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2026:CGHC:233
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ORDER RESERVED ON 12.12.2025
ORDER DELIVERED ON 02.01.2026
ORDER UPLOADED ON 02.01.2026
MCRC No. 8716 of 2025
1 - Chaitanya Baghel S/o Shri Bhupesh Baghel, Aged About 38 Years
R/o 1/7, Mansarovar Parisar, Bhilai, Durg (C.G.) (Currently Under
Judicial Custody At Central Jail, Raipur (C.G.)
... Applicant(s)
versus
1 - Directorate Of Enforcement, Raipur Zonal Office, Through Its
Assistant Director, Mr. Sunil Kumar Singh, 2nd Floor, Subhash Stadium,
Moti Bagh, Raipur, (C.G.) 492001
... Respondent(s)
For Applicant (s)
:
Shri N.Hariharan, Sr. Counsel, Shri Mayank
Jain, Shri Madhur Jain, Shri Arpit Goel and
Shri Deepak Jain, through VC assisted by
Shri Harshwardhan Parganiha, Advocates
For Respondent/ED
:
Shri Zoheb Hossain & Shri Pranjal Tripathi,
Advocates through VC assisted by Dr.
Saurabh Kumar Pande, Dy. AG.
(HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE ARVIND KUMAR VERMA)
CAV ORDER
The present applicant has preferred this application under
Section 483 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (pari
materia to Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., 1973) seeking grant of regular bail
in connection with the offence registered
by the Enforcement
Directorate (ED) by way of an ECIR alleging commission of offence
punishable under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002 arising out of the alleged scheduled
offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
FACTUAL MATRIX
2.
Genesis of Proceedings:
The present proceedings arise out of FIR No. 04/2024 dated
17.01.2024 registered by the EOW/ACB, Raipur, for offences punishable
under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
and Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,
alleging a large-scale criminal conspiracy in the excise administration of
the State of Chhattisgarh during the period 2019 to 2023, resulting in an
alleged loss of approximately ₹ 2161 crore to the State exchequer.
3.
Initiation of PMLA Investigation
On the basis of the said scheduled offences, proceedings under
the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were initiated by the
Directorate of Enforcement through ECIR No. RPZO/04/2024 dated
11.04.2024. The gravamen of the ED case is that the proceeds
generated from the alleged excise scam constitute “proceeds of crime”
which were concealed, layered and projected as untainted property by
various accused persons.
4.
Excise Policy Framework and Institutional Structure
The excise policy of the State underwent a structural change in 2017
with the creation of the Chhattisgarh State Marketing Corporation
Limited (CSMCL), entrusted with exclusive retail sale of liquor through
State-run outlets, with procurement from manufacturers and storage
through the Chhattisgarh State Beverage Corporation Limited (CSBCL).
Liquor in the State broadly falls under two categories, namely Country
Liquor (CL) and Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL), with country liquor
being manufactured only through three distilleries operating within the
State.
5. Alleged Criminal Syndicate and Control Mechanism
The prosecution case alleges that a criminal syndicate comprising
senior bureaucrats, politicians, excise officials and private entities
subverted the statutory excise framework and converted CSMCL into an
instrumentality for institutionalized corruption. It is alleged that Arun Pati
Tripathi was positioned as Managing Director, CSMCL, to operationalize
the scheme, while policy decisions and administrative approvals were
facilitated at higher levels of governance
6.
Modus Operandi – PART-A (Accounted Liquor)
Under the first limb of the alleged conspiracy (PART-A), commissions
were allegedly extracted from distillers on procurement of accounted
liquor by CSMCL. Preferred manufacturers were favoured, while noncompliant distillers were sidelined. The alleged commission was fixed
initially at ₹75 per case and was subsequently enhanced. The
prosecution alleges that detailed procurement data was used to ensure
systematic collection of commission, which was allegedly shared among
syndicate members and political functionaries.
7.
Modus Operandi – PART-B (Unaccounted / Illicit Liquor)
The second limb (PART-B) pertains to alleged manufacture and sale of
unaccounted “kacha” liquor through State-run shops. According to the
prosecution, duplicate holograms, bottles and transportation channels
were used to bypass warehouses and regulatory safeguards. The entire
sale was allegedly conducted in cash, without payment of excise duty or
taxes, resulting in illicit enrichment of the syndicate.
8.
Modus Operandi – PART-C and FL-10A Licences
A third stream of alleged illegal earnings (PART-C) is stated to have
arisen from cartelization among distillers and extraction of quid pro quo
payments for market allocation. Further, FL-10A licences were allegedly
introduced to extract commissions from foreign liquor manufacturers,
with licence holders acting as intermediaries and sharing profits with the
syndicate.
9.
Scale of Alleged Proceeds of Crime
As per the ED, the cumulative proceeds of crime generated through
PART-A, PART-B, PART-C and FL-10A mechanisms are stated to be in
excess of ₹2161 crore. Parallel proceedings by ACB/EOW have also
alleged generation of proceeds exceeding ₹2500 crore through
scheduled offences.
10.
Role Attributed to Various Accused and the present applicant
The prosecution case assigns differentiated roles to bureaucrats,
politicians, excise officials, distillers, logistics providers, manpower
contractors, hologram suppliers and cash collection agencies, alleging
that each segment was aligned to ensure seamless operation of the
alleged racket.
11.
In so far as the role of the present applicant is concerned, it is
alleged that he was associated with certain individuals who are stated to
be part of the said syndicate. However, the records reveal that the
applicant is not alleged to have held any official or statutory position in
the Excise Department, Chhattisgarh State Marketing Corporation
Limited (CSMCL), Chhattisgarh State Beverage Corporation Limited
(CSBCL), or any authority connected with formulation or implementation
of excise policy. No administrative order, policy decision, licence, tender,
or official act is attributed to the applicant in the prosecution material.
The allegations qua the applicant primarily rest on statements recorded
under Section 50 of the PMLA and broad assertions of association,
without reference to any specific overt act directly attributable to him in
the execution of the alleged scheme. The material on record, as per the
prosecution’s own allegations, establishes that the applicant was closely
associated with key syndicate members Anwar Dhebar and Trilok
Singh Dhillon and that he received approximately Rs. 1000 crores in
cash as commission from the illicit proceeds of the liquor scam.
12.
Stage of Proceedings
The
ED
has
filed
multiple
prosecution
complaints,
including
supplementary complaints, before the learned Special Court under
PMLA. The ACB/EOW has also filed charge-sheets under the PC Act.
The investigation, as reflected from the record and submissions, has
been expanded over time with further complaints and supplementary
filings.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT
I.
PMLA prosecution by ED-Bail Jurisdiction of Constitutional
Courts
13.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that though the present
case has been registered by the Enforcement Directorate under the
PMLA, the power of this Court to grant bail under Section 483 of the
BNSS remains intact and must be exercised in consonance with
constitutional principles of liberty and fairness. The Apex Court in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary Vs. Union of India (2022) 10 SCC 386, while
upholding the PMLA framework, has categorically held that “The
satisfaction under Section 45 of the PMLA is only prima facie and does
not amount to recording of guilt.” Thus, even in ED cases, bail cannot be
denied mechanically.
II.
Twin
Conditions
under
Section
PMLA-Prima
Facie
Satisfaction Met
14.
It is further submitted that the twin conditions under Section 45
of the PMLA do not create an absolute bar on grant of bail. The Court is
required to form a prima facie opinion, and not to undertake a detailed
evaluation of evidence. In the present case, the ED has failed to place
any material to demonstrate that the applicant was directly indulged in
laundering of proceeds of crime or that he is in possession of the same.
Consequently, the statutory threshold stands satisfied in favor of the
applicant. The Apex Court in the matter of Karti Chidambaram Vs.
Directorate of Enforcement (2022)11 SCC 566, while granting bail in
PMLA case held that “Arrest is not mandatory merely because it is
lawful. Custodial detention must be justified by necessity.”
15.
It is asserted that the applicant has not been shown to have
directly possessed the proceeds of crime. He allegedly only
facilitated the syndicate and did not personally receive any tainted
funds. Co-accused allegedly handled transactions and proxies; the
applicant's involvement is argued to be remote, Thus, there is no
allegation that the applicant himself converted or invested
identifiable proceeds of crime into assets. Under the PMLA, one
cannot be treated as laundering proceeds unless he “knowingly assists”
in dealing with such proceeds. Counsel for the applicant disputes that
any link or proceeds has been established and argued that the
money found in real estate deals or cash transfers is not shown to
have come from a predicate offence committed by him.
III. ED Arrests-Custody must be Justified, Not Punitive
16.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the arrest by the ED cannot
be used as a punitive measure. Once investigation is substantially
complete and no recovery is pending, continued incarceration become
unconstitutional. In Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40, the
Apex Court while dealing with economic offences held that “ the object
of bail is neither punitive nor preventive. Deprivation of liberty must be
justified by compelling reasons.”
