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NAFR
Digitally signed
RAGHVENDRA by
JAT
RAGHVENDRA
JAT
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 9323 of 2023
Order Reserved on: 6.2.2026
Order Delivered on: 9.4.2026
1 - Chandrashekhar Ratnakar S/o Shri Ramnihor Ratnakar Aged About
36 Years R/o Village- Gotoura, Tahsil- Masturi, District : Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Home/police, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Police Station And PostRakhi, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Director General (Jail) Jail And Corrective Services, Chhattisgarh,
Headquarters, Sector- 19, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
3 - Jail Superintendent Central Jail, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur),
Chhattisgarh.
4 - Enquiry Officer / Jail Superintendent District Jail, District :
Dantewada, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
: Ms. Pratibha Sahu, Advocate.
For Respondent(s)/State
: Mr. Hrishikesh Sharma, Panel Lawyer.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following
reliefs:“10.1 That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
call for the entire records of the petitioner's case from the
possession of the concerned authorities.
10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
set
aside
the
impugned
orders
dated
14.9.2017
(Annexure P/5) and 8.2.2018 (Annexure P/7) and direct
the
respondent
authorities
to
grant
him
all
the
consequential benefits.
10.3 Any other relief or relief(s) which this Hon'ble Court
may deem fit or proper in the facts and circumstances of
the case may also be granted along with cost of the
petition.”
2. Brief facts of the case, is that, the petitioner was working as Chief
Guard (Gatekeeper) at Central Jail, Jagdalpur. On 13.09.2016,
certain alleged prohibited items, namely one currency note of Rs.
500 denomination and three currency notes of Rs. 100
denomination each, were seized from his possession, and by
order dated 13.09.2016, issued by the Superintendent, Central
Jail, Jagdalpur, he was placed under suspension with immediate
effect. Thereafter, on 01.10.2016, the Jail Superintendent, Central
Jail, Jagdalpur, issued a charge-sheet against the petitioner
containing three charges and directed him to submit his reply
within 15 days from the date of receipt thereof. The petitioner
submitted his detailed reply to the said charge-sheet on
17.10.2016 explaining the charges levelled against him. Being
dissatisfied
with
the
reply,
the
authorities
conducted
a
departmental enquiry, and upon its conclusion, the Enquiry
Officer/Jail Superintendent, District Jail, Dantewada, submitted an
enquiry report dated 13.07.2017 wherein, except Charge No. 2,
Charges No. 1 and 3 were held to be proved. A copy of the
enquiry report was thereafter supplied to the petitioner with a
direction to submit his representation, which he accordingly
submitted on 22.08.2017, however, the disciplinary authority found
the same unsatisfactory and, upon consideration of the enquiry
report, the petitioner’s representation, and the evidence on record,
passed order dated 14.09.2017 imposing the penalty of
withholding
one
annual
increment
with
cumulative
effect.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred a
departmental appeal on 08.10.2017 before the Director General
(Jail), Jail and Correctional Services, Raipur. The Director General
(Jail), Jail and Correctional Services, Raipur, vide order dated
08.02.2018, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order dated
14.09.2017 passed by the disciplinary authority. Hence, the
present petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
orders dated 14.09.2017 and 08.02.2018 are ex facie illegal,
arbitrary, and unsustainable in the eyes of law, inasmuch as the
charges framed against the petitioner are not in accordance with
the applicable statutory provisions. It is contended that no case is
made out under Rule 252(B) or Rule 570 of the relevant rules, and
even with regard to Charge No. 2, the competent disciplinary
authority itself has recorded a finding that the said charge has not
been proved. As regards the alleged violation of Rule 3(1) of the
C.G. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965, it is submitted that in
the absence of applicability of Rule 570, the invocation of Rule
3(1) is also misconceived and untenable in the petitioner’s case. It
is further argued that the punishment of stoppage of one annual
increment with cumulative effect amounts to a major penalty,
which cannot be imposed unless the charges are established by
cogent and convincing evidence; in the present case, no such
legally admissible evidence exists. Learned counsel contends that
when the very foundation of the charges is legally unsustainable,
the imposition of penalty amounts to a miscarriage of justice, and
therefore the petitioner deserves to be exonerated of all charges
and the impugned punishment order is liable to be quashed. On
merits, it is further submitted that a total sum of Rs. 800/- (one
note of Rs. 500/- and three notes of Rs. 100/- each) was found in
the front pocket of the petitioner’s trousers, and if the petitioner
had intended to conceal or clandestinely use the said amount for
any improper purpose, he would not have kept it openly in the
front pocket. The fact that the amount was found there indicates
that it was inadvertently left in his pocket from the previous day, as
duly explained in his written explanation, however, the respondent
authorities have failed to consider this bona fide explanation while
passing the impugned orders. She has placed reliance upon the
judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of
Sher Bhadur vs. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 142, Union of
India vs. H.C. Goel, (1963) SCC Online SC 16, Moni Shankar
vs. Union of India, (2008) 3 SCC 484 and Union of India & Ors.
