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2026:CGHC:234
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ORDER RESERVED ON 19.12.2025
ORDER DELIVERED ON 02.01.2026
ORDER UPLOADED ON 02.01.2026
MCRC No. 8224 of 2025
1 - Chaitanya Baghel S/o Shri Bhupesh Baghel Aged About 38 Years
R/o 1/7 Mansarovar Parisar, Bhilai, Durg Chhattisgarh. (Currently Under
Judicial Custody At Central Jail, Raipur (C.G.)
... Applicant (s)
versus
1 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through Economic Offences Wing (Eow) /
Anti- Corruption Bureau (Acb) Headquarter Opposite Jai Jawan Petrol
Pump. Telibandha, Raipur Chhattisgarh - 492001
... Respondent(s)
For Applicant(s)
:
Shri N.Hariharan, Sr. Counsel, Shri
Mayank Jain, Shri Madhur Jain, Shri Arpit
Goel and Shri Deepak Jain Advocates
through VC assisted by Shri Harshwrdhan
Parganiha and Ms. Manubha Shankar,
Advocate.
For Respondent/State
:
Shri Mahesh Jethmalani, Sr. Advocate
assisted by Shri Ravi Sharma, Advocate
through VC assisted by Dr. Saurabh
Pande, Dy. AG
(Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma)
C A V Order
This application has been preferred by the applicant
under
Section 483 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking
enlargement on regular bail in connection with FIR No. 04/2024 dated
17.01.2024 registered by the EOW/ACB, CG (hereinafter referred to as
the “non-applicant”) for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471,
120-B IPC and Sections 7 & 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988. For the limited and circumscribed purpose of adjudicating the
present bail application, this Court deems it appropriate to advert to the
brief facts of the case.
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
2.
The short case of the prosecution as set out in the FIR and the
records before this Court, is that by the ED letter dated 11.07.2023
under Section 66(2) PMLA
which alleges a massive 2019-2023
syndicate involving manufacture/sale of illegal liquor through licensed
government shops in Chhattisgarh generating huge proceeds distributed
among excise officials, bureaucrats, distillers and political functionaries,
causing loss of exchequer. Notably the applicant was not named in the
FIR. The investigation has spanned 21 months, the Charge sheet No.
03/2024 dated 01.07.2024, arraigned 4 accused; stated “further
investigation underway.” Five supplementary charge sheets filed
sequentially:
27.09.2024,
18,11,2024,
30.06.2025,
07.07.2025
&
26.08.2025 - none arraigned the applicant despite passing references.
There are total of 51 accused were arrayed and 29 charge sheets
without
arrest.
ED
has
registered
ECIR
RPZO/04/2024
dated
11.04.2024 predicated on this FIR and conducted search at applicant’s
premises leading to arrest on 18.07.2025. Applicant challenged the
same in Cr.M.P. No. 2506/2025. ED filed Prosecution Complaint on
15.08.2025.
3.
After 60 days custody expiry, the ED moved to the Special Court
for permission to 2 days interrogation
which was allowed on
12.09.2025.
production
EOW
immediately
sought
warrant
on
15.09.2025. On production, EOW filed arrest application on the same
day which was dismissed for maintainability granting liberty to the
Sessions Court. Sessions Court rejected bail of petition No. 2762 of
2025 on 22.09.2025 and subsequently, it was rejected on 24.09.2025.
EOW arrested the applicant on 24.09.2025 post rejection by this Court
despite production warrant not authorizing arrest.
4.
The Special Court alleged that the applicant routed excise
proceeds to his construction firm via channels. No recovery effected; no
further interrogation post-remand. Applicant thereafter, sought regular
bail before the Special Court (PC Act), Raipur which was rejected on
8.10.2025. Hence, the instant bail application.
Post the dismissal of the Applicant's anticipatory bail application
by this Court on 24.09.2025, the EOW/ACB immediately effected the
Applicant's arrest on the very same day (24.09.2025), notwithstanding
that the production warrant issued earlier neither authorized nor
contemplated such arrest. The Non-Applicant promptly moved a remand
application before the Learned Special Court (PC Act), Raipur, seeking
police custody from 24.09.2025 to 06.10.2025 – a period of 12 full days.
In the said remand application, it was vaguely alleged that the Applicant
had "arranged money out of the excise crime proceeds and directed its
delivery through various channels" ultimately utilizing the said funds in
his construction firm's projects. The Learned Special Court allowed the
remand application, granting police custody as prayed for. However,
during the entire remand period (24.09.2025 to 06.10.2025):No recovery
of any incriminating material whatsoever was effected from the Applicant
or his premises. No further interrogation was conducted post the initial
2-hour questioning on 12.09.2025.No searches were carried out at the
Applicant's residential/commercial premises by the EOW (in stark
contrast to the ED search conducted on 18.07.2025).
5.
Thereafter, the Applicant filed a regular bail application under
Section 483 BNSS before the very same Learned Special Court (PC
Act), Raipur, which came to be rejected vide detailed order dated
08.10.2025. This constitutes the instant bail application preferred by the
Applicant before this Court.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT
6.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Applicant, aptly submits that while
inviting this Court to the unique facts and circumstances of the case,
most respectfully and vehemently submitted as under:
I. THE ARREST OF THE APPLICANT IS EX-FACIE MALAFIDE,
ARBITRARY AND CONSTITUTES A CLASSIC INSTANCE OF
"EVERGREENING" CUSTODY TO DEFEAT STATUTORY REMEDIES
– A GROSS ABUSE OF PROCESS OF LAW DEMANDING
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
7.
Shri Hariharan, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant submits
that this is not an ordinary bail application; this is a clarion call against
the blatant misuse of arrest powers by the Economic Offences Wing
(EOW) to perpetuate incarceration where investigation stands virtually
complete. The Applicant stands completely unmentioned in the FIR
dated 17.01.2024 – the foundational document of this prosecution.
Notwithstanding a whopping 21 months of investigation, during which
six charge sheets (main + five supplements) were meticulously filed on
01.07.2024, 27.09.2024, 18.11.2024, 30.06.2025, 07.07.2025 and
26.08.2025, the Applicant was conspicuously excluded as an accused in
every single one of them. Even more damningly, specific allegations
against the Applicant find mention as early as page 239 of the main
chargesheet dated 01.07.2024 – yet no arrest followed for over 15
additional
months
and
considering
this
timeline
of
calculated
procrastination: The EOW had complete knowledge of the Applicant's
alleged role since July 2024, yet chose the precise moment of
24.09.2025 – literally hours after this Court rejected anticipatory bail and
on the cusp of the Applicant's statutory release from ED custody
(arrested by ED on 18.07.2025, approaching 60-day default bail under
Section 167(2) BNSS). This is the textbook definition of "insurance
arrest" – a malafide tactic to defeat constitutional remedies. No
summons under Section 41A BNSS was ever issued. No search was
conducted at the Applicant's premises by EOW (unlike ED, which
searched on 18.07.2025 yielding zero incriminating recovery). No
interrogation was necessitated – indeed, when permission was finally
sought for 2 days (12-13.09.2025), only 2 hours on the first day sufficed,
with the second day conveniently skipped. This Court must intervene
where executive overreach threatens personal liberty. As held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark case of Joginder Kumar v.
State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 (paras 8-10):
8. The horizon of human rights is expanding. At
the same time, the crime rate is also
increasing. Of late, this Court has been
receiving complaints about violation of human
rights because of indiscriminate arrests. How
are we to strike a balance between the two?
9. A realistic approach should be made in this
direction. The law of arrest is one of balancing
individual rights, liberties and privileges, on the
one hand, and individual duties, obligations and
responsibilities on the other; of weighing and
balancing the rights, liberties and privileges of
the single individual and those of individuals
collectively; of simply deciding what is wanted
and where to put the weight and the emphasis;
of deciding which comes first the criminal or
society, the law violator or the law abider; of
meeting the challenge which Mr Justice
Cardozo so forthrightly met when he wrestled
with a similar task of balancing individual rights
against society's rights and wisely held that the
exclusion rule was bad law, that society came
first, and that the criminal should not go free
because the constable blundered. In People v.
Defore1 Justice Cardozo observed:
"The question is whether protection for the
individual would not be gained at a
disproportionate loss of protection for society.
On the one side is the social need that crime
shall be repressed. On the other, the social
need that law shall not be flouted by the
insolence of office. There are dangers in any
choice. The rule of the Adam’s case (People v.
Adams2) strikes a balance between opposing
interests. We must hold it to be the law until
those organs of government by which a change
of public policy is normally effected shall give
notice to the courts that change has come to
pass."
10. To the same effect is the statement by
Judge Learned Hand, in Fried Re3:
"The
protection
of
the
individual
from
oppression and abuse by the police and other
enforcing officers is indeed a major interest in a
free society; but so is the effective prosecution
of crime, an interest which at times seems to
be forgotten. Perfection is impossible; like other
human institutions criminal proceedings must
be a compromise."
The quality of a nation's civilization can be
largely measured by the methods it uses in the
enforcement of criminal law.”
8.
No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the police officer to
do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing and the
justification for the exercise of it is quite another. The police officer must
be able to justify the arrest apart from his power to do so. Recently, in
Arvind Kejriwal v. CBI, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2550, the Apex Court
has held as under:
“31. In this vein, the language of Section 41(1)
(b) postulates as follows:
“41. When police may arrest without warrant.—
(1) Any police officer may without an order from
a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any
person—
…..
(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has
been made, or credible information has been
received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that
he has committed a cognizable offence
punishable with imprisonment for a term which
may be less than seven years or which may
extend to seven years whether with or without
fine, if the following conditions are satisfied,
namely:—
(i) the police officer has reason to believe on the
basis of such complaint, information, or
suspicion that such person has committed the
said offence;
(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest
is necessary—
(a) to prevent such person from committing any
further offence; or
(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or
(c) to prevent such person from causing the
evidence of the offence to disappear or
tampering with such evidence in any manner; or
(d) to prevent such person from making any
inducement, threat or promise to any person
acquainted with the facts of the case so as to
dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the
Court or to the police officer; or
(e) as unless such person is arrested, his
presence in the Court whenever required cannot
be ensured, and the police officer shall record
while making such arrest, his reasons in writing:
Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases
where the arrest of a person is not required
under the provisions of this sub-section, record
the reasons in writing for not making the arrest.
32. Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC clearly
stipulates that an arrest under this provision can
be made based on a complaint or credible
information that an individual has committed a
cognizable
offence
punishable
with
imprisonment up to seven years, with or without
a fine. However, such an arrest must be
conducted subject to the satisfaction of specific
conditions outlined in subsections (a) to (e). The
rigors of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) have been
extensively examined by this Court in Arnesh
Kumar (supra), where it was observed that:
“7.1. From a plain reading of the aforesaid
provision, it is evident that a person accused of
offence punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may be less than seven years or which
may extend to seven years with or without fine,
cannot be arrested by the police officer only on
its satisfaction that such person had committed
the offence punishable as aforesaid. Police
officer before arrest, in such cases has to be
further satisfied that such arrest is necessary to
prevent such person from committing any
further offence; or for proper investigation of the
case; or to prevent the accused from causing
the evidence of the offence to disappear; or
tampering with such evidence in any manner; or
to prevent such person from making any
inducement, threat or promise to a witness so
as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to
the Court or the police officer; or unless such
accused person is arrested, his presence in the
court whenever required cannot be ensured.
These are the conclusions, which one may
reach based on facts.
7.2. The law mandates the police officer to state
the facts and record the reasons in writing which
led him to come to a conclusion covered by any
of the provisions aforesaid, while making such
arrest. Law further requires the police officers to
record the reasons in writing for not making the
arrest.