17.
The said principle has been reiterated in P.Chidambaram Vs.
Directorate of Enforcement (2020) 13 SCC 791, where the Apex Court
granted bail in an ED case, observing that “Gravity of offence along
cannot be decisive of bail.”
18.
Learned counsel for the applicant assails the arrest of the
applicant as being mechanical, unjustified and constitutionally
infirm, contending that the power under Section 19 of the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002 has been exercised in gross disregard to
the statutory safeguards embedded therein. It is submitted that the
grounds of arrest supplied to the applicant are vague repetitive and
largely a verbatim reproduction of the allegations already
contained in the prosecution complaint, without disclosing any
emergent circumstances necessitating custodial detention. The arrest, it
is contended, is not founded on any fresh incriminating material
discovered immediately prior thereto, but is merely predicated upon
statements recorded under Section 50 of th PMLA and documentary
material already in possession of the ED.
19.
He submits that mere existence of material is not synonymous
with necessity of arrest. The applicant was cooperating with the
investigation, had appeared pursuant to summons and was neither
absconding nor obstructing the course of investigation. Not satisfaction
has been recorded as to why arrest was indispensable, as opposed to
continuing the investigation with the applicant at liberty. It is submitted
that the “reason to believe” recorded by the authorized officer does not
reflect an independent application of mind to the twin requirements
under Section 19 namely, (i) the belief that the person is guilty of the
offence of money laundering and (ii) the necessity of arrest. The
grounds of arrest, according to the applicant, fail to demonstrate any live
nexus between the alleged offence and the need for immediate
deprivation of liberty.
20.
Placing reliance on the recent judgments of the Apex Court,
counsel for the applicant submits that the arrest under PMLA is not
automatic upon registration of an ECIR or filing of a complaint and
that continued incarceration without demonstrable necessity. amounts to
pre-trial punishment.
IV. Prolonged Incarceration in Ed Cases-Constitutional Safeguard
21.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that prolonged
incarceration in ED cases, where trials are inherently protracted strikes
at the very root of Article 21. The Apex Court in Manish Sisodia Vs.
directorate of Enforcement, (2024) SCC OnLine SC, granted bail
under the PMLA
holding that “When the accused has undergone
substantial incarceration and the trial is unlikely to conclude soon,
continued detention is unjustified.”
The
prolonged
pre-trial
incarceration with no trial commenced deprived the accused of his “right
to speedy trial” which is a facet of Article 21. Similarly, in Union of India
Vs. K.A.Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713, the Apex Court held that
Constitutional Courts are empowered to grant bail even in stringent
statutes where delay in trial results in prolonged custody. It has been
argued that the same principle applies here that the trial has not yet
begun despite significant time in custody, warranting bail in the interest
of justice.
22.
Learned counsel for the applicant has highlighted the inordinate
delay in framing charges or commencing trial. He has already endured
over 5 months in custody. It has been argued that in the matter of
Manish Sisodia, the Court reiterated that the right to a fair and speedy
trial is inviolable. The co-accused in this matter have differently
participated in the conspiracy. Several of them are already on bail or
lesser custody. It is therefore urged that the role of the applicant was not
supervisory or executive, unlike others citing the principle that bail is a
rule and jail is the exception, it is argued that denying bail solely on the
gravity of charges would be artistry, especially since others implicated,
have been released.
23.
He further argued that in one of the observation of the Apex Court
that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment” and that one cannot be
“made to run from pillar to post” in matters of life and liberty. He had also
drawn the attention of this Court to the matter of V.Senthil Balaji
(supra) where the court relaxed bail conditions in a money laundering
case, noting that even if statutory conditions were strict, the trial had
stalled and bail had been granted with safeguards and similar equitable
considerations mandate grant of bail here, subject to any conditions this
Court may deem fit.
V. No Risk of Absconding or Tampering-ED has Complete Control
of Records
24.
It is submitted that the ED has already seized all relevant
documents and material. There is no allegation much less any material
to suggest that the applicant is likely to tamper with evidence or
influence witnesses. In Dataram Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
(2018) 3 SCC 22, the Apex Court has held that “A person should not be
deprived of liberty without cogent reasons, mere apprehension is
insufficient.”
VI. Arrest Not Mandatory Even in ED Matters
25.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that even under special
statutes, arrest is not an automatic consequence. The Apex court in
Siddarth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 1 SS 676 has held that “If
the accused has cooperated with the investigation and arrest is not
necessary, custody should not be insisted upon.”
26.
Thus, in the light of the settled position of law laid down by the
Apex Court, continued incarceration of the applicant in an ED-registered
PMLA case after substantial completion of investigation would amount
to pre-trial punishment which is impermissible in law.
VII.
Protracted
Trial And
Structural
Impossibility
Of
Early
Conclusion
27.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the present case is
a class illustration of a prosecution where trial is structurally
incapable of being concluded within any reasonable time frame.
The PMLA proceedings alone involve 21 accused persons, 64
witnesses and more than 325 documents running into several
thousands of pages. As per the admitted position of the Enforcement
Directorate, investigation is still stated to be ongoing.
28.
More significantly, the predicate offence itself involves 51
accused, 1110 witnesses and 990 documents, rendering the conclusion
of the trial in the scheduled offence a virtual impossibility in the near
future. It is now settled law that the trial under the PMLA cannot be
concluded before the conclusion of the trial in the predicate
offence. This legal position stands conclusively affirmed by the Apex
Court in V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State (2024) 3 SCC 51. In light of this
admitted factual matrix, continued incarceration of the applicant would
amount to indefinite pre-trial detention, which is constitutionally
impermissible.
VII. Bail In PMLA Cases Where Trial Is Not Likely To Conclude Soon
29.
The Apex Court has repeatedly held that where there is no
likelihood of early conclusion of trial, bail must follow even in
PMLA cases, notwithstanding the rigours of Section 45. The ED’s
contention that the length of custody undergone must cross a particular
threshold is legally unsustainable. The correct test, as laid down by
the Apex Court, is not the duration of incarceration per se, but the
likelihood of timely conclusion of trial, particularly in PMLA matters.
30.
Reliance
has
been
placed
in
the
following
authoritative
pronouncements:
•
Manish Sisodia Vs. Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 1920
•
Union of India Vs. K.A.Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713
•
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9
SCC 813
•
Ramlipal Meena Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, SLP (Crl.)
No. 3205/2024.
These judgments unequivocally hold that Article 21 cannot be
sacrificed at the altar of procedural rigor and that prolonged
incarceration without realistic prospect of trial is impermissible.
VIII. Bail on the Ground of Parity
31. Out of 21 accused persons, 7 were arrested and 5 have already
been granted bail including:
•
Anil Tuteja -Order dated 15.04.2025 (SLP (Crl.) No. 3148/2025;
•
Arun Pati Tripathi -Order dated 12.02.2025 (Cr.A. No.
725/2025)
•
Trilok Singh Dhillon -Order dated 26.03.2025 (Cr.A. No.
1535/2025)
•
Anwar Dhebar – Order dated 19.05.2025 (Cr.A. No. 2669/2025)
•
Arvind Singh -Order dated 13.05.2025 (Cr.A. No. 2576/2025)
The applicant's alleged role is significantly lesser than several of
the above accused who have already been enlarged on bail. Denial of
bail to the applicant would therefore offend the principle of parity which
is a well recognized facet of bail jurisprudence.
32.
It is further submitted that the ED has demonstrably adopted a
pick-and-choose policy effecting selective arrests. Several accused
having graver and more direct roles, including excise officials and
distillery owners who are alleged direct beneficiaries have never been
arrested. Selective arrest has been judicially recognized as a relevant
and weighty ground for grant of bail including in PMLA cases.
Reliance has been placed on :
•
Vipin Yadav Vs. ED, 2025 Scc OnLine Del 6237
•
Chandra Prakash Khandelwal Vs. ED , 2023 SCC OnLine Del
•
State of MP Vs. Sheetla Sahai (2009) 8 SCC 617
IX. Further Investigation without permission of Court.
33.
All prosecution complaints filed by the ED record that further
investigation is pending, yet no permission of the Special Court
was ever sought, as mandatorily required. This Court in Cr.M.P. No.
2056/2025 has categorically held that :
No permission for further investigation was obtained; Such
irregularity is a relevant factor for grant of bail.
The legal position that no further investigation can be conducted
by the ED without prior permission of the Special Court stands settled
by :
•
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Vs. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1
•
Bhupesh Kumar Baghel Vs. ED WP No.
11.08.2025.