vs. Gyanchand Chatter, (2009) 12 SCC 78.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has supported
the impugned punishment order passed by the competent
respondent authorities, contending that the misconduct alleged
against the petitioner is of a serious nature. It is submitted that the
petitioner was serving as a Jail Guard and, therefore, was
expected to maintain the highest standards of integrity, vigilance,
and discipline. However, during checking prior to his entry into the
jail premises, currency notes were found in the front pocket of his
trousers, which, in the sensitive environment of a correctional
institution, constitutes a grave lapse. It is further argued that in
view of the said incident, the initiation of departmental enquiry
proceedings was fully justified and in accordance with law, and
upon due consideration of the evidence on record, the competent
authority has imposed an appropriate penalty. Learned counsel
submits that in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, this Court does not sit as an appellate
authority over departmental proceedings, and no meticulous reappreciation of evidence is warranted unless there is patent
illegality, perversity, or procedural impropriety. According to the
State, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any such perversity,
jurisdictional error, or non-applicability of the relevant provisions
as alleged by him. It is thus contended that the impugned orders
have been passed after due application of mind and proper
consideration of the material available on record, and therefore,
the same do not call for any interference by this Court.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sher Bahadur vs.
Union of India & others, (2002) 7 SCC 142, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed as under:“7. It may be observed that the expression “sufficiency of
evidence” postulates existence of some evidence which
links the charged officer with the misconduct alleged
against him. Evidence, however voluminous it may be,
which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor
establishes any nexus between the alleged misconduct
and the charged officer, is no evidence in law. The mere
fact that the enquiry officer has noted in his report, “in
view of oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence
as adduced in the enquiry”, would not in principle satisfy
the rule of sufficiency of evidence. Though, the
disciplinary authority cited one witness Shri R.A. Vashist,
Ex. CVI/Northern Railway, New Delhi, in support of the
charges, he was not examined. Regarding documentary
evidence, Ext. P-1, referred to in the enquiry report and
adverted to by the High Court, is the order of
appointment of the appellant which is a neutral fact. The
enquiry officer examined the charged officer but nothing
is elicited to connect him with the charge. The statement
of the appellant recorded by the enquiry officer shows
no more than his working earlier to his re-engagement
during the period between May 1978 and November
1979 in different phases. Indeed, his statement was not
relied upon by the enquiry officer. The finding of the
enquiry officer that in view of the oral, documentary and
circumstantial
evidence,
the
charge
against
the
appellant for securing the fraudulent appointment letter
duly signed by the said APO (Const.) was proved, is, in
the light of the above discussion, erroneous. In our view,
this is clearly a case of finding the appellant guilty of
charge without having any evidence to link the appellant
with the alleged misconduct. The High Court did not
consider this aspect in its proper perspective as such
the judgment and order of the High Court and the order
of the disciplinary authority, under challenge, cannot be
sustained, they are accordingly set aside.”