7.3. In pith and core, the police office before
arrest must put a question to himself, why
arrest? Is it really required? What purpose it will
serve? What object it will achieve? It is only
after conditions as enumerated above is
satisfied, the power of arrest needs to be
exercised. In fine, before arrest first the police
officers should have reason to believe on the
basis of information and material that the
accused has committed the offence. Apart from
this, the police officer has to be satisfied further
that the arrest is necessary for one or the
morepurposes envisaged by sub-clauses (a) to
(e) of clause (1) of Section 41 of Cr.PC.”
33. Given this annotation, while there exists no
doubt that the submissions made by the
Appellant in regard to the precepts of Section
41(1)(b) are sound, the provision is inapplicable
to the vicissitudes of the present factual matrix.
Here is a case where the court upon application
of judicial mind accorded its approval to the
Appellant’s arrest for which necessary warrant
was issued. There was thus no occasion for the
arresting police officer to form an opinion
regarding the existence of valid reasons of
arrest. The competent court having undertaken
such a task, the police officer cannot be
expected to sit over the order of the court.”
9.
Further, it has been held that due to the complexity and web of
facts and the material on record, it was crucial to comprehensively
determine the role of the appellant in the alleged conspiracy and then
only decide his entitlement to bail. It has been observed that :
38. The evolution of bail jurisprudence in India
underscores that the ‘issue of bail is one of
liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the
public treasury, all of which insist that a
developed jurisprudence of bail is 22 | P a g e
integral to a socially sensitized judicial
process’.4 The principle has further been
expanded to establish that the prolonged
incarceration of an accused person, pending
trial, amounts to an unjust deprivation of
personal liberty. This Court in Union of India v.
K.A. Najeeb has expanded this principle even in
a case under the provisions of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter
‘UAPA’) notwithstanding the statutory embargo
contained in Section 43-D(5) of that Act, laying
down that the legislative policy against the grant
of bail will melt down where there is no
likelihood of trial being completed within a
reasonable time.5 The courts would invariably
bend towards ‘liberty’ with a flexible approach
towards an undertrial, save and except when
the release of such person is likely to shatter
societal aspirations, derail the trial or deface the
very criminal justice system which is integral to
rule of law.
39. It was submitted during these proceedings
that the FIR was registered on 17.08.2022, and
since then, the chargesheet along with four
supplementary chargesheets have been filed.
The fourth supplementary chargesheet was filed
as recently as 29.07.2024 and we are informed
that the Trial Court has taken cognizance of the
same. Additionally, seventeen accused persons
have been named, 224 individuals have been
identified as witnesses, and extensive
documentation, both physical and digital, has
been submitted. These factors suggest that the
completion of the trial is unlikely to occur in the
immediate future.
40. In our considered view, although the
procedure for the Appellant’s arrest meets the
requisite criteria for legality and compliance,
continued incarceration for an extended period
pending trial would infringe upon established
legal principles and the Appellant’s right to
liberty, traceable to Article 21 of our Constitution.
The Appellant has been granted interim bail by
this Court in the ED matter on 10.05.2024 and
12.07.2024, arising from the same set of facts.
Additionally, several co-accused in both the CBI
and ED matters have also been granted bail by
the Trial Court, the High Court, and this Court in
separate proceedings.
41. So far as the apprehension of the Appellant
influencing the outcome of the trial is concerned,
it seems that all evidence and material relevant
to the CBI’s disposition is already in their
possession, negating the likelihood of tampering
by the Appellant. Similarly, given the Appellant’s
position and his roots in the society, there
seems to be no valid reason to entertain the
apprehension of his fleeing the country. In any
case, in order to assuage the apprehensions of
the CBI, we may impose stricter bail conditions.
As regard to Appellant indulging in influencing
witnesses, it needs no emphasis that in the
event of any such instance, it will amount to
misuse of the concession of bail and necessary
consequences will follow.”
10.
The Apex
Court
struck
down
a
similarly
timed
arrest,
observing:"Where the Investigating Agency had knowledge of the role of
the accused much prior to his arrest... and chooses to arrest him only
when he is on the verge of securing default bail... such conduct smacks
of mala fides and warrants interference. "The same principle applies
with greater force here in the matter of Mohd. Zubair v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2023) 16 SCC 764 (arrest not unbridled) and Siddharth v.
State of U.P., (2022) 1 SCC 676 (custody for heinousness/custodial
need/witness peril only.
III.
ARREST
VIOLATES
STATUTORY
SAFEGUARDS
UNDER
SECTION 35(b) BNSS – NO PRECONDITIONS SATISFIED
11.
Neither the grounds of arrest nor the remand application dated
24.09.2025 disclose any material, much less any tangible material, that
satisfies the statutory sine qua non under Section 35(b) BNSS.
•
Preventing further offence: There is no specific apprehension that
the Applicant is likely to commit any further offence; he is not a
history-sheeter and has no criminal antecedents.
•
Aiding investigation: By the time of his arrest, the investigation
had already been underway for 21 months; six chargesheets had
been filed; and the investigating agency itself records that the
Applicant’s interrogation stood concluded in a brief two-hour
session. No fresh investigative step is shown to have flowed from
his subsequent custody.
•
Preventing tampering: The case is purely documentary. All
relevant material has long since been seized by the ED/EOW, and
no further recovery is stated to be pending.
•
Securing presence: The Applicant is a permanent resident of
Chhattisgarh with deep roots and has always cooperated with the
law; there is no allegation that he ever absconded or declined to
appear when required.
In these circumstances, custody was not a measure of last resort
but a first impulse. The remand order’s bare allegation of “money routing
to his construction firm” finds no corroboration in any chargesheet or ED
record. This arrest, therefore, is by ambush, not by necessity.
IV. THE ENTIRE FURTHER INVESTIGATION IS VOID AB INITIO –
CONDUCTED
WITHOUT
MANDATORY
COURT
PERMISSION,
RENDERING ARREST ILLEGAL
12.
This case exposes a systemic malaise: unfettered post-
chargesheet investigation. After filing Chargesheet No. 03/2024 on
01.07.2024 (explicitly stating "further investigation underway"), EOW
filed five supplementary chargesheets arraying 47 additional accused –
all without obtaining prior court permission under Section 173(8) BNSS.
Mere intimation of "ongoing investigation" in chargesheets does not
constitute permission. No application was ever moved before the
jurisdictional Special Court seeking leave. No fresh material was
discovered post-chargesheet to justify roping in the Applicant (41 st Law
Commission Report, para 17.12). The Apex Court has spoken
authoritatively: Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762, it has
been observed that “Once the final report is filed... police ought to seek
formal permission from the Court... Piecemeal investigation is
impermissible. It has been held as under:
“C. The following has been said in para 49 in
Vinay
Tyagi's
case
(supra):
"49.Now, we may examine another significant
aspect which is how the provisions of Section
173(8) have been understood and applied by the
courts and investigating agencies. It is true that
though there is no specific requirement in the
provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code to
conduct
"further
investigation"
or
file
supplementary report with the leave of the court,
the investigating agencies have not only
understood but also adopted it as a legal practice
to seek permission of the courts to conduct
"further investigation" and file "supplementary
report" with the leave of the court. The courts, in
some of the decisions, have also taken a similar
view. The requirement of seeking prior leave of
the court to conduct "further investigation" and/or
to file a "supplementary report" will have to be
read into, and is a necessary implication of the
provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The
doctrine of contemporanea expositio will fully
come to the aid of such interpretation as the
matters which are understood and implemented
for a long time, and such practice that is
supported by law should be accepted as part of
the interpretative process.”
13.
In the matter of "Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat,
(2019) 17 SCC 1, it has been observed that :
“42. There is no good reason given by the Court
in these decisions as to why a Magistrate’s
powers to order further investigation would
suddenly cease upon process being issued, and
an accused appearing before the Magistrate,
while concomitantly, the power of the police to
further investigate the offence continues right till
the stage the trial commences. Such a view
would not accord with the earlier judgments of
this Court, in particular, Sakiri (supra), Samaj
Parivartan Samudaya (supra), Vinay Tyagi
(supra), and Hardeep Singh (supra); Hardeep
Singh (supra) having clearly held that a criminal
trial does not begin after cognizance is taken, but
only after charges are framed. What is not given
any importance at all in the recent judgments of
this Court is Article 21 of the Constitution and the
fact that the Article demands no less than a fair
and just investigation. To say that a fair and just
investigation would lead to the conclusion that
the police retain the power, subject, of course, to
the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to
further investigate an offence till charges are
framed, but that the supervisory jurisdiction of
the Magistrate suddenly ceases mid- way
through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount
to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry
out for further investigation so that an innocent
person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused
or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left
out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and
restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate,
particularly when such powers are traceable to
Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section
2(h), and Section 173(8) of the CrPC, as has
been noticed hereinabove, and would be
available at all stages of the progress of a
criminal case before the trial actually
commences. It would also be in the interest of
justice that this power be exercised suo motu by
the Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of
each case. Whether further investigation should
or should not be ordered is within the discretion
of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such
discretion on the facts of each case and in
accordance with law. If, for example, fresh facts
come to light which would lead to inculpating or
exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth
and doing substantial justice in a criminal case
are more important than avoiding further delay
being caused in concluding the criminal
proceeding, as was held in Hasanbhai Valibhai
Qureshi (supra). Therefore, to the extent that the
judgments in Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel
(supra), Athul Rao (supra) and Bikash Ranjan
Rout (supra) have held to the contrary, they
stand overruled. Needless to add, Randhir Singh
Rana v. State (Delhi Administration) (1997) 1
SCC 361 and Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal
and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 129 also stand
overruled.”
14.
Further investigation requires judicial sanction... to prevent fishing
expeditions. Similarly, in "Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of
Bihar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 251, it has been held as under:
21. Before parting with this matter, we deem it fit
to issue the following directions:
(i) In view of Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali27, it can be
seen that the ‘leave of the court’ to file a
supplementary chargesheet, is a part of Section
173(8) CrPC. That being the position, in our
considered view, the Court is not rendered
functus officio having granted such permission.
Since the further investigation is being made with
the
leave
of
the
Court,
judicial
stewardship/control thereof, is a function which
the court must perform.
(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper
functioning of the machinery of criminal law.
They form the bedrock of fairness, transparency,
and accountability in the justice system. If the
Court finds or the accused alleges (obviously
with proof and reason to substantiate the
allegation) that there is a large gap between the
first information report and the culminating
chargesheet, it is bound to seek an explanation
from the investigating agency and satisfy itself to
the propriety of the explanation so furnished.
The direction above does not come based on
this case alone. This Court has noticed on many
unfortunate occasions that there is massive
delay in filing chargesheet/taking cognizance etc.
This Court has time and again, in its
pronouncements underscored the necessity of
speedy investigation and trial as being important
for the accused, victim and the society. However,
for a variety of reasons there is still a lag in the
translation of this recognition into a reality.
(iii) While it is well acknowledged and recognized
that the process of investigation has many
moving parts and is therefore impractical to have
strict timelines in place, at the same time, the
discussion made in the earlier part of this
judgement, clearly establishes that investigations
cannot continue endlessly. The accused is not
out of place to expect, after a certain point in
time, certainty- about the charges against him,
giving him ample time to preparing plead his
defence. If investigation into a particular offence
has continued for a period that appears to be
unduly long, that too without adequate
justification, such as in this case, the accused or
the complainant both, shall be at liberty to
approach the High Court under Section 528
BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update on the
investigation or, if the doors of the High Court
have been knocked by the accused, quashing. It
is clarified that delay in completion of
investigation will only function as one of the
grounds, and the Court, if in its wisdom, decides
to entertain this application, other grounds will
also have to be considered.