301/2025 dated
The filing of repeated supplementary complaints without satisfying
the narrow exception laid down in Pramatha Nath Talukdar Vs.
Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 155 further
weakens the prosecution case.
X. No Recovery of Proceeds of Crime from the Applicant
24.
Search was conducted under Section 17 of the PMLA on
10.03.2025 and 18.07.2025 yielded absolutely nothing incriminating
from the Applicant. Absence of recovery of proceeds of crime is a
relevant factor for grant of bail, as held in Paras Mal Lodha Vs.
Assistant Director, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 8676.
XI. Sole Reliance on Unreliable Section 50 Statements.
The ED’s case rests predominantly on the statements of Lakshmi
Narayan Bansal (LNB) which are coerced, uncorroborated, inconsistent
and recorded after issuance of open-ended warrants.
34.
LNB is himself an accused and an absconder. Income Tax records
contain exculpatory statements of LNB dated 27.01.2021 denying
any link with the liquor matter. This Court in its order dated 17.10.2025
(Cr.M.P. Nop. 2056/2025) has already held that such statements
recorded during open-ended warrants and selective investigation
are relevant for bail. Even otherwise, confessional statements of coaccused are not substantive evidence,as held in :
•
Prem Prakash Vs. ED (2024) 9 SCC 787;
•
Subramanya Vs. State of Karnataka (2023) 11 SCC 255;
•
Haricharan Kurmi Vs. State of Bihar, 1964 Scc OnLine SC 255
35.
So far as the whatsapp chats and call records are concerned,
they are of no incriminating value. The alleged whatsap chats and call
records do not pertain to the liquor scam and lack any corroborative
material. It is settled law that unconnected chats or loose sheets
cannot relied upon to deny bail as held in :
•
Preeti Chandra Vs. ED (2023) 3 HCC (Del) 1;
•
Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Union of India (2017) 11 SCC 731;
•
CBI Vs. V.C.Shukla (1998) 3 SCC 410.
The ED has failed to establish any of the three foundational facts
required under Sections 3 and 24 of the PMLA namely:
i) Existence of proceeds of crime;
ii) Nexus of the Applicant with such proceeds;
iii) Projection or claiming such proceeds as untainted.
Even the alleged return of Rs. 2 crores to LNB is not part of the
prosecution complaint and is based on a belated Section 50 statement
and lacks any linkage to proceeds of crime.
36.
It has been further submitted that the applicant was never
summoned for three years, never named earlier and was arrested only
after allegedly coerced statements-demonstrating a targeted and
discriminatory exercise of power. Hence, within the framework of the
prosecution case itself, the role attributed to the applicant appears to be
indirect and inferential, flowing from alleged association rather than from
demonstrable acts of commission or direct handling of proceeds of
crime, the evidentiary value of which is a matter for trial. Thus, on a
holistic and cumulative consideration of the factual matrix, settled legal
principles and constitutional imperatives,the applicant has made out a
strong case for grant of bail, even within the rigours of the PMLA.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE ED
37.
Mr. Hossain, learned counsel for the ED has placed on record a
comprehensive array of evidence against the applicant including :
Section
statements
:Recorded
confessional
and
narrative
statements of multiple witnesses (summoned under Section 50 PMLA)
implicating the applicant in handling proceeds of crime. (Apex Court has
affirmed that such statements are admissible and can furnish a prima
facie case.)
Digital and Financial Data : Forensic analysis of Whatsapp chats and
other electronic records revealing communications about illicit fund
movements, as well as bank and real estate transaction documents
evidencing extensive cash flows and layering of funds.
Projective Involvement : Documentary and testimonial evidence
showing the applicant’s active role in controlling liquor syndicate.
Cash Book Entry : A ledger entry indicating repayment of 2 crores to a
key syndicate operator (to neutralize evidence of crime).
Non-Cooperation (Section 17 PMLA) : The ED notes that the applicant
repeatedly evaded summons and did not cooperate with the
investigation, impeding the probe. (Courts have held that ignoring lawful
summons amounts to obstructing investigation). Taken together this
material provides prima facie evidentiary basis implicating the applicant
in laundering large sums in the liquor scam (similar to how Tarun Kumar
Vs. ED found that Section 50 statements and documents can show an
accused “knowingly” handling proceeds.
38.
He submits that Section 45(1) of the PMLA categorically makes
money laundering offences cognizable and non bailable over riding the
Cr.P.C. It provides that
an accused shall not be released on bail
“unless” two conditions are met: (I) the Public Prosecutor has been
heard and (ii) the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing the accused in not guilty of money laundering and he is not
likely to commit any offence while on bail. In short, both twin conditions
must be fulfilled to grant bail. Courts have repeatedly held these
conditions to be mandatory and onerous.
•
Mandatory Twin Conditions: The Apex court has empahsized
that Section 45 imposes a near-”not bail” regime. In Vijay
Madanlal Chaudhary Vs. Union of India (2022) the Court
upheld the stringent bail provisions,noting that PMLA reverses
the presumption of innocence and places the burden on the
accused to make out a prima facie case for bail. Likewise
Gautam Kundu Vs. ED and subsequent cases reiterate that
Section 45’s twin conditions are “mandatory and need to be
complied with”. In Tarun Kumar (2023), the Court reiterated
that these conditions must be satisfied before bail under 439
Cr.P.C can be granted. Thus, bail in PMLA is truly the
exception not the norm.
•
Nature of Offence: Aggravated Crime: The PMLA is a
“special statute” targeting money laundering which has been
described as an “aggravated form of crime” with serious
transnational impact. In Kanhaiya Prasad Vs. Union of India
(2025) the Supreme Court stressed that due to the gravity of
money laundering “without exception” the rigours of Section 45
must be applied, regardless of how bail is sought. Given the
enormous stakes (Rs. 1000 + crores allegedly laundered here)
this court must be cautious.
•
Burden on Accused : The onus is on the applicant to satisfy
these conditions. The accused must prima facie prove
innocence and no risk of re-offence (and this can be
discharged only on probabilities). In Tarun Kumar, the SC has
specifically noted that if statements and documents on record
strongly implicate the accused, he has “failed to meet the
threshold stipulations” of proving he is not guilty and not likely
to offend.
39.
He therefore submits that applying these principles, the applicant
plainly fails to satisfy Section 45. First there is no prima facie case of
innocence. The evidence including multiple Section 50 statements and
financial records, points strongly to the applicant's involvement in
processing illicit funds. As in Tarun Kumar where such material was
held sufficient to show the role of the accused in the laundering cycle,
the same conclusion holds here: the ED’s evidence on record casts
clear suspicion on the applicant. He has neither disproved
nor
explained these charges convincingly. In fact the investigational material
suggest affirmative participation (he managed the Excise Deptt. And
benefitted from the proceeds), undercutting any claim of prima facie
innocence. He submits that the offence under the PMLA is cognizable
and non-bailable and that the legislature has consciously imposed a
stringent bail regime under Section 45.The twin conditions under
Section 45 are mandatory and cumulative and unless both are satisfied,
the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant bail. Strong reliance is placed upon
Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary Vs. Union of India (2022) and Tarun
Kumar Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (2023), wherein the Apex
Court reiterated that the burden squarely lies on the accused to prima
facie establish innocence.
40.
The prosecution has relied upon statements recorded under
Section 50 of the PMLA which are admissible in evidence. In Rohit
Tandon Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (2018) 11 SCC 46, the Apex
Court held that statements recorded under Section 50 are admissible
and can form the basis for forming a prima facie view at the stage of
bail. The Delhi High Court in Amanatullah Khan Vs.ED, 2024 SCC
OnLine Del 1658 has reaffirmed that such statements carry evidentiary
value at the stage of consideration of bail/anticipatory bail. Therefore,
the applicant’s attempt to dilute the evidentiary wroth of Section 50
statements is contrary to settled precedent.
41.
It is submitted that mere incarceration of about four months
cannot be treated as prolonged detention warranting grant of bail in a
grave economic offence under the PMLA. The Apex Court in Uday
Singh Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 357,
has held that such a short duration of custody does not, by itself, justify
grant of bail, particularly when the allegations disclose serious economic
offences.
42.
In sum, neither limb of Section 45 is satisfied. This Court must
“meticulously” apply Section 45’s twin tests. There is no doubt that the
ED has an opportunity to oppose and indeed has opposed the bail.
More critically, the Court cannot find “reasonable grounds” to believe the
accused in not guilty-quite the opposite, as prima facie evidence
suggests involvement. Likewise, there is a real risk of the accused
committing offences (such as witness intimidation) on bail. The burden
was on the applicant to demonstrate the contrary, which he has not met.
43.