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Moni Shankar vs.
Union of India, (2008) 3 SCC 484, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has observed as under:“17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial
one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are
not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of
natural justice are required to be complied with. The
courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to
consider as to whether while inferring commission of
misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant
piece of evidence has been taken into consideration
and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom.
Inference on facts must be based on evidence which
meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal
was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the
premise that the evidence adduced by the Department,
even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its
entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof,
namely, preponderance of probability. If on such
evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has
not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to
interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of
unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of
proportionality.”
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India &
others vs. Gyanchand Chatter, (2009) 12 SCC 78, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed as under:“34. In Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan [(1986) 3 SCC
454 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 662 : AIR 1986 SC 995] this Court
held that even in a domestic enquiry, the charge must be
clear, definite and specific as it would be difficult for any
delinquent to meet the vague charges. Evidence adduced
should not be perfunctory even if the delinquent does not
take the defence or make a protest against that the
charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from
being vitiated for the reason that there must be fair play in
action, particularly, in respect of an order involving
adverse or penal consequences.
35. In view of the above, law can be summarised that an
enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving
strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles
of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite
and giving details of the incident which formed the basis
of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague
charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively
and not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or
unreasonable, nor the same should be based on
conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in proof
and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the
delinquent cannot be a misconduct. The authority must
record reasons for arriving at the finding of fact in the
context of the statute defining the misconduct.”
9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Uttar
Pradesh
through
Principal
Secretary,
Department
of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow vs. Ram Prakash Singh, 2025 SCC
Online SC 891, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as
under:“14. What follows from a conjoint reading of the above two
decisions is and what applies here is that, ‘materials
brought on record by the parties' (to which consideration in
the enquiry ought to be confined) mean only such
materials can be considered which are brought on record
in a manner known to law. Such materials can then be
considered legal evidence, which can be acted upon.
Though the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not strictly
applicable to departmental enquiries, which are not judicial
proceedings,
nevertheless,
the
principles
flowing
therefrom can be applied in specific cases. Evidence
tendered by witnesses must be recorded in the presence
of
the
delinquent
employee,
he
should
be
given
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and no
document should be relied on by the prosecution without
giving copy thereof to the delinquent - all these basic
principles of fair play have their root in such Act. In such
light, the documents referred to in the list of documents
forming part of the annexures to the chargesheet, on
which the department seeks to rely in the enquiry, cannot
be treated as legal evidence worthy of forming the basis
for a finding of guilt if the contents of such documents are
not spoken to by persons competent to speak about them.
A document does not prove itself. In the enquiry, therefore,
the contents of the relied-on documents have to be proved
by examining a witness having knowledge of the contents
of such document and who can depose as regards its
authenticity. In the present case, no such exercise was
undertaken by producing any witness.
29. At paragraph 18 of the judgment, this Court after
examining the decision in Kailash Chander Asthana
(supra), Union of India v. E. Bashyan38 and Mohd.
Ramzan Khan (supra) found no conflict between Kailash
Chander Asthana (supra) and the two others.
30. In view of the above, ordinarily, the Constitution
Bench might not have proceeded further; however, it
found it necessary to do so in light of the observations
recorded in paragraph 19:
19. In Mohd. Ramzan Khan case the question
squarely fell for consideration before a Bench of
three learned Judges of this Court, viz., that
although
on
account
of
the
Forty-second
Amendment of the Constitution, it was no longer
necessary to issue a notice to the delinquent
employee to show cause against the punishment
proposed and, therefore, to furnish a copy of the
enquiry officer's report along with the notice to make
representation against the penalty, whether it was
still necessary to furnish a copy of the report to him
to enable him to make representation against the
findings recorded against him in the report before
the disciplinary authority took its own decision with
regard to the guilt or otherwise of the employee by
taking into consideration the said report. The Court
held that whenever the enquiry officer is other than
the disciplinary authority and the report of the
enquiry officer holds the employee guilty of all or
any
of
the
charges
with
proposal
for
any
punishment or not, the delinquent employee is
entitled to a copy of the report to enable him to
make a representation to the disciplinary authority
against it and the non-furnishing of the report
amounts to a violation of the rules of natural justice.
