts below have failed to
appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court finds that
both the Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter
meticulously and there is no scope left for this Court to interfere.
Interestingly, in the case at hand, factum with regard to issuance of cheque
as well as signatures thereupon never came to be disputed. Accused, in his
statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., nowhere denied factum with
regard to his having issued cheque, but attempted to set up a case that
cheque in question was issued as security cheque but same has been
misused. Moreover, pattern of cross-examination conducted upon the
complainant nowhere suggests that accused was able to create any doubt
with regard to existence of his legally enforceable liability, rather accused
virtually admitted factum with regard to his having availed facility of term
loan and his issued cheque, defence of security cheque attempted to set up
at the behest of the accused never came to be probablize, as such, no
illegality otherwise can be said to have been committed by courts below,
while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which talk about
presumption in favour of holder of cheque that cheque in question was
issued towards discharge of lawful liability.
7.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:
“23.
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa
vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus
clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of
improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the
Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the
cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent
undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed
that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section
138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a
cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually
confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a
scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be
expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further
observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the
presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all
preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which
creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the
prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the
complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in
some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her
own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a
probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act
regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not
rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for
prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where
the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange
the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the
drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to
make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay
the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour
constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the
question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for
discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial
court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it
keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is
presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the
responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in
matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency
of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the
matter, would be extremely heavy.”
8.
To the contrary, complainant-bank, with a view to prove its
case, examined Sh. Rattan Singh as CW-1, Mr. Virender Katoch as CW-2
and Mr. Sushil Kumar as CW-3. Complainant also tendered in evidence the
documents i.e. Register of cheque Ext.CW-1/B, cheque returned memo
Ext.CW-1/C,
legal
notice
Ext.CW-1/D,
postal
receipt
Ext.CW-1/E,
statement of account Ext.CW-1/F, application for term loan Ext.CW-1/G,
letter of agreement Ext.CW-1/H, agreement of loan Ext.CW-1/J and
minutes of meeting Ext.CW-1/K.
9.
Mr. Rattan Singh Kanwar, while deposing on behalf of the
complainant-bank as CW-1, successfully proved all ingredients of Section
138 of the Act. He also proved that cheque bearing No.298129 dated
31.12.2013 amounting to Rs.1,50,000/- (Ext.CW1/B) bears the signatures
of the accused and the same was issued by the accused in favour of the
complainant-bank towards discharge of lawful liability. He also proved on
record that cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned was
dishonoured with remarks “Funds insufficient” in the account of the
accused vide return memo dated 01.01.2014 Ext.CW-1/C. Before initiating
proceeding under Section 138 of the act, complainant-bank served upon
the accused with legal/statutory demand notice dated 09.01.2014 (Ex.
CW1/D). Despite receipt of the said notice, the accused neither replied to
the same nor made payment of the cheque amount within the stipulated
period. Though during cross-examination, accused attempted to set up a
defence that cheque in question was issued as security cheque, but such
defence of him was never probablized by leading cogent and convincing
evidence.
10.
By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued as
security can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State
of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on
28.10.2021, has held as under:
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper
under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state
of being safe and the security given for a loan is something
given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to
make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties
to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is
advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a
specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure
such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other
form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or
agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount,
the cheque which is issued as security would mature for
presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to
present the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138
and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
11.
Needless to say, expression “Security cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather
same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on
record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable
Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a
“security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would
not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the
cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138
of the Act in case of its dishonour.
During the course of arguments, Mr. Goldy Kumar, learned
12.
counsel for the accused, attempted to argue that complainant-bank had
actually realized the amount otherwise sought to be realized through
cheque in question by selling the truck in auction, but bare perusal of
record nowhere suggests that such defence was ever raised at the behest
of the accused trial. No suggestion worth credence ever came to be put
to the witness adduced on record at the behest of complainant-bank
that amount otherwise sought to be realized through cheque in
question, stood released by way of sale of the truck in auction.
Having scanned pleadings as well as evidence adduced on
13.
record
by
the
complainant,
this
court
finds
that
complainant
successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act.
Similarly, factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by
the accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established
on record.
14.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in
view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the Courts
below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by
Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath
Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein
it has been held as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine
the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order.
In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But
the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an
appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the
High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal,
unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court
which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”
15.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/
incorrectness committed by inferior criminal Court in its judicial process or
illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused
has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the Courts
below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the Courts
below.
16.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the
Courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper
appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
17.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court within one month to serve the sentence as
awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction,
if any, stands vacated. Bail bonds, if any, are discharged. Pending
applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
Amount, if any, lying deposited by the accused with the
18.
Registry of this court as well as learned trial Court is ordered to be released
in favour of the complainant by remitting the same in its saving bank
account, detail whereof, shall be furnished within a period of one week.
June 15, 2026
(sunil)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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