It contends that the applicant “sponsored” key appointments (in
the
Chhattisgarh
State
Marketing
Corporation)
and
oversaw
commission-collection schemes, making him a kingpin rather than a
mere minor conspirator. The money laundering is not an ordinary
offence but an aggravated economic crime having serious ramifications
on the financial integrity of the nation. He further submits that the
applicant was not a peripheral participant but was the apex of the
syndicate, exercising supervisory control over the flow and deployment
of illicit funds.
44.
He further argued that the seriousness of the alleged offence and
the imperatives of effective investigation weight decisively against
enlargement of the applicant on bail. Money Laundering at this scale is
extraordinary; PMLA offences are “aggravated” crimes. Granting bail in
such cases is contrary to legislative intent. Moreover, the ED asserts
that the applicant’s continued custody is necessary to trace further
actors in the syndicate and recover proceeds. Indeed, even procedural
history shows caution: The co-accused has also had his bail application
dismissed on 20.06.2025 and on an almost identical record confirms the
appropriate stance is to withhold bail here as well.
45.
In these circumstances, equity does not favor release. The
applicant has been in custody since 18.07.2025 but prolonged custody
alone does not override statutory mandate. The Apex Court in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary cautioned that concerns of delay cannot bypass
Section 45 strictures. The gravamen of the offence and the risk factors
must guide this Court.
46.
Mr. Hossain, learned counsel for the respondent/ED submits that
the decisions such as Manish Sisodia and Anil Tuteja were rendered
in exceptional factual circumstances and cannot be treated as blanket
precedents. It is argued that those cases turned on extraordinary delay
and peculiar procedural factors, whereas in the present case,
investigation is ongoing and the applicant's custodial interrogation
remains necessary. He further submits that the PMLA reflects the
legislative intent to combat complex financial crimes with a deterrent
framework. Grant of bail in cases of this magnitude, it is argued, would
erode public confidence and undermine the statutory objective of the
Act.
47.
Learned counsel for the respondent-ED submits that contention of
the applicant that further investigation conducted after filing of the first
prosecution complaint dated 19.06.2024 is impermissible for want of
permission of the Special Court, is contrary to settled law and
deserves outright rejection. It is submitted that the Apex Court while
upholding constitutional validity of the Explanation to Section 44 of the
PMLA, has clearly recognized that further investigation is a statutory
and continuing power of the authorized agency and that the
Explanation is an enabling provision intended to ensure that no
offender of money laundering escapes prosecution merely because a
complaint has already been filed.
48.
In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Vs. Union of India (2022) 10 SCC
386, the Apex Court authoritatively held that :
The Explanation to Section 44 permits the
Authority to bring on record further evidence in
respect of further investigation even after
cognizance has been taken and it is always
open to the authorized authority to seek
permission of the Court during trial,keeping in
mind the provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.”
The Apex Court further clarified that the authorized authority may
either seek permission to bring further evidence on record during trial; or
file a fresh complaint against a person not previously arraigned; or
request the Court to proceed against such person under Section 319
Cr.P.C. (now corresponding provision under BNSS).
49.
He further contended that it is a settled proposition of law that trial
commences only after framing of charges and not prior thereto. In the
present case, it is an admitted position that charges have not yet been
framed and therefore the trial has not commenced. Consequently, the
submission that prior permission of the Special Court was mandatory at
the present stage is legally unsustainable. The statutory recognition of
further investigation even after filing of final report is well settled under
Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. which has been consistently interpreted by the
Apex Court. In State of A.P. Vs. A.S.Peter (2008) 2 Scc 383, the Apex
Court has categorically held as under:
“Indisputably, the law does not mandate taking of
prior permission from the Magistrate for further
investigation. Carrying out of further investigation
even after filing of the charge sheet is a statutory right
of the police.”
50.
The
discretion
between
further
investigation
and
re-
investigation equally settled. While re-investigation without leave of
court is impermissible, further investigation is expressly sanctioned by
law. This position was reaffirmed in Vinay Tyagi Vs. Irshad Ali (2013) 5
SCC 762, wherein it was held that further investigation under Section
173(8) Cr.P.C. is permissible even after submission of the police report
and that the report arising therefrom is termed a supplementary report.
51.
It has been further submitted that the Apex Court has consistently
held that taking of cognizance does not bar further investigation In
State of T.N. Vs. Hemendhra Reddy, (2023) 16 SCC 779, the
Supreme Court reiterated that even de hors a specific direction of the
Court, further investigation is permissible under Section 173(8)Cr.P.C.
The three Judge Bench Judgment in Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya Vs.
State of Gujarat (2019) 17 SCC 1, has conclusively settled the law by
holding that :
•
Further investigation can continue even after the Magistrate has
taken cognizance;
•
there is no requirement for recalling or reviewing the order
accepting the final report; and
•
further investigation is merely a continuation of the earlier
investigation and does not attract the principle of double jeopardy.
52.
It has been further submitted that the argument of the applicant
that arrest during further investigation is completely devoid of legal
basis. The PMLA expressly empowers the ED to arrest a person not
shown as an accused in the original complaint if the requirements of
Section 19 of the PMLA are satisfied. The Apex Court in Tarsem Lal
Vs.Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 971, has
recognized that :
•
the ED can arrest a person not already named as an accused in the
complaint; and
•
53.
no prior permission of the trial court is required for such arrest.
Learned counsel appearing for the ED justifies the arrest as being
lawful necessary and in strict compliance with Section 19 of the
PMLA.
It is submitted that the arrest is founded upon voluminous
material collected during investigation, including statements recorded
under Section 50 of the Act, digital evidence, bank transactions and
forensic analysis, which prima facie establish the involvement of the
applicant in the offence of money laundering.
54.
It is argued that the grounds of arrest were duly communicated to
the applicant in writing, thereby fulfilling the statutory mandate. The ED
asserts that the formation of “reason to believe” is based on objective
material and not on mere suspicion and conjecture.
The custodial
interrogation was necessary to unravel the complex web of financial
transactions, trace the proceeds of crime, identify the role of other
conspirators and prevent destruction or concealment of evidence. The
gravity and magnitude of the offence, involving large scale laundering of
proceeds of crime, justify the exercise of the power of arrest.
55.
It is contended that non-issuance of summons under Section
50 prior to arrest does not vitiate the arrest, an issuance of summons
is not a mandatory precondition for invoking Section 19. It is submitted
that the apprehension of tampering with evidence and influencing
witnesses cannot be ruled out if the applicant is enlarged on bail at this
stage and thus, the arrest is neither arbitrary nor punitive but a
legitimate exercise of statutory power in furtherance of effective
investigation under the PMLA.
56.
The Directorate of Enforcement, in its prosecution complaints and
supplementary complaints filed in connection with ECIR/RPZO/04/2024,
has alleged the existence of an organised liquor syndicate operating in
the State of Chhattisgarh during the period 2019–2023. However, on a
careful perusal of the material placed on record, it emerges that the role
attributed to the present applicant is largely inferential and derivative in
nature, rather than being founded on any specific overt act directly
attributable to him.
57.
In view of the settled legal position emerging from the
authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court, the ED is legally
empowered to conduct further investigation; no prior permission of the
Special Court is required before commencement of trial; arrest during
further investigation is lawful; Section 50 statements are admissible and
relevant at the bail stage and short incarceration does not dilute the
rigour of Section 45 PMLA.
The objections raised by the applicant on these grounds are
therefore misconceived, legally untenable and liable to be rejected.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:
58.
Having bestowed anxious consideration to the rival submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, perused the case diary,
prosecution complaints, grounds of arrest, supplementary materials
placed by the Enforcement Directorate and examined the statutory
framework of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in light of
binding precedents of the Apex Court, this Court is conscious of the
gravity and the seriousness of the offence alleged under the provisions
of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. It is noteworthy that the
applicant has not been named in the ECIR nor in the FIR in respect of
the predicate offence underscoring the tenuousness of the prosecution’s
narrative at this stage. At the same time, it is equally trite that the
considerations governing the grant or refusal of bail must be tested on
well settled principles of criminal jurisprudence and constitutional
safeguards.
59.
This Court reiterates that at the stage of consideration of a bail
application, the exercise of jurisdiction is neither punitive nor
determinative of guilt. The Court is required to assess whether
continued incarceration of the applicant is necessary, proportionate and
constitutionally permissible, having regard to the nature of allegations,
material collected, role attributed and the likelihood of the trial
concluding within a reasonable time. A conjoint ready of the pleadings
and material placed on record reveals the following facts:
I.
Judicial Principles for consideration of bail under the PMLA
60.
This Court, before adverting to the facts of the present case,
deems it apposite to reiterate the settled parameters governing the grant
of bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Undoubtedly, the statute incorporates stringent conditions; however,
stringency of a statutory regime cannot be read as a license to
disregard constitutional safeguards. The Apex Court in Satender
Kumar Antil Vs. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51, has held that even in cases
involving special statutes, deprivation of liberty must satisfy the test of
necessity and proportionality and that arrest and incarceration cannot be
resorted to as a matter of course.
