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Serial No.08
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP (C) No.303/2022
Date of order: 17.08.2022
Union of India & ors
Catharine Eva Myrthong
Vs.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner
For the Respondents
: Mr. U.K. Nair, Sr.Adv with
Mr. S.P. Mahanta, Sr.Adv
Mr. L.M. Sangma, Adv
Mr. M. Lyngdoh, Adv
: Dr. N. Mozika, ASG with
Ms. S. Rumthao, Adv
Ms. A. Pradhan, Adv
i) Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
The short question involved in this case is whether an applicant
having taken advantage of a concession as regards any eligibility criterion
in one category may again avail of the same concession in another
category to be, in effect, the double or multiple beneficiary of the
concession by virtue of such candidate belonging to two or more of the
categories entitled to obtain the concession.
2.
The issue is of some importance and despite the considerable
industry on the part of Counsel appearing on either side, no direct
precedent on the issue has been brought.
3.
It must be recorded at the outset that this petition has been received
since the Central Administrative Tribunal was not available as is recorded
in the interim order of August 12, 2022, and that despite the petitioner’s
best efforts, the petition carried to the Tribunal could not be listed since
August 5, 2022 while the selection process was being continued upon the
petitioner being found ineligible to be considered for the post.
4.
The petitioner applied for the post of Professor-cum-Principal in
the College of Nursing of the North Eastern Indira Gandhi Regional
Institute of Health and Medical Sciences, Shillong. In terms of the
governing rules and the invitation to apply, the age limit for recruitment
was 45 years. Indeed, the exact words are as follows:“Not exceeding 45 years (Relaxable by 5 years for Government
Servants in accordance with the instruction of Central Govt.)”
5.
Since the other eligibility criteria to be entitled to apply for the post
are irrelevant for the present purpose, it is only the age criterion which is
taken into consideration.
6.
It is not in dispute that the petitioner belongs to a scheduled tribe.
The petitioner is also in government service. At the time that the
petitioner applied for the position, she was about 54 years of age and her
application was rejected on the ground that she was overaged by about
four years or so. It is against the rejection of her application, that the
petitioner is before this Court.
7.
The petitioner relies on an office memorandum of March 27, 2012
issued by the government of India that claims to be a consolidation of the
orders on relaxation in upper age-limit allowed to various categories of
Central government servants. It is important to notice the exact words of
the relevant memorandum which is followed by a detailed table running
into the next six pages:
“Consolidated orders on relaxation in upper age limit allowed
to various categories of government servants.
“The undersigned is directed to invite attention to this
Department’s Notification No.2/101 /72-Estt(D) dated 07.03.1974
and to say that since then a number of instructions allowing
relaxation in upper age to Central government servants for
recruitment to various categories of posts under the Central
government have been issued. For the facility of reference and
guidance, the content of the important/relevant O.M.’s/orders on
the subject have been consolidated. The number and date of
original O.M.’s have been referred under each category for easy
reference to the context.”
8.
The petitioner relies on the first entry in the table pertaining to
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The memorandum refers to a
notification of March 7, 1974 and provides that in all posts filled by direct
recruitment, there would be an age relaxation to the extent of five years
for scheduled caste and scheduled tribe applicants.
9.
The petitioner next places Rule 10 of the Recruitment Rules for
Nursing Faculty and Other Posts of NEIGRIHMS, 2004. The relevant
provision reads as follows:
“10. Reservation of Schedule Caste & Schedule Tribe –
Nothing in these Rules shall affect reservation, relaxation of age
limit and other concessions required to be provided for Schedule
Castes & Schedule Tribes and other special categories of person in
accordance with the orders issued by the Central Government from
time to time in this regard.”
10.
The petitioner asserts that in view of the office memorandum of
March 27, 2012 and the specific provision in the Recruitment Rules of
2004, the petitioner would be entitled to a further relaxation of five years
of age over and above the relaxation of five years that she earned by virtue
of the petitioner being a government servant. The petitioner maintains
that the unequivocal wording of Rule 10 virtually incorporates the
memorandum of March 27, 2012 into the 2004 Rules and whatever other
relaxation the petitioner may be entitled to by virtue of any other status,
the petitioner cannot be denied the additional age relaxation of five years
in terms of the memorandum of March 27, 2012.
11.
For contrary purposes, the parties have placed reliance on the
judgments reported at (2010) 3 SCC 119 (Jitendra Kumar Singh v. State
of Uttar Pradesh); (2017) 12 SCC 680 (Deepa EV v. Union of India); and
(2019) 7 SCC 383 (Niravkumar Dilipbhai Makwana v. Gujarat Public
Service Commission).
12.
Though, in the ultimate analysis, the judgments carried by the
parties to Court may not throw any light on the particular issue which
arises here, the judgments may be noticed. All three cases involved
selection of aspirants to posts involving both reserved category
candidates and unreserved category candidates.