(iv) Reasons are not only important in the judicial
sphere, but they are equally essential in
administrative matters particularly in matters
such as sanction for they open the gateway to
greater consequences. Application of mind by
the authorities granting or denying sanction must
be easily visible including consideration of the
evidence placed before it in arriving at the
conclusion.”
15.
Leave of Court is now compulsory for all post-chargesheet
investigations. This very Bench in Chaitanya Baghel v. ED ( Cr.M.P.
No. 2506/2025 dated 17.10.2025, paras 86,103) held:
“86. Therefore, it is the duty of the
Investigating agency that once a complaint
filed before the Magistrate and Magistrate has
taken cognizance thereafter the further
investigation should be with the permission of
the Magistrate. In the matter of Hardeep
Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held that the trial commences only on
charges being framed. However, if the
respondent has conducted the investigation
without obtaining prior permission of the
competent court, it may not strictly conform to
the procedural framework governing complaint
cases and the investigation before the
adjudicating authority. Illegality means a
fundamental breach of law which cannot be
fix, whereas an irregularity is a procedural
deviation that can often be corrected or
regularized.
Notwithstanding this, such
deviation, while irregular, would not vitiate the
proceedings or amount to illegality.
XXXX
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XXXX
103. 103. The ground raised by the
petitioner in this petition are procedural
lapses/irregularities which does not amount to
illegality. Learned counsel for the respondent
in para 70 of his written submission has stated
that the petitioner deserves to be relegated to
the remedy of a regular bail which requires the
petitioner to satisfy the mandatory twin
conditions of bail under Section 45 of PMLA to
seek release from custody. I agree with the
contention raised by the learned counsel for
the respondent that the grounds raised in this
petition are procedural lapses /irregularities
not amounting to illegality and these are the
grounds of bail. In light of the foregoing
discussion, this Court finds no ground to
interfere with the investigation or the arrest
effected by the Investigating Agency.
Accordingly the petition stands dismissed.”
Absence of court permission renders further investigation void ab
initio – a strong ground for bail."Arrest during such illegal sequel cannot
stand.
V. PARITY SCREAMS FOR RELEASE – THE EPITOME OF PICKAND-CHOOSE INVESTIGATION
16.
Compelling Case for Applicant's Release on Grounds of Parity:
The doctrine of parity is not merely equitable; it is constitutional
imperative under Article 14 – equals must be treated equally. In this
massive liquor syndicate involving 51 accused, the EOW's selective
arrests and releases expose a pernicious pick-and-choose methodology
that shocks judicial conscience. While the Applicant languishes in
custody on uncorroborated whispers, kingpins and major beneficiaries
roam free. The irresistible doctrine of parity that permeates this
prosecution like a constitutional mandate under Article 14. Considering
the following co-accused, all arrayed with graver roles yet consistently
granted bail by superior fora: Arun Pati Tripathi, arrayed as A-1 and
alleged mastermind/key conspirator orchestrating the entire liquor scam
operations including distribution of proceeds to politicians and officials,
was granted bail by the Supreme Court in SLP(Crl.) No. 1263/2025
dated 07.03.2025; Trilok Singh Dhillon, arrayed as A-5 and identified
as major syndicate beneficiary handling illegal liquor supply chain
through licensed shops with cash handling and commission distribution,
secured Supreme Court liberty in SLP(Crl.) No. 14697/2024 dated
27.11.2024; Anurag Dwivedi, also arrayed as A-5 and functioning as
cash aggregator collecting and distributing crores in excise crime
proceeds across the syndicate network, was enlarged on bail by the
Supreme Court in SLP(Crl.) No. 18386/2024 dated 07.03.2025; Arvind
Singh, arrayed as A-2 with direct excise department linkage facilitating
illegal liquor licenses and quotas for the syndicate, obtained Apex Court
relief in Criminal Appeal No. 2699/2025 dated 19.05.2025; Sanjay
Kumar Mishra, arrayed as A-4 and operating as key co-conspirator
coordinating between distillers and political beneficiaries, was granted
bail by this very Court in M.Cr.C No. 7093/2025 dated 23.09.2025;
Vijay Bhatia, arrayed as A-41 and recognized as major beneficiary
receiving substantial illegal commissions invested in benami assets,
secured bail from this Court in M.Cr.C No. 5601/2025 dated
25.09.2025; and Sunil Dutt, arrayed as A-10 with operational role as
syndicate member handling logistics for spurious liquor transportation
and distribution, was released by this Court in M.Cr.C No. 188/2025
dated 12.03.2025. These instances are not aberrations but the rule: of
51 accused arrayed across six chargesheets, 29 stand chargesheeted
without any arrest whatsoever, while of the 22 arrested, 12 (over 55%)
have already been granted bail by the Apex Court and this Court itself,
including principal kingpins, cash aggregators, excise officials, and
direct beneficiaries – all with roles demonstrably graver than the
peripheral "money routing" allegation against the Applicant who remains
unnamed in the FIR and evert chargesheet. This pick and choose
methodology, where even absconder Laxminarayan Bansal (against
whom open-ended arrest warrant dated 19.05.2025 in Corruption Case
No. 01/2024 remains operative) roams free while his vitiated statement
alone sustains the Applicant's custody, constitutes naked discrimination
offending Article 14. As held in Vipin Yadav v. Directorate of
Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6237 (paras 31, 39-40), where
co-accused with similar or graver allegations secure liberty, parity
becomes irresistible; denial thereof shocks judicial conscience and
mandates the Applicant's immediate release. It has been held that:
31. The applicants have essentially pressed their
applications of bail on the ground that the
respondent department has adopted a pick and
choose strategy by not arresting the accused
Aggarwal, who is purportedly the real mastermind
behind the conspiracy and is alleged to have
known about the source of funds and arranged
mule accounts as well. It is argued that the
accused was instrumental on all levels of the
alleged conspiracy, despite he has not been
arrested. It is argued that the accused Rohit has
projected as the mastermind of the conspiracy in
the prose complaint and his role is similar, if not
graver, than the applicants.
39. Recently, in the case of Himansh alias
Himanshu Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 4697, the Apex Court had
enlarged the accused therein on bail on the sole
that the mastermind of the alleged offence had
never been arr the case. Non-arrest of similarly
placed co-accused persons ha considered to be a
significant factor by Coordinate Benches Court to
grant concession of bail to an accused as well
[Ref. Bind v. Serious Fraud Investigation Office:
BAIL APPLN. 3642 Ramesh Manglani v. ED,
(2023) 7 HCC (Del) 134; Sanjay Ka Enforcement
Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 9569; etc].
The precedents clearly reflect that the relevance
of selective prosecution by the investigating
agency, which is manifestly arbitrary, cam
discounted while considering the question of
grant of bail.
40. Having not arrested an accused who appears
to have a role than the applicants and not even
arraigned a person named to have facilitated in
arranging the mule accounts, the approach a by
the respondent department prima facie appears
to be ma arbitrary and the benefit of parity cannot
be denied to the applicants.”
Statistical Indictment of Selective Prosecution:Total Accused Arrayed: 51
* Chargesheeted without arrest: 29
* ARRESTED: 22
◦ Already GRANTED BAIL: 12
◦ REMAINING IN CUSTODY: This data speaks volumes: half of the
accused roam free despite chargesheets; of those arrested, most were
secured liberty. The Applicant is unnamed in FIR/six chargesheets, no
recovery was effected though stands discriminated against.
Most Egregious Violation: Absconder with open-ended arrest warrant
issued by Special Court (PC Act), Raipur on 19.05.2025 (Corruption
Case No. 01/2024) – against Laxminarayan Bansal (Pappu Bansal)
was never cancelled/recovered. His role as a Prime cash conduit; his
legally vitiated statement (recorded while warrant operative, violating
Section 72 BNSS) forms sole basis for Applicant's arrest. It is irony that
the EOW neither arrests him nor cancels warrant, yet relies on his
statement to oppose Applicant's bail. As has been held in Vipin Yadav
v. Directorate of Enforcement (supra) "Where co-accused with similar
or graver allegations have been granted bail, parity becomes irresistible.
Discrimination in bail jurisprudence offends Article 14.
17.
Similarly in the matter of Krishnan Subramanian v. State, 2022
SCC OnLine Del 1384, it has been held as under:
“17. Learned ASC submitted that given the
sensitive nature of the matter and the large sums
of money involved, there is a strong possibility of
the applicant absconding and not facing trial.
Further if released on bail, he can influence the
witnesses and tamper with evidence since he, as
the Group CFO, had wide ranging connections
and standing with the employees of the Religare
Group. It is vehemently submitted that the
applicant is not entitled to any relief by this Court
and the instant application is liable to be
dismissed.
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23. In the instant case, it is an admitted case that
co-accused Maninder Singh was enlarged on bail
by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order
dated 5th May 2021. The said bail order was
challenged before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court by
way of filing SLP (CRL.) Diary No. 12290/2021.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court vide order dated 12th
July 2021 confirmed the bail order dated 5th May
2021 and dismissed the SLP. The co-accused Anil
Saxena was also enlarged on bail by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated
17th June 2020 in Bail Application No. 1074/2020.
The said order was also challenged before the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court by way of filing SLP (CRL)
Diary No. 13106/2020. The Hon‟ble Supreme
Court vide order dated 17th July 2020 did not
interfere with the bail order of co-accused Anil
Saxena.
24. A perusal of record shows that chargesheet
has already been filed, all materials have been
collected by the investigating authorities and the
evidence against the applicant is documentary in
nature. In the considered opinion of this Court, the
applicant is neither a flight risk, nor can there be
any propensity on his part to tamper with any
evidence or influence any witness inasmuch as
the entire domain of evidence is documentary in
nature, which exists as it is from the year 2008
onwards, unhindered, and untampered. The
applicant is a permanent resident of Delhi and has
clean antecedents. He has been languishing in jail
since 8th December 2021. In that background
considering the chargesheet, first supplementary
chargesheet
and
second
supplementary
chargesheet as well as the fact that other coaccused persons having been enlarged on bail by
the Coordinate Bench which stand confirmed by
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court; and the facts and
circumstances and discussion as aforesaid, this
Court is inclined to allow the instant bail
application seeking regular bail.”
18.
The seriousness of the offences, though grave, does not in itself
eclipse the doctrine of parity. The Applicant’s position, even on the
prosecution’s own showing, is materially superior to and more
favourable than that of several co-accused who have already been
enlarged on bail. Unlike accused A-1 to others, the Applicant is not
named in the FIR or in any of the chargesheets; no summons, notice or
prior search was ever directed against him by the EOW, though other
co-accused were repeatedly interrogated and their premises raided. No
cash, documents or other incriminating articles have been recovered
from the Applicant, in stark contrast to the substantial cash recoveries
made from admitted cash aggregators and field operators. Even on the
prosecution narrative, the allegation against the Applicant is confined to
an ancillary or peripheral role of “routing money”, whereas the
co-accused who have secured bail are attributed core operational roles
in manufacturing, supply, storage, transport, cash collection and
distribution across the syndicate. The Applicant is a first-time offender
with no prior criminal antecedents, unlike several co-accused who are
alleged to be repeat participants in the liquor syndicate over multiple
excise years. If Arun Pati Tripathi (A-1), projected as the mastermind,
has been found deserving of liberty by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and
if persons like Trilok Singh Dhillon, whose alleged cash empires are
far more entrenched, have been granted conditional release, then, in
equity and in law, this Hon’ble Court cannot deny similar relief to the
Applicant whose role is demonstrably lesser.