61.
Similarly, in Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40, it has
been held that the object of bail is to secure the presence of the
accused at trial and not to inflict punishment prior to conviction.
In
Manish Sisodia Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (2024) 2 SCC 349,
has consistently held that the jurisdiction at the stage of bail is guided by
the principles of necessity, proportionality and fairness and not by
punitive considerations.
II.
Findings on Non-Issuance of Summons under Section 50 of
the PMLA.
62.
On a careful perusal of the record, it emerges as an undisputed
position that the applicant was never served with summons under
Section 50 of the PMLA prior to his arrest for the
purpose of
recording his statement. In other words, it is contended that at no stage
of proceedings was the petitioner served with any notice or summons
under Section 50 of the PMLA for the purpose of recording his
statement. Such omission, it is urged strikes at the very root of the
procedural safeguards envisaged under the Act and consequently,
vitiates the subsequent proceedings, including the arrest. As has been
lucidly explained in its order passed by this Court in Cr.M.P. No. 2506 of
2025 on 17.10.2025, more particularly, in paragraphs 77 & 78 thereof,
the object of issuance of a notice under Section 50 of the PMLA is two
fold. Firstly, it serves to apprise the person concerned of the nature and
scope of the inquiry being undertaken and secondly, it affords such
person a meaningful opportunity to place his version of facts or to
produce relevant material before the competent authority. Failure to
issue such notice deprives the person of a valuable right to be heard
and to clarify his position prior to the initiation of any coercive action.
63.
This Court further observed that even in cases where the statute
does not expressly mandate issuance of notice in every situation, the
principles of fairness and natural justice would nonetheless require the
authority to record cogent reasons if such an opportunity is denied. The
discretion vested in an investigating agency is not unbridled; it carries
with it a corresponding obligation to act judiciously, reasonably and in a
manner consistent with the legislative intent and constitutional ethos.
64.
While it is correct that issuance of summons under Section 50 is
not, in absolute terms, a statutory precondition for arrest under Section
19 of the PMLA, this Court is of the considered view that Section 50
embodies a substantive procedural safeguard, designed to ensure
transparency, fairness and voluntary cooperation before the drastic
measure of arrest is invoked. The Apex Court in Vijay Madan Lal
Choudhary Vs. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1, while upholding the
constitutional validity of the PMLA, has categorically observed that
procedural safeguards under the Act cannot be reduced to empty
formalities and must operate in substance. The complete omission to
invoke Section 50 prior to arrest, when viewed in conjunction with the
facts and circumstances of the present case, assumes relevance at
the stage of bail, though it may not, by itself, invalidate the arrest.
65.
At the outset, it must be reiterated that bail jurisprudence under
the PMLA, though undoubtedly stringent, is not intended to eclipse
constitutional guarantees, nor to legitimize incarceration by default.
The rigour of Section 45 of the PMLA, however strict, does not oust
the jurisdiction of constitutional courts to protect personal liberty
where continued detention becomes disproportionate, punitive or
unjust. The satisfaction contemplated under Section 45 of the PMLA is
prima facie in nature, and not a determination of guilt. The legal
position stands conclusively settled by the Constitution Bench in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary Vs. Union of India (20220 10 Scc 386, wherein
it was held that the Court at the stage of bail, is required only to assess
whether reasonable grounds exist for believing that the accused is not
likely to be guilty and not to conduct a roving enquiry for a mini-trial.
66.
The power of arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA is undoubtedly
a drastic power, an its exercise is conditioned upon strict adherence to
the statutory safeguards and constitutional limitations. The expression
“reason to believe” is not an incantation to be mechanically reproduced,
but a safeguard intended to ensure that personal liberty is not scarified
at the altar of mere suspicion.
III. Findings on Grounds of Arrest and the Necessity of Custodial
Incarceration
67.
The grounds of arrest furnished to the applicant essentially rely
on the seriousness of the alleged offence and the supposed involvement
of the applicant in laundering the proceeds of crime. The Apex Court has
consistently held that mere non-appearance pursuant to summons
under Section 50 of the PMLA is not by itself, sufficient to constitute a
valid ground for arrest under Section 19 of the Act. However,
seriousness of allegations, howsoever grave, cannot alone justify
continued pre-trial incarceration. The Apex Court in Pankaj Bansal
Vs. Union of India (2023) 7 SCC 1 and more recently in Senthil Balaji
Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626, has held
that arrest under the PMLA must be founded upon demonstrable
necessity and not on generalized assertions of gravity or suspicion.
68.
In the present case, the investigation is largely documentary and
digital in nature. Statements have already been recorded, material has
been seized and the respondent has failed to demonstrate any specific
investigative requirement which necessitates continued custodial
interrogation of the applicant. Stated differently, it is urged that the
custodial action taken against the applicant was unwarranted and
disproportionate, inasmuch as there existed neither any necessity nor
exigency justifying such coercive measure. It is a matter of record that
the applicant was never served with summons under Section 50 of the
PMLA nor was he required to appear before the Enforcement
Directorate in relation to the alleged offence prior to his arrest.
Consequently, the allegation of non-cooperation as reflected in the
grounds of arrest, is stated to be factually incorrect.
69.
Further it has been contended that although the grounds of arrest
advert to non-cooperation, the arrest was not founded solely on that
premise but was sought to be justified on other grounds recorded by the
Investigating Officer. Nevertheless, a mere erroneous reference to noncooperation, by itself, would not render the arrest illegal though it may
constitute a procedural lapse amounting to an irregularity rather than an
illegality. The arrest, as asserted was ultimately based on the subjective
satisfaction of the Investigating Officer, purportedly formed on the basis
of material already available with the Enforcement Directorate.
70.
It is also contended that the further investigation carried out by the
Enforcement Directorate was undertaken without prior permission of the
competent Court. The custodial arrest of the petitioner was effected after
a lapse of nearly four months without any disclosure of fresh
incriminating material having been collected during the intervening
period. In the circumstances where the alleged involvement of the
petitioner had already crystallized earlier, the subsequent
arrest,
delayed and unexplained, is asserted to be legally impermissible.
Though the procedure under Sections 200 to 204 Cr.P.C. governs
proceedings under the PMLA and not Section 173 Cr.P.C, the delay
in effecting arrest and the absence of prior judicial sanction for further
investigation remain relevant considerations while assessing the
necessity and propriety of continued custodial detention.
71.
In this regard, learned counsel for the ED contends that even after
filing the prosecution complaint, it retains the statutory authority to
conduct further investigation under the PMLA. However, the Apex Court
has consistently held that such power is not unfettered and must be
exercised subject to judicial oversight and the statutory safeguards
prescribed under the Act. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Vs. Union of
India (2023), the court emphasized that investigative powers, including
those exercised post filing of a charge sheet must be exercised on the
basis of tangible material and within the bounds of law. It has been held
as under:
“263. Clause (i) of the Explanation enunciates
that the jurisdiction of the Special Court while
dealing with the offence being tried under this
Act, shall not be dependent upon any orders
passed in respect of the scheduled offence,
and the trial of both sets of offences by the
same Court shall not be construed as joint
trials. This, in fact, is reiteration of the earlier
part of the same section, which envisages that
even though both the trials may proceed before
the same Special Court, it must be tried
separately as per the provisions of the 1973
Code. Insofar as Clause (ii) of the Explanation,
at the first glance, it does give an impression
that the same is unconnected with the earlier
part of the section. However, on closer scrutiny
of this provision, it is noted that the same is
only an enabling provision permitting to take on
record material regarding further investigation
against any accused person involved in respect
of offence of money-laundering for which
complaint has already been filed, whether he
has been named in the complaint or not. Such
a provision, in fact, is a wholesome provision to
ensure that no person involved in the
commission of offence of money- laundering
must go unpunished. It is always open to the
Authority authorized to seek permission of the
Court during the trial of the complaint in respect
of which cognizance has already been taken by
the Court to bring on record further evidence
which request can be dealt with by the Special
Court in accordance with law keeping in mind
the provisions of the 1973 Code as well. It is
also open to the Authority authorized to file a
fresh complaint against the person who has not
been named as accused in the complaint
already filed in respect of same offence of
money-laundering, including to request the
Court to proceed against such other person
appearing to be guilty of offence under Section
319 of the 1973 Code, which otherwise would
apply to such a trial.”
72.
It has been emphasized that the primary objective of any further
investigation is to uncover the truth and ensure justice is served. In the
context of the PMLA, the Apex Court has held that the ED retains the
statutory authority to conduct further investigation even after filing of the
prosecution complaint. This authority is subject to the
safeguards
enshrined in the statute and must be exercised in accordance with the
principles of fairness and reasonableness.