13.
In Jitendra Kumar Singh, it was held at paragraph 48 of the report
that when a reserved category candidate secured such marks as would
qualify an unreserved category candidate obtaining the same marks to be
selected, then such meritorious reserved category candidate would be
deemed to be selected as an unreserved category candidate. Though the
principle has been enunciated in wide words, the ratio has to be read down
in the context of the applicable rules.
14.
Thankfully, the seemingly wide dictum in Jitendra Kumar Singh
has been appropriately whittled down in the discussion in Niravkumar
Dilipbhai Makwana. At paragraphs 24 and 25 of the report in Makwana,
the later judgment noticed the following stipulation which applied in the
Jitendra Kumar Singh case:
“3(6) If a person belonging to any of the categories mentioned in
sub-section (1) gets selected on the basis of merit in an open
competition with general candidates, he shall not be adjusted
against the vacancies reserved for such category under sub-section
(1).”
15.
To boot, the following written instruction was issued by the
authorities and governed the decision in Jitendra Kumar Singh:
“It shall be immaterial that he has availed any facility or relaxation
(like relaxation in age-limit) available to reserved category.”
16.
The rationale for treating a meritorious reserved category
candidate, who obtains such marks as would entitle an unreserved
category candidate obtaining the same marks to be selected, as an
unreserved selectee is that even if there were no reservation, such
candidate would have succeeded in being selected by virtue of her merit.
However, if the relevant reserved category meritorious candidate
participated in the selection process by availing of any relaxation in the
qualification criteria, then she would have taken benefit of the affirmative
action and, unless the applicable rules permit her to be catapulted as an
unreserved category selectee, having taken the benefit of any concession
by virtue of her status to participate in the selection process, she would
have to be regarded as a reserved category selectee. Any relaxation of the
eligibility criteria for certain specified categories is, by itself, affirmative
action.
17.
The dictum in Jitendra Kumar Singh has to be read against the
backdrop that the applicable rules expressly permitted a reserved
category candidate, who secured such marks as would entitle an
unreserved category candidate obtaining the same marks to be selected,
to be regarded as an unreserved category selectee irrespective of whether
such candidate had obtained the benefit of any concession to be eligible
to participate in the selection process. Such distinction was noticed and
brought out in the judgment in Makwana.
18.
On the other hand, in Makwana, there was a government
notification, as noticed at paragraph 14 of the report, that permitted the
meritorious reserved category candidates to be adjusted in the unreserved
category based on the marks obtained. However, there was a January 29,
2000 circular that added a caveat that a reserved category candidate
would jump to occupy an open category seat by dint of performance only
if such candidate had not availed of any relaxation “viz. age-limit,
experience, qualification, number of chances to appear in the examination
...” In other words, in the altered scenario in Makwana, as opposed to
Jitendra Kumar Singh, only such reserved category candidates who
secured as much marks as the last qualifying unreserved category
candidate, would be regarded as appointees in the unreserved category if
the candidates had not availed of any relaxation by virtue of such
candidates’ status, qua age, experience, number of chances to apply and
the like.
19.
In Deepa EV, the Supreme Court noticed an office memorandum
of the Union Department of Personnel and Training of July 1, 1998 that
provided as follows in its third paragraph:
“3. In this connection, it is clarified that only such SC/ST/OBC
candidates who are selected on the same standard as applied to
general candidates shall not be adjusted against reserved
vacancies. In other words, when a relaxed standard is applied in
selecting an SC/ST/OBC candidates, for example in the age limit,
experience, qualification, permitted number of chances in written
examination, extended zone of consideration larger than what is
provided for general category candidates etc., the SC/ST/OBC
candidates are to be counted against reserved vacancies. Such
candidates would be deemed as unavailable for consideration
against unreserved vacancies.”
20.
Upon considering the effect of the office memorandum of July 1,
1998 in a case pertaining to selection, it was held in Deepa EV that if the
reserved category candidate, who had obtained higher marks than the last
qualifying unreserved category candidate, had not obtained any benefit
of relaxation in the eligibility criteria, such reserved category candidate
would be regarded as unreserved category appointee. However, if the
concerned reserved category candidate had obtained the benefit of any
concession, the candidate would be considered successful in the relevant
reserved category rather than being catapulted to the unreserved category.
21.
With respect, none of the judgments cited nor the office
memorandum of July 1, 1998 has any material bearing on the present
case, despite the strenuous effort on behalf of the respondents to rely on
the last sentence of the third paragraph from the memorandum of July 1,
1998. Even the last sentence from the relevant memorandum has to be
read in the context of what precedes it; that is to say, the last sentence
would be applicable only in a selection scenario and not when it comes
to considering whether a candidate was eligible to be considered for
selection. The argument made on behalf of the respondents to the effect
that the last sentence in the said memorandum of July 1, 1998 would
govern the eligibility position in a solitary post selection process, does
not appeal and is expressly rejected.