V. THE CLASSIC TRIPLE TEST IS SQUARELY SATISFIED – NO
FLIGHT
RISK,
NO
TAMPERING
APPREHENSION,
FULL
COOPERATION ASSURED
19.
The Applicant satisfy the test of flight risk. He is a permanent
resident of Chhattisgarh, with his family, assets and business interests
firmly rooted within the State, has no criminal antecedents, and has
never evaded or obstructed any process of law at any stage.
20.
There is equally no realistic possibility of tampering with evidence.
The prosecution case is overwhelmingly documentary; the investigating
agencies have already cited about 885 witnesses and seized
approximately 939 documents running into thousands of pages, and no
further search or recovery is stated to be pending. The object of bail is to
secure presence, not punishment. It has been held by the Apex Court in
Sanjay Chandra Vs.CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40, as under:
“23. Apart from the question of prevention being
the object of a refusal of bail, one must not lose
sight of the fact that any imprisonment before
conviction has a substantial punitive content and
it would be improper for any Court to refuse bail
as a mark of disapproval of former conduct
whether the accused has been convicted for it or
not or to refuse bail to an un-convicted person for
the purpose of giving him a taste of
imprisonment as a lesson.
24) In the instant case, as we have already
noticed that the "pointing finger of accusation"
against the appellants is `the seriousness of the
charge'. The offences alleged are economic
offences which has resulted in loss to the State
exchequer. Though, they contend that there is
possibility of the appellants tampering witnesses,
they have not placed any material in support of
the allegation. In our view, seriousness of the
charge is, no doubt, one of the relevant
considerations while considering bail applications
but that is not the only test or the factor : The
other factor that also requires to be taken note of
is the punishment that could be imposed after
trial and conviction, both under the Indian Penal
Code and Prevention of Corruption Act.
Otherwise, if the former is the only test, we would
not be balancing the Constitutional Rights but
rather "recalibration of the scales of justice."
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42. When the undertrial prisoners are detained in
jail custody to an indefinite period, Article 21 of
the Constitution is violated. Every person,
detained or arrested, is entitled to speedy trial,
the question is : whether the same is possible in
the present case.
43. There are seventeen accused persons.
Statement of the witnesses runs to several
hundred pages and the documents on which
reliance is placed by the prosecution, is
voluminous. The trial may take considerable time
and it looks to us that the appellants, who are in
jail, have to remain in jail longer than the period
of detention, had they been convicted. It is not in
the interest of justice that accused should be in
jail for an indefinite period. No doubt, the offence
alleged against the appellants is a serious one in
terms of alleged huge loss to the State
exchequer, that, by itself, should not deter us
from enlarging the appellants on bail when there
is no serious contention of the respondent that
the accused, if released on bail, would interfere
with the trial or tamper with evidence. We do not
see any good reason to detain the accused in
custody, that too, after the completion of the
investigation and filing of the charge-sheet.”
VI. NO PRIMA FACIE CASE EVEN REMOTELY MADE OUT – A
CASTLE BUILT ON SAND21.
The prosecution edifice, with respect, collapses upon close
scrutiny. It rests almost entirely on stale, untested and legally vulnerable
Section 161 BNSS statements, without any cogent independent
corroboration, and fails even prima facie to disclose the essential
ingredients of the offences alleged.(i) Sole dependence on Section 161
statements.
22.
The case against the Applicant is anchored primarily on:The
statement of Probir Sharma dated 04.12.2025 – an accomplice
account recorded nearly one and a half years after the registration of the
FIR, which, even if taken at face value, is unsupported by any
independent contemporaneous material such as emails, ledger entries,
banking instructions or digital trails linking the Applicant to the alleged
routing of funds. The statement of Laxminarayan Bansal – a
proclaimed absconder against whom a live non-bailable arrest warrant
remains in force, rendering his statement inherently suspect and vitiated
in terms of the safeguards embedded in Section 72 BNSS, as a person
who has deliberately kept himself beyond the reach of lawful process. In
law, such belated and self-serving statements by an accomplice and an
absconder, standing alone and without credible corroboration in material
particulars, cannot form a secure foundation for depriving a citizen of
liberty at the pre-trial stage.(ii) Absence of basic offence-ingredients
even on prosecution showing Even assuming the prosecution narrative
to be correct for the limited purpose of bail, the imputed acts do not
satisfy the core ingredients of the sections invoked:Prevention of
Corruption Act: The Applicant is admittedly not a public servant, nor is
there any concrete material of intentional abetment of a specific act of
bribery or criminal misconduct by a named public servant. Mere
allegations of “benefit” or “proximity” to those in office, without a defined
actus reus, do not satisfy Sections 7 or 12. Sections 467,468,471 IPC
(forgery and use of forged documents): No forged document is alleged
to have been authored, executed, fabricated, altered or used by the
Applicant. There is no handwriting, digital signature, document-seizure
or forensic material connecting him to any hologram, tender paper,
licence or bogus record. Section 420 IPC (cheating): There is no
allegation, much less proof, of any dishonest inducement by the
Applicant causing delivery of property or any act/omission by a
particular person to his detriment. The essential elements of deception
and consequent delivery are conspicuously absent. Section 120-B IPC
(criminal conspiracy): Apart from generalized assertions that the
Applicant “benefitted” from the alleged scam, there is no tangible
material
demonstrating
a
meeting
of
minds
or
any
physical
manifestation of an agreement between the Applicant and named
co-accused, as mandated in Ram Sharan Chaturvedi v. State of M.P.,
(2022) 16 SCC 166, where the Apex Court held that mere association
or proximity is insufficient, and there must be concrete evidence of a
shared design translated into overt acts.(iii) Scope of bail jurisdiction –
no mini-trial. It is trite that at the stage of bail the Court is not required to
conduct a mini-trial or weigh the evidence as at final adjudication; what
is required is only a prima facie satisfaction that the accusation is
supported by credible material. When, as here, the case rests on
uncorroborated, delayed statements of highly interested witnesses and
when the statutory ingredients of the alleged offences are themselves in
serious doubt, continued pre-trial incarceration of a first-time accused
would offend settled principles of bail and the constitutional mandate of
personal liberty under Article 21.
23.
In these circumstances,the prosecution case against the Applicant
tested on the touchstone of basic criminal jurisprudence and the
governing precedents, appears so fragile that it cannot, justify further
denial of liberty.
VII.
GROSS
VIOLATION
OF
ARTICLE
–
PROTRACTED
DETENTION WHERE TRIAL IS A DISTANT MIRAGE:
24.
Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that the present
incarceration has effectively degenerated into punishment by process
rather than by proof. The prosecution itself asserts that there are 51
accused persons, approximately 1110 witnesses and about 990
documents running into thousands of pages, while charges are yet to be
framed and the investigation admittedly continues in respect of several
other accused. In these circumstances, there is no realistic prospect of
an early conclusion of trial, and continued custody of the Applicant
would amount to pre-trial punishment. Reliance is placed on Kapil
Wadhawan v. CBI, 2025 INSC 1440, particularly paragraphs 11–25,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has cautioned that once
investigation is complete and the prosecution has marshalled its
material, prolonged pre-trial detention ceases to serve any legitimate
investigative purpose and impermissible partakes the character of a
substantive sentence. It has held that :
11. Having heard parties at length, we need to
observe certain settled principles under the bail
jurisprudence. There is no gainsaying that under
Indian law “bail is the rule and jail is an exception”
is etched in the ethos of criminal jurisprudence.
This rule stems from the fact that criminal law
presumes a person to be innocent unless proven
otherwise. Meaning that generally an under-trial
prisoner ought not be
placed behind bars
indefinitely unless there is clear threat to society,
influencing witnesses/inquiry or he is a flight risk
etc. This rule also ensures that process is also
not made punishment, wherein a person is jailed
for very many years pending trial. Bail under the
Code is a qualified right of an accused before
conviction,
wherein
the
accused
is
not
guaranteed bail, rather it puts onus on the
prosecution to establish as to why the under-trial
prisoner should not be enlarged on bail. Any
deviation
in
the
above
proposition
is
constitutionally circumspect.
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XXXXXX
14. 14. Fundamentally every accused before this
Hon’ble Court seeking bail is an undertrial,
clothed with the presumption of innocence, a
foundational postulate that does not dissolve
merely because allegations are serious or the
statute invoked is stringent. It is established
through a catena of decisions that pre-trial
incarceration cannot be allowed to degenerate
into punishment without adjudication, and courts
are constitutionally obliged to intervene where
long custody becomes disproportionate, arbitrary,
or excessive.
This Court recently in the case of Javed Gulam
Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 9
SCC 813 6, while granting bail to an accused
being prosecuted under the provisions of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, took
into consideration his incarceration of 4 years,
and the stage of the trial, where charges were yet
to be framed and the prosecution further intended
to examine not less than eighty witnesses,
observed that:
“7. Having regard to the aforesaid, we wonder by
what period of time, the trial will ultimately
conclude. Howsoever serious a crime may be, an
accused has a right to speedy trial as enshrined
under the Constitution of India. Over a period of
time, the trial courts and the High Courts have
forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that
bail is not to be withheld as a punishment.
xx xx xx
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency
including the court concerned has no wherewithal
to provide or protect the fundamental right of
anaccused to have a speedy trial as enshrined
under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State
or any other prosecuting agency should not
oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the
crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the
Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of
the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is
still an accused; not a convict. The over-arching
postulate
of
criminal
jurisprudence
that
an
accused is presumed to be innocent until proven
guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, howsoever
stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which
the prosecuting agency as well as the Court have
proceeded, the right of the accused to have a
speedy trial could be said to have been infringed
thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
This Court therefore emphatically ruled that if the
State lacks the wherewithal to ensure a speedy
trial, it cannot oppose bail on the ground of
seriousness of the offence, thereby clarifying that
Article 21 applies irrespective of the nature of
crime.
15. Adding to the above, there has been many
cases before this
Court, which indicate that a
separate treatment is meted out in large scale
economic offenses regarding grant of bail.
Wherein this Court has on many occasions held
that strictest standards have to be applied while
granting bail involving large scale economic fraud.
[See also State of Bihar & Anr. v. Amit Kumar
alias Bachcha Rai, (2017) 13 SCC 751.
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24. Coming back to the facts of the case, it is
clear that the appellant was made accused on
account of non-payment of loan and credit facility
availed from a consortium of 17 Banks and
divesting of the money in 81 shell companies.
Admittedly, this is a case based on documentary
evidence and all the accused persons connected
with these companies, except the appellants
herein have been granted bail. In the present
case, total 11 cases have been registered against
the appellant as indicated in para 3 above. In all
other cases, the appellants have been released
on bail. The chargesheet filed by the CBI is
voluminous in nature containing more than 4 lakh
pages and having 736 witnesses. In addition, 17
trunks of documents are those which are not
relied upon and may be brought on record
subsequently if deemed necessary by the
prosecution. The proceedings against the assets
have already been taken up by the NCLT and the
CIRP is in progress. In the present case, pending
trial, the charges have not yet been framed by the
Court.
25. Thus, looking to the number of witnesses and
the orders passed by the Courts, it appears that if
the case is taken up on day-to-day basis, even in
two to three years, the conclusion is not possible.
Considering all the facts and circumstances of the
case, subject to putting the restrictions on
movement of appellants out of India, and without
expressing any opinion on the merits of the case,
while disposing of these appeals, we deem it
appropriate to release the appellants on bail with
the following conditions – …………...”
25.