73.
From perusal of the grounds of arrest, it is evident that the arrest
of the applicant is substantially based upon material already collected
during investigation, including statements recorded under Section 50 of
the Act and documentary evidence. No specific circumstance has been
pointed out which necessitated the immediate arrest of the applicant at
that stage, nor has it been demonstrated that custodial interrogation was
indispensable once such material stood secured.
74.
This Court is mindful that arrest is not meant to be punitive, nor
can it be resorted to merely because the statute confers the power to do
so. The purpose of arrest is to aid investigation, prevent evasion of
justice or secure the presence of the accused. Where these objectives
can be achieved without incarceration, continued detention becomes
disproportionate. While the legality of arrest may ultimately be examined
in appropriate proceedings at the stage of bail, this Court is duty bound
to assess whether continued custody is justified. In the present case,
investigation is largely documentary in nature, the material relied upon
by the respondent is already on record and the trial has yet to
commence.
75.
Similarly, in Pankaj Bansal Vs.Union of India (2023), it was held
that further investigation cannot be conducted in a manner that infringes
the statutory rights of the accused or circumvents procedural safeguards
including the requirement of prior permission where mandated.
76.
Pertinently, the present matter is a complaint case. No doubt
Section 44 (1) (d) permitting filing of supplementary complaints when
fresh materials are available to the ED in relation with money laundering
but the procedure prescribed for filing of complaint under Section 44 of
the PMLA read with Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. with Section 200 to 204 of
the Cr.P.C. and is distinct from that of a police report under Section 173
of the Cr.P.C. Section 200 provides for a Magistrate taking cognizance
of an offence on complaint. Thereafter, an enquiry is conducted by the
competent Magistrate in terms of Section 201 to 204 Cr.P.C. and the
Section 207 & 208 of the Cr.P.C. provides supply of documents,
statements and other material to the accused. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matter of Bhupesh Kumar Baghel Versus Union of India
& Ors. {Writ Petition (s) (Criminal) No(s) 301/2025, decided on
11/08/2025} has held thus:2. It is a matter of record that, with respect to the
interpretation of Section 44(1) of the Prevention of
Money-Laundering Act, 2002, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v.
Union of India & Ors., (2023) 12 SCC 1in paragraph
263 has held as follows:
“263. Clause (i) of the Explanation enunciates
that the jurisdiction of the Special Court while
dealing with the offence being tried under this
Act, shall not be dependent upon any orders
passed in respect of the scheduled offence, and
the trial of both sets of offences by the same
court shall not be construed as joint trials. This,
in fact, is reiteration of the earlier part of the
same section, which envisages that even
though both the trials may proceed before the
same Special Court, it must be tried separately
as per the provisions of the 1973 Code. Insofar
as clause (ii) of the Explanation, at the first
glance, it does give an impression that the
same is unconnected with the earlier part of the
section. However, on closer scrutiny of this
provision, it is noted that the same is only an
enabling provision permitting to take on record
material regarding further investigation against
any accused person involved in respect of
offence of money laundering for which
complaint has already been filed, whether he
has been named in the complaint or not. Such a
provision, in fact, is a wholesome provision to
ensure that no person involved in the
commission of offence of money laundering
must go unpunished. It is always open to the
authority authorised to seek permission of the
court during the trial of the complaint in respect
of which cognizance has already been taken by
the court to bring on record further evidence
which request can be dealt with by the Special
Court in accordance with law keeping in mind
the provisions of the 1973 Code as well. It is
also open to the authority authorised to file a
fresh complaint against the person who has not
been named as accused in the complaint
already filed in respect of same offence of
money laundering, including to request the
court to proceed against such other person
appearing to be guilty of offence under Section
319 of the 1973 Code, which otherwise would
apply to such a trial.”
3. To sum up the contention of the petitioner, this
Court has held that: (I) The authorities of the
Enforcement Directorate can bring on record further
evidence during the trial; (ii) the further evidence can
be brought on record with the prior permissionof the
Court; and (iii) the Enforcement Directorate can either
file a fresh complaint or the Court can proceed
against such other person under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
(now substituted by a new provision under the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023).
77.
It is pertinent to note that the learned Special Judge, Riapur, in
proceedings arising out of the EOW case, has issued a permanent
warrant of arrest against one Mr. Lakshmi Narayan Bansal who is also
named as an accused in the ECIR and is stated to be absconding.
Despite the subsistence of such permanent warrant, no effective steps
appear to have been taken by the Investigating Officer or the
Enforcement Directorate to secure his arrest.
78.
Learned counsel for the applicant has placed on record that
during the course of remand proceedings and in the presence of
Enforcement Directorate, it was specifically brought to the notice of the
Court that an open ended warrant of arrest had been issued against the
said Mr. Lakshmi Narayan Bansal. Astonishingly, when queried in this
regard, learned counsel for the respondent fairly submitted to the best of
his knowledge, the Enforcement Directorate was unaware of the said
fact. Such an admission prima facie reflects a serious lapse in the
investigation and lends credence to the grievance that a selective or
‘pick and choose’ approach may have been adopted by the investigating
agency.”
79.
With respect of Mr. Lakshmi Narayan Bansal, although the record
indicates that the warrant of arrest issued against him remains
unexecuted the mere non-arrest of a co-accused by itself does not
establish mala fides or illegality in the proceedings initiated against the
present applicant. At best, such circumstance may amount to an
irregularity; however an irregularity of this nature does not ipso facto
vitiate the entire proceedings.
80.
Further under Section 70 of the Cr.P.C and Section 72 of the
BNSS 2023, the law prescribes the form of warrant and duration of
arrest, leaving no scope for selective or discretionary non-compliance
when a judicial warrant has been issued. Section 72 (2) of the BNSS
provides as under:
“every such warrant shall remain in force
until it is either canceled by the court that
issued it or it is executed, meaning the
person is arrested. This provision
ensures a warrant is valid indefinitely
until one of these two events occurs.”
It emerges from the record that the competent Special court in
E.O.W./liquor scam case has declared Mr.Lakshmi Narayan Bansal as
absconding and, accordingly, issued a permanent warrant of arrest on
19.05.2025 which remains neither executed or cancelled.
81.
Counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of the court to the
fact that an open ended warrant of arrest has been issued against Mr.
Bansal
in
connection
with
FIR
No.
04/2024.
Shockingly,
the
respondent/Investigating Agency did not verify this critical fact from the
concerned EOW, Raipur.
82.
Further despite full knowledge of the issuance of permanent
warrant of arrest as informed by the learned counsel for the accused in
remand proceeding before the Special Judge, the respondent recorded
the statement of Mr. Bansal on two occasions ie. 26.07.2025 and
10.09.2025 under Section 50 of the PMLA yet failed to arrest him. It is
well settled that an Investigating Agency cannot exercise discretion to
override a judicial mandate, the presence of a permanent warrant of
arrest leave no room for selective action. During the course of
arguments, the ED candidly admitted that Mr. Bansal was not arrested
notwithstanding the statements recorded and was allowed to go
unimpeded.
83.
Prima facie the conduct of the prosecution reveals a manifestly
inconsistent and selective approach being both hot and cold in its
approach and has acted in a pick and choose manner in investigation.
While procedural lapses are apparent, it is clarified that such
irregularities, though regrettable do not amount to illegality per se, and a
distinction between irregularity and illegality.
Findings on Selective Arrest and Pick and Choose
84.
The material placed on record prima facie reveals that certain
individuals alleged to have played graver and more direct roles,
including alleged beneficiaries, have not been arrested, despite being
named in the ECIR and despite issuance of warrants in predicate
proceedings. The selective invocation of coercive powers against the
applicant, while similarly or more seriously placed persons remain at
liberty, raises a legitimate concern regarding unequal application of law.
The Delhi High Court in Vipin Yadav Vs. Directorate of Enforcement,
2025 SCC OnLine Del 6237, has recognized that selective arrest is a
relevant consideration while adjudicating bail under the PMLA as it
bears directly upon fairness of the process. This Court finds that the
applicant has succeeded in demonstrating a prima facie case of
discriminatory exercise of arrest powers which cannot be ignored at this
stage. In substance, the investigating authority has followed a “pick and
choose” approach by consciously refraining from arresting those
individuals who were fully aware of the source of the illicit funds actively
facilitated the laundering process by arranging mule accounts and
played a central and pervasive role at every stage of the alleged
conspiracy .Despite such grave and foundational allegations, those
individuals have not been subjected to custodial arrest.
85.
It is thus contended that denial of bail to the applicant, in the face
of non-arrest of a co-accused whose role is projected as more
significant
and
culpable,
would
amount
to
discriminatory
application of the coercive powers of arrest and would render the
exercise of such power arbitrary and unjust.