However, after taking this view, the Court directed
that the law laid down there shall have prospective
application and the punishment which is already
imposed shall not be open to challenge on that
ground. Unfortunately, the Court by mistake allowed
all the appeals which were before it and thus set
aside the disciplinary action in every case, by failing
to notice that the actions in those cases were prior
to the said decision. This anomaly was noticed at a
later stage but before the final order could be
reviewed and rectified, the present reference was
already made, as stated above, by a Bench of three
learned Judges. The anomaly has thus lent another
dimension to the question to be resolved in the
present case.”
33. Resting on the aforesaid reasoning, the answer to
the basic question (majority view) in B. Karunakar
(supra) is found in paragraph 29 reading as follows:
“29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry
officer is not the disciplinary authority, the
delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy
of
the
enquiry
officer's
report
before
the
disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions
with regard to the guilt or innocence of the
employee with regard to the charges levelled
against him. That right is a part of the employee's
right to defend himself against the charges
levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry
officer's report before the disciplinary authority
takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of
reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove
his innocence and is a breach of the principles of
natural justice.”
10.
From a bare perusal of the record, it emerges that when the
petitioner was at the checkpoint prior to entering the jail premises,
he was subjected to routine checking, during which a sum of Rs.
800/- comprising one note of Rs. 500/- and three notes of Rs.
100/- each was found in the front pocket of his trousers. Upon
being questioned, the petitioner explained that on the previous
day he had gone to the market for certain purchases and had
inadvertently left the remaining amount in his trouser pocket,
having forgotten to remove it thereafter. He categorically stated
that the said amount was not carried for any improper or
unauthorized purpose. The material on record does not indicate
any clear violation of Rule 570 or Rule 252(B) of the C.G. Prison
Rules, 1968. During the course of the departmental enquiry, the
petitioner reiterated this explanation in his deposition, and the
concerned checking official, who was examined as a witness, also
confirmed that the currency notes were found in the front pocket
of the petitioner’s trousers. It is noteworthy that had the petitioner
intended to indulge in any illegal or mala fide act, he would
reasonably have concealed the money in a hidden place to avoid
detection, particularly as he was a long-serving Jail Guard well
aware of the mandatory checking procedure before entry into the
prison premises. The fact that the money was kept in an easily
detectable place lends credence to the petitioner’s explanation,
which appears plausible and bona fide. However, this vital aspect
has not been duly considered in the departmental proceedings.
Furthermore, since Rule 570 of the C.G. Prison Rules, 1968 is not
directly attracted to the facts of the present case, the invocation of
Rule 3(1) of the C.G. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965,
premised upon the alleged violation of Rule 570, also appears
unsustainable. The Enquiry Officer as well as the Appellate
Authority failed to properly examine the applicability of the
relevant provisions and proceeded to impose punishment without
cogent material substantiating the charges in accordance with law.
Although the scope of interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India in matters of departmental enquiry is limited,
judicial intervention is warranted where there is manifest injustice
or patent illegality. In the present case, this Court finds that the
charges framed under Rule 570 of the C.G. Prison Rules, 1968
and Rule 3(1) of the C.G. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965
were neither applicable nor proved in accordance with law, and
therefore the impugned action cannot be sustained.
11. Accordingly, for the reasons stated hereinabove and in view of the
findings recorded, the impugned orders dated 14.09.2017 and
08.02.2018 are hereby set aside and quashed. As a consequence
thereof, the writ petition stands allowed, and the petitioner shall
be entitled to all consequential benefits arising therefrom, in
accordance with law.
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
The date when The date when The date when the judgment is
the judgment is the judgment is uploaded on the website
reserved
6.2.2026
Raghu Jat
pronounced
9.4.2026
Operative
Full
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9.4.2026
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