This is punishment by process, not proof. As has been held in the
matter of Kapil Wadhawan v. CBI, (supra)
"Pre-trial detention
becomes punishment post-investigation completion. In the matter of
Manish Sisodia v. ED, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1920 and K.A. Najeeb
v. UOI, (2021) 3 SCC 713, It has been held as under:
53. The Court further observed that, over a period
of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have
forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that
bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. From
our experience, we can say that it appears that the
trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play
safe in matters of grant of bail. The principle that
bail is a rule and refusal is an exception is, at
times, followed in breach. On account of non-grant
of bail even in straight forward open and shut
cases, this Court is flooded with huge number of
pendency. It is high time that the trial courts and
the High Courts should recognize the principle that
“bail is rule and jail is exception”.
54. In the present case, in the ED matter as well
as the CBI matter, 493 witnesses have been
named. The case involves thousands of pages of
documents and over a lakh pages of digitized
documents. It is thus clear that there is not even
the remotest possibility of the trial being concluded
in the near future. In our view, keeping the
appellant behind the bars for an unlimited period
of time in the hope of speedy completion of trial
would deprive his fundamental right to liberty
under Article 21 of the Constitution. As observed
time and again, the prolonged incarceration before
being pronounced guilty of an offence should not
be permitted to become punishment without trial.
55. As observed by this Court in the case of
Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra), the objective to
keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or
disposal of an appeal is to secure the attendance
of the prisoner at trial.
56. In the present case, the appellant is having
deep roots in the society. There is no possibility of
the country and not being available for facing the
trial. In any case, conditions can be imposed to
address the concern of the State.”
VIII. THE GOLDEN CANON: BAIL, NOT JAIL – REINFORCED BY
CONDITIONS
26.
In the matter of State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC
308: "Basic rule is bail, not jail. In P. Chidambaram Vs. ED, (2020) 13
SCC 791, it has been held as under:
23. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan
and another
(2004) 7 SCC 528, it was held as under:“11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is
very well settled. The court granting bail should
exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and
not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of
granting bail a detailed examination of evidence
and elaborate documentation of the merit of the
case need not be undertaken, there is a need to
indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie
concluding
why
bail
was
being
granted
particularly where the accused is charged of
having committed a serious offence. Any order
devoid of such reasons would suffer from nonapplication of mind. It is also necessary for the
court granting bail to consider among other
circumstances, the following factors also before
granting bail; they are:
(a) The nature of accusation and the severity of
punishment in case of conviction and the nature
of supporting evidence.
(b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with
the witness or apprehension of threat to the
complainant.
(c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support
of the charge. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay v.
Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Puran v.
Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338.)
Referring to the factors to be taken into
consideration for grant of bail, in Jayendra
Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of Tamil Nadu
(2005) 2 SCC 13, it was held as under:-
“16. …….The considerations which normally
weigh with the court in granting bail in nonbailable offences have been explained by this
Court in State v. Capt. Jagjit Singh AIR 1962 SC
253 and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)
(1978) 1 SCC 118 and basically they are — the
nature and seriousness of the offence; the
character of the evidence; circumstances which
are peculiar to the
accused; a reasonable
possibility of the presence of the accused not
being secured at the trial; reasonable
apprehension of witnesses being tampered with;
the larger interest of the public or the State and
other similar factors which may be relevant in the
facts and circumstances of the case……”
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30. The learned Solicitor General submitted that
the statement of witness ‘X’ who is said to have
been approached not to disclose any information
regarding the appellant and his son, has been
recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. in which the
said witness ‘X’ has made the statement that he
has been approached. Statement under Section
164 Cr.P.C. of the said witness ‘X’ is said to have
been recorded on 15.03.2018. The said witness
allegedly approached or the other witnesses in a
case of the present nature, cannot be said to be
a rustic or vulnerable witness who could be so
easily influenced; more so, when the allegations
are said to be based on documents. More
particularly, there is no material to show that the
appellant or his men have been approaching the
said witness so as to influence the witness not to
depose against the appellant or his son.”
27.
He thus submits that as catalogued above – where arrest reeks of
mala fides, investigation stands vitiated, parity screams for equality,
triple test stands traversed, and Article 21 liberty hangs by a thread –
this Court may graciously be pleased to grant regular bail to the
Applicant forthwith on such terms as deemed fit. No other effective
remedy subsists. Hence prayed accordingly.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT/STATE
28.
Learned counsel for the State submits the following point-wise
reply to the submissions advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for
the applicant, demonstrating why the applicant-the alleged kingpin and
principal beneficiary of a Rs. 4000 plus crore liquor syndicate oses an
existential threat to the ongoing investigation and merits continued
custody:
I.
ARREST
MALAFIDE/”EVERGREENING” – A BASELESS
CANARD; ARREST
TIMED
PERFECTLY
WITH
EVIDENTIARY
FOLDING
29.
The Applicant's narrative of "insurance arrest" is a deliberate
distortion of unimpeachable investigative chronology. Far from being
unnamed or peripheral, the Applicant emerges as the architect of the
scam
through
emerging
chargesheets:Chargesheet
evidence
No.
03/2024
post-five
supplementary
(01.07.2024,
pg.
239)
contained initial leads on Applicant's fund routing; full culpability
crystallized via post-chargesheet statements (Probir Sharma dt.
04.12.2025; Laxminarayan Bansal) + banking trails confirming ₹1000+
crores parked on Applicant's instructions. Arrest on 24.09.2025 followed
dismissal of anticipatory bail by this Hon'ble Court (24.09.2025) – not
ED's 60-day cusp – after 2-hour interrogation (12.09.2025) revealed
non-cooperation and evasion tactics. No notice is needed under Section
41A BNSS where custodial confrontation is imperative (Siddharth v.
State of U.P., (2022) 1 SCC 676, wherein it has been held as under:
“19. It appears that the learned Special Judge was
labouring under a misconception that in every nonbailable and cognizable offence the police is
required to invariably arrest a person, even if it is
not essential for the purpose of investigation.
20. Rather the law is otherwise. In normal and
ordinary course the police should always avoid
arresting a person and sending him to jail, if it is
possible for the police to complete the
investigation without his arrest and if every kind of
co-operation is provided by the accused to the
Investigating
Officer
in
completing
the
investigation. It is only in cases of ulmost
necessity, where the investigation cannot be
completed without arresting the person, for
instance, a person may be required for recovery of
incriminating articles or weapon clue as to of
offence or for eliciting some information or his
accomplices or any circumstantial evidence, that
his arrest may be necessary. Such an arrest may
also be necessary if the concerned Investigating
Officer or Officer-in-charge of Police Station thinks
that presence of accused will be difficult to procure
because of grave and serious nature of crime as
the possibility of his absconding or disobeying the
process or fleeing from justice cannot be ruled
out....'
"9. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view of
the high courts and would like to give our
imprimatur to the said judicial view. It has rightly
been observed on consideration of Section 170 of
the Cr.P.C. that it does not impose an obligation on
the Officer-in-charge to arrest each and every
accused at the time of filing of the chargesheet.
We have, in fact, come across cases where the
accused has cooperated with the investigation
throughout and yet on the chargesheet being filed
non-bailable warrants have been issued for his
production premised on the requirement that there
is an obligation to arrest the accused and produce
him before the court. We are of the view that if the
Investigating Officer does not believe that the
accused will abscond or disobey summons he/she
is not required to be produced in custody. The
word "custody" appearing in Section 170 of the
Cr.P.C. does not contemplate either police or
judicial custody but it merely connotes the
presentation of the accused by the Investigating
Officer before the court while filing the
chargesheet.
10. We may note that personal liberty is an
important aspect of our constitutional mandate.
The occasion to arrest an accused during
investigation arises when custodial investigation
becomes necessary or it is a heinous crime or
where there is a possibility of influencing the
witnesses or accused may abscond. Merely
because an arrest can be made because it is
lawful does not mandate that arrest must be
made. A distinction must be made between the
existence of the power to arrest and the
justification for exercise of it. If arrest is made
routine, it incalculable harm to the reputation and
self-esteem of a person. If can cause the
Investigating Officer has no reason to believe that
the accused will abscond or disobey summons
and has, in fact, throughout cooperated with the
investigation we fail to appreciate why there
should be a compulsion on the officer to arrest the
accused.”
30.
Notice is dispensable where arrest necessity crystallizes during
investigation").The Apex Court matter of Joginder Kumar (1994) 4
SCC 260 applies to routine cases, not mega-scams involving ₹4000
crores where financial trails demand custodial decoding (Nimmagadda
Prasad v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 466, it has been held as under:
22) It is also pointed out that M/s Indus Techzone
Pvt. Ltd., availed Rs. 175 crores of loans by
mortgaging about 75 acres of land which is shown
to have been spent for the development of project.
The investigating agency is of the opinion that a
major
chunk
of
the
funds
was
diverted/misappropriated by way of fake work
orders/RA bills.”
31.
Economic offences warrant stricter bail scrutiny"). Arvind
Kejriwal (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2550) distinguished: There, precognizance arrest; here, post-6 chargesheets + witness statements.
II: SECTION 35(b) BNSS FULLY SATISFIED CUSTODY IMPERATIVE
FOR FUND TRACING & CONFRONTATION The remand grounds
(24.09.2025-06.10.2025) explicitly satisfied Section 35(b):
He submits that no recovery is needed in documentary financial
scam as has been held in the matter of Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v.
CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439 where in it has been observed that "Custody for
tracing money trails, not physical recovery".
III: FURTHER INVESTIGATION PERFECTLY VALID – DEEMED
PERMISSION VIA SUCCESSIVE CHARGESHEET ACCEPTANCE
32. Applicant's "void ab initio" bogey stands rejected by judicial
precedent and this Court's own orders:Judicial Acquiescence: Special
Court accepted all 6 chargesheets (main + 5 supplements) without
demur – clear deemed permission (Anil Tuteja SLP(Crl) 11659/2024
dismissed 16.09.2025).Applicant's Suppression: Cr.M.P. 2654/2025
(challenging further investigation) dismissed by this Court on 28.08.2025
on maintainability, granting liberty for fresh petition – never filed.
Annexure-A proves suppression – smacks of abuse of process. The
Apex Court Precedent: Vinay Tyagi (2013) 5 SCC 762, which permits
informal intimation. it has been held that:
“49. On the contrary, the court had noticed
explicitly in its order that it was a case of
supplementary or further investigation and filing
of a ‘supplementary report’.
50. Once the Court has taken this view, there is
no question of treating the first report as being
withdrawn, cancelled or capable of being
excluded from the records by the implication. In
fact, except by a specific order of a higher court
competent to make said orders, the previous as
well as supplementary report shall form part of
the record which the trial court is expected to
consider for arriving at any appropriate
conclusion, in accordance with law. It is also
interesting to note that the CBI itself
understood the order of the court and
conducted only ‘further investigation’ as is
evident from the status report filed by the CBI
before the High Court on 28th November,
2007.”
In the matter of Robert Lalchungnunga (2025) doesn't
retroactively invalidate accepted chargesheets. The present case of the
applicant Chaitanya Baghel (17.10.2025) is distinguished: There is no
chargesheet acceptance; full judicial cognizance.
IV: PARITY INAPPLICABLE – BAILS TO MINORS; SUPREME
COURT REJECTED KINGPINS
33.
Applicant's cherry-picked list misleads this Court:True Position:
12/22 bailed are minor operatives; kingpins (like Applicant) denied (Vipin
Yadav distinguished – no ₹4000 crore scam there).Laxminarayan
Bansal: Voluntarily cooperated pre-arrest (NBW issued 22.05.2025 for
investigation aid, not trial); application for cancellation pending – no
Section 72 violation (Siddharth v. State of UP (2022) 1 SCC 676 para
18: "Cooperation overrides mechanical arrest").