V. Findings on Parity with Co-accused
86.
It is borne out from the record that several co-accused including
Anil Tuteja, Arun Pati Tripathi, Trilok Singh Dhillon, Anwar Dhebar
and Arvind Singh, who are the kingpins and key conspirators of the
syndicate-who constitute the principle accused in the matter have
already been enlarged on bail by the Apex Court. The role attributed to
the present applicant is not shown to be severe or qualitatively different
from those co-accused. In such circumstances, denial of bail would
result in unequal treatment.
The Apex Court in Tarun Kumar Vs.
Enforcement Directorate, 2023 SCC OnLine 1486 has held that parity
cannot be denied unless clear and cogent distinguishing features are
established.
This Court has also noted that in Cr.M.P. No. 2506 of 2025 dated
17.10.2025 this Court has empahsized that parity, though not absolute,
cannot be brushed aside when similarly placed co-accused stand
enlarged on bail and no distinguishing circumstance is shown.
87.
Once the grounds of arrest cease to have a live and compelling
nexus with the necessity of further detention, continued incarceration
would offend the constitutional mandate of Article 21. Liberty, though not
absolute, cannot be curtailed on speculative apprehensions.
88.
Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court finds that the
prosecution case against the applicant is predominantly documentcentric, resting upon statements recorded under Section 50 of the
PMLA, financial records, digital material and inferential links. The
admissibility, credibility and evidentiary worth of such material are
matters that can only be conclusively adjudicated during trial, after full
fledged examination and cross examination.
89.
So far as the nature and evidentiary worth of the materials placed
on record are concerned, this Court finds guidance from the
authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in CBI Vs. V.C.Shukla.
Although the said decision arose at the stage of discharge after
completion of investigation. The Apex Court has categorically held that
entries contained in diaries,notebooks, files or loose sheets which are
not maintained as “books of account” in the regular course of business
do not satisfy the requirements of Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Such loose papers or sheets, even if recovered during investigation are
legally irrelevant and inadmissible as substantive evidence. Only those
entries which are recorded in books of account regularly kept, having
regard to the nature of occupation or business, can be treated as
admissible under law. It has been observed by the Apex Court as under:
“39. A conspectus of the above decisions makes
it evident that even correct and authentic entries
in books of account cannot without independent
evidence of their trustworthiness, fix a liability
upon a person. Keeping in view the above
principles, even if we proceed on the assumption
that the entries made in MR 71/91 are correct
and the entries in the other books and loose
sheets which we have already found to be not
admissible in evidence under Section 34) are
admissible under Section 9 of the Act to support
an inference about the formers' correctness still
those entries would not be sufficient to charge
Shri Advani and Shri Shukla with the accusations
levelled against them for there is not an iota of
independent evidence in support thereof. In that
view of the matter we need not discuss, deleve
into or decide upon the contention raised by Mr.
Altaf Ahmed in this regard. Suffice it to say that
the statements of the for witnesses, who have
admitted receipts of the payments as shown
against them in MR 71/91, can at best be proof
of reliability of the entries so far they are
concerned and not others. In other words, the
statements of the above witnesses cannot be
independent evidence under Section 34 as
against the above two respondents. So far as
Shri Advani is concerned Section 34 would not
come in aid of the prosecution for another reason
also. According to the prosecution case itself his
name finds place only in one of the loose sheets
(sheet No. 8) and not in MR 71/91. Resultantly,
in view of our earlier discussion, section 34
cannot at all be pressed into service against him.
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
41. In the light of the above principles we may
now consider the arguments canvassed by Mr.
Altaf Ahmed to made the entries in the books
and the enclose sheets admissible under the
above section as relevant evidence. He
submitted that the materials collected during
investigation and placed on record clearly
establish the existence of a general conspiracy
amongst jains to promote their economic interest
by corrupting public servant. He next contended
that the materials further disclosed that in order
to accomplish the design of the general
conspiracy, a number of separate conspiracles
with similar purpose had been hatched up
between jains and different public servants.”
90.
Although learned Senior Counsel for the applicant has cited the
above case laws to demonstrate the inadmissibility of certain evidence
such as loose papers or sheets, this Court is not discussing the same
for the reason that it constitutes a pure question of merit to be
adjudicated upon by the trial court.
91.
Significantly, no recovery of proceeds of crime has been
effected from the personal possession of the applicant, nor is there
any allegation of the applicant having directly enjoyed the fruits of the
alleged proceeds of crime in a manner demonstrable at this stage. The
role attributed to the applicant, though serious, rests largely on all
allegations of supervisory control and association which are yet to
be established by cogent and impeachable evidence.
92.
This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the trial in
the
present case is likely to be protracted, having regard to the number
of accused, the volume of documentary evidence, the complexity of
financial transactions and the multiplicity of witnesses. In such
circumstances, continued incarceration of the applicant would convert
the presumption of innocence into a hollow promise, thereby
offending the constitutional mandate of fairness.
93.
As has been submitted by the counsel for the applicant that the
present prosecution is a text book illustration of a case where the trial is
structurally incapable of being concluded within any reasonable time
frame. The record reveals that the proceedings under the PMLA alone
involved as many as 21 accused persons, hundreds of witnesses
and several hundred documents running into thousands of page.
Even as of date, the ED itself maintains that the investigation has
not yet attained finality.
94.
The complexity of the matter is further compounded by the fact
that the predicate offence encompasses an even larger evidentiary
canvas, involving an extraordinary volume of material, numerous
accused and a vast array of witnesses. In such circumstances,it
would be wholly unrealistic to expect that the trial, either in the
scheduled offence or the PMLA proceedings would conclude in
the near future.
It is now well settled that a trial under the PMLA
cannot logically or legally be concluded prior to the culmination of the
trial in the predicate offence. This legal position stands conclusively
affirmed by the Apex Court in V.Senthil Balaji Vs.State (2024) 3 SCC
51. The inevitable consequence is that continued incarceration of the
applicants would amount to prolonged and indeterminate pre-trial
detention.
95.
In cases such as the present, where there are multiple accused,
voluminous evidence to be appreciated, scores of witnesses to be
examined and no reasonable likelihood of early conclusion of trial and
where the delay is not attributable to the accused, continued custody by
mechanically invoking Section 45 of the PMLA would reduce the
provision to a tool of incarceration rather than a safeguard.
96.
As consistently held in a catena of judgments, constitutional
courts retain the plenary power to grant bail on the grounds flowing
from Part III of the Constitution. Section 45 of the PMLA does not, and
cannot, operate as an absolute embargo where continued incarceration
would infringe the fundamental right to personal liberty and fair trial. The
sacrosanct guarantee under Article 21 must prevail even in the face of
stringent provisions contained in special statutes.
97.
In the present case, the applicant is in custody since 18.07.2025
and the trial is unlikely to conclude in the foreseeable future, the delay
as borne out from the record, cannot be attributed to the applicant.
Recently, in a judgment of the Apex Court, directions were issued that
Investigation cannot continue endlessly in the matter of Robert
Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R.L.Chonthu Vs. State of Bihar, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 2511, wherein it has been held as under:
“20. On this count, prosecution against the
appellant is liable to be quashed. The
conclusion is that even though, in the one case
that has been consistently highlighted by the
State, it cannot be said that the appellant acted
within the scope of authority as given by
Section 13(2A) of the Arms Act, but given that
the administrative authorities have already
discharged him, that issue need not be taken
further. On the issue of sanction being improper
and large delay in filing of chargesheet as also
consequent action, we have decided in favour
of the appellant.
The appeal is accordingly allowed.
21. Before parting with this matter, we deem it
fit to issue the following directions:
(i) In view of Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad
Ali27, it can be seen that the ‘leave of
the court’ to file a supplementary
chargesheet, is a part of Section
173(8) CrPC. That being the position,
in our considered view, the Court is
not rendered functus officio having
granted such permission.
Since the further investigation is being made
with the leave of the Court, judicial
stewardship/control thereof, is a function which
the court must perform.
(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper
functioning of the machinery of criminal law.
They form the bedrock of fairness,
transparency, and accountability in the justice
system. If the Court finds or the accused
alleges (obviously with proof and reason to
substantiate the allegation) that there is a large
gap between the first information report and the
culminating chargesheet, it is bound to seek an
explanation from the investigating agency and
satisfy itself to the propriety of the explanation
so furnished.
The direction above does not come based on
this case alone. This Court has noticed on
many unfortunate occasions that there is
massive delay in filing chargesheet/taking
cognizance etc. This Court has time and again,
in its pronouncements underscored the
necessity of speedy investigation and trial as
being important for the accused, victim and the
society. However, for a variety of reasons there
is still a lag in the translation of this recognition
into a reality.