22.
A participant in a selection process may have no entrenched right
to be selected, but, equally, such candidate has a right to be fairly
considered for selection, subject to the candidate being eligible for
participation in the process. The petitioner’s grievance is not that she has
not been selected, but that she has not been considered for selection. It is
the petitioner’s ouster from the process that she challenges as unfair and
arbitrary.
23.
The matter may be seen with an example to elicit the principle that
would govern the present scenario. Reference in this regard will again be
made to the memorandum of 2012 that the petitioner cites as a trump
card. The discussion here is confined to relaxation in age-limit and such
discussion may be relevant in respect of similar relaxed qualifying
criteria like years of experience or number of chances permitted to apply;
but may not be relevant for other criteria like educational qualifications
or place of residence or the like.
24.
It is possible that several types of concessions or relaxations are
provided to several categories of persons. It would not follow that if a
person belongs to several of the categories, the quantum of concession
that such candidate would be entitled to avail would be the sum of the
concession available in every applicable category. In other words, if age
relaxation, which is the issue involved in the present case, is to be taken
into consideration and if the applicable rules permit age relaxation for
scheduled caste candidates and also for persons with disability, a
scheduled caste candidate with disability would not be entitled to
duplication of the concession unless the rules expressly permit the same.
25.
To clarify, when a concession as to any qualifying criteria is
conferred and such concession is available to several classes of persons,
when a person answers to more than one description of the classes, such
person may not be entitled to take advantage of the concession more than
once unless the rules expressly permit so. Logically, that ought to be the
principle.
26.
To continue with the example, in the above scenario of age
relaxation for scheduled caste candidates and also for persons with
disability, if there was a further concession for local candiates and the
concession in respect of all three categories was an age relaxation of five
years, an absurd situation would arise if the aggregate concession by
covering all the categories were to be obtained. If, in such a case, the
upper age-limit for the post is fixed at 48, a local scheduled caste
candidate with disability, by adding up the concession in the three
categories, would be eligible to apply at age 63; which would be absurd.
27.
Thus, the answer in the present case has to be that when a candidate
falls in several of the categories entitled to the some relaxation, the
candidate may avail of the maximum relaxation in any one category once,
unless the rules or the advertisement or the like permit a duplication or
multiplication thereof.
28.
One may now return to the March, 2012 office memorandum that
the petitioner has cited. In the table following the substance of the matter
set out hereinabove, several categories of persons are indicated. The first
category, as referred to above, pertains to scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes. The third category pertains to persons with disabilities. For SC and
ST candidates, an age relaxation of five years across the board is
permitted and for PWD an age relaxation of 10 years is permitted. If
nothing else were to be indicated in the relevant memorandum, an SC or
ST candidate suffering from any disability would not be entitled to age
relaxation of 15 years. However, the relevant memorandum expressly
specifies in its second page that both the age relaxation could be availed
of by a SC and ST candidate who is disabled. In the absence of this
express specification, the benefit in aggregate could not have been taken.
29.
Much is made of Rule 10 of the said Rules of 2004 and the apparent
non-obstante clause that it begins with. A proper reading of the rule
would imply that if SC and ST candidates were entitled to any concession
which was not indicated in the foregoing rules, but which was pursuant
to any Central government orders, they would be entitled to avail of the
same. That would imply that if a person applying for the post of Principalcum-Professor in the nursing college were to be an SC or ST candidate,
she could also have availed of the age relaxation of five years in terms of
the March, 2012 office memorandum.
30.
However, the rules cannot be seen to imply that a government
servant who belongs to a scheduled tribe would be entitled to a further
five-year age relaxation over and above the relaxation obtained by virtue
of being a government servant. If the extents of relaxation were different
in respect of several categories, a candidate belonging to multiple
categories may take the benefit of the maximum concession, but not the
sum total thereof corresponding to the number of categories whereunder
she qualifies.
31.
The principle will apply with greater force in a selection process
for the appointment of a solitary, open category candidate; as in the
present case.
32.
Since nothing in the relevant advertisement or the applicable rules
permitted a candidate belonging to several categories to obtain the
aggregate of the concession pertaining to a particular criterion, the
petitioner herein was appropriately found ineligible to participate in the
process or be considered for selection.
33.
Accordingly, there is no merit in the petition. The petitioner’s
application was rightly rejected and the petitioner’s candidature not
considered since the petitioner was seeking to take advantage of the age
relaxation twice over which the rules did not expressly or otherwise
permit.
34.
WP (C) No.303 of 2022 is dismissed.
35.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
36.
There will be no impediment to the selection process being
completed or for any appointment to the relevant post being made in
accordance with law.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
17.08.2022
“Lam DR-PS”
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