V: TRIPLE TEST HOPELESSLY FAILED – APPLICANT FAILS EVERY
PRONG
34.
It is submitted the by the learned Senior counsel for the
respondent that the applicant eggregiously fails each limb of the
well-settled “triple test” governing the grant of bail. His stature,
resources and demonstrated conduct make him a quintessential
high-risk accused on all three counts—flight risk, likelihood of tampering
with evidence, and propensity to influence or intimidate witnesses. In the
matter of Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81, the Apex
Court has cautioned that powerful and politically connected accused
often overawe or terrorize witnesses, leading to retractions, hostility and
collapse of prosecutions. The present case is a classic illustration of that
principle: the Applicant’s enormous financial muscle and deep political–
bureaucratic nexus, coupled with specific allegations of pressure on key
witnesses, create a clear, present and intolerable risk of interference
with the due course of justice, thereby disentitling him to the
discretionary relief of bail. It has been stated that the accused if
Powerful, intimidate witnesses".
VI:OVERWHELMING PRIMA FACIE CASE – APPLICANT AS
UNDISPUTED KINGPIN
35.
It is submitted that the material on record discloses an
overwhelming prima facie case, firmly establishing the Applicant as one
of the principal kingpins of the conspiracy. The evidentiary matrix is
irrefutable and multi-layered:Statement of Probir Sharma (Section 161
BNSS, dated 04.12.2025): He has categorically deposed that, at the
Applicant’s behest, a sum of about ₹70 crores was routed through
Pappu Bansal to Vijay Agrawal, thereby providing both direct naming
and a concrete money trail. Statement of Laxminarayan Bansal: He has
further disclosed that approximately ₹1000 crores of scam proceeds
were parked with Ram Gopal Aggarwal on the specific instructions of
the Applicant, again linking the Applicant to the ultimate destination of
illicit funds. Bank records and ledgers: The accounts of Shivam
Constructions show large volumes of unexplained cash deposits which
mirror, in timing and magnitude, the proceeds of the liquor scam.Shell
entities: Concerns such as Vitthal Green Project and Baghel
Developers have surfaced as bogus or facade entities, contrived and
used at the instance of the Applicant for parking and layering tainted
funds. This corroborated chain of oral and documentary evidence
satisfies
the
threshold
laid
down
in
Haricharan
Kurmi
and
Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI, negating any need for a mini-trial at the
bail stage. The statutory ingredients of the offences are, therefore,
clearly made out even at this preliminary stage: Section 120-B IPC: A
common design is evident from the coordinated routing and parking of
funds, demonstrating a shared criminal agreement implemented over
several years. Sections 420,467,468, 471 IPC: Forged holograms and
related fabricated documents were generated and routed through the
Applicant’s network as part of the scam architecture. Sections 7 and 12
of the Prevention of Corruption Act: The record discloses systematic
abetment of corrupt acts through a nexus of political and official actors,
operating for the benefit of the Applicant and his associates. Imminent;
Delay Attributable to Applicant There is, therefore, no infraction of Article
21 in continuing the Applicant’s custody. The investigation is nearing
completion: six chargesheets have already been filed; approximately
885 witnesses and 939 documents stand marshalled and are ready to
be proved at trial. Any marginal delay is substantially attributable to the
Applicant’s
own
litigation
strategy,
including
an
extended
anticipatory-bail marathon between 12.09.2025 and 24.09.2025, which
necessarily consumed judicial and investigative time.
VII: BAIL, NOT JAIL CANON INAPPLICABLE TO KINGPINS
36.
It is submitted that Applicant's "Unnamed in FIR/Chargesheets"
Plea: Deliberate Suppression of Emerging Evidence Contrary to the
Applicant's insinuation of peripheral involvement, post-chargesheet
investigation under Section 173(8) BNSS crystallized his pivotal
role:Probir Sharma (s.161 CrPC dt. 04.12.2025): "Applicant orchestrated
₹ 270 crores routing via Laxminarayan Bansal to Vijay Agrawal"—direct
naming of the money trail. Laxminarayan Bansal: "₹1000 crores parked
with
absconder
Treasurer)
on
Ram
Gopal
Applicant's
Aggarwal
explicit
(Chhattisgarh
Congress
instructions."Bank
Ledgers
(Vitthalpuram Residential Complex): Crores in unexplained cash
deposits mirroring scam proceeds; cash expenditures on construction
masked laundering (e.g., casual shoes-3, sandals-2, slippers-2, towels21). A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 (para 133):
Prosecution not bound to array all in FIR; may examine as witnesses.
No right to joint trial. Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
1968 SC 938: Accomplice evidence (protected u/s 132 Evidence Act)
admissible with caution—precisely applicable.2. Role of Applicant:
Kingpin & Master Architect (Not Peripheral Player)Applicant's centrality
demolishes parity claims. He supervised the scam ecosystem (20192023):Illegal duty-free liquor production; commissions from distillery
owners. Hologram forgery; government shop sales; Part-B siphoning.
Engineered policy subversion: Tailored Excise Policy for FL/IMFL
commissions; manpower agencies for Part-B loot; strategic officer
postings; district-level "contact persons" under his command. Financial
nerve centre: Accounting of illicit proceeds; laundered via shell entities
(Vitthalpuram Residential Complex, Shivam Constructions)—₹4000
crore exchequer loss, syndicate profit. In Gulabrao Babukar Deokar v.
State of Maharashtra, (2013) 16 SCC 190: Nature/seriousness of
economic offence + societal impact paramount in bail calculus.Bank
Entries Affirm Direct Infusion: Vitthalpuram Residential Complex
accounts unmistakably establish tainted funds infusion via large,
unexplained
cash
receipts—matching
scam
collections
in
timing/quantum. Cash layered as unsecured loans/advances/sham
receipts, integrating proceeds into real estate. Applicant: principal
beneficiary and money-launderer.3. "No Search/Recovery" Red Herring:
Irrelevant
in
Financial
Scams
Physical
recovery
immaterial
in
documentary money-laundering rackets:ED search (18.07.2025): Bank
documents/ledgers confirming layered laundering. EOW remand
(24.09.2025–06.10.2025):
Revealed
non-cooperation
+
custodial
confrontation; witness intimidation (not recovery).Y.S. Jagan Mohan
Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439 wherein it has been held that Custody
decodes financial trails, not yields seizures.4. Further Investigation
Judicially Sanctioned & Chargesheets Accepted.
37.
Applicant's "void ab initio" trope rejected. Special Court accepted
deemed chargesheets (main + 5 supplements) sans demurrer;
permission u/s 173(8) BNSS implied. Applicant's Cr.M.P. 2654/2025
dismissed (28.08.2025)—suppression proves abuse of process. Anil
Tuteja SLPs dismissed (16.09.2025); Chaitanya Baghel distinguished
(no chargesheet acceptance there). Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5
SCC 762 (para 49): Informal intimation suffices.5. Parity Illusion: Bailed
Co-Accused Minors; Kingpins Denied12/22 bailed: minor logistics
handlers. Core financiers (Applicant-tier) incarcerated.6. Triple Test
Catastrophically
Failed—Existential
Threat
to
ProbeFlight
Risk:
Undeclared foreign assets (Shivam Constructions); political escape
networks.Tampering Risk: Probir Sharma: "Applicant threatened postED arrest"; documents manipulated.Influence Risk: Laxminarayan
Bansal: "Relatives pressurized"; Ram Gopal Aggarwal absconding.Y.S.
Jagan Mohan Reddy (2013) 7 SCC 439 (para 42): Influential accused
threatening integrity? Bail denied. Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar,
(2002) 6 SCC 81 (para 31): Powerful accused paralyze witnesses.
Laxminarayan Bansal: Voluntary cooperation (NBW investigative aid);
cancellation pending (Siddharth v. State of UP, (2022) 1 SCC 676 para
18).7. Prima Facie Case Ironclad: Corroborated Financial MatrixBeyond
Haricharan
Kurmi
caution:Direct
Statements:
Probir
Sharma
+
Laxminarayan Bansal (naming quantum).Documentary Backbone: Bank
entries + ledgers (₹1000 crores traced).Policy Manipulation: Excise
Policy
+
tender
Ingredients:S.120B:
rigging
Proven
grid).S.420/467/468/471:
(Applicant's
common
Hologram
fingerprints).IPC/PC
design
forgery
(district
abetment;
contact
proceeds
delivery.PC S.7/12: Political-official nexus.Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI,
(2013) 7 SCC 466: Financial trail = prima facie guilt.8. No Article 21
Infraction: Public Interest Trumps DelayTrial imminent (chargesheets
complete); delay self-inflicted (anticipatory bail chain). K.A. Najeeb
(PMLA-specific); Kapil Wadhawan (2025 INSC 1440): Ongoing
economic probe overrides delay.9. Bail Canon Inapplicable: "Kingpin
Exception"
GovernsSanjay
Chandra/P.
Chidambaram:
Concluded
probes. Here, live investigation unmasks layers. State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand limited by ₹4000 crore societal devastation.
38.
In light of the foregoing—prima facie kingpin role established via
corroborated financial trails; triple test fails catastrophically; parity
illusory; further probe demands uninterrupted custody and may
therefore, graciously dismiss the application and uphold the impugned
order dt. 08.10.2025. Public interest outweighs private liberty
VIII. BANK
ENTRIES
ESTABLISH
DIRECT
INFUSION
AND
UTILIZATION OF SCAM PROCEEDS
39.
It is specifically reiterated that the bank account entries of the
applicant’s
firm,
Vitthalpuram
Residential
Complex
unmistakably
establish the infusion of tainted funds in exchange for large, unexplained
cash receipts. These cash inflows match, in timing and quantum, the
cash collections generated from the liquor scam and routed through the
syndicate’s channels. The investigation has disclosed that such cash
was systematically introduced into the banking system in the guise of
unsecured loans, advances or sham business receipts, thereby layering
and integrating the proceeds of crime into the Applicant’s real estate
project. These facts belie the attempt of the Applicant to portray himself
as a mere bystander and instead affirm his role as a principal
beneficiary and money-launderer. The Applicant further utilized these
unaccounted proceeds to finance goods, services and constructionrelated payments for his private project, thereby not only legitimizing
black money but also causing substantial loss of tax and excise revenue
to the State. These acts constitute classic instances of generation,
layering and integration of proceeds of crime, squarely attracting the
rigours
of
economic-offence
jurisprudence
as
recognized
in
Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 466 and Gulabrao Deokar
v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 16 SCC 190. 2. Witness Statements
Form a Coherent, Corroborated Chain Against the Applicant2.1 The
Applicant’s contention that there is “no material” or only “bald
statements” is demonstrably false. The prosecution relies not on a
solitary, uncorroborated declaration but on a convergent body of
statements
recorded
under
Section
BNSS
from
multiple
independent witnesses, including Shri Probir Sharma – who has
categorically stated that, at the behest of the Applicant, he facilitated
large-scale cash movements and investments in the Applicant’s projects
using scam proceeds; Shri Rajesh Bisen and Shri Vimal Kumar Tiwari –
employees connected with co-accused; their statements explain how
cash collections from the liquor trade were systematically channelled;
Shri Santosh Aggarwal and Shri Rajendra Kumar Aggarwal – whose
evidence throws light on the downstream handling and routing of funds;
Shri Rakesh Dodhi – Chartered Accountant, whose testimony and
records lend professional corroboration to the financial structuring
undertaken for the Applicant.
40.
If Read together with the banking records and ledger entries,
these statements form a robust, mutually-reinforcing evidentiary chain.
At the bail stage, the law only requires prima facie satisfaction based on
such material; conclusive proof is not the standard, as repeatedly held
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nimmagadda Prasad and Y.S. Jagan
Mohan Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439.