(iii) While it is well acknowledged and
recognised that the process of investigation
has many moving parts and is therefore
impractical to have strict timelines in place, at
the same time, the discussion made in the
earlier part of this judgement, clearly
establishes that investigations cannot continue
endlessly. The accused is not out of place to
expect, after a certain point in time, certaintyabout the charges against him, giving him
ample time to preparing plead his defence. If
investigation into a particular offence has
continued for a period that appears to be
unduly long, that too without adequate
justification, such as in this case, the accused
or the complainant both, shall be at liberty to
approach the High Court under Section 528
BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update on the
investigation or, if the doors of the High Court
have been knocked by the accused, quashing.
It is clarified that delay in completion of
investigation will only function as one of the
grounds, and the Court, if in its wisdom,
decides to entertain this application, other
grounds will also have to be considered.
(iv) Reasons are not only important in the
judicial sphere, but they are equally essential in
administrative matters particularly in matters
such as sanction for they open the gateway to
greater consequences. Application of mind by
the authorities granting or denying sanction
must be easily visible including consideration of
the evidence placed before it in arriving at the
conclusion.”
98.
It is not in dispute that the investigation in the present matter is
substantially documentary in nature and that the applicant has remained
in custody for a considerable period. The material collected by the
Enforcement Directorate including statements recorded under Section
50 of the PMLA and digital/financial records has already been brought
on record. At this stage, the evidentiary value of such material is a
matter to be tested during trial and not conclusively adjudicated at the
stage of bail.
99.
The right to a speedy trial, as an inseparable facet of Article 21 of
the Constitution, cannot be sacrificed at the altar of procedural rigidity.
The Apex Court in Manish Sisodia Vs. CBI & ED (2024) has
categorically held that where the trial is unlikely to conclude within a
reasonable period, prolonged pre-trial detention under special statute
offends Article 21, particularly when the conclusion of trial is not
foreseeable, even in cases involving economic offences.
100. The argument of the Enforcement Directorate that the applicant
wields political influence, though noted, cannot be accepted as a
standalone ground to deny bail in the absence of specific material
demonstrating actual attempts at witness intimidation or obstruction of
justice. Apprehensions, howsoever grave, must be founded on
tangible material and not on conjecture. It is also material to note that
multiple prosecution complaints have already been filed and the
documentary
and
digital
evidence
stands
secured.
In
such
circumstances, the possibility of tampering with evidence stands
significantly diminished.
101. This Court is conscious of the gravity of offences under the PMLA
and the deleterious impact of money laundering on the financial health
of the nation. However, severity of allegations cannot, by itself,
become a justification for perpetual incarceration, particularly when
the adjudicatory process is bound to take years. The criminal justice
system does not countenance a regime where detention becomes the
rule and trial the exception. Such an approach would reduce the
concept of bail to a mere illusion and render Article 21 a dead letter.
102. The contention of the ED that parity is wholly inapplicable has
been duly considered. While it is correct that bail orders passed on
peculiar facts do not constitute binding precedent, parity is not the sole
of determinative factor in the present case. The grant of bail herein is
founded on the cumulative assessment of the period of custody already
undergone, the stage of the proceedings, the nature of evidence and the
overarching constitutional mandate that bail is the rule and jail an
exception.
103. This court finds it significant to note that in respect of one of the coaccused namely, Anil Tuteja, the Apex Court while dealing Special
Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 11790 of 2024 (Anil Tuteja and
Another Vs. Union of India and Others, has issued a categorical and
time bound direction to the Investigating Agencies including the
enforcement Directorate and the concerned State authorities to
conclude the investigation and file the complaint/additional charge sheet
within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of the
said order. It is pertinent to mention here that at the time when the
further investigation was set in motion, the Apex Court had not accorded
permission to proceed further. Nevertheless, the controversy before the
Apex Court did not pertain to the legal requirement of obtain permission
for investigation. Rather, the limited issue was confined to the
expeditious completion of the investigation and in that context alone, the
Apex court was pleased to grant a period of three months for concluding
the same.
104. The applicant's alleged role is significantly lesser than that of
several superior accused who have already been enlarged on bail.
Denying bail to the applicant would therefore offend the well-recognized
principle of parity, a cornerstone of bail jurisprudence. It is evident from
the record that several co-accused, including Anil Tuteja, Arun Pati
Tripathi, Trilok Singh Dhillon, Anwar Dhebar, and Arvind Singh—
who are the kingpins and key conspirators forming the syndicate have
already been granted bail by the Apex Court and the role attributed to
the present applicant is neither severe nor qualitatively distinct from
theirs.
105. On the Apex Court itself deemed it appropriate to confine the
investigation against a co-accused within a fixed time frame and to
preserve the right to seek bail thereafter, continued or prolonged pretrial incarceration of the present applicant, in the absence of any
demonstrable necessity or fresh incriminating material, would run
contrary to the settled principles governing bail jurisprudence.
106. The principle of parity which is a facet of Article 14
of the
Constitution and a well recognized cannon of bail jurisprudence,
mandates
that similarly situated accused persons ought not to be
subjected to disparate standards of treatment in matters affecting
personal liberty. Once the Apex court has delineated the contours within
which investigation against a co-accused must be concluded and has
envisaged consideration of bail on merits thereafter this Court would be
failing in its constitutional duty if the present applicant- standing on
lesser footing is denied the same normative protection.
107. It is trite law that parity does not demand mechanical replication of
orders; however, it does require the Court to ensure consistency in
judicial approach, unless distinguishing circumstances of a compelling
nature are demonstrated. No such distinguishing material has been
placed on record by the respondent to justify a harsher or more
restrictive treatment of the present applicant vis-a-vis the said coaccused Anil Tuteja. As per the prosecution case, the alleged kingpins,
principal conspirators and major beneficiaries of the transactions are
stated to be Anwar Dhebar, Anil Tuteja, Arvind Singh, Arunpati
Tripathi and Trilok Singh Dhillon who are the main architects and
beneficiaries of the alleged offence are already enlarged on bail by the
Apex Court.
108. The material relied upon by the Enforcement Directorate does not
disclose any document, official communication, financial instrument,
bank account, or property standing in the name of the applicant which
would, by itself, demonstrate direct involvement in the generation of
proceeds of crime. The allegations, as they stand, are premised
primarily on statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA and
broad assertions regarding influence and proximity, rather than concrete
acts of commission. While it is alleged that the applicant stood “at the
apex” of the syndicate, no contemporaneous documentary evidence has
been placed on record to establish that the applicant exercised control
over procurement decisions, fixation of commission rates, award of
tenders, movement of liquor, or handling of cash collections. The
prosecution has not pointed to any minutes of meetings, written
instructions, digital communications, or financial trails originating from
the applicant that would prima facie substantiate such a role.
109. The prosecution narrative proceeds on the premise that the
alleged syndicate was managed operationally by public servants and
private intermediaries, with day-to-day execution allegedly handled by
certain named officials and associates. The applicant is not shown to
have held any statutory position in the Excise Department, CSMCL,
CSBCL, or any licensing authority, nor is he alleged to have issued any
administrative direction, policy decision, or official order forming part of
the scheduled offences.
110. On a cumulative consideration of the facts and circumstances and
on a holistic appreciation of the factual matrix and legal position, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the applicant has made out a
case for grant of bail. The statutory rigour of Section 45 of the PMLA,
when tested against the touchstone of constitutional proportionality,
stands sufficiently satisfied at this stage. Continued incarceration of
the applicant, in the facts of the present case, would amount to pre-trial
punishment, which is alien to the settled principles of criminal
jurisprudence.
111. This Court is satisfied that the ends of justice can be adequately
secured by imposing stringent conditions to ensure the presence of the
applicant during trial and to prevent any misuse of liberty. Accordingly,
the bail application deserves to be allowed and it is hereby allowed. The
concerned trial court shall enlarge the applicant on bail subject to
stringent terms and conditions as may be fixed after hearing the
ED/respondent. The condition shall include (a) surrender of passport if
any (b) furnishing an undertaking on oath to the concerned court that he
will regularly and punctually attend the trial court and shall cooperate
with the trial court for early disposal of the case and (c) in the event it is
found that the applicant is not cooperating with the concerned court for
early disposal of the case or commits a breach of any of the conditions
of bail, it will be open for the respondent to apply for cancellation of bail
before the concerned court.
112. It is made clear that the observations made herein are strictly
confined to the adjudication of the present bail application and shall not
be construed as an expression on the merits of the case during trial.
Sd/(Arvind Kumar Verma)
Judge
SUGUNA
DUBEY
Digitally signed
by SUGUNA
DUBEY
Date:
2026.01.02
19:02:41
+0530
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