41.
The reliance placed by the Applicant on the principle that
accomplice evidence requires caution is misplaced in the present
context. The State does not rest its case on an isolated accomplice
statement; instead, it relies on interlocking statements and documentary
material which collectively establish the Applicant’s culpability.
4. Systematic Intimidation of Witnesses Demonstrates Real and Present
Risk of Tampering:
During investigation, it has emerged from multiple independent
sources and from the statements of key witnesses that the Applicant,
acting in concert with his highly influential father, has coerced,
threatened and intimidated material witnesses with the express object of
compelling them to retract, dilute or resile from their earlier statements.
This pattern of conduct is not speculative; it is borne out from the record.
Witnesses have specifically narrated how pressure was brought upon
them through visits, phone calls and intermediaries, with a clear
message that adverse testimony against the Applicant would invite
serious consequences.
42.
In Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81, the
Supreme Court poignantly noted the inherent vulnerability of witnesses
when confronted with powerful, politically connected accused persons
and cautioned that courts must factor in the real likelihood of intimidation
and repression. The present case is a textbook application of that
dictum, given the Applicant’s enormous financial muscle, political
connections and familial influence. In these circumstances, the
apprehension that the Applicant will tamper with evidence and browbeat
witnesses is not a mere allegation of the prosecution; it is a
well-founded, evidenced reality. Grant of bail in such a situation would
send a message of impunity and irreparably damage the ongoing
investigation.
43.
Applicant’s Conduct Disentitles Him to Discretionary Relief :
The cumulative material – bank entries, corroborated witness
statements, and documented attempts at interference – clearly
demonstrates that the Applicant has benefitted directly and substantially
from the proceeds of the scam;Actively participated in generation,
layering and integration of illicit funds; and sought to thwart, derail and
contaminate the investigation by pressurizing witnesses.
Bail is a discretionary and equitable relief. A litigant who abuses
the process, suppresses relevant facts and interferes with the
administration of justice cannot seek to invoke that discretion in his
favour. The Applicant’s conduct, far from inspiring confidence, calls for
judicial circumspection.
44.
In view of the above, it is submitted that there exists strong prima
facie material demonstrating the Applicant’s role as a principal
conspirator and major beneficiary of a multi-crore economic offence;The
risk of tampering with evidence and intimidating witnesses is not
hypothetical but established; and the interests of a fair and effective
investigation, as also the larger public and State interest, would be
gravely prejudiced by the Applicant’s release at this stage.
45.
Evidence Discloses a Formally Structured, Politically Protected
State-Wide Liquor Scam. The investigation has unearthed that, between
2018 and 2023, during the tenure of the then political dispensation, a
formally structured, politically protected and State-wide liquor scam was
executed in Chhattisgarh. The material on record shows that
bureaucratic officials, political representatives and private individuals
operated not as isolated wrongdoers but as part of an organized
syndicate functioning in a coordinated, hierarchical manner. These
actors moved in lockstep and with explicit approval, knowledge and
consent of the present Applicant, who has been identified as one of the
central conspirators and a key architect of the criminal enterprise. The
evidence demonstrates that the scam was not an ad-hoc aberration but
a systematically institutionalized scheme of corruption running across
multiple years and across the entire excise chain.
46.
Roles of Co-Conspirators Demonstrate Applicant’s Centrality in
the Conspiracy. The statements and documents collected during
investigation identify several crucial co-conspirators whose roles, when
read together, underscore the Applicant’s central position:a. Mrs.
Soumya Chaurasia – Initially posted as Sub-Divisional Officer and later
as Commissioner, Bhilai–Charoda Municipal Corporation, she was
subsequently elevated as Deputy Secretary in the Chief Minister’s
Office. Her proximity to the highest executive authority and her strategic
positions made her a vital conduit for policy and administrative
facilitation of the scam. b. Shri Anil Tuteja, IAS – A senior IAS officer
closely aligned with the then political leadership, who played an
instrumental role in orchestrating administrative manoeuvres that
enabled the smooth functioning of the illicit system. His bureaucratic
influence and access to departmental structures fortified and insulated
the conspiracy. Shri Anwar Dhebar – An influential politician and
brother of the then Mayor of Raipur Municipal Corporation. He acted as
a central channel for movement of illegal cash, coordinating between
distilleries, syndicate managers and political beneficiaries. These roles,
taken cumulatively, demonstrate that the Applicant was not an incidental
participant but sat at the apex of a pyramidal command structure
comprising bureaucrats, political figures and private operatives, each
performing functions that ultimately served his financial and personal
interests.
III. Applicant’s Direct Role in Clandestine Cash Movements and Routing
of Scam Proceeds. It has been conclusively revealed during
investigation that the Applicant ensured the clandestine movement of
illegal cash – internally referred to as “goods” – derived from the liquor
scam. These funds were transported to and from several persons,
including Ramgopal Aggarwal, on a routine basis.
47.
Substantial number of such deliveries and collections were routed
through Rajiv Bhawan, Raipur, the headquarters of the Chhattisgarh
Pradesh Congress Committee. Cash dispatched by co-accused Anwar
Dhebar was routinely carried by his trusted aide, Deepen Chavda, and
thereafter delivered to Devendra Dadsena at Rajiv Bhawan at around
10:00 A.M., approximately four times every month.This systematic and
scheduled pattern of delivery continued uninterrupted for almost two
years, from 2019 to 2021, thereby demonstrating the existence of a
well-organized, well-oiled criminal machinery, rather than sporadic or
isolated transactions. The Applicant’s name repeatedly surfaces in
internal communications and statements as the ultimate controller and
beneficiary of these movements.
IX. INFUSION OF TAINTED FUNDS INTO APPLICANT’S PROJECT –
GENERATION, LAYERING AND INTEGRATION OF PROCEEDS OF
CRIME
48.
The bank account entries of the Applicant’s firm “Vitthalpuram
Residential Complex” clearly reveal that crores of rupees generated
from the excise scam were routed through various channels and
ultimately deposited into the firm’s bank accounts. These deposits
correspond to unaccounted cash collections from the liquor operations
and are not supported by any legitimate business rationale or
documentary explanation. The Applicant then used these illicitly
generated and laundered funds to finance goods,services and
construction work for his private project. Such conduct amounts to the
classic three-stage process of (i) generation, (ii) layering and (iii)
integration of proceeds of crime:Generation through corrupt commission
mechanisms in the liquor trade;Layering via shell entities, cash couriers
and intermediaries;Integration through infusion into the Applicant’s
ostensibly lawful real-estate venture. These findings are supported by
the statements of Probir Sharma, Rajesh Bisen, Vimal Kumar Tiwari,
Santosh Aggarwal, Rajendra Kumar Aggarwal and Rakesh Dondhi,
whose testimonies, when read together with the bank and ledger
records, constitute strong prima facie evidence of the Applicant’s role as
a principal money-launderer and financial architect of the scam.
X. SYSTEMATIC INTIMIDATION OF WITNESSES – GRAVE RISK OF
TAMPERING AND OBSTRUCTION
49.
During the course of investigation, it has emerged from multiple
independent sources, including statements of key witnesses, that the
applicant, acting in tandem with his highly influential father, has coerced,
threatened and intimidated crucial witnesses with the object of
compelling them to retract, dilute or resile from their earlier statements.
Witnesses have specifically stated that they were approached and
warned against supporting the prosecution version, and were pressured
to modify or withdraw their cooperation with the investigating agency.
This conduct is not an isolated allegation but a consistent pattern, which
shows a deliberate design to obstruct, derail and contaminate the
investigation. Such interference strikes at the very heart of the criminal
justice system and demonstrates that, if enlarged on bail, the Applicant
would pose a serious, imminent and well-founded threat to the integrity
of the ongoing proceedings. In the context of powerful and politically
connected accused persons, the apprehension of witness intimidation is
not merely theoretical but amply justified, as noticed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81.
Applicant’s Influence, Financial Muscle and Political Nexus – Bail Would
Seriously Jeopardize Investigation. The record shows that the Applicant
is an individual of enormous influence, substantial financial resources
and deep-rooted connections within bureaucratic and political circles.
His proximity to decision-makers in the erstwhile government, his control
over front entities, and his demonstrated capacity to manipulate
administrative processes collectively render him a high-risk accused. In
these circumstances, his release at this juncture would pose a clear and
credible
danger
of:Tampering
evidence;Engineering
retractions
with
or
documentary
hostile
and
stances
electronic
from
key
witnesses;Coordinating with absconding conspirators and further
frustrating the trace of scam proceeds. The investigation has already
revealed that approximately ₹4000 crores of public money has been
siphoned off through the scam. The magnitude of the economic offence
and its impact on public interest, especially in a resource-constrained
State, are compelling factors militating against grant of bail, as
underscored in Gulabrao Babukar Deokar v. State of Maharashtra,
(2013) 16 SCC 190.
50.
Tampering with documentary and electronic evidence;Engineering
retractions or hostile stances from key witnesses;Coordinating with
absconding conspirators and further frustrating the trace of scam
proceeds. The investigation has already revealed that approximately
₹4000 crores of public money has been siphoned off through the scam.
The magnitude of the economic offence and its impact on public
interest, especially in a resource-constrained State, are compelling
factors militating against grant of bail, as underscored in Gulabrao
Babukar Deokar v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 16 SCC 190.
51.
Respondent submits that there exists overwhelming prima facie
evidence of the Applicant’s role as a principal conspirator and financial
kingpin of the liquor scam;The risk of witness intimidation and evidence
tampering is real, established and continuing; and the gravity, magnitude
and societal impact of the offence, coupled with the Applicant’s influence
and conduct, render this a case wholly unfit for grant of bail. It is,
therefore, respectfully prayed that this Court may be pleased to reject
the present bail application and affirm the order dated 08.10.2025
passed by the Learned Special Court (PC Act), Raipur, in the interest of
justice and public interest.
52.
Formally Structured, Politically Shielded Liquor Scam (2018–
2023)1.1 The investigation has now conclusively revealed that between
2018 and 2023, during the tenure of the then political dispensation, a
formally structured, politically protected, State-wide liquor scam was
executed in Chhattisgarh. The scheme was not a series of isolated acts,
but a cohesive and centrally coordinated criminal enterprise.1.2 The
material on record demonstrates that bureaucratic officials, political
representatives and select private individuals operated as members of
an organized syndicate, each performing defined roles at different
stages of the excise chain—policy formulation, tendering, procurement,
hologram supply, retail operations, cash collection and laundering.
53.
All these key actors functioned in close coordination and with the
explicit approval, knowledge and consent of the present Applicant, who
has emerged as a principal conspirator and one of the central command
figures of this criminal enterprise.2. Specific Institutional Roles of
Co-Conspirators – Contextualizing the Applicant’s Position.
54.
The investigation has, inter alia, identified the roles of the
following senior functionaries, which in turn underscore the Applicant’s
centrality:a. Mrs. Soumya Chaurasia – Initially posted as Sub-Divisional
Officer (SDM), Patan, and later as Commissioner, Bhilai-Charoda
Municipal Corporation; subsequently elevated as Deputy Secretary in
the Chief Minister’s Office. Her proximity to the highest executive
authority and her strategic postings made her a crucial conduit in
enabling, facilitating and shielding the syndicate’s operations. Shri Anil
Tuteja, IAS – A senior IAS officer closely aligned with the then Chief
Minister, who played an instrumental role in orchestrating administrative
manoeuvres that enabled the smooth functioning of the scam. His
bureaucratic
influence
and
access
to
departmental
structures
significantly fortified the conspiracy.
55.
Shri Anwar Dhebar – A prominent political figure and an influential
Congress leader, who served as a key operative of the syndicate and
acted as a central channel for the movement of illegal cash generated
from the scam.
56.
These roles show that the Applicant was operating at the apex of
a vertically integrated network, exercising supervisory control over
bureaucratic, political and private actors who worked in tandem to
execute and conceal the scam.
The material collected clearly shows
that the Applicant is an individual of enormous influence, substantial
financial muscle and deep-rooted connections within bureaucratic and
political circles. His network spans elected representatives, senior civil
servants and private intermediaries embedded across the excise and
administrative apparatus. In light of this profile, the investigating agency
has justifiably apprehended that his release at this stage would pose a
serious, imminent and well-founded threat to the integrity of the ongoing
investigation. The apprehension is neither vague nor speculative; it is
grounded in concrete instances of:Coercion, threats and inducements
extended to key witnesses; Efforts to influence or neutralize co-accused
and couriers involved in cash transportation; and the Applicant’s
demonstrated inclination to obstruct, derail and contaminate the
evidentiary process. In such circumstances, the settled principles
governing bail in serious economic offences and corruption cases
(including Gulabrao Babukar Deokar v. State of Maharashtra and
Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI) squarely support the State’s
contention that the risk of witness intimidation and evidence tampering
is both real and grave, and that continued custody is necessary to
secure the ends of justice.
57.
Overall Impact and Necessity of Continued Custody. The
cumulative
effect
of
the
evidence—documentary,
financial
and
testimonial—shows that:The Applicant was at the heart of a State-wide
corruption grid, functioning as one of the top-tier commanders;He
personally supervised the financial architecture and ensured the
movement, parking and utilization of illicit proceeds; and the scam has
caused an unprecedented loss of approximately ₹4000 crores to the
State exchequer, gravely undermining public interest, revenue integrity
and institutional credibility. In the face of such material, the present case
does not warrant any indulgence by way of bail. On the contrary, it calls
for heightened judicial vigilance to ensure that the investigation is
permitted to reach its logical conclusion free from interference,
intimidation or dilution.
58.
In view of the above additional facts and circumstances, read with
the earlier written and oral submissions, it is humbly reiterated that:The
Applicant’s role is that of a principal conspirator and major beneficiary,
not a peripheral participant;His release at this stage would gravely
imperil the ongoing investigation by enabling further tampering with
evidence and suborning of witnesses; and the gravity, magnitude and
organized nature of the offence, coupled with the Applicant’s influence
and conduct, render this a case wholly unfit for grant of bail. It is,
therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may reject
the present bail application and affirm the order dated 08.10.2025
passed by the Learned Special Court (PC Act), Raipur.
FINDINGS AND THE CONCLUSION
59.
Heard learned counsel for the Applicant, Respondent-State, at
length
over
multiple
adjournment
dates.
Perused
the
record
meticulously, including FIR No. [04/2024], chargesheets (main + 5
supplements), witness statements, seized documents, and materials
placed on record.
60.
The prosecution's narrative unmasks a sophisticated syndicate
involving kingpin orchestration of illegal liquor production, hologram
forgery, policy subversion, Part-B siphoning, and ₹4000 crore exchequer
devastation—layered through shell entities like Vitthalpuram Residential
Complex and Shivam Constructions.
61.
It is the case that the applicant was allegedly involved in a large
scale syndicate which was operating in the State of Chhattisgarh. It is
further case of prosecution that the allegations arise out of certain
transactions and official decisions allegedly taken during the relevant
period, wherein it is sought to be contended that the applicant, along
with other accused persons was part of a larger conspiracy which
allegedly resulted in wrong gain to certain private individuals
and
corresponding loss to the public exchequer. The applicant has been
arrayed as an accused primarily on the basis of the statements recorded
during investigation and alleged linkages drawn by the investigating
agency.
62.
Notably, the applicant was not named in the First Information
Report nor does the FIR attribute any direct, specific or overt role to the
applicant in the alleged offence. The allegations sought to be levelled
against the applicant would necessarily require a detailed appreciation
of evidence, examination of witnesses and scrutiny of documentary
material which lies exclusively within the domain of the trial. It is well
settled that such an exercise is wholly impermissible at the stage of
consideration of a bail application, as bail proceedings cannot be
converted into a mini-trial.
63.
Investigation was initiated by the Police/EOW/ACB and the
applicant was arrested on 24.09.2025 in connection with the FIR No.
04/2024 dated 17.01.2024. The investigation as informed,is substantially
complete and custodial interrogation of the applicant is no longer
required. The material relied upon by the prosecution is largely
documentary in nature and is already in the custody of the investigating
agency.
64.
In the first charge-sheet filed by the Economic Offences Wing
(EOW) in Crime No. 03/2024, the applicant was not arrayed as an
accused. Even thereafter, the EOW filed multiple supplementary chargesheets, as many as five in number, yet in none of the said chargesheets was the applicant shown or arraigned as an accused.
65.
Even after filing as many as five supplementary charge-sheets,
the investigating agency consistently refrained from arraigning the
applicant as an accused. It is an admitted position that no recovery
whatsoever—neither money, property nor any incriminating article—has
been effected from the possession of the applicant. The prosecution has
not alleged that even a single penny of the purported proceeds of crime
has been recovered by the EOW from the present applicant.
67.
The investigation, as conceded by the prosecution itself, is
substantially complete, and there is nothing on record to suggest that
custodial interrogation of the applicant is either necessary or justified at
this stage. Continued incarceration, therefore, serves no investigational
purpose. The statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161
Cr.P.C. are predominantly directed against co-accused Trilok Singh
Dhillon and the applicant is sought to be implicated by way of alleged
association. It is of considerable relevance that the said co-accused has
already been granted bail by the High Court, thereby squarely attracting
the principle of parity in favour of the present applicant.
68.
The prosecution has relied on the statement of co-accused
Lakshmi Narayan Bansal. Despite an open-ended/permanent warrant of
arrest having been issued against the proclaimed absconder/coaccused, and despite his availability to the Investigating Officer, he was
neither arrested nor proceeded against and was permitted to walk free
after recording of his statement. Such selective application of the law
glaringly reflects a “pick and choose” approach, which is antithetical to
the concept of fair and impartial investigation.
68.
The magnitude of the case itself demonstrates the futility of
prolonged pre-trial incarceration. As per the prosecution’s own version,
the matter involves 51 accused persons, 1110 witnesses and
approximately 990 documents spanning thousands of pages. Charges
are yet to be framed against several accused, and investigation is stated
to be continuing. In such circumstances, the prospect of an early
conclusion of trial is illusory. Prolonged incarceration in a case of this
nature would amount to punishment before conviction and would plainly
violate the applicant’s fundamental right to a speedy trial guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
69.
Adding to the procedural infirmities, the EOW has proceeded with
further investigation and filing of supplementary reports without
obtaining prior permission of the competent court, contrary to the law
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinay Tyagi, Vinubhai
Haribhai Malaviya, and Robert L. Chonthu @ R.L. Chonthu (supra).
Such deviation further weakens the sanctity of the prosecution’s case.
70.
The allegations sought to be levelled against the applicant would
require meticulous appreciation of evidence, examination of a vast body
of witnesses and scrutiny of voluminous records, an exercise which can
only be undertaken during trial. It is trite law that bail proceedings
cannot be transformed into a mini-trial. Viewed cumulatively—absence
of the applicant’s name in the FIR, consistent non-arraignment in first
charge-sheet and thereafter five supplementary charge sheets, lack of
recovery, completion of investigation, grant of bail to similarly placed coaccused, procedural lapses on the part of the investigating agency, and
the inevitability of a protracted trial—this Court finds no compelling
reason to curtail the applicant’s liberty any further.
71.
It is further significant to note that, as per the prosecution’s own
case, the alleged masterminds and key conspirators of the entire liquor
scam are stated to be Arun Pati Tripathi, Trilok Singh Dhillon,
Anurag Dwivedi, and Arvind Singh, who are alleged to have
conceived, orchestrated and implemented the criminal conspiracy,
including formation of the syndicate and distribution of proceeds of
crime to politicians and public officials. It is further of considerable
significance that as many as 29 Excise Officials who are alleged to have
been involved in the very same liquor scam and against whom serious
allegations were levelled by the prosecution, have already been
enlarged on bail by the Apex Court. The grant of bail to such a large
number of public officials, whose alleged role was integral to the
execution of the purported conspiracy, unmistakably fortifies the
applicant’s claim to parity. In the absence of any material demonstrating
a role attributable to the applicant that is graver or distinguishable from
those officials already on bail, the continued incarceration of the
applicant would be wholly unjustified and contrary to the settled
principles governing grant of bail.
72.
Applying the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements to the facts
of the present case, it is evident that:
(a) The applicant was not named in the FIR;
(b) He was never arraigned as an accused in
the original or five supplementary chargesheets;
(c) No recovery has been effected from him by
the EOW;
(d) His alleged role, if any, is at best derivative
and associative;
Singh Dhillon, have already been granted bail
by the Apex Court.
74.
In the absence of any distinguishing material against the
applicant, denial of bail would amount to hostile discrimination, directly
offending the doctrine of parity as expounded by the Apex Court.
75.
This Court is, therefore, persuaded to hold that the applicant has
made out a clear and compelling case for grant of bail, not only on facts
but also on the anvil of binding constitutional and precedential mandates
laid down by the Apex Court.
76.
Despite the fact that a permanent warrant/open ended warrant
was issued by the Special Court, in this case against Mr. Lakshmi
Narayan Bansal and the same was available to the Investigating Officer,
he merely recorded the statement of the co-accused LNB, without
effecting his arrest and let him escape, such actions constitute a grave
violation of law. Therefore, this Court direct the Director General of
Police of the State to look into this matter and issue appropriate
directions to all the police officers across the State and ensure that
similar violations do not occur in future.
77.
Having bestowed anxious consideration to the material placed on
record, and with due deference to the imperatives of investigation, this
Court, without venturing into the merits of the matter, is of the
considered opinion that no compelling or justifiable reason now survives
for the continued incarceration of the applicant. The ends of justice, in
the facts and circumstances of the case, would be sufficiently
safeguarded by enlarging the applicant on bail.
81.
Accordingly, the present bail application deserves to be and is
hereby allowed. It is directed that the applicant shall be released on bail
upon his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh only) along with two local sureties of the like amount, to the
satisfaction of the learned Trial Court, subject to the following stringent
conditions so as to ensure the fair, smooth and expeditious conduct of
the trial:
(a) he shall surrender his passport, if any, before
the Trial Court;
(b)
The applicant must cooperate with the
investigation and the trial proceedings;
(c) he shall not directly or indirectly make any
inducement, threat or promise to any person
acquainted with the facts of the case;
(d) he shall commit no offence whatsoever during
the period he is on bail; and
(e) in case of change of residential address
and/or mobile number, the same shall be
intimated to the Court concerned by way of an
affidavit.
(f) any stringent conditions as may be imposed by
the trial court.
Any violation of the above conditions will
entitle the prosecution to move application for
cancellation of bail which shall be considered
promptly and on merits.
82.
It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove are
confined strictly to the adjudication of the present bail application.
Nothing stated in this order shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case. The learned Trial Court shall proceed
with the matter independently and uninfluenced by any of the
observations contained in this order.
83.
Nothing stated herein shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case and the trial court shall proceed
independently, uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this
order.
Sd/(Arvind Kumar Verma)
Judge
SUGUNA
DUBEY
Digitally signed
by SUGUNA
DUBEY
Date:
2026.01.02
19:39:58
+